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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the effectiveness of Active Labour Market 
Policies (ALMP) in reducing unemployment in European transition and non-
transition economies. The theoretical framework proposed to analyse the 
effectiveness of ALMPs in reducing unemployment indicates that these policies 
affect unemployment through several different mechanisms. ALMPs can facilitate 
the matching process, increase productivity, increase labour supply and competition 
in the labour market, reduce welfare losses of the unemployed and serve as a 
stimulus to unemployed individuals‘ willingness to work. This research is based on 
both a country-level analysis using a sample of European transition and non-
transition economies (for 2005-2015) and individual-level analysis using cross-
sectional data (2012) for Kosovo. The country-level analysis assesses the ALMP 
effectiveness using two different strategies. The first one investigates the effect of 
ALMP expenditure (as share of GDP) on the flow from unemployment to 
employment using a Fixed-Effects panel model and finds a positive effect, in line 
with expectations. The economic significance of this finding, however, is 
questionable since the increase in the outflow from unemployment is relatively 
small. The second strategy investigates whether the ALMP expenditure (as share of 
GDP) reduces the unemployment rate in a dynamic panel analysis, using a 
Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator. This strategy, also, investigates 
the relative effectiveness of different measures by separately including variables to 
account for: Training, Employment Incentives, Supported Employment and 
Rehabilitation, Direct Job Creation and Start-Up Incentives. The results from the 
second approach find no significant effect of any of the ALMPs in reducing the 
unemployment rate. The analysis of the ALMP effectiveness at the individual level 
in Kosovo explores the following measures: On the Job Training, Internship Scheme 
and Institution and Enterprise Training.  This analysis focuses on the following 
outcomes: beneficiaries‘ probability of finding a job post-participation; beneficiaries‘ 
probability of increasing job search and beneficiaries‘ probability of having an 
employment contract. The empirical findings indicate that participation in one of 
these active measures is associated with a higher individual‘s probability of being 
employed compared to a non-participant, however the results differ subject to model 
specification. In addition, the findings also suggest that among employed individuals 
those that participated in ALMPs are more likely to be in informal employment.  
Finally, an assessment of the policy implications for European economies seeking to 
increase and sustain employment through active measures is provided based on the 
empirical evidence presented in this thesis. 
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1.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) is to provide means 
for skill enhancement and intensify job-search activity which would improve 
employment prospects of the unemployed. ALMP help ensure the return of the 
unemployed in the labour market as fast as possible with the most optimal job match. 
During the last decade, in part due to the global financial crisis, unemployment has 
reached one of the most daunting levels in the history of the European economies. 
This issue is even more pronounced in many of the European transition economies 
because of the already high unemployment inherited from the period of break-up of 
socialist system and transition to the market system. During the process of transition, 
the issue of skill mismatch made high rates of unemployment a persistent feature of 
their labour markets.  
In the current economic situation, European economies have put a greater emphasis 
on policies dedicated to improving human capital having realised how essential they 
are to achieving higher rates of employment, improving the quality of work and 
raising labour productivity. Some authors have argued that raising expenditure on 
ALMPs along with improving coordination of employment strategies in European 
economies can help reduce unemployment rates both in short and long-term 
(Calmfors et al., 2002; Van Vliet and Koster, 2011). According to Banociova and 
Slavomira (2017, p.3), „a country that supports expenditures on ALMP in long-term 
has a more stable employment development than a state that provides smaller 
contributions for labour market measures, particularly in the times of negative 
economic development‟.  
Section 1.2 of this chapter introduces the aim and objective of the thesis while 
section 1.3 discusses the structure of the thesis. The characteristics and trends of the 
labour market indicators are discussed in section 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 and the extent of 
expenditure on active labour market policies (ALMPs) in section 1.6.1. The labour 
market indicators and the level of expenditure on ALMPs are analysed in the light of 
the data provided by Eurostat, International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and World 
Bank. Since there is considerable variation, the data for the European Union – 15 
3 
 
Western European countries
1
, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
2
 and South East 
Europe (SEE)
3
 are compared. In accordance with the focus of this thesis, this chapter 
also discusses separately the labour market indicators and the expenditure on 
ALMPs for Kosovo in sections 1.5.3 and 1.6.2.   
1.2 Aims and objectives of the thesis  
ALMPs are designed to address skill mismatches and labour imbalances, increase 
productivity and prepare the unemployed for the rapid changes in the labour market. 
An essential attribute of ALMPs is to enhance human capital and shift from an 
‗employment‘ to ‗employability‘ paradigm, i.e., their aim is not merely to provide 
the unemployed with a job, but to enhance their skills so they become capable of 
finding and retaining employment. Investigations of ALMP effectiveness to increase 
employability in western economies are numerous, but evaluations of these policies 
in European transition economies are still rare and lack the use of sophisticated 
methodology.  The critical review of empirical studies provided in sections 2.3 and 
4.4.1 highlights that there are relatively few studies analysing the ALMP 
effectiveness in transition economies, either at the individual or country level. The 
poor quality and unavailability of data has impeded the thorough research of the 
ALMP effectiveness in transition economies. The data from administrative records 
typically do not provide detailed information needed by current evaluation 
methodologies for the micro-econometric analysis and follow-up surveys are also 
rare. Studies based on experimental designs are largely missing for transition 
economies even though they are considered as the ‗gold standard‘ in evaluation 
methodology.  
In most cases there is the possibility that an individual could be eligible to participate 
in more than one active measure, hence the relative effectiveness of these policies 
should be analysed in an econometric framework that allows for multivalued 
treatment. Until recently, the evaluation methodology did not allow for multivalued 
                                                          
1 The 15 EU Western Countries consist of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
2 Central and Eastern European (CEE) is the group of countries comprising: Bulgaria, Croatia, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and the three Baltic 
States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
3
 The South East Europe (SEE) 6 consists of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, FYR 
Macedonia Kosovo and Serbia. Kosovo is excluded from the discussion here since it will be discussed 
separately in section 1.3.3. 
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treatment. The estimation technique used for the individual level analysis in this 
research project uses a more sophisticated evaluation technique which allows 
analysis of this aspect. To the best of authors‘ knowledge this is the first study to use 
a double robust estimator to assess the ALMP effectiveness. This estimator allows 
for both the treatment model to address the selection issue and the outcome model to 
account for variables affecting the outcome. Also, this research project fills a gap in 
literature for transition economies, as the first study using an advanced econometric 
methodology to analyse the effectiveness of ALMPS in Kosovo. Finally, to the best 
of authors‘ knowledge, there are no studies that analyse the effect of participation in 
an ALMP on an individual‘s probability of finding employment in the formal sector 
as opposed to the informal sector. The empirical analyses in chapters 5 and 6 of this 
thesis aim to fill this gap in the literature. 
There are also very few empirical studies using country level data to investigate this 
topic for transition economies. This thesis contributes to the empirical literature by 
assessing the ALMP effectiveness in increasing matching efficiency and reducing 
unemployment rate for transition economies. In order to compare the effectiveness of 
ALMPs between transition and non-transition economies and due to the limited data 
for transition economies, the country level analysis was extended to include the 
European non-transition economies.   
Motivated by these gaps in the literature explained above, the aim of this thesis is to 
investigate the effectiveness of ALMPs in transition and non-transition economies in 
reducing unemployment. The following objectives were set to accomplish the aim of 
the thesis:  
1. To provide a comprehensive and critical review of the theoretical framework 
of unemployment and the multiple effects of ALMPs in reducing it; 
2. To provide a critical review of the empirical studies analysing the 
effectiveness of ALMPs in European Transition and Non-Transition 
economies;  
3.  To empirically analyse the effectiveness of ALMP expenditure as share of 
GDP in reducing unemployment at the economy-wide level in European 
transition and non-transition economies; 
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4. To critically review different evaluation methodologies and empirical studies 
analysing the ALMP effectiveness at the individual level in addressing the 
issues of the missing counterfactual and selection bias; 
5. To empirically evaluate the overall and relative effectiveness of three active 
measures implemented in Kosovo: On-the-Job Training, Institution and 
Enterprise Training and Internship Scheme on finding employment, 
searching for jobs and, conditional on being employed, having an 
employment contract. 
6. To synthesise policy recommendations for improving the effectiveness of 
these policies as a tool to reduce unemployment among vulnerable groups 
such as youths and the low-skilled unemployed. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis  
In order to address the above objectives the remainder of the thesis is structured as 
follows. The aim of chapter 2 is to develop a theoretical framework to analyse the 
relationship between ALMPs and unemployment and to review empirical studies 
which have investigated ALMP effectiveness at the economy-wide level. To address 
the first objective of the thesis, this chapter analyses the underlying theories of 
unemployment, utilising the NAIRU framework developed by Layard, Nickell and 
Jackman (1991) and the hysteresis hypothesis. A modified version of NAIRU by 
Calmfors (1994) is used to analyse the multiple effects of the ALMPs in the labour 
market. Given that this thesis places a particular focus on the European transition 
economies, this chapter will discuss the theoretical explanations of the causes and 
consequences of the high unemployment rates in transition economies comparing the 
structuralist view of unemployment and the hysteresis hypothesis. Furthermore, this 
chapter argues that the transition economies may be characterised by multiple 
equilibria in the labour market which can result in an economy getting stuck in a 
‗bad-job/low-skill equilibrium‘. One characteristic of the latter can be the presence 
of a large informal sector. The empirical studies reviewed in chapter 2 reach no 
agreed consensus regarding the effectiveness of these policies. This theoretical and 
empirical review will be used as the basis for empirical analysis of the effects of 
ALMPs at the individual (chapters 5 and 6) and the economy-wide level (chapter 3). 
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Having critically reviewed previous theoretical and empirical research on the ALMP 
effectiveness, chapter 3 continues to addresses objective three and investigate the 
following research question: Are ALMPs in European economies (transition and 
non-transition) effective in reducing unemployment at the economy-wide level? To 
answer this question, chapter 3 employs two empirical strategies using two separate 
datasets to assess the ALMP effectiveness for European transition economies and 
non-transition economies. The first one assesses the efficiency of the ALMP 
expenditure as share of GDP in matching the job-seekers with vacancies using static 
panel modelling techniques. The second strategy assesses the efficiency of these 
policies in reducing the unemployment rate using a dynamic panel modelling 
approach.   
Assessing the effectiveness of ALMPs at the individual level is not an easy task 
because of the missing counterfactual data (an individual cannot be in two different 
states: beneficiary and control at the same time). Hence, chapter 4 addresses 
objective four by critically discussing various evaluation methodologies employed in 
microeconomic policy analysis. This chapter also partially addresses objective two 
by reviewing the empirical studies investigating the effectiveness of ALMPs at the 
individual level.  
Having discussed the evaluation methodology and reviewed the empirical research 
on the effectiveness of ALMPs, chapter 5 addresses objectives five and six and 
answers the following research question: Which of the following three active 
measures, On the Job Training (OJT), Institution and Enterprise Training (IET) and 
Internship Scheme (IS), is more effective in increasing an individual‟s probability of 
undertaking active job search, finding employment and having an employment 
contract in Kosovo? This chapter employs two different empirical strategies. The 
first one is a multinomial probit regression model with a three category dependent 
variable which equals zero if the individual is unemployed at the time of the survey, 
one if the individual is employed with an employment contract and two if the 
individual is employed without an employment contract. Given that the beneficiaries 
of these active measures are selected based on a certain set of criteria, a potential 
issue in this empirical investigation is selection bias. Hence, the second empirical 
investigation addresses selection bias using the Inverse Probability Weighting – 
Regression Adjustment (IPWRA). This approach is a doubly robust estimator which 
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uses both treatment and outcome models and it can achieve unbiased estimates even 
if one of the models is incorrectly specified. Another novelty of this empirical 
approach is that it allows for a multiple treatment model thus this evaluation study is 
the first one to assess the effectiveness of multiple active measures in the same 
framework.  
In order to analyse the overall effectiveness of the active measures, chapter 6 
extends the analysis of the previous chapter by using an additional dataset, Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) for Kosovo, to create a control group. This chapter also 
addresses objective five and six and answers the following research question: To 
what extent the active measures implemented in Kosovo affect the beneficiaries‟ 
probability of finding employment and receiving an employment contract? This 
empirical analysis uses the same evaluation methodology as chapter 5, IPWRA, to 
assess the ALMP effectiveness.  
Chapter 7 provides the conclusion to the thesis, synthesising the main findings of 
this research and contributions to knowledge of the theoretical and empirical 
analysis. Based on these findings policy recommendations with regard to increasing 
ALMP effectiveness in Kosovo are discussed. This chapter also analyses the 
limitations of the research programme reported in this thesis and develops 
suggestions for further research on this subject.  
1.4 Transition process and the labour markets of European 
transition economies 
This section provides a brief overview of the impact of the transition process on the 
labour market indicators in European transition economies. A more comprehensive 
discussion about the transition process and unemployment is provided in section 2.3.  
During the pre-transition period, open-unemployment did not exist; it was during the 
transition process that unemployment emerged and became a persistent feature of 
most of the transition countries (Boeri, 1997; Nesporova, 2002). The rise of 
unemployment was a direct consequence of the dramatic collapse of output that 
transition economies were facing with the shift from the rigid trade relationships of 
the central planning system to a market economy (Burda, 1993; Lehman and 
Muravyev, 2011).  
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The fall in labour demand, which continued after the initial fall of output, was also a 
consequence of the inefficient use of labour resources or labour hoarding in the pre-
transition period which became apparent after privatisation (Adam, 1982; Bruck et 
al., 2007). Labour hoarding can be defined as ―a situation where an establishment is 
paying for more worker-hours than is necessary to produce current levels of output‖ 
(Pissarides, 1991, p. 3). Though the labour hoarding is not easy to be estimated a 
number of studies suggest that between 15 to 30 percent of the employed in CEE 
countries were hoarded labour (Gora, 1991; Nesporova, 1991). 
In most of the transition economies initially non-agricultural self-employment was 
non-existent, while most of the employment was concentrated in large 
conglomerates (Boeri, 1998). The restructuring of labour markets involved large job 
losses in heavy industries and agriculture, while light manufacturing and services 
were being developed (Boeri, 1992). Almost six million people lost their jobs in the 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and many withdrew permanently 
from labour market (Hoti, 2003).  According to researchers, the skills acquired in the 
state sector were often not suitable for employment in the private sector which 
induced persistence in unemployment – many skills have become obsolete due to 
changes in new forms of firm organization and technology (Burda, 1993; Boeri, 
1997, Nesporova, 2002). Hoti (2003) argues that the occupational adjustment 
requires time and this is what makes unemployment in transition countries persistent.  
As figure 1.1 shows, in general, the transition countries experienced robust economic 
growth from the mid-90s, which was faster than that of the EU15 until the global 
financial crisis. The labour markets of European countries responded to the decline 
in output during the financial crisis by a sharp decrease in employment rates, a rapid 
rise in unemployment rates, a reduction in working hours and fall in real wages 
(Burda, 1993; Leon-Ledesma and McAdam; 2004; Lehman and Muravyev, 2011). 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show that there are differences between the CEE and SEE in 
growth of GDP per capita and the employment to population ratio. During the first 
stages of transition, SEE countries experienced the deepest recession and still remain 
the slowest growing. The cause of this slow recovery in this region has mainly been 
attributed to the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia. 
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Figure 1.1 GDP per capita for EU15, CEE and SEE countries, 1993 to 2016 
 
Source: World Bank database (2018)  
 
Figure 1.2 Employment to population ratio for EU15, CEE and SEE countries, 1993 
to 2016 
 
Source: World Bank database (2018)  
The nature of jobs has also changed during the transition process: informal, 
temporary and casual employment has increased.  A study by Schneider and 
Williams (2013) found that although the shadow economy had fallen from 37.9% in 
1999 to 33.7% of official total GDP in 2007 for transition countries, the shadow 
economy in those countries remained larger than the average of 116 developing 
countries (26.2%) and the 25 OECD countries (13.0%). The average level of 
informality of the CEE countries had fallen further by 2015 to about 23%, however, 
it still remained higher than EU15 average (13.5%). Among the European transition 
economies, Bulgaria has the highest informality with 31% of the official GDP while 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia with lowest with about 15% of the GDP 
(Schneider, 2015).   
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1.5 Labour market indicators   
The previous section identified that after nearly three decades of transition and more 
than a decade of the start of the global financial crisis unemployment remains an 
important issue in both developed and transition European economies. Considering 
that this thesis focuses on European countries, this section will examine the gravity 
of unemployment issue in these countries. Section 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 will discuss the 
labour force participation and unemployment rate, respectively, for EU15 compared 
to CEE and SEE countries. A specific summary of the labour market in Kosovo is 
provided in a separate section, 1.5.3. 
1.5.1 Labour Force Participation  
During the first stages of the transition period, CEECs together with high and 
persistent unemployment, typically experienced a huge fall in labour force 
participation. Due to a lack of job opportunities, some unemployed became 
discouraged and withdrew from the labour market. From the macroeconomic point 
of view, the cost of the low labour force participation rates is similar to that of high 
unemployment since both reduce the labour force available and as such diminish 
growth potential. As figure 1.3 shows that since 2005 the labour force participation 
(LFP) rates for CEECs have increased continually, almost reaching those in EU 
Western economies.  
Figure 1.3 Labour Force Participation Rate, % of total working age population 
 
Source: Eurostat (2018) for EU countries and ILO (2018) for SEE 
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According to the Eurostat database (2018), in 2017 the economically active labour 
force accounted for more than 72% of the working age population in EU transition 
economies compared to 74% in EU Western Economies. However, the LFP figures 
for South East Europe 6
4
 (presented in figure 1.3 only from 2008 to 2016 due to 
missing data) suggest that participation rates are much lower compared to both CEE 
and EU economies, with an average of just 54% of the working age population. 
Apart from Kosovo, the labour force participation rate in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
remains the lowest among the transition countries at just 43.2% on average in 2016 
and has not changed much since 2005. 
 
Considering age, one apparent trend is that the participation of the population aged 
15 to 24 in the labour market is decreasing over time in the EU 15; the participation 
of this group has dropped from about 48% in 2005 to about 43% in 2017 (Eurostat 
database, 2018). However, as figure 1.4 shows, there are notable differences among 
countries where the participation of youth in Ireland dropped from 66% in 2005 to 
46% in 2017 or in Spain from 47% to 33%. On the other hand, the participation rates 
for CEECs remained on average constant; however, it increased from 36% in 2005 to 
46% in 2017 in Estonia and from 25% to 35% in Lithuania. As figure 1.4 shows, the 
participation rate of this group in SEE countries has fallen. A particularly large 
reduction is observed in Albania where it fell from 50% in 2002 to just 31% in 2015 
(ILO database, 2018). This may be partly explained by the substantial increase in 
higher educational enrolment by young cohorts in the region that led to their delayed 
entry into the market (World Bank, 2013b).  
                                                          
4
 Kosovo is excluded from the discussion here since it will be discussed separately in section 1.3.3. 
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Figure 1.4 Youth Labour Force Participation aged 15-24 
 
Source: Eurostat (2018) for EU member states and ILO (2018) for SEE. 
Note: For SEE countries the figure presents data for 2008 and 2015 due to missing data.  
 
During the socialist period, the female labour force participation rates in CEECs, 
except for Western Balkan Countries, were very high by international standards 
(Nesporova, 2002; Lehman and Muravyev, 2011). The transition process initially 
reduced both female and male LFPs and brought down female labour force 
participation to the EU level and that of males well below to that of the EU level. 
Female LFP is also low in the SEE region but here there are additional explanatory 
factors to the transition process that include cultural reasons and traditional roles 
assigned to women. Also, the social benefit system is seen as cause of inactivity in 
some cases such as that of Montenegro, where the introduction of life-long benefits 
for mothers of at least three children in 2016 resulted in more than 15,000 women 
applying for this benefit, consequently causing many of them to withdraw from the 
labour market (World Bank, 2017). Women‘s LFP in Albania fell in comparison to 
pre-transition period but remained on average constant from 2005 to 2016 at about 
47%. The lowest female participation rate in the Western Balkans countries is that of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina with about 32%. In Croatia and Bulgaria the female 
participation rates remained quite unchanged during this period at around 45%.  As 
seen in figure 1.5, the gender differences in labour force participation in the CEECs, 
in general are much larger than those in EU 15, expect for Italy where the gender gap 
is 19.1 percentage points (pp) compared to Romania (18 pp) and Poland, Czech 
Republic and Hungary (14 pp). The gender participation gap in SEE is considerably 
larger compared to both EU15 and CEECs. Apart from Kosovo, which is discussed 
in the next section, the gender gap for FYR Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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are the largest among the European transition countries of around 25 and 24 
percentage points in 2015 (ILO, 2018).   
Figure 1.5 LFP rates by gender (%) for EU15, CEECs (2017) and SEE (2015) 
 
Source: Eurostat database (2018) for EU member states and ILO (2018) for SEE.  
 
Considering the analysis of the educational attainment in most of the transition 
countries the highest proportion of the labour force consists of workers with 
completed secondary education. According to the Human Capital theory, educational 
achievement is considered to be crucial determinant of the labour supply. In the post-
transition period secondary and tertiary education have become more valuable and 
skills obtained in higher education increase the probability of gaining employment 
considering the structural changes in the pattern of employment (Boeri and Terrell, 
2002). Countries with the highest proportion of those who have only completed 
primary education in the SEE region are FYR Macedonia with more than 28 percent, 
followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo with 20% of the labour force in 
2012 (ILO database, 2018). The proportion with completed higher education in 
Montenegro‘s labour force was just over 10% followed by Serbia with 12.5% 
compared to FYR Macedonia with about 19% in 2017 (ILO database, 2018).  
1.5.2 Unemployment Rates and Duration  
As discussed in section 1.3.1 before the start of transition in the CEECs 
unemployment was not common. Masked unproductive employment was mainly in 
the public administration sector and in inefficient state-owned enterprises. 
Privatization of the state-owned enterprises led to a drastic increase in 
unemployment and displacement of the labour force, some of who left the labour 
force forever (Mickiewicz, 2010). The first rise in unemployment was concentrated 
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in agriculture and heavy industry, which was initially expected to be absorbed by the 
expansion of light manufacturing, construction and services (OECD, 1992; 
Mickiewicz, 2010). In most of the CEECs job-destruction in the public sector was 
not followed by an equal amount of job-creation in the private sector leading to an 
employment decline (World Bank, 2005; Kovtun et al., 2014). In recent years, the 
unemployment in CEECs has fallen from the double digits, the only country still 
having double digit unemployment rate in Croatia with 11.1% while the Czech 
Republic has the lowest unemployment rate of 2.9% in 2017. However, 
unemployment in the South East Europe 5 is the highest amongst the European 
transition countries, and it remains a major economic and social challenge (ILO 
database, 2018). As can be seen in figure 1.6, even though the unemployment rate 
has fallen in these countries since 2005, it still quite high compared to the average of 
EU15 and CEE countries with an average of 18% in 2017. Apart from Kosovo, the 
countries with the highest unemployment rate in the region are Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) at about 25% and Former Yugoslav Republic of (FYR) 
Macedonia with 23%. 
Figure 1.6 Unemployment rate for EU15, CEE and SEE 
 
Source: Eurostat database (2018) for EU15 and CEECs and ILO database (2018) for SEE 
 
Long-term unemployment, consisting of persons who are unemployed for one year 
or more, is very high in most of the transition countries and has been increasing in 
some of them since 1995 (Eurostat database, 2018).  The persistent low-job creation 
in the private sector in the SEE has increased the possibility of persistent 
unemployment. In CEECs more than 42% of the unemployed have been searching 
for a job more than one year which has dropped from 54% in 2005 (Eurostat 
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database, 2018). However, the data show that there are differences in long-term 
unemployment between CEECs where Slovakia has the highest figure of long-term 
unemployed with 62% while Poland the lowest with 31% of the total unemployed. 
SEE countries exhibit much higher long-term unemployment; in FYR Macedonia 
and Montenegro the proportion of long-term unemployment is more than 77% 
(Eurostat database, 2018). The ‗true‘ unemployment rates in CEECs may be lower 
than the figures provided by Labour Force Survey, since a significant number of 
workers considered unemployed may actually work in the informal sector. However, 
some potential workers are disheartened or discouraged from seeking employment 
and withdraw from the labour market. This is particularly true for Western Balkan 
countries (KAS, 2017; GoS, 2016).  
 
As discussed in section 1.4, in post-transition economies labour markets are 
characterized by a high degree of skill mismatch due to slow skill adjustments during 
periods of restructuring (Bejakovic and Mrnjavac, 2014). This mismatch further adds 
to the difficulties of improving the labour market as the jobseekers will need to 
acquire necessary skills in order to benefit from the available employment 
opportunities.  
 
Figure 1.7 Qualification mismatch in EU15 and selected CEECs, 2015 
 
Source: OECD database (2018)  
 
As seen in figure 1.7, the qualification mismatch
5
 was, on average in 2015, much 
higher in the EU15 than in the CEECs. Given that this measure captures both, over-
qualification and under-qualification, one may suggest that the mismatch in EU15 
might be primarily due to over-qualification.   
 
                                                          
5
 The OECD measures the qualification mismatch indicator by comparing each individual‘s education 
level to the level required in their occupation. The ‗normal‘ qualification level that is required in an 
occupation is defined as the qualification level that is most observed among people employed in that 
occupation. People can be over-qualified when their qualification level exceeds the one that is usually 
required in their occupation, or under-qualified, when they have a qualification level below.  
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Unemployment among youths is even higher than the general unemployment. In 
comparison to adults, young workers face a disadvantageous labour market situation. 
The 2017 youth unemployment rates for Greece (43%), Spain (38%) and Italy (34%) 
are higher than any of new EU member states where the highest rate is that of 
Croatia (27%). As mentioned in a World Bank report (Bogetic et al., 2012) and 
illustrated in Figure 1.8, youth unemployment is a particularly daunting problem for 
the SEE countries. In several SEE states youth unemployment rates is almost 50% 
for FYR Macedonia while 62% for Bosnia and Herzegovina, much higher than the 
two extreme cases in the Eurozone: Greece and Spain (EBRD, 2013; ILO database, 
2018).  
  
Figure 1.8 Youth Unemployment rate for EU15, CEEC and SEE, 2005 and 2017 
 
Source: Eurostat (2018) for EU member states and ILO (2018) for SEE. 
Note: For SEE countries the figure presents data for 2008 and 2015 due to missing data for 2005 and 
2017. Data for Montenegro for 2008 is missing.  
1.5.3 Labour market indicators in Kosovo  
As pointed out in the introduction of this chapter, this thesis gives particular 
emphasis on the analyses of the effectiveness of ALMPs in the reducing 
unemployment in Kosovo.  Hence this section will provide a brief analysis of the 
labour market indicators. In comparison to other transition countries, Kosovo has a 
distinct history which is reflected in the current labour market situation. Kosovo was 
one of the last countries to start the transition from a central to a market economy 
(Hoti, 2017). Before Yugoslavia was dissolved, Kosovo was the poorest region in 
the country with a per capita social product of a quarter of the country‘s average in 
1989 (Bevc, 1993). During the period 1989 – 1999 the occupation of Kosovo by 
Serbia led to the country‘s isolation and a massive dismissal of workers from their 
jobs of up to 145,000 workers (Hoti, 2017). During 1990 to 1995, the GDP 
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contracted by 50% compared to its pretransition level (Hoti, 2017).  Kosovo‘s post 
1999 economic recovery has been very slow in tackling the inherited structural 
unemployment problem and the depleted human capital stock. Kosovo is known for 
its young population and also large-scale emigration which affect the size and the 
age composition of the labour force (Hoti, 2017). Nearly one third of the population 
is under the age of 15 which implies that there are a large number of new entrants 
into the labour force each year.  
The labour market performance in Kosovo is the poorest when compared to other 
Balkan countries and European Union member states. As figure 1.9 shows, low 
labour force participation (LFP) remains one of the most critical issues in the labour 
market in Kosovo. Of those of working age, in 2017 only 42.8% were participating 
in the labour force (economically active) meaning that they were either employed or 
unemployed (i.e., actively seeking work and available to work) (KAS, 2017). Part of 
the reason for the difference between Kosovo and Balkan countries is that Kosovo 
has a very young population and has experienced a significant expansion of higher 
education in recent decades, thus many of these young people are still in education 
and categorized as inactive. The discouragement of the labour force participants is 
widely persistent, out of the 733,341 inactive population, 165,712 people did not 
search for a job because they did not believe that there are job opportunities for them 
(KAS, 2015).  
Figure 1.9 Main labour market indicators: Kosovo, 2002 to 2017 
 
Source: KAS (2002 to 2017) 
Participation is much lower among women than that of men, just over 20% for 
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responsibilities and the absence of (affordable) childcare are among the reasons for 
the low women participation in the labour force (Democracy for Development, 
2015). In addition, women‘s low LFP in Kosovo is also related to stereotypical 
gender roles that certain occupations are not considered suitable for women. As 
noted by a World Bank report (2002) in times of limited labour demand and social 
policies to support women, they become more easily discouraged than men and 
withdraw from the labour market.  
Only 29.8% of the working age population was employed in 2016; only 12.7% of 
working age women were employed compared to more than 46% of men (KAS, 
2017). Despite being low, the employment rate has been increasing steadily over the 
years from about 21% in 2002 to almost 30% in 2017 (see figure 1.10). Across 
different age groups the employment rate was highest among 35-44 years old 
(40.5%). The lowest employment rate is among the young population (15-24 years 
old) at just over 11.2%, where the employment rate for young women is only 5.2% 
while around 12% for young men. Figure 1.10 also shows that the higher the level of 
education the higher possibility of being employed; about 57% of those who have 
university degree are employed  
Figure 1.10 Employment rate (% of active population) by age, gender and education, 
2017 
 
Source: KAS (2017) 
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In addition to the low employment rate in Kosovo, vulnerable employment, which 
refers to self-employment without employees or those who are employed in any 
family business without pay is around 23.1% of total employment. Men are more 
likely to have vulnerable employment (24.4%) compared to women (18.3%). In 
terms of the contractual agreement, more than 78% of respondents in the LFS had an 
individual contract. With regard of those who have a contract, more than 70% had a 
temporary contract (no gender differences) and only 5% of the employed were 
entitled to the benefits of the social security schemes in the job. 
Of the entire working age population, according to the LFS 2017, the unemployment 
rate in Kosovo was 30.5%, it was higher for women (36.6%) than for men (28.7%). 
As presented in figure 1.11, the unemployment rate in Kosovo has dropped 
significantly since 2002 from 55% to about 30% in 2017. The majority (71.5%) of 
unemployed have been unemployed for more than a year. According to the LFS 
(2017), the likelihood of becoming long-term unemployed increases with age and 
women are also more likely to become long-term unemployed compared to men, 
except for young women. With regard to the age groups, the unemployment rate of 
the youth population is the highest among all age groups at about 52.7%, where 
63.5% of women of this age are unemployed compared to 48.4% of men. The 
likelihood of a young person being unemployed is twice as high as that of older 
workers and the difference is more pronounced among males.  
Figure 1.11 Unemployment rate (% of active population) by age, gender and 
education, 2017 
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Source: KAS (2017) 
 
This exceptionally high youth unemployment in Kosovo is related to the weak 
demand for labour (Corbanese and Rosas, 2007). Even though the rate of job 
creation has been improving in Kosovo, the amount of new vacancies is not rising at 
the pace of the inflow of the new labour participants (USAID/UNDP, 2009). In 
Kosovo the share of youths aged 15 to 24 not employed, not in education and not in 
training (NEET) is very high of more than 27% of the young population (KAS, 
2016). This raises concerns about their future employability and detachment from the 
labour market. Despite lack of good job opportunities, there are other factors which 
might have affected youth unemployment and idleness such as low quality of 
education and incompatibility of education programmes with the labour demand, 
lack of practical work during school, lack of career counselling, limited information 
about the labour market demand and lack of networking (MLSW, 2017). This makes 
the young entrants to the workforce often relatively unskilled and poorly prepared, in 
terms of both job-related and employability skills (USAID, 2009; MLSW, 2017).  
A significant emigration of its population has been an integral part of Kosovo 
throughout history. As presented in figure 1.12, the emigration of Kosovo population 
increased dramatically in the 1990s‘ due to the conflict in former Yugoslavia which 
resulted in a grave political and socio-economic situation in Kosovo. Given poor 
employment opportunities in Kosovo during this period, emigration was considered 
as the only option to escape unemployment and poverty, to contribute towards 
household income and increase their welfare. According to Human Rights Watch 
during this period there was a ‗forced emigration of 350,000 Kosovo Albanians‘ and 
it was mainly the young population who escaped the country (Gollopeni, 2016). The 
emigration culminated in 1999 when an estimated 850,000 Kosovo Albanians were 
evicted from their homes to the neighbouring countries (Albania, FYR Macedonia 
and Montenegro) leading to mass emigration. While the largest number of refugees 
returned to Kosovo after the conflict was over, about 100,000 ethnic Serbs left 
Kosovo to Serbia and the north of Kosovo (Elsie, 2011). According to KAS (2014), 
in 1998 and 1999, 51,728 Kosovo Albanians (21,973 and 29,755, respectively) or 
about 13.6% of all emigrants left the neighbouring countries to Europe and other 
countries (Haxhikadrija, 2009).  
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Figure 1.12 Emigration of the Kosovo population (expressed in number of people), 
1969 to 2010 
Source: KAS (2014) 
The emigration during the 1990s was mainly due to the political situation while 
socio-economic situation was the main reason for emigration during the other 
periods of migration. The latest stage of migration was in 2014 and 2015 when 
approximately 100,000 citizens left Kosovo towards Western European countries 
mainly due to low job opportunities and the loss of hope for better domestic 
economic prospects in the near future (Gollopeni, 2016). According to Kosovo 
Agency of Statistics (2014), in 2011, 21.4% of Kosovo‘s population was living 
abroad (that was approximately 381,000 persons).  
The level of remittances received by transition countries have frequently been a vital 
source of external finance for these countries after incoming foreign direct 
investment (World Bank 2006; Hoti, 2009). Kosovo was ranked as one of the 
countries with the highest percentage of remittances on GDP; in 2014, 16.1% of 
GDP comprised of remittances while this percentage dropped in 2015 to 13% 
(Ministry of Economic Development - MED, 2018). Most of the remittances are 
used for consumption like food and clothing (35.4%), other expenditure on such as 
electrical equipment, cars and weddings (24.8%), renovating houses and buying new 
ones (19.6%) while a smaller amount of remittances goes on education and medical 
care (10.6%) (MED, 2018). Education is one of the accelerators of the countries‘ 
economic growth and many studies suggest that the number of high-school drop-outs 
has fallen due to the remittances (MED, 2018).  
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The emigration of population affects the composition and size of the labour force 
and it also affects the skill composition of labour left in the country of origin. In a 
study of 24 countries with large scale emigration, the share of highly skilled 
emigrants was not more than 10% of the population (Adams, 2003). More 
specifically, a study by Hoti (2009) suggests that 7.4% of Kosovar individuals with 
completed higher education (about 11,000) live out of the country. Many studies 
have emphasised a positive relationship between education and emigration since it 
gives people the incentive to acquire higher education in order to be marketable 
internationally (Ivļevs and King, 2010). This is commonly referred to as the ‗brain 
drain‘ and it is considered as damaging to the country of origin as much as the 
emigration (Hoti, 2009). Emigration of highly skilled workers makes the country less 
attractive to foreign direct investment, it affects the level of income and increases the 
fiscal burden of people left in the country etc. Skilled and unskilled workers are 
frequently complementary in the process of production and the absence of the former 
can make the later less productive (Docquier and Rapoport, 2004; Hoti, 2009). Given 
peoples‘ incentive to migrate and the lower employment opportunities in their home 
country, the ALMP participants in Kosovo, analysed in chapters 5 and 6, might also 
use the training acquired to emigrate to countries where their new skill can be 
utilised.  
1.6 Types of ALMPs  
Having so far discussed the labour market indicators in European countries with 
particular attention to Kosovo, this section investigates the ALMPs which are 
recognised as one of the essential policy instruments to alleviate labour market 
mismatch and to fight high unemployment rates. This section provides a brief 
discussion of the types of ALMPs and their aim in the labour market, with an 
extended analysis of the multiple effects of these policies being provided in section 
2.2.3. The following section sheds light on the level of ALMP expenditure in EU15 
and transition economies. This serves as starting point for the analysis of the 
relationship between ALMPs and unemployment in the following chapter.  
ALMPs are a group of policies used by governments to promote employment, 
growth and equality (Calmfors et al., 1994; Rueda, 2006). The main aim of these 
policies is to enhance labour supply, increase labour demand and improve the 
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functioning of the labour market. Policy makers recognize ALMPs as potentially 
being a direct instrument in reducing unemployment through enhancing information 
exchange, increasing the skills and employability of the unemployed and improving 
the matching of vacancies and job-seekers (Calmfors et al. 2002). Moreover, these 
policies can affect labour demand by reducing the hiring costs, thus facilitating job-
creation in the labour market. Some policy-makers view ALMPs not as a cure for 
large-scale unemployment, but rather as a treatment for specific types of 
unemployment or specific groups of unemployed individuals. The multiple effects of 
ALMPs are analysed in detail in Chapter 2. 
There is a wide variety of ALMPs among European countries. Kluve (2006) 
classified ALMP interventions into six core categories; the same classification that 
was suggested and is now used by the OECD and Eurostat.  
1. Training is the most common active policy encompasses classroom training, on-
the-job training and work experience. The primary aim of the training 
programmes is to enhance human capital through improving skills needed for 
employment and to increase the productivity of the participants. This measure 
can either provide more general knowledge such as language courses and basic 
computer courses, or specific vocational programmes that can also increase 
occupation-specific skills such as craft and operative skills.  
2. Subsidised private sector employment that comprises measures that increase job-
opportunities in the private sector. This measure aims to alter workers and/or 
employers behaviour with regard to private sector employment. The most 
common measure is the wage subsidy which aims to encourage employers to 
increase job-opportunities for new workers and/or to maintain those jobs that are 
under threat of being made redundant The financial subsidy is typically paid to 
employers but may be paid directly to supported employees for a fixed period of 
time, and is often targeted at the long-term unemployed. This category also 
encompasses grants for self-employment and start-up businesses, which can 
include a combination of training, financial support and management advising 
for a fixed period of time (Kluve et al., 2006). 
3. Subsidised public sector employment (public works) aims to offer job 
opportunities in the public sector through direct job creation. These measures are 
usually targeted at disadvantaged groups with the objective of keeping the 
24 
 
participants in the labour market and preventing loss of human capital during the 
period of unemployment.  
4. Job search assistance and sanctions aim to increase the effectiveness and 
intensity of the job search process (Card et al., 2010; Butschek and Walter, 
2013). The main objective of job search assistance is to increase the efficiency of 
the job matching through job search courses, job clubs, counselling and 
monitoring and sanctions applied in the case of noncompliance with 
requirements. This active measure can be managed by private agencies but 
historically public job search services have dominated provision. In many 
countries the Public Employment Services (PES) predominantly target long-term 
unemployed and disadvantaged groups while private agencies target white-collar 
and more privileged employees. This active measure includes also benefit 
sanctions or specified reductions in (or loss of) unemployment benefits if the 
unemployed refuse to accept an offered job or do not apply sufficient effort in 
their job search.  
 
The first four active measures are descriptions of the programme types while the 
next two focus on specific target groups for ALMPs. In many countries, ALMPs 
have been used to address inequality and are targeted at disadvantaged individuals in 
the labour market (Card et al., 2010).  
 
5. Youth programmes include the above mentioned active measures applied 
specifically to the young unemployed usually aiming to increase their 
employability skills (World Bank, 2008), e.g. through training programmes, 
subsidies and job search assistance.  
6. Measures for the disadvantaged groups such as training may be used to assist 
specific groups of unemployed. Examples of such measures include support for 
females enter male dominated occupations and increase their income level 
(Bergman and Van den Berg, 2006),support for immigrants and minorities‘ in the 
labour market through language and induction courses and subsidised 
employment (Butschek and Walter, 2013). 
 
In practice, classifying actual programmes into these categories is frequently difficult 
since most national programmes combine two or more active measures targeted to 
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the same group (Calmfors et al, 2002). Measures that encourage desirable behaviour 
such as training, job search assistance and subsidies are usually called ‗‘carrots‘‘ 
while imposing threats on the unemployed such as benefit sanctions are called 
‗‘sticks‘‘ (Kluve and Schmitt, 2002).  
1.6.1 ALMP expenditure in EU member states 
Transition countries‘ labour markets are characterised by specific features which 
affect the potential of ALMPs to improve labour market performance. For instance, 
the extent and speed of structural changes means that any feasible implementation of 
ALMPs would not be sufficient to absorb the workers displaced during transition 
period. The limited capability of the labour markets in transition economies to create 
new jobs led to a stagnant pool of unemployment with the tendency to become long-
term unemployment. As discussed in section 1.3.2, most of the transition economies 
are characterised by chronic long-term unemployment. In developed countries the 
unemployed workers are disproportionately from marginalised groups, those with 
low attachment to the labour market or who face trouble finding employment at the 
beginning of their working life. In contrast, the pool of unemployment in transition 
countries typically contains large numbers of the core labour force, those possessing 
large stock of human capital and who have high attachment to the market. The 
stagnant pool of unemployment further led to high deterioration of human capital. 
Job competition in transition labour markets is much stronger than in developed 
countries thus the unemployed who participate in the active programmes may not 
have the same experiences and outcomes as those in other countries (Lehman and 
Kluve, 2008).  
 
ALMPs became popular in European countries in the 1990s and have continued to 
increase in scale and scope, however there is heterogeneity in the expenditure 
dedicated to these measures. Figure 1.13 presents the ALMP expenditure as share of 
GDP for both the EU15 and CEECs
6
. As the graph shows, the EU 15 countries 
allocate considerably more expenditure on ALMPs as a % of GDP than the new 
member states. In CEE countries, regardless of their generally high unemployment, 
the spending on ALMP is limited, which is not surprising since transition countries 
have faced great fiscal pressures. As seen in figure 1.13, on average in 2015 the 
                                                          
6
  Comparative data for ALMP expenditure in SEE is not available.  
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ALMP expenditure as percentage of the GDP in CEE countries was 0.24% compared 
to 0.62% in the EU15. During the Global Financial Crisis an intensification of 
ALMP expenditure was undertaken in many EU countries, despite the budget 
constraints and capacity issues which have constrained their growth (Gama et al. 
2015). However, after 2012 there was no significant increase in these expenditures 
(Numanovic et al., 2016).    
 
Figure 1.13 ALMP Expenditure as a share of GDP; EU15 and CEE 
 
Source: Eurostat database (2018) 
 
Although the data in figure 1.13 reflect some general trends in total expenditure on 
ALMPs, the difference between countries cannot be easily generalised. Figure 1.14 
shows that Denmark is the highest spender among the EU15 countries allocating 
more than 1.4% expenditure as share of GDP while Greece allocates only 0.18%. 
Amongst the CEECs only the level of ALMP expenditure in Hungary is comparable 
with those of high spenders in the EU 15 with 0.79% of GDP, whereas all other 
countries are low spenders, with Romania spending only 0.019%, and Latvia and 
Estonia spending about 0.10% of GDP in 2015. Despite the fact that Balkan 
Countries in recent years have considerably increased the amount spent on active 
policies, it is still much lower than that of the EU 15. The level of expenditure of the 
ALMPs in Serbia was about 0.2% of country‘s‘ GDP while Albania spent only 
0.05% in 2015 (Numanovic et al., 2016).  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EU15 0.578 0.567 0.522 0.507 0.591 0.631 0.677 0.656 0.617 0.645 0.617
CEE 0.190 0.190 0.169 0.163 0.229 0.295 0.210 0.216 0.257 0.241 0.254
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Figure 1.14 ALMP Expenditure as a share of GDP; EU15, CEE and selected SEE, 
2016 
 
Source: Eurostat (2018) for EU member states and Numanovic et al., (2016) for SEE 
countries.  
Note: Data for UK is not available. Data for Italy, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) FYR 
Macedonia and Serbia are for year 2015.  
 
Figures 1.15 and 1.16 tend to capture the relationship between ALMP expenditure as 
share of GDP and unemployment rates for both the EU 15 and CEE for 2015. Figure 
1.15 shows that there might be pattern relating the ALMP expenditure and 
unemployment rate for EU 15 countries. Figure 1.15 shows that the low spenders on 
ALMP as a % of GDP tend to have high unemployment rates, such as Greece, Spain, 
Portugal and Italy whereas countries that allocate more expenditure to ALMPs such 
as Finland, Sweden and Denmark tend to have lower unemployment rates. On the 
other hand, in the CEECs no clear relationship between ALMP expenditure and 
unemployment rate can be observed.  
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Figure 1.15 Unemployment rate and ALMP Expenditure as a share of GDP for 
EU15 countries, 2015 
 
Source: Eurostat database (2018) 
Figure 1.16 Unemployment rate and ALMP Expenditure as a share of GDP for CEE 
countries, 2015 
 
Source: Eurostat database (2018) 
 
Figure 1.17 shows that the coverage rate of the unemployed persons by ALMP (the 
share of registered unemployed benefiting from ALMPs in a given year) also varies 
greatly between countries. Except for Hungary (44.3%), every other country in CEE 
and SEE is below the EU average (23.6%). The lowest activation coverage is that of 
BiH and FYR Macedonia, the activation policies cover only 2.4% and 6.5% of 
registered unemployed respectively (Numanovic et al., 2016). The low coverage in 
these countries can partially be explained by the high unemployment which suggests 
that the number of unemployed assisted by these policies is too small and inadequate 
for these labour markets characterised by many challenges. 
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Figure 1.17 ALMP Coverage rate of unemployed persons (%); EU15, CEE and 
selected SEE, 2016 
 
Source: Eurostat (2018) for EU member states, Numanovic et al., (2016) for Albania, BiH 
and FYR Macedonia and Gerovska (2017) for Serbia.  
Note: Data for UK, Greece, Italy and Luxembourg is not available. Data for Ireland and Netherlands 
is for year 2014, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and FYR Macedonia is for year 2015.  
As explained in section 1.4, active measures mainly target the low-skilled, long-term 
unemployed and marginalised groups and those groups that have problems entering 
the labour market. In a well-functioning implementation of the active policies, the 
predetermined target groups should be set so as to minimise deadweight and 
substitution effects
7
. Candidates for participation in active measures are usually 
selected based on particular criteria where all the registered unemployed from a 
given target group can apply. According to Steendam et al. (2010), the 
implementation of active measures in Germany and Belgium were especially 
successful partially due to well-defined target groups and the selection of 
participants based on the criteria. On the other hand, the ALMPs in transition 
countries, such as Albania, FYR Macedonia and BiH, did not follow the pre-set 
criteria for selection, but rather recruited from all the unemployed. Numanovic et al. 
(2016) emphasise that the targeting was not sufficiently personalised in these 
countries and there is no well-established institutional mechanism that could identify 
the needs of the job-seekers and help them through the employment process. The 
ILO (2014) also highlighted that in Albania vulnerable groups have limited inclusion 
in the active measures with current policies being poorly targeted on this category of 
job-seekers. 
                                                          
7
 The substitution effect leads to the substitution of one category of workers with the ALMP 
beneficiaries because they are less costly.  The deadweight effect leads to employing the same 
individuals that would have been employed even in the absence of such programmes. More details 
about these two effects are provided in section 2.2.3. 
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1.6.2 ALMPs in Kosovo  
One of the main objectives of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare in Kosovo 
is to increase employment through ALMPs (MLSW, 2017). However, the number of 
registered unemployed benefiting from ALMPs in Kosovo remains relatively low, 
mainly due to the limitations of the budget and staff of the Employment Agency of 
Kosovo. According to MLSW (2017), only about 10% of the 101,773 registered 
unemployed in 2016 benefited from ALMPs. The number of the ALMP 
beneficiaries, however, seems to be increasing since in 2015 only 6,966 registered 
unemployed benefited from these policies compared 10,419 in 2016. Table 1.1 
presents the ALMPs in Kosovo during 2016, where vocational training in VTC 
(Vocational Training Centre) is the largest active measure with 7.6% of total 
registered unemployed.   
 
Table 1.1 The number of ALMP participants in Kosovo, 2016 
Indicator  Classification by Eurostat  
Number of 
participants 
in 2016 
% of 
registered 
unemployed 
in 2016  
Employment through 
ALMPs 
Active Labour Market 
Programmes  1,781 1.8% 
Of which:       
Public jobs  Creating jobs   819 0.80% 
Salary subsidy  
Incentives for permanent 
employment  474 0.50% 
Apprenticeship work  
Labour market measures: 
Support to interns  434 0.40% 
Self-employed  Incentives for self-employment 54 0.10% 
Vocational training 
 Active Labour Market 
Programmes  7,687 7.60% 
Of which: 
   Vocational training in 
VTC  Institutional training  6736 6.60% 
On-the-job training  Training on the job  951 0.90% 
Source: MLSW (2017) 
 
Similar to many Balkan Countries, ALMPs in Kosovo were introduced through 
support of  international funds such as European Agencies, the German Government, 
the Swiss Government, the Government of Finland, the Luxembourg Government 
and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) etc. Due to data 
unavailability, this thesis will focus only on a fraction of ALMPs implemented in 
31 
 
Kosovo, those implemented by UNDP in cooperation with the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Welfare. While this section briefly depicts the ALMPs implemented by 
UNDP, section 5.2 provides an extensive examination of the design and targeting 
and detailed data analysis of the active measures investigated.  
This ALMP programme launched in 2007 (which was a continuation of the 
Employment Project which was implemented from 2005) and was targeted mainly at 
low-skilled young women and men aged 15 to 29 without previous work experience. 
The programme was implemented in seven regions in cooperation with regional and 
municipal employment offices and private sector enterprises. The programmes‘ 
prime objective was to increase the employability of youths in Kosovo. The ALMPs 
funded by the UNDP in Kosovo comprise the measures presented in table 1.2.  
 
The total number of beneficiaries up to June 2016 was 13,285. The active measure 
with the largest number of beneficiaries is On the Job Training with 4,429 
beneficiaries, the Public Works projects with 3,194 followed by Wage Subsidies and 
the Internship Scheme with 2,794 and 1,175 respectively (UNDP, 2014). From the 
total number of beneficiaries at least 50% were women, 21% were from minorities 
and 56% were from rural areas. 
Table 1.2 ALMPs implemented by UNDP and MLSW in Kosovo during 2005 – 
2016 
 
 Active labour market measures    
No. of beneficiaries in total 
since 2005 
 Public Works projects   3194 
 On the Job Training (OJT) 2007  4429 
 Pre-Employment Training (PET) 2007 – 2008      79 
 Wage Subsidies (WS)  2794 
 Internship Scheme (ISch)  1175 
 Institution and Enterprise based training (IET) 2008    373 
 Training at a local school 2007 – 2008      40 
 Professional practice in enterprise for VET students  1138 
The Self-Employment Programme     63 
 Total Beneficiaries 13,285 
Source: Active Labour Market Programme for Youth, UNDP, 2016 
The above-mentioned interventions applied in Kosovo helped young people to 
establish interaction with labour market for the first time through enhancing 
employability and vocational skills. According to the UNDP‘s Annual Report (2014) 
the ALMP programmes have successfully provided equal opportunities to youths 
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and the disadvantaged and integrated minorities and other low-skilled groups into the 
labour market. In 2008 and 2012, two different external evaluations of the 
programmes concluded that the ALMPs generated positive benefits and they 
increased the chances of the participants getting employed (Mukavilli, 2008; 
Kavanagh, 2012). Even though the ALMPs implemented were considered 
successful, the Labour Force Survey results show that the youth unemployment rate 
in Kosovo still remains high. Both of the previous evaluation studies were largely at 
a descriptive level of analysis, providing only a comparison of descriptive statistics 
between treatment and control groups. Kavanagh (2012) uses a control group of only 
150 individuals in comparison to 1,082 treated which raises doubt as to the reliability 
of the analysis. Mukavilli (2008) uses a more balanced sample, though the latter is 
small, 399 individuals where 100 are control individuals. Neither of the studies used 
an advanced evaluation methodology to assess the ALMP effectiveness thus they do 
not account for potential selection bias. Chapters 5 and 6 use the same data as 
Kavanagh (2012), though the latter will also utilise the Labour Force Survey data 
collected in 2012 while employing the most recent evaluation methodology.  
1.7 Conclusions 
This chapter provided the initial analysis of the labour market indicators and ALMP 
expenditure and coverage in European transition and non-transition economies. 
Given the focus of this thesis, particular emphasis was given to Kosovo. Transition 
economies experienced a large drop in labour force participation rates and an 
increase in unemployment during the first stages of transition process. Labour force 
participation has increased steadily in CEE economies almost reaching those in 
Western European economies in recent years. The unemployment rate in CEE has 
also dropped continually during the last decade and on average it is lower than that 
of the EU15. The unemployment rate in SEE, however, still remains very high and 
the long-term unemployment rate is also much higher than in the other regions as is 
the size of the informal sector. This chapter also assessed expenditure on ALMPs, 
comparing the expenditure of European transition and non-transition economies. The 
figures presented in section 1.6.1, point out that transition economies allocate 
considerably less expenditure, as a % of GDP, to ALMPs compared to non-transition 
economies. It is also observed that the non-transition economies allocating higher 
expenditure to ALMPs have lower unemployment rate. This pattern of the 
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relationship between ALMP expenditure and unemployment rate, however, is not 
observed in transition economies. The transition economy with the most daunting 
problem of unemployment is Kosovo, despite its high unemployment rate the 
expenditure allocated to ALMP is very low compared to other countries in the 
region.  
The first part of this chapter presented the aim, objectives and the structure of this 
research project. Given the high unemployment rates in transition economies and the 
goal of ALMPs in enhancing individuals‘ skills and improving employment 
opportunities, this thesis aims to analyse to what extent these policies can reduce 
unemployment in European transition and non-transition economies. Section 1.2 
pointed out the lack of empirical studies for transition economies, especially those 
employing more advanced evaluation methodologies. This thesis fills this gap in the 
literature by evaluating ALMPs in European transition and non-transition economies 
using the most recent techniques. The following chapter will critically analyse the 
theoretical framework through which the effectiveness of ALMPs can be empirically 
investigated. 
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2.1  Introduction 
Chapter 1 provided an introduction to the state of the labour markets in European 
transition economies, with special reference to Kosovo. It focused on the factors 
influencing their high rates of unemployment and the types and scope of Active 
Labour Market Policies (ALMPs). One of the main objectives of this second chapter 
is to provide a critical assessment of the theory of the Non-Accelerating Inflation 
Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) based on the framework of Layard, Nickell and 
Jackman (1991) and the role of ALMPs in reducing unemployment. Layard, Nickell 
and Jackman is the most commonly used theoretical framework to analyse the 
NAIRU. This theoretical framework will be used to set the ground and critically 
review the arguments for analysing the multiple effects of the ALMPs at the 
individual and economy-wide level. The hysteresis hypothesis of unemployment will 
be critically analysed. Given the context of European transition economies, a less 
restrictive version of NAIRU, the structuralist view of unemployment, will be 
developed to evaluate the nature of unemployment.  
A major gap in the theoretical and empirical literature is the analysis of the 
effectiveness of ALMPs in the context of countries with high informal employment. 
An important objective of this chapter is to provide a concise and critical assessment 
of the arguments associated with the relationship between ALMPs and informal 
employment and what are the mechanisms through which ALMPs could provide 
incentives for the switch from informal to formal employment. 
Chapter 1 observed that disadvantaged labour and, particularly, youth unemployment 
is one of the main targets of the ALMPs. However, the literature review shows that 
youth unemployment has not been the focus of empirical studies resulting in a gap 
between the aims and the results of these policies. Data unavailability in European 
transition economies frequently limits empirical studies assessing the effectiveness 
of ALMPs on youth unemployment. This chapter has a particular focus on 
investigating the theoretical explanations of the causes of youth unemployment in 
transition economies with particular emphasis on Kosovo.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews two theoretical 
approaches, the traditional NAIRU theoretical model and the Hysteresis hypothesis 
and provides a thorough discussion on the effects of ALMPs in the context of 
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Layard-Nickell-Jackman model. Section 2.3 discusses the causes and characteristics 
of unemployment in labour markets in transition economies which will be followed 
by a review of the empirical studies that assessed whether the nature of 
unemployment in transition economies conforms more to the structuralist or the 
hysteresis hypothesis. Since the empirical analysis in chapter 3 will also include 
European non-transition economies, section 2.5 will review more recent  empirical 
studies for these countries. The theory of the duality of the labour markets in the 
context of transition economies is analysed in section 2.6 while section 2.7 provides 
a discussion of the causes of youth unemployment in transition economies. Finally, 
in section 2.8 the conclusions of the chapter are summarised.  
2.2 A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of ALMPs 
In the theoretical field there are currently two main unemployment hypotheses: the 
Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) and Hysteresis. The 
first emphasises the presence of a Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment 
(NAIRU) which is the equilibrium rate of unemployment and hypothesises that there 
is no long-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation (Ball and Mankiw, 
2002). This view of the NAIRU is that there is a level of the unemployment rate 
below which the inflation rate accelerates while above it the inflation rate 
decelerates; thus if the unemployment rate is always equal to the NAIRU, the 
inflation rate will be constant in the long-run aside from the effects of short-run 
shocks (Fair, 1999). This theory was firstly proposed by Phelps (1968) and Friedman 
(1968) who argue that shocks have only temporary effects on the equilibrium rate 
and unemployment will tend to get back to that rate in the long-run. The traditional 
view of the NAIRU implies that the equilibrium unemployment rate changes slowly 
over time due predominantly to demographic factors. A less restrictive version of the 
NAIRU was developed by Phelps (1994) which allows the equilibrium rate to 
deviate in response to shocks in the underlying economic factors determining the 
equilibrium rate such as: the real interest rate (Blanchard, 1999), productivity growth 
(Pissarides, 1990) and the labour market institutional framework such as the 
generosity of the unemployment benefit system, other non-wage income, etc. 
(Marjanovic and Mihajlovic, 2014). This is referred to as the Structuralist view and 
suggests that most shocks cause a temporary divergence from the natural rate of 
unemployment but if the shock is strong enough it might cause a shift in the 
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equilibrium rate to a higher level. According to Papell et al. (2000) the structuralist 
view suggests that unemployment is stationary around a process that is subject to 
structural changes.   
The increase of unemployment during the oil shock in the 1970s made the hysteresis 
hypothesis popular. This hypothesis states that shocks may have a permanent effect 
on the unemployment rate over the long-run path. The hysteresis hypothesis implies 
that after a shock the unemployment rate may never return to the previous 
equilibrium rate because of labour market rigidities explained by insider-outsider 
interactions and by human capital depreciation and social stigma related to the long-
term unemployed (Blanchard and Summers, 1986, 1988; Layard et al., 1991). Thus, 
this hypothesis emphasises that unemployment is not a stationary process. 
Additionally, it is also possible to observe a ‗persistence‘ in unemployment which 
implies a very slow speed of adjustment and it needs a long period of time to revert 
to the equilibrium rate after the shock.  
Considering the high unemployment rate in transition economies, discussed in 
Chapter 1, it is important to observe the nature of unemployment and assess whether 
it is better explained by the NAIRU or the Hysteresis hypotheses in order to design 
appropriate measures directed to reduce unemployment. If unemployment patterns 
are in accordance with the NAIRU, then it can be reduced through institutional 
measures such as a reduction in unemployment benefits, increasing labour market 
flexibility and labour mobility, reducing the strictness of the employment protection, 
introducing more active labour market policies to enhance skills through labour 
training and so on. If the unemployment in transition economies exhibits more 
hysteresis effects, besides applying the same policies as to reduce the NAIRU, 
policies should also be directed at increasing aggregate demand through monetary 
and fiscal policies.  
Both hypotheses concerning the determinants of the unemployment rate will be 
critically reviewed in the following sections. Sub-section 2.2.1 will establish the 
determinants of NAIRU in the Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) approach which 
is most commonly used when analysing the macroeconomic effect of ALMPs. Sub-
section 2.2.2 will provide a critical discussion on the hysteresis hypothesis and the 
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implications of the insider-outsider hypothesis. A review of the effects of ALMPs at 
the economy level is provided in section 2.2.3.   
2.2.1 Layard, Nickell and Jackman’s approach to the NAIRU 
The most popular version of the NAIRU is the model developed by Layard, Nickell 
and Jackman (1991). This model assumes an economy of imperfectly competitive 
profit-maximising firms facing exogenously determined product market conditions 
and predetermined capital and technology (Layard et al., 1991). The model assumes 
that firms and labour have a certain bargaining power to set the price of output in the 
case of firms and the price of supplied labour in the case of workers. The model is 
consistent with the efficiency wage framework or a wage bargaining model.  
The equations of price and wage setting introduced below illustrate the main points 
of the model. According to Blanchard (2006), the price-setting and wage-setting 
relations resemble the labour demand and labour supply in a neoclassical model of 
labour market analysis. 
            2.1 
    where          2.2 
where   is the aggregate value added price (GDP deflator),  is the aggregate level 
of wages,           are the expectations of the future prices and labour costs, 
respectively,   
  is the level of expected demand in the economy,  ̅ is the level of 
output in the economy corresponding to full utilisation of resources,   is the 
aggregate unemployment rate,   is the fixed labour force,   is the capital stock and 
   is the is the effect of wage-push factors such as unions and the generosity and 
coverage of unemployment benefits.  
The behaviour of firms is captured by equation 2.1, where the firms set prices as a 
mark-up over labour costs which depend on  demand conditions, i.e. on the 
difference between expected demand and the level of output in the economy 
corresponding to full utilisation of resources (  
   ̅), the difference between the 
actual aggregate value added price and expected price        and productivity 
      . As expressed by equation 2.2, real wages       are influenced by firm 
specific factors such as the productivity      , on one hand, and the labour market 
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specific factors such as the difference between the actual and expected wages    
   , the unemployment rate  , and wage-push factors   , including union 
bargaining strength and unemployment benefits. Layard et al. (1991) note that an 
important assumption of the model is that the measure of productivity in the price 
mark-up and wage equations are exactly the same, which suggests that the capital 
and labour are perfect substitutes for each other.  
Equations 2.3 and 2.4 below present the aggregate side of the economy.  
     ̅                                                                                                                       2.3 
                                                                                                                           
Where ɛ is the technology shock,    is the actual aggregate demand,   stands for 
exogenous demand factors such as monetary or fiscal policy shocks, and   is the 
money stock.      ̅   expresses the difference between the actual aggregate 
demand and the level of output corresponding to full utilisation of resources. 
Equation 2.3 expresses the relationship between the output and the unemployment 
rate which suggests that for a given ɛ, a rise in the unemployment rate will be 
accompanied by a fall in the output. Equation 2.4 expresses the relationship between 
the aggregate demand and the exogenous real factors such as fiscal policies denoted 
by   and nominal money balances      .  
In the long-run, it is assumed that the expectations regarding future wage and price 
are fulfilled thus there are no wage and price surprises, thus w = w
e
 and p = p
e 
and 
no difference between expected and actual demand      
 . Substituting equation 
2.4 into 2.1 and equating equation 2.1 with 2.2 will give the long-run unemployment 
and wage equilibrium presented in equations 2.5 and 2.6.   
   
        
     
                                                                                                                     2.5 
       
             
      
 
     
      
                            2.6 
From equation 2.5, one can see that unemployment equilibrium is determined by the 
exogenous wage pressure    and the parameters of the wage and price equations 2.1 
and 2.2,    and    respectively. The equilibrium level of unemployment does not 
depend on the difference in growth rates of capital and labour, the latter only 
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influences the real wage as seen in equation 2.6. This follows from the equality of 
the coefficients of the trend productivity expressions in the price and wage 
equations. Layard et al. (1991) explain that if these coefficients were different it 
would give unemployment a trend dependent upon productivity growth. However, 
these authors acknowledge that such a trend is not observed in the data hence their 
assumption. The long-run equilibrium level of unemployment is not influenced by 
either monetary or fiscal policies. A key feature of the model is that the exogenous 
demand side policies do not influence this equilibrium as described in equation 2.5.  
In the short-run, however, expectations may not be achieved which causes the level 
of unemployment to diverge from its equilibrium rate. This generates the negative 
relationship between inflation and unemployment; when the unemployment falls 
below the natural rate, the inflation rate rises and vice versa. Thus    in equation 2.5 
may be presented as the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment – 
NAIRU.  
A graphical representation of the NAIRU is presented in Figure 2.1 which is based 
on Layard et al. (1991). It presents the price setting curve which is the graphical 
illustration of equation 2.1 and the wage-setting curve corresponding to equation 2.2. 
The point where the two setting curves intersect represents the equilibrium thus both 
workers and firms have fulfilled price and wage expectations. To the right of the 
intersection, the inflation rate rises while on its left it falls.  
Figure 2.1 Layard–Nickell-Jackman Framework 
 
Source: Layard et al. (1991) 
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Layard et al. (1991) also incorporated the hysteresis hypothesis into their NAIRU 
model by introducing the short-run change of unemployment in the price and wage-
setting equations   . This term stands for the unemployed workers fired in the last 
period which captures the influence of recently laid-off workers on real wages and 
equilibrium unemployment. The hysteresis hypothesis was pioneered by Blanchard 
and Summers (1986) when analysing the persistent high unemployment rates in 
Europe during the 1970s and 1980s. Blanchard and Summers (1986) argued that if 
uncommonly large shocks can increase unemployment rate for a sufficient length of 
time, it is likely that the level of NAIRU will increase. The model by Blanchard and 
Summers (1986) implies that it is the bargaining power of the remaining employees 
(insiders) that sets the new wage level for the whole labour market which will 
determine the level of unemployment. The greater the bargaining power of the 
insiders, the higher the wage level and the higher the unemployment rate. The 
following section will discuss the hysteresis hypothesis and the sources of the insider 
power that can determine the wage level and unemployment rate.  
2.2.2 The Hysteresis hypothesis and Insider-Outsider theory 
Some scholars suggest that the labour market displays a form of hysteresis 
(Blanchard and Summers, 1986; Layard et al., 1991; Ball and Mankiw, 2002; Gali, 
2015). An aggregate shock, such as negative productivity shock or an external 
globalisation shock, would influence unemployment by causing it to diverge from its 
natural rate and then could have a permanent effect on it, since the unemployment 
rate will not return to the initial equilibrium after the shock (Blanchard and 
Summers, 1986; Cuestas and Ordonez, 2011).  
The insider-outsider theory assumes that there is a long-term employment 
relationship between firms and their workers. According to Blanchard and Summers 
(1986, 1987) and Lindbeck and Snower (1988), the main element of the insider-
outsider theory is wage rigidity and the power of the insiders in the wage-setting 
mechanism. Blanchard and Summers (1986) point out that unemployment 
hysteresis/persistence can result from the ‗membership rule‘ which considers the 
employed as the insiders who ignore the outsiders (the unemployed) in wage-setting. 
Insiders are concerned with maintaining their desired level of wages in their current 
jobs while not ensuring employment opportunities for outsiders. An unanticipated 
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negative structural shock increases the unemployment level which will reduce the 
number of insiders in the labour market. Even though some previous workers lose 
their insider status, the smaller group of insiders will in the future set wages at the 
level to maintain this new lower level of employment.  
According to Lindbeck and Snower (1988), insiders‘ power comes about as the 
result of the turnover costs which make it costly for employers to recruit new 
employees to replace current ones. Considering that insiders have experience and 
accumulated skills during their working period in the firm, it will be costly to fire 
insiders and hire outsiders who will require additional costs such as greater 
supervision, additional job-specific training and so on. In addition, insiders‘ turnover 
requires costly firing procedures and severance payments. Taken together these 
turnover costs give power to insiders since these costs may not be recovered in the 
form of lower unit labour costs associated with new workers. Hence the larger the 
turnover costs for the employer, the more power insiders will gain in setting wages 
above the market clearing level. Given the higher wages, jobs become more 
attractive which will result in higher labour supply relative to labour demand leading 
to a higher involuntary unemployment. The key point made by Lindbeck and Snower 
(1988) is that not only are these turnover costs likely to be significant, they are 
highly likely to be influenced by insiders. Since the employers have to bear some of 
these costs, they may not have an incentive to replace insiders with outsiders. 
Lindbeck and Snower (1987, 1988, 2001) also emphasise that insiders may increase 
cooperation with each other (individually or collectively) in the production process 
in order to boost their wage level. This cooperation will not take place with potential 
undesired entrants (outsiders) which would further lower the productivity of the 
outsiders.  
As explained by Blanchard and Summers (1986), the existing employees hold 
‗membership status‘ as insiders in the firm. Lindbeck and Snower (1988) extended 
the basic framework to allow for the membership status to be acquired and lost at 
different rates. The recently unemployed workers may maintain their status and new 
employees may need to be employed for a continuous period of time to acquire that 
status. Layard et al. (1991) also categorise the long-term unemployed as outsiders, 
arguing that the short-term and long-term unemployed are not comparable in a sense 
that human capital can deteriorate the longer the individual is unemployed. The long-
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term unemployed subsequently can be less competitive in the labour market and less 
attractive to the employer (Calmfors and Lang, 1995; Dobbie, 2006; Gali, 2015). 
Additionally, the individual might get accustomed to being unemployed and reduce 
their job-search intensity (Ball and Mankiw, 2002; Leon-Ledesma and McAdam, 
2002). Employers frequently use the duration of unemployment as a screening 
mechanism when hiring new employees so the longer one is unemployed the lower 
chances to be considered employable (Dobbie, 2006). 
In conclusion, under the hysteresis hypothesis in addition to reforming the structure 
of labour market, such as labour market institutions, wage bargaining legislation and 
union power, policy makers can seek to reduce unemployment through engineering a 
number of positive shocks to the labour market through stimulating aggregate 
demand.  
The following section will analyse the various effects of ALMPs based on the 
theoretical approach of Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) outlined above. This 
section will be followed by a discussion on the nature of unemployment in transition 
economies and a review of empirical studies that discuss whether unemployment in 
these countries conform to the structuralist or hysteresis hypotheses.    
2.2.3 Effects of Active Labour Market Policies at the Economy Level 
The effectiveness of ALMPs needs to be analysed in a framework where the 
determinants of the labour market equilibrium are explicitly addressed. The labour 
market analysis developed by Layard et al. (1991) is now used as that base 
theoretical framework for assessing the economy wide effects of the ALMPs in the 
labour market framework. Calmfors (1994) modified the LNJ model to make a 
distinction between regular employment in the labour market and participation in 
active programmes. In this model, the proportion of individuals in the labour force 
who participate in active measures are deducted from the regular labour force. This 
is illustrated in the Figure 2.2 by a leftward shift of labour force curve. The 
difference between unemployment at the initial equilibrium point (point A in Figure 
2.2) and the reduced labour force is referred to as open unemployment. Thus, regular 
employment refers to the employment excluding participants in the active 
programmes, even though from the employee point of view the subsidised jobs are 
perfect substitutes for regular employment (Calmfors, 1994). According to Calmfors 
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et al. (2002), ALMP effects can influence the labour market either through the wage-
setting or the price-setting schedules.  
Using this framework, the following effects of ALMPs will be discussed and 
illustrated in Figure 2.2 and in equation 2.5:  
 Effects on the matching process  
 Productivity effects  
 Effects on labour force and competition in the labour market 
 Deadweight loss and substitution effects 
 Reduced welfare losses for the unemployed 
 Work – test effects  
Effects on the matching process - Active labour market policies traditionally are 
thought to facilitate the matching process in the labour market which has frequently 
been regarded as their primary function (Calmfors et al., 2002; Card et al., 2010; 
Schmidl, 2014; Escudero, 2018). This is achieved through several channels.  
Firstly, ALMPs may enable the qualifications and skills of the beneficiaries to be 
better adapted to the structure of the demand for labour. More particularly, as 
explained in Chapter 1, this would be the effect of training and re-training 
programmes, where the beneficiaries can acquire skills based on the requirements of 
unfilled jobs. Secondly, through participating in the active programmes, the 
unemployed individuals‘ job-search activity may be encouraged and better targeted. 
Finally, active labour market programmes can substitute for the regular employment 
experience and thus reduce employers‘ uncertainty about the employability of the 
beneficiaries. This effect would be predominantly attributed to subsidised 
employment and on-the-job training.   
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Figure 2.2 Economy wide effects of ALMPs on wages and regular employment
 
The number of unemployed job-seekers relative to that of vacancies would be likely 
to decrease when a better matching process is achieved in equilibrium. This would 
affect both the wage-setting and price-setting schedules in the model. The initial 
equilibrium is point A in Figure 2.2.  The firms‘ costs decline because vacancies are 
filled more quickly and due to that, firms provide more vacancies which is 
equivalent to an increase in the labour demand. This effect can be interpreted as a 
rightward shift in the price-setting curve from PS0 to PS1 in Figure 2.2, thus from 
equilibrium point A to equilibrium point F. In the equation of the equilibrium 
unemployment 2.5, this effect is depicted by a decrease in parameter    which 
captures firm‘s mark-up of prices on their costs. 
  
  
            
     
                                                                                                         
Furthermore, the same effect also deteriorates the position in the wage bargaining 
process of the existing employees (or unions) relative to firms. The argument is that 
since the firm can expect to fill the vacancy easier, the firm has a better bargaining 
position relative to existing employees. Since this effect improves the matching 
effectiveness, it reduces the employers‘ incentive to attract labour by pushing up 
wages. Thus this can induce a downward shift of the wage-setting curve from WS0 
to WS1 in Figure 2.2. This is illustrated in Figure 2.2 as a shift in the equilibrium 
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from point A to B and in the equation 2.8 by a decrease in parameter    which 
captures the bargaining position of existing employees relative to firms. Both effects 
increase regular employment but the net effect on real-wage is unclear.  
  
  
            
     
                                                                                                          
The effect on the matching process might be negative given the reduced search 
behaviour of the active programme participant, i.e. the so-called lock-in effects (Van 
Ours, 2001; Schmidl, 2014). The job search intensity of participants in ALMPs is 
highly likely to decrease during the training period. Except for job search assistance, 
the lock-in effect has been found to be important for all types of active measures, 
especially for subsidised employment (Van Ours, 2001, 2002; Sianesi, 2008; 
Schmidl, 2014). One must also take into account that search intensity might have 
been reduced before participating in the programmes. In such cases, the search 
intensity of the beneficiary before and during ALMP participation is expected to be 
lower than that of the openly unemployed (Holmlund and Linden, 1993; 
Hamalainen, 2002; Sianesi, 2008; Schmidl, 2014).  
Productivity effects - One of the most desired effects of active policies is the 
increase in the productivity of the job-seekers (Hamalainen, 2002; Kluve et al., 2007; 
Card et al., 2017). As pointed out in Chapter 1, active measures are mainly targeted 
at the long-term unemployed and disadvantaged labour in general. Taking into 
account that the productivity of the targeted individuals is frequently relatively low 
due to human capital deterioration or other reasons, one of the aims of the active 
programmes is to offset this tendency through training. Subsidised employment also 
serves the same purpose through increasing the beneficiaries‘ experience and 
additional learning on-the-job. The consequent effect of the increase in productivity 
on employment is uncertain. When the labour becomes more efficient, the scale 
effect tends to increase employment because of the tendency to extend output 
because unit labour costs fall, ceteris paribus. The fall in unit labour costs is captured 
by a decrease in parameter    in equation 2.9. This effect would result in a rightward 
shift on the price setting schedule from PS0 to PS1 thus leading to a higher regular 
employment. The new equilibrium point is reflected by a shift from point A to point 
F in Figure 2.2.  
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On the other hand, since a given output can be produced with a smaller number of 
workers, the substitution effect tends to reduce the number of employees. These 
effects make the result of productivity effects on regular employment ambiguous. 
The increase in productivity might also increase the beneficiaries‘ reservation wages 
which results in real wages going up at any given level of regular employment i.e. a 
leftward shift of the wage-setting schedule from WS0 to WS2. This is illustrated in 
Figure 2.2 as a shift from point A to point G and in equation 2.10 by an increase in 
parameter   which reflects a higher level of real wages but leaving the employment 
rate unchanged. 
  
  
            
     
                                                                                                    
According to Calmfors et al. (2002), the net effect of the increase in productivity on 
the wage and price settings depends on the magnitude of these two opposing effects 
of active policies. 
Another important potential effect of active policies is to transfer labour from low 
productivity to high productivity sectors through training and other programmes 
which aim to enhance the skills of the unemployed (Calmfors et al., 2002; 
Speckesser, 2004; Card et al., 2010; Card et al., 2017). When the skills of the 
unemployed are enhanced it is expected that labour supply transfers from low to high 
productivity sectors. This effect is presented in Figure 2.3. The economy consists of 
two sectors: a low-productivity sector (price schedule I) and a high-productivity 
(price schedule II) sector. Figure 2.3 shows that the wage-setting curve has different 
slopes corresponding to these two sectors. The higher the employment rate in the 
sector the steeper the wage-setting curve, meaning that employers will have to offer 
higher wages to employ higher-productivity labour. Labour demand is assumed to be 
higher in the high-productivity than in low-productivity sector. After the successful 
completion of active programmes low-productivity labour will be transferred to the 
higher-productivity sector. Calmfors et al. (2002, p.17) point out that ―the labour 
demand as a share of sectoral workforce at a given real wage falls in the high 
productivity sector where labour supply increases, and rises in the low-productivity 
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sector where labour supply decreases‖.  This result is illustrated as a shift of the 
labour demand (price-setting curve) to the left in the high productivity sector and a 
shift to the right for the low-productivity sector. Thus, the demand for high-
productivity labour falls while the demand for low-productivity labour increases. 
Having in consideration that the wage-setting schedule has a steep slope, the high 
productivity workers will face a substantial fall in the real wages while the low 
productivity workers will face only a marginal increase of real wages. On the other 
hand, employment of low-productivity workers can increase by a larger amount than 
the fall of the employment of high-productivity workers. Therefore, the net effect on 
employment of the reallocation of the labour force between the two sectors is 
expected to be positive.  
Figure 2.3 Reallocation of unemployed between high-productivity and low-
productivity sectors 
  
Source: Calmfors et al. (2002) 
Effects on labour force and competition in the labour market - One of the most 
important effects of the ALMPs is to preserve the size of the labour force since due 
to the discouragement amongst the unemployed, especially long-term unemployed, 
in the absence of such policies the labour supply will tend to shrink, other things 
being equal. Figure 2.4 illustrates the anticipated effect of active measures on labour 
force participation. Participating in active programmes increases the motivation to 
actively search for jobs which counteracts the ―discouraged-worker effect‖ of 
unemployed. Active measures tend to increase labour force participation, hence a 
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positive labour supply effect would be illustrated with a rightward shift of the labour 
force curve (the vertical curve presented in Figure 2.4). However, in the absence of a 
secondary effect this would result in a higher unemployment level.  
The effect of active policies on increased competition for jobs can be analysed 
within the insider-outsider framework (Blanchard and Summers, 1986; Calmfors, 
1994; Calmfors and Lang, 1995). As discussed in Chapter 1, active programmes 
target the outsiders in the labour market, typically the young unemployed, long-term 
unemployed, people out of labour force, women, immigrants etc. It is the increased 
competition from outsiders following a successful active programme that 
discourages insiders from putting upward pressure on wages. The lower level of real 
wage would incentivise employers to raise the employment level resulting in a 
rightward shift of the wage-setting curve. Thus, an initial increase in the 
unemployment rate which raises competition for jobs in the labour market puts 
downward pressure on real wages and subsequently results in firms hiring more 
workers. This effect is shown in equation 2.11 by an increase in parameter   which 
captures the increase in the unemployment rate and illustrated in Figure 2.4 with a 
shift from WS1 to WS2 resulting in equilibrium point change from A to B
8
..  
  
  
        
         
                                                                                                                 
Figure 2.4 The effect of ALMPs on labour force and competition in the labour 
market 
 
Source: Calmfors et al., (2002) 
                                                          
8
 In Figure 2.2 this effect is also illustrated with the shift from equilibrium point A to point D. 
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Deadweight loss and substitution effects
9
 - Active policies might also have 
unintended negative effects in the labour market such as crowding-out regular 
employment (Dahlberg and Forslund, 1999, Kluve et al., 2006; Schmidl, 2014). Two 
such unintended effects induced by active policies are: the substitution and 
deadweight effect. The first effect leads to the substitution of one category of 
workers with another because relative wage costs have changed, in this case in 
favour of the active programme beneficiaries. The deadweight effect leads to 
employing the same individuals that would have been employed even in the absence 
of such programmes. These effects are most likely to occur in case of subsidised 
employment and job creation schemes. These effects are expected to reduce regular 
employment which results in a leftward shift of the price-setting curve from PS0 to 
PS2 in Figure 2.2 and a new equilibrium point from A to C which tend to reduce real 
wages (Calmfors, 1994; Calmfors et al., 2002).  
  
  
        
     
                                                                                                                  
Reduced welfare losses for the unemployed – Active policies‘ objective is to 
increase the welfare of participants since it increases their expected future level of 
income. Additionally, beneficiaries may experience improved emotional and 
psychological well-being compared to remaining unemployed (Calmfors et al., 
2002). Beneficiaries may perceive participation in the active programmes as 
meaningful thus increasing their well-being. Another objective of active programmes 
is to improve their future income and prospects in the labour market and increase 
their probability of getting a job and remaining employed thus participation in these 
programmes decreases the risks of future ‗unemployability‘. All of the above effects 
of ALMPs reduce the welfare difference between having and not having a job, so 
that they increase the wage pressure under the process of collective and individual 
wage bargaining. The individual workers acquire wage bargaining power relative to 
employers since now they possess more employable skills. Trade unions have also 
an incentive to negotiate higher wages because even if workers risk losing their jobs 
as a consequence of wage rises they face better opportunities of finding alternative 
                                                          
9
 According to Kluve et al. (2007) another negative effect of ALMPs is the displacement effect. This effect tends 
to crowd out from the market firms or workers receiving no subsidies. Because it is less costly for the subsidised 
firm to increase its output, the unsubsidised firm becomes less competitive in the market and reduces the regular 
employment. In the context of this thesis, the displacement effect is regarded as another substitution effect. 
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employment. This is reflected in the equation 2.13 with an increase in wage push 
factor    which leads to an increase in real wages and higher unemployment. This 
effect is illustrated in Figure 2.2 as an upward shift of the wage-setting curve where 
the equilibrium unemployment moves from point A to point E. 
  
  
            
     
                                                                                                         
Work-test effects – A certain number of recipients of unemployment benefits may 
not be interested in searching for work and thus are not expected to be willing to 
participate in active programmes. In a labour market with high unemployment it is 
not easy to identify the individuals who are not willing to be employed. Thus 
participating in the active measures may serve as a ‗work test‘ for the eligibility of 
unemployment benefits, since those who are not interested in being employed will 
prefer to continue receiving unemployment benefits. In countries where participation 
in the active programmes is mandatory to obtain the unemployment benefits, this 
work-test effect is expected to reduce aggregate unemployment. However, according 
to Calmfors and Skedinger (1995), this effect is not expected to substantially reduce 
the number of benefit claimants or the amount of the open unemployment since 
those who are placed in the programmes in order to renew their unemployment 
benefits are not really interested in remaining in the labour market. In such cases, it 
is expected to seriously weaken the efficiency of active programmes in terms of re-
employment probabilities.  
In conclusion, active measures may have a number of different effects in the labour 
market. The above discussion reveals that it is likely to be quite difficult to assess the 
net effect of active measures since these individual effects may counteract each 
other. In the context of transition economies, the effects of ALMPs are likely to be 
even more complex to assess due to the peculiarities of the labour markets in these 
countries and their high unemployment rates and large informal sectors.  
The next section provides a discussion of the causes of unemployment and the 
characteristics of unemployment in transition economies followed by a review of 
studies which assessed the structuralist vs. hysteresis hypothesis of the nature of 
unemployment in these economies. This section will be followed by a critical 
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literature review of empirical studies assessing the employment effects of active 
measures at the economy level in transition countries. 
2.3 Unemployment and the Transition process  
As Chapter 1 established, the labour markets in European transition countries 
initially showed relatively high unemployment rates, which in many cases reached 
double-digit figures. During the early period of transition, the fall in output came as a 
consequence of the institutional and structural changes associated with economic 
transition, economic liberalisation and the emergence of product market competition. 
The process of these structural changes that shook labour markets in transition 
countries led to a rise in unemployment (Boeri, 2001; Boeri and Terell, 2002; León-
Ledesma and McAdam, 2004; Munich and Svejnar, 2009; Cuestas and Gil-Alana, 
2010; Cuestas and Ordonez, 2011; Kovtun et al., 2014).  
In the literature the evolution of unemployment in transition countries has been 
explained by two basic mechanisms: reallocation and restructuring (Blanchard, 1997; 
Mickiewicz and Bell, 2000; Mickiewicz, 2010). Reallocation refers to the process 
through which the resources like capital and labour are being allocated from the state 
to the private sector. The elimination of state subsidies resulted in a contracted 
output and shrunk labour demand in the state sector (Blanchard, 1997). The 
liberalisation was also associated with the removal of restrictions and taxes on the 
new private firms. However, the initial result of liberalisation was an adverse shift of 
demand for labour by state firms rather that a favourable shift of private demand for 
labour, and therefore an increase in unemployment.  
Because of the lack of incentives in command planning, many enterprises in the pre-
transition economies were too large, their products were of poor quality and there 
was extensive hoarding of capital and labour. Thus, the restructuring of these 
enterprises was necessary to improve productivity and to increase international 
competitiveness. According to Blanchard (1997), the deep restructuring in the 
transition economies had two relevant dimensions. First, the existing employees did 
not have the right skills for the international open market so had to be replaced. A 
considerable number of plants were being shut down and even those that were 
successfully privatised did not retain all their original employees Second, the capital 
equipment of the public firms in communist countries was typically old and 
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technologically obsolete. Restructuring during transition required a large capital 
enhancement to replace the old one. Since the state firms now faced severe financial 
constraints from governments and were unlikely to restructure, in order to raise the 
capital and enhance workers‘ skills governments were motivated to start programmes 
for large-scale privatisation.  
However, the privatisation plans were mostly limited in scope and frequently very 
slowly implemented especially in heavy industry and mining (Mickiewicz, 2010). 
One of the obstacles to privatisation seemed to have been the opposition of insiders, 
the employees of the enterprises who had power vis-à-vis government to block the 
privatisation process. The employees perceived the privatisation as putting their jobs 
at risk while those remaining employed would be paid lower wages. The Russian 
privatisation process attempted to overcome this obstacle by enlisting the support of 
insiders in the firm and by giving them a large stake in the privatisd firms 
(Blanchard, 1997). This approach was also followed in some Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) countries and to a lesser extent in CEE countries.  
With respect to accessing new capital, enterprises had incentives to generate profit 
and use these earnings to buy new equipment. These earnings, however, were 
usually insufficient to extend the technology and equity financing was mostly not 
available. Equity investors were not interested in investing in enterprises where the 
majority of the stakeholders were employees who might end up using new funds to 
increase their own wages. In slow-reform countries, there were a large majority of 
enterprises or sections of industry that operated under strict budget constraints due to 
their support of existing employees in these old enterprises. As a consequence, they 
were not able to finance new investment. Thus, the capital shortages in transition 
economies caused insufficient labour demand leading to unemployment hysteresis. 
This lack of efficient and prolonged restructuring caused persistent high 
unemployment in the slow-reform transition economies (Mickiewicz and Bell, 2000; 
Mickiewicz, 2010). 
In transition economies, especially those in South Eastern Europe, employment 
protection legislation consists of a very basic job security law and provides very 
limited coverage of the areas commonly regulated in the EU, while the enforcement 
of these laws is typically not prioritised by governments (Kolev and Saget, 2005; 
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Corbanese and Rosas, 2007; Mojsoska-Blazevski, 2016). Weak enforcement of 
employment protection legislation (EPL) in transition economies undermines the 
incentives that EPL provides for employers and employees to invest in human capital 
which in turn will result in negative effects on basic employment security for 
workers, productivity, competitiveness and overall efficiency.  
In Kosovo labour legislation does not include unemployment assistance and provides 
a very limited social safety net which comprises of two broad categories.  The first 
one is the pension system (old-age assistance programme) while the second category 
is the social assistance which comprises two sub-categories: the first for families 
where no one is able to work and the second for families with a child under 5 where 
only one member is able to work, but cannot find a job. The coverage and 
effectiveness of this safety net is inadequate to provide insurance for the unemployed 
and the loss of earnings during unemployment. The common argument that a rigid 
labour market is caused by excessive labour legislation does not explain high 
unemployment in all ETEs. E.g. Kosovo has a low index of labour market regulation 
with the labour market freedom index for Kosovo in 2018 being 58 ranking as 
moderately free from regulation (Heritage Foundation, 2018).   
Chapter 1 provided a detailed discussion of labour market indicators which showed 
that labour markets in transition economies suffered from high youth unemployment, 
large regional disparities in unemployment, long-term unemployment spells and low 
employment to population ratios. During the communist era, large enterprises were 
frequently the main providers of jobs for an entire region. Large regional disparities 
in unemployment emerged when many of these large enterprises collapsed during 
early transition. The population in communist countries tended to be attached to a 
specific locality and their reliance on local social networks further limited their 
geographical mobility (Mickiewicz, 2010). On the other hand, during early transition 
transport fares increased, further increasing the immobility of labour force between 
regions which contributed to the stagnant regional unemployment differentials. 
Economic restructuring in transition economies has also triggered skills mismatch in 
the labour market (Bartlett, 2013). As discussed above, the new jobs created 
frequently require different skills from those inherited from the communist era. The 
privatisation of the state enterprises, the new Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) 
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and foreign direct investment which brought new technology also required more 
adaptable and soft skills. On the other hand, the educational and training systems in 
transition economies has not been developed to meet the new requirements of the 
labour market (Arandarenko and Bartlett, 2012; Bartlett, 2013). Even if individuals 
hold the right qualification from the official educational system, they might not have 
the skills required to effectively perform in that particular occupation (Kupets, 
2015). This skill mismatch plays an important role in the persistence of the long-
term unemployment since skill mismatch typically increases with the length of the 
spell of unemployment.   
The high share of long-term unemployment along with persistent regional 
differences and lack of relevant skills and geographical mobility provide an 
indication that labour markets in transition economies frequently exhibit structural 
mismatches which is related to an overall economic imbalance reflecting structural 
problems in the economy. According to Nesporova (2002), although cyclical 
unemployment can be evident during economic recessions it is less important than 
structural unemployment, while frictional unemployment is not a significant source 
of unemployment in most European transition economies. The rest of this section 
provides a review of empirical studies assessing whether the unemployment in 
transition countries displays characteristics in line with the structuralist or hysteresis 
hypothesis.  
There has been a growing interest in recent years to test whether the unemployment 
in European transition countries fulfil the structuralist view or the hysteresis 
hypothesis; the evidence is rather mixed. Using aggregate data for twelve transition 
countries, Leon-Ledesma and McAdam (2004) employed stationarity tests 
controlling for structural breaks and business cycle effects. The findings from this 
study suggest that unemployment dynamics in these countries are structuralist in 
nature, meaning that temporary shocks do not have any permanent effect on 
unemployment rate. However, the authors observed the existence of multiple 
equilibria around which the economy fluctuates after large shocks. This pattern is 
especially evident for the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia. Furthermore, 
Camarero et al. (2008) applied unit root tests with structural breaks for Central and 
Eastern European Countries (CEEC) and found evidence against the unemployment 
hysteresis and in support of the structuralist view of unemployment that temporary 
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shocks induce slow adjustments to the equilibrium rate of unemployment but do not 
have permanent effects on it. The same result was found when using panel data and 
also when testing separately for each country. Cuestas and Ordonez (2011) applied 
panel unit root testing for eight CEEC that joined the EU in 2004 and found evidence 
to support the validity of the structuralist theory in four out of eight countries: 
Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Slovenia. 
 Moreover, when testing for co-movement of the unemployment rates in these 
countries, evidence suggests there are common factors that drive the unemployment 
rate in transition countries which might be related to the process towards their 
integration in the European Union. Gozgor (2013) also applied a unit root test for ten 
CEEC, however they found evidence to support the validity of hysteresis hypothesis 
for these countries. Marjanovic and Mihajlovic (2014) used unit root tests, panel unit 
root tests and also structural break analysis and find mixed results for CEEC. When 
applying unit root tests they found evidence to support hysteresis theory for all 
transition countries, except Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania and Romania. The results 
from panel unit root testing suggest mixed results for transition countries. Since the 
observation period of this study (monthly data for period 2000 to 2013) was subject 
to some crisis event, these authors raised concerns that their results might lead to 
wrong conclusion. Marjanovic and Mihajlovic (2014) divided the period of 
observation into two sub-periods to identify when structural breaks may have 
occurred. The results provide evidence that before the great recession of 2007, 
unemployment in transition countries showed hysteresis behaviour, while after the 
recession the unemployment rate become stationary at higher levels.  
Bukowski et al. (2013) investigated the impact of shocks and rigidities in the labour 
market. This empirical study employed a Structural Vector Error Correction Model, 
using a panel of quarterly data from 1996 to 2007. The investigation concluded that 
positive labour demand shocks determine increases in employment and reductions in 
unemployment in the short-run. Positive labour supply shocks were found to 
increase unemployment; this is especially the case in Poland which may be the result 
of specific institutional factors such as their welfare system (Nesporova, 2002). The 
rigidity of wages was found to be an important factor determining unemployment in 
transition countries.  
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Lehman and Muravyev (2009) analysed the impact of labour market institutions on 
labour market outcomes in European transition economies. Such institutions include 
employment protection legislation, active labour market policies, duration of 
unemployment benefits, the tax wedge on labour and union density. The results 
show convincing evidence that stronger employment protection legislation depresses 
the employment-to-population ratio and it substantially increases youth 
unemployment. Findings from the study indicate a smaller impact of other labour 
market institutions and policies on labour market outcomes.  
Cazes (2002) investigated the effects of labour market institutions on different labour 
market outcomes for both transition and OECD countries. The investigation of Cazes 
also put emphasis on the strictness of employment protection legislation in transition 
countries considering that labour market in many of these countries have been rigid 
and granted workers a higher degree of job security. The study found that high 
collective bargaining coverage and payroll taxes tend to increase the long-term 
unemployment while the presence of more powerful trade unions seems to increase 
the overall unemployment rate. The findings also suggest that a long duration of 
unemployment benefits and high labour taxes increase youth unemployment rates. 
Cazes found that stronger employment protection legislation might reduce both 
employment rates and labour force participation rates.  
The evaluation of ALMPs at the economy wide level in transition economies have 
utilised mainly the matching function which attempts to capture the efficiency of 
matching under the assumption that these policies increase search and matching 
efficiency. The following section provides an introduction to the conceptual 
framework of this approach and a review of empirical studies using matching 
function in European transition economies. 
2.4 Conceptual Framework of the Matching Function and a 
Review of Empirical Studies for Transition Economies  
As section 2.2.3 discussed, raising the efficiency of the matching process between 
the unemployed and employers (through enhancing their human capital, re-locating 
jobs or workers and/or increasing the search intensity of the job-seeker) is regarded 
as one of the main functions of active policies. Human capital enhancement may be a 
crucial element where the labour market displays structural mismatches, which are 
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likely to be especially important in transition countries. Most of the empirical 
research in assessing the effects at the economy level of ALMPs in European 
transition countries has focused on modelling matching functions. As utilised in 
these research studies, the matching function typically regresses the exit from 
unemployment to employment, i.e. the number of successful matches between the 
previously unemployed and unfilled vacancies, on the vacancy stock, the 
unemployment stock and a set of variables measuring ALMPs.  
The matching function is attractive for empirical studies since it enables modelling 
of the mismatch in the labour market with minimum complexity. This approach 
summarizes the mechanism of bringing together firms who advertise vacancies and 
the unemployed who are searching for jobs through employment agencies, reading 
advertisements in the newspapers or utilising their social networks. As Petrongolo 
and Pissarides (2001, p. 391) review, ‗the key idea is that this complicated exchange 
process is summarised by a well-behaved function that gives the number of jobs 
formed at any moment in time in terms of the number of workers looking for jobs, the 
number of firms looking for workers, and a small number of other variables‘. The 
simplest form of the matching function is M = m(U,V), where M is the number of 
matches created or jobs filled in a given period of time, U is the number of 
unemployed workers searching for a job while V is the number of open vacancies. 
Layard et al. (1991) acknowledge that the matching function accounts for the 
mismatch that measures the degree of heterogeneity in the labour market across 
different dimensions such as the skill groups, industrial sectors and regions. It is 
often encountered that the skills possessed by workers are not compatible with those 
required in current vacancies which lengthens the duration of search. Industrial 
sector mismatch would prevail when industries require specific skills which may not 
be available amongst current job-seekers.  Regional differences in unemployment 
may also be persistent because of low labour and/or job mobility. Layard et al. 
(1991) also suggest that there might be additional imbalances caused by temporary 
structural shocks such as those which arise from the business cycle. However, since 
both reflect imbalances of labour demand and supply, Layard et al. (1991) suggest 
that, for practical purposes, they should be referred by the generic term ‗mismatch‘. 
The concept of mismatch bears some relationship to the concept of structural 
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unemployment which by definition is the unemployment arising from fast structural 
changes such as those experienced by transitional economies. 
The microeconomic foundation of the matching function is based on the search 
phenomena of the economic agents in attempt to create efficient matching. Efficient 
matching can be defined as the ability of unemployed to find a match in a relatively 
short period of time. The average time that it takes for a match to be created depends 
on how the firm and worker search for a match. In matching function models returns 
to scale are likely to play an important role.   
The empirical analysis of the matching function is similar to the Cobb-Douglas 
production function; so when the sum of the coefficients of unemployment and 
vacancy stocks is equal to unity, it implies constant returns to scale (CRS) while 
when it exceeds (is less than) unity it implies increasing (decreasing) returns to scale 
(IRS). It is usually assumed that the matching function ensures CRS, meaning that an 
increase in size of labour market in terms of vacancies and unemployed workers 
would increase the matching efficiency at the same magnitude. Some models use a 
matching function allowing IRS which indicates positive externalities with respect to 
labour market size (Munich et al., 1998; Stevens, 2002). Petrongolo and Pissarides 
(2001) emphasise that because of the heterogeneity of workers and jobs, the 
transition probabilities and the mean duration of unemployment spells and unfilled 
vacancies will differ across the labour market. According to Petrongolo and 
Pissarides (2001) the dependence of the mean transition probabilities on the number 
of workers and firms engaged in search is an externality and the matching function 
can give a measure of the extent of these search externalities. If the elasticity with 
respect to unemployment in the matching function equation (M = m(U,V)) is    and 
the elasticity with respect to vacancies is   ; then      measures the negative 
externality of unemployed towards other unemployed workers (congestion 
externality – when a rise in new entrants in the unemployment pool reduces the 
matching efficiency of the existing unemployed or the employed workers who search 
while being employed) while the    measures the positive externality from the 
unemployed to firms (an increasing search and matching intensity with rising 
unemployment). Similarly, the positive externality from firms on searching 
unemployed (thick-market effect) is measured by    and negative externality of 
firms on other firms (congestion externality) is measured by     . When IRS 
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prevails, there could be more than one equilibrium because of strong positive 
externalities of high search intensity (Munich et al., 1998). In one equilibrium, firms 
and workers put more search effort to create a match which creates higher returns 
from the search effort while in another equilibrium the search effort from both firm 
and workers can be low resulting in a low matching rate and higher unemployment.   
Some studies suggest that labour markets in CEE countries may be characterised by 
multiple equilibria which makes the matching function with IRS an appropriate 
choice to analyse the labour market in these countries (Munich et al., 1998, Munich 
and Svejnar, 2009). Appendix 2.1 examines how multiple equilibria may prevail in a 
labour market according to Snower‘s (1994) model and provides an explanation of 
why CEE countries may have been caught in a low-skill, bad-job equilibrium.  
Based on the theoretical model of Snower (1994), multiple equilibria can result in a 
‗low-skill, bad-job equilibrium‘ and a ‗high-skill, good-job equilibrium‘. Snower 
argues that labour market can fall into a ‗low-skill, bad-job trap‘ which entails a 
preponderance of jobs that are associated with low wages, low productivity and little 
opportunity to acquire training or enhance human capital. In this context, firms do 
not provide a lot of skilled vacancies because there is not enough skilled labour and 
these vacancies would be difficult to fill. Snower refers to this as the ‗vacancy 
supply externality‘. Similarly, workers are not incentivised to acquire skills since 
there are few skilled vacancies and as such the skills would be likely to remain 
under-compensated. This is regarded as the ‗training supply externality‘. If firms 
provide skilled vacancies it raises the workers‘ returns to education and training, 
however firms do not pay for the workers‘ education. By the same argument, 
workers who acquire training and education increase firms‘ returns to opening 
vacancies for skilled jobs. Snower argues these two externalities reinforce one 
another and can induce an insufficient level of training.  
Snower‘s (1994) model suggests that the higher the aggregate number of skilled 
workers and vacancies for skilled jobs the higher the average wage paid to workers. 
Since high-skilled workers are more productive it means that more is being produced 
in this sector and the firms will also generate higher profit. Thus, a policy 
implication for countries with a high proportion of low skilled workers and seeking 
to move to the good-job equilibrium is to subsidise education in order to produce 
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higher skilled workers or to subsidise skilled employment directly in firms. In the 
context of this thesis, the shift to the good equilibrium may be assisted by increased 
subsidises for training, wage subsidies for skilled workers and other ALMPs. 
However, since the bad-job equilibrium is likely to be a stable one, Snower (1994, 
p.19) argues that small subsidies may not be enough to shift from the bad to the good 
equilibrium and only a ‗„big push‟ in the form of sufficiently large skilled 
employment subsidies is required before the sector can be propelled toward the 
high-skill, good-job equilibrium‟. 
The dependent variable in studies using a matching function can be the total outflow 
from unemployment, the flow from unemployment to employment, or the total 
number of hires (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). A major limitation of using this 
approach is that data on outflows from unemployment into employment is usually 
unavailable, so the measure on total outflows from unemployment is usually used in 
these studies ignoring other flows in the labour market such as outflows from 
unemployment to inactivity and job-to-job flows. The former are likely to be 
relatively large in early and mid-transition. Studies have also included additional 
explanatory variables that may influence matching in a systematic way such as 
variables to account for regional differences and district size, demographic variables, 
level of education, level of wages (Coles and Smith, 1996) and output per head 
(Munich et al., 1998) etc.  
Usually, a distinction is made between ordinary and augmented matching functions 
where the latter take into account that workers and jobs are heterogeneous. Lehman 
(1995) uses the augment matching function to account for the search effectiveness of 
the unemployed workers. The search effectiveness is dependent on different factors 
with one of them being ALMPs which, as discussed in section 2.2.3, are assumed to 
have positive effect on matching efficiency. The size of ALMPs is measured in the 
model in various ways such as the expenditure on ALMPs at the regional or country 
level, the number of the unemployed participating in active programmes during a 
specified period, number of hours a worker spent in a subsidised job, etc.  
Studies have also discussed the appropriateness of the assumption that not only the 
stocks of unemployment and vacancies influence the efficiency of matching 
(Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001; Coles and Petrongolo, 2002). These studies argue 
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that flows (inflows of new vacancies and unemployed in a certain period in the 
labour market) play an important and significant role in explaining the efficiency of 
matching. This is referred to as stock-flow matching. Coles and Smith (1996) make a 
sharp distinction between the stocks and inflows; they argue the unemployed stock 
should not be matched with the stocks of vacancies because they were participants in 
the previous matching round but did not match. The analysis of stock–flow matching 
can be better understood when analysing the entrance of new unemployed individual 
into the labour market. The new entrant in the unemployment pool searches for a job 
in a bulk of advertisements before deciding to apply. Coles and Smith assume that 
there is a positive probability that even after applying for all the advertised jobs there 
will be no match because the unemployed does not meet the requirement of the 
employer. So, for a new entrant into unemployment there are two possibilities; the 
unemployed may achieve a match or they will continue to remain in the 
unemployment pool. In the first case, that would mean that the new entrant (the 
inflow) in the unemployment pool is matched with a vacancy in the existing vacancy 
stock. On the other hand, if the new entrant does not find a suitable match with the 
existing stock of vacancies, it is reasonable to believe that he might have to wait for 
the new inflows into vacancies to create a match. In this case, it is the vacancy 
inflow that is matched with an unemployed in the existing stock of unemployment.  
According to Munich and Svejnar (2009), the matching function captures the 
unemployment dynamics assessing the extent to which high unemployment in 
transition countries is a result of the following three causes: a) economic structural 
mismatch, (b) macroeconomic policies or external shocks and (c) the ongoing 
transition from planned to market economy. The first cause suggests that the high 
unemployment is a result of an inefficient matching created by poorly designed 
labour market policies and institutions which tend to reduce individuals‘ search 
effort, increase skills depreciation, induce high reservation wages or geographical 
mismatch. In such cases, both unemployment and vacancy stocks tend to be high 
simultaneously. The second factor implies that high unemployment is caused by low 
demand for labour resulting from tight macroeconomic policies or external 
contractionary shocks such as a globalisation shock; this would be marked by a low 
vacancy stock relative to the inflows into unemployment which will cause high 
unemployment. While the third factor causing high unemployment implies that due 
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to the unfinished transition process, net job destruction in firms is still ongoing; thus 
it would be manifested with high unemployment stock caused by high inflows into 
unemployment relative to the number of vacancies.  
Munich and Svejnar (2009) estimate a matching function of the outflows from 
unemployment with three explanatory variables: the number of unemployed in a 
district, the number of individuals flowing into unemployment and the number of 
vacancies in a district during a period of time, for five transition countries and one 
Western country (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, East and West 
Germany). The main limitation of the study is that it uses total outflows from 
unemployment rather than outflows to employment thus it fails to identify the 
specific job-related flows in the labour market. The results from the estimation of the 
matching function show that the coefficients on unemployment, vacancies and 
inflows to unemployment vary across these countries. The results from the 
estimation of the matching function show positive but small coefficients for the 
vacancy stock and large positive and significant coefficients for unemployment stock 
suggesting that unemployment stock is an important determinant of the outflow. In 
the second specification a variable measuring inflows into unemployment was 
included in the model. The coefficients of the inflows into unemployment range 
from 2.0 for Poland to 4.3 for Slovakia compared to the coefficients for existing 
unemployment stocks which range from 0.74 for Czech Republic to 2.59 for Poland. 
Based on the larger magnitude of the coefficients of inflows to unemployment 
compared to existing unemployed, this result suggests a higher efficiency of 
matching for newly unemployed.  
The estimation of returns to scale suggest that there is increasing returns to scale for 
all but one of these countries ranging from 2.40 for Hungary to 1.56 for West 
Germany (the sum of coefficients of three explanatory variables should exceed unity 
in order to have increasing returns); Poland is an exception with constant returns to 
scale. Because the coefficient of inflows to unemployment is the highest among the 
three explanatory variables, it is this coefficient that generates increasing returns. 
Given the low vacancy stocks, this might suggest that it is the new entrants into the 
unemployment pool who disproportionately match with the existing vacancies, while 
those previously unemployed remain unmatched; which leads to a high matching 
efficiency but also high long-term unemployment. In general, the study finds 
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evidence to support the hypothesis that in transition countries high unemployment 
might be a result of the low number of vacancies and high inflows to unemployment. 
As these authors emphasise, this outcome is consistent with the hypothesis that 
unemployment in transition countries is predominantly caused by tight 
macroeconomic policies and external shocks (which cause the low number of 
vacancies, e.g. low labour demand relative to unemployment and inflows) and on-
going restructuring in transition countries (high number of inflows into 
unemployment).  
Table 2.1 provides a summary of the empirical studies assessing ALMP 
effectiveness in transition countries at the economy-wide level. Only two empirical 
studies have employed panel regression analysis to assess the economy-wide effects 
of ALMPs: Cazes (2002) for 8 European Transition countries while Lehman and 
Muravyev (2009) extended the sample to 27 transition countries. Cazes (2002) and 
Lehman and Muravyev (2009) for CEEC and CIS transition countries found 
considerable evidence that an increase in the expenditure on ALMPs will lead to a 
reduction in the overall unemployment rate and especially the youth unemployment 
rate.  
The results for transition economies using a matching function are influenced by the 
methodology used in terms of the model specification, the inclusion of additional 
control variables that affect the outflows from unemployment, whether they use 
static or dynamic models and the extent to which they account for endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables. Some of the studies employing matching functions found 
evidence of positive effects; other empirical studies have not detected any impact, 
while some even found evidence of a negative impact of ALMPs on outflows from 
unemployment. When using the matching function approach, Burda and Lubyova 
(1995) found positive but modest effects of expenditure on ALMPs on outflows 
from unemployment for the Czech and Slovak Republics. However, these results 
should be taken with caution since the study does not account for demand 
conditions. Positive effects of expenditure on employment subsidies and public 
works per members on the outflow from unemployment of the regional labour force 
were found by Munich et al. (1998) for the Czech but not for Slovak Republic, 
though this difference is predominantly attributed to different demand conditions in 
the two countries. In their study, Munich et al. account for the economic activity in 
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the regional level by the ratio of industrial output to the labour force, the number of 
firms with fewer than 25 employees per member of labour force and the ratio of the 
value of agricultural production to industrial production. 
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Table 2.1 Summary of studies on economy wide effects of ALMPs for European Transition Economies and selected Western Economies 
 
 
Studies of European transition economies based on chronological order (year of publication)  
Study Country Data Dependent Variable   Estimation technique Results 
Boeri and 
Burda, 1995 
Czech Republic  Regional 
Employment 
Offices  
1991 – 1994  
Number of individuals flowing from 
unemployment into jobs  
Matching Function: 
Dynamic Panel models 
ALMP variables:  
Spending on programmes 
at the district level per 
year, inflows of positions 
(i.e., available slots in the 
various programmes) and 
inflows per quarter of 
persons into ALMP 
programs (i.e., filled 
positions).  
Small positive effect of all ALMPs on 
exits from unemployment into jobs. 
Burda and 
Lubyova, 1995  
Czech and 
Slovak 
Republics  
Regional 
Employment 
Offices 
1991 - 1994  
Number of individuals flowing from 
unemployment into regular 
employment 
Matching Function 
ALMP Variable: 
Regional ALMP 
spending. 
 
Modest positive effect of ALMPs on 
exit rates from unemployment into 
employment.  
Lehman, 1995  Poland  Regional 
Administrative 
data 
 Outflow of the registered unemployed 
into regular un-subsidised jobs 
Matching Function: 
Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) 
ALMP variable: Stock of 
participants in training 
and re-training measures 
Insignificant effects of ALMPs. 
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Puhani and 
Steiner, 1996  
Poland LFS and 
National 
Labour Office 
(NLO)  
1992 – 1994  
1. Outflow rates from unemployment 
into employment and  
2. Outflow rates from employment into 
unemployment 
Matching Function: 
Random and Fixed 
Effects  
ALMP variables:  
Regional expenditure on 
public works, intervention 
works and public training.   
No significant effect of ALMPS exp. 
on the outflow rates from 
unemployment to employment.  
Intervention works and public training 
expenditure raises the outflow rate 
from employment into unemployment.  
Munich, 
Svejnar and 
Terrell, 1998 
Czech and 
Slovak 
Republics  
Regional 
Administrative 
data  
The number of individuals flowing 
from unemployment in certain district 
and time  
Matching Function:  
ALMP variable: 
Expenditures on ALMP 
per members of district 
labour force.  
Small positive effects of ALMP 
expenditure on outflows from 
unemployment 
Puhani, 1999 Poland Labour Force 
Survey and 
Ministry of 
Labour 
1992 – 1996  
1. Outflow rates from unemployment 
into employment and  
2. Outflow rates from employment into 
unemployment 
Matching Function: 
Dynamic Panel models 
ALMP variable:   
Regional ALMP 
expenditure.  
Small positive effect of public training 
programmes in reducing 
unemployment  
Dmytrotsa, 
2003 
Ukraine  National 
Employment 
Offices  
2000 - 2002 
Outflow from unemployment  Matching Function: 
OLS 
ALMP variable: 
Number of registered 
unemployed placed in 
different measures; 
Amount of information 
given by the PES.  
Positive effect of increasing exit from 
unemployment for public works and 
training programmes. 
Dmitrijeva 
and Hazans, 
2007  
Latvia  Regional 
Employment 
offices  
1998 - 2003 
Outflows from the pool of registered 
unemployed into regular employment  
Matching Function:  
ALMP variable: 
The share of trained and 
re-qualified unemployed 
in the pool. 
Positive and statistically significant 
impact of the share of trained 
unemployed on outflows to 
employment. 
Jeruzalski and 
Tyrowicz, 
2009  
Poland Regional 
Administrative 
data  
2000 - 2008 
Log of monthly outflows to 
employment out of unemployment 
(unemployed de-registered due to 
commencing employment). 
Matching Function: 
Two Stage Stochastic 
Frontier and 
Difference-in 
Difference.  
ALMP variable: The 
share of registered 
unemployed 
participating in ALMPs.  
 
Significant negative effects of ALMPs 
in outflows to employment (high lock-
in effects or essential ineffectiveness of 
ALMPs). 
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Tomic, 2012  Croatia  Regional 
Administrative 
data 
2000 - 2011 
Number of employed persons from the 
CES Registry during the month 
Matching Function: 
Stochastic Frontier 
Estimation 
ALMP variable:   
Share of persons in 
ALMP in total number 
of unemployed in each 
regional office at the 
year end 
ALMP variable is significant and 
positive but very small 
Studies of European non-transition economies based on chronological order (year of publication) 
Study Country Data Dependent Variable   Estimation technique Results 
Anxo et al. 
(2001)  
France and 
Sweden  
Regional level 
data  
1. Employment demand decrease due 
to hiring / stock of employment 
demands at the end of the month 
(DEFM) (France)  
 
2.Number of unemployed people 
leaving unemployment towards 
employment/ unemployment stock at 
the end of the month (Sweden) 
Matching function : 
Fixed Effects  
ALMP variable: Inflows 
to four different ALMPs.  
Positive but small effect of ALMPs. 
Better work when targeted at long-term 
unemployed.  
Hujer et al., 
2002  
West and East 
Germany  
Regional 
Administrative 
data  
1999-2001 
Job Seekers Rate – the rate of total job 
seekers and ALMP participants 
relative to the labour force  
Dynamic modelling for 
West Germany – diff. 
and sys GMM and OLS 
and within estimator 
for East Germany  
ALMP variable: The 
stock of participants in a 
specific type of 
programme relative to 
the total rate of job 
seekers 
Negative effects for vocational training 
and job creation schemes. Insignificant 
effect; questionable results due to the 
small dataset.  
Hujer and 
Zeiss, 2005 
West Germany  Regional 
Employment 
office data  
2003 – 2004  
Outflow from unemployment to 
employment  
Matching Function: 
Dynamic Panel models, 
GMM. 
ALMP variable:  
Inflows from 
unemployment into job 
creation schemes. 
 
Job creation schemes reduce the 
inflows into regular employment in the 
first 12 months after a programme 
extension (suggesting lock-in effects). 
In the period between 12 and 18 
months after a programme extension it 
does not affect the inflows into 
employment.  
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Altavilla and 
Caroleo (2006)  
Italy  Regional 
Administrative 
data  
1996 - 2001 
Unemployment rate and Labour Force 
Participation  
GMM and Panel 
Vector Autoregressive 
ALMP variable:  The 
total number of 
participants 
in a programme in a 
particular region divided 
by the total 
working-age population 
in the same region 
ALMPs significant in reducing 
unemployment rate and increasing 
participation rate. 
Hujer and 
Zeiss (2006)  
West Germany  Regional 
Administrative 
data  
2003-2004 
The flow from unemployment to 
employment  
Matching function: 
Stock-flow combination 
(GMM; choice of lags 
higher than the training 
period to avoid the 
locking-in effect)  
Small regional level effect (possible 
substitution effect when compared to 
the microeconomic effect on the 
individual where the effect is 
significant in increasing individuals‘ 
probability to get employed. 
Hujer et al., 
(2007) 
West Germany Regional 
Administrative 
data  
Outflows of unemployed individuals 
into regular, non-subsidised 
employment  
Matching function: 
Dynamic model 
(GMM) with spatial 
effects using two 
different weights 
Insignificant or negative effects of the 
policies. 
Altavilla and 
Caroleo, 
(2009) 
Italy  Regional 
Administrative 
data  
1997 - 2007 
Employment rate and Participation rate  Panel factor-
augmented vector 
autoregressive   
ALMP variable:   
The ratio between the 
number of participants in 
ALMP and the working-
age population in the 
same region. 
Increase the job reallocation and boost 
reemployment. Increase labour force 
participation. ALMPs are effective 
only in regions with lower labour 
market rigidity.  
Dauth et al. 
(2010)  
Austria  Regional level 
data  
2001-2007 
1.The number of matches in a region 
and  
2. The regional job-seeker rate 
Matching Function: 
Difference and System 
GMM  
ALMP variable: The 
stock of participants in a 
certain programme 
relative to the number of 
job-seekers. 
Positive effects of job schemes in the 
non-profit sector, wage subsidies, and 
apprenticeships on the regional 
matching function and the job-seeker 
rate. 
Arranz et al., 
(2013) 
Spain  Regional 
Administrative 
data  
1987 – 2010 
1. Levels of employment (total 
employment and 
temporary employment),  
2. Unemployment and labour force, 
Difference and system 
GMM 
ALMP variable:  
Incentivized contracts to 
Expenditure on job-creation 
programmes and the number of 
participants in vocational training 
programmes have little or no effect on 
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employment rate (employed 
population as a proportion of the 
working-age population),  
3. Unemployment rate (unemployed 
population as a proportion of the 
labour force), 
4. Temporary employment rate 
(number of temporary contracts 
divided by the 
number of workers in wage 
employment) and  
5. Labour market transitions (flows 
between unemployment and 
employment, and between temporary 
and permanent employment). 
promote permanent jobs; 
No. of participants in 
vocational training; 
Expenditure on job-
creation programmes; 
No. of indirectly 
incentivized contracts.  
the transitions from unemployment to 
employment. Incentivised contracts to 
promote permanent jobs have small 
positive effect on transitions from 
unemployment to employment and 
from temporary employment to 
permanent employment.  
Studies using samples of mixed countries, based on chronological order (year of publication) 
Study Country Data Dependent Variable   Estimation technique Results 
Cazes, (2002) 19 OECD and 
8 transition 
countries 
(Bulgaria, 
Czech 
Republic, 
Estonia, 
Hungary, 
Poland, 
Russian 
Federation, 
Slovakia, 
Slovenia) 
OECD database 
and National 
sources  
Five dependent variables: 
1. Unemployment rate  
2. Long-term unemployment rate  
3.  Youth unemployment rate 
4. Employment rate 
5. Labour Force Participation rate  
Panel data regressions 
ALMP variable: 
The ratio of GDP 
spending on ALMP to 
the unemployment rate. 
Significant ALMP effects: reduces 
unemployment rates and increases 
employment and labour force 
participation rates.  
Estevao (2003) 15 Industrial 
Countries  
 
National level 
data  
1985 - 2000 
The share of the working-age 
population employed in the business 
sector. 
Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) 
ALMP variable:  
ALMP expenditure as 
share of GDP 
Increase business employment. Direct 
subsidies to employment creation are 
more effective in raising employment 
rates in the business sector than 
expenditures on training or PESs.  
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 Bassanini and 
Duval (2006)  
21 OECD 
countries 
National level 
data  
1982 – 2003  
1.Unemployment rate and  
2. Employment rate  
Fixed Effects and 
Instrumental Variable 
approach 
ALMP variable: ALMP 
expenditure as share of 
GDP 
In general increases employment rate 
and reduces unemployment rate. The 
most consistent result is that of training 
programmes.  
Lehman and 
Muravyev, 
(2009)  
Eastern Europe 
and Central 
Asia  (27 
countries) 
OECD, 
EUROSTAT 
for EU member 
states and 
World Bank 
and IMF for 
SEE and CIS 
countries 
1995 – 2008  
1.Employment to population Ratio  
2. Unemployment rate  
3. Long-term unemployment rate  
4. Youth unemployment rate  
Random and Fixed 
Effects 
ALMP variable:   
The expenditure of 
ALMP as a percentage 
of GDP. 
ALMP significant in reducing youth 
unemployment rate, long-term 
unemployment and unemployment rate. 
Oesch (2010) 21 OECD 
Countries 
National level 
data 
1991 – 2006  
Unemployment rate of unskilled 
workers. 
OLS 
ALMP variable: ALMP 
spending as % of GDP 
divided by 
unemployment rate  
ALMP expenditure reduces 
unemployment rate of unskilled 
workers.  
Murtin and 
DeSerres 
(2014)  
11 OECD 
countries  
National level 
data  
1985-2007 
Unemployment outflow rate 
(measured as the number of hires 
divided by the number of unemployed)  
Matching function; 
Instrumental variable 
approach. 1st stage OLS 
dep. Var. labour 
market tightness, 2nd 
stage instrumental 
variable.  
1st stage OLS, 2nd stage 
differences GMM.  
ALMP variable:  
Spending on ALMPs per 
unemployed worker 
normalized by a proxy of 
average income (GDP 
per worker). 
No effect of ALMPs on unemployment 
outflow rate.   
Escudero 
(2018)  
31 OECD 
countries  
National level 
data  
1985 - 2010 
1.Unemployment rate, 
2. Employment rate,  
3. Labour force participation of the 
overall and low-skilled population and 
4. Low-skilled unemployed rate.  
Instrumental Variable 
approach  
ALMP variable:  
Expenditure on ALMPs 
per unemployed person. 
In general, positive effect of ALMP on 
the labour market: reduce 
unemployment and increase 
employment and participation rate.  
72 
 
Taking into consideration that the matching mechanism can work differently in 
different regions, Puhani (1999) ran separate regressions for industrial, agricultural 
and modern regions however the evidence of the effects of ALMPs did not differ. 
Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz (2009) critiqued the study of Puhani (1999) arguing that it 
used data from a period when Poland was experiencing an overall reduction in 
unemployment (period from 1992 to 1994). Thus, they point out that the positive 
effects found in Puhani (1999) might not present the real effect of ALMPs in this 
country. In contrast, Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz (2009) used data for a period with both 
an increase and decrease in unemployment (period from 2000 to 2008) and found 
strong evidence that an increase in number of participants in training programmes, 
subsidised private employment and public works reduced the outflow from 
unemployment into employment for Poland.  
In order to account for regional differences, Lehman (1995) included dummy 
variables to indicate whether a region belongs to heavily industrialised, agricultural 
or developed region.  Lehman found no evidence that the stock of the unemployed in 
public training and re-training and public works programmes impact on the flow out 
of unemployment to employment for Poland in any of the observed regions. Results 
from Kwiatkowski and Tokarski (1997), for the same country, found negative effects 
of expenditure on public works and loans to enterprises on outflows from 
unemployment, no effects of training and start-up loans but positive effects of 
expenditure of public works on outflows from unemployment. Lenkova (1997) also 
found no evidence that increasing the number of participants in training led to an 
increase in the flow out of unemployment for Bulgaria. A limitation of both Lenkova 
(1997) and Kwiatkowski and Tokarski (1997) is that they do not account for demand 
conditions or region-specific differences. 
Munich et al. (1998) emphasise that empirical studies that have not controlled for 
region size have biased results. The reason for this is that the region size is likely to 
be correlated with the matching parameters. The higher correlation of unemployment 
and vacancy stock with the regional level characteristics, the greater the likelihood of 
incorrect estimates. Munich et al. (1998) refer to this as spurious scale effect. The 
spurious effect can be avoided if the study uses panel data together with region-
specific time-invariant effects (Puhani, 1999; Dimitrijeva and Hazans, 2007; 
Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz, 2009). In contrast to most of the empirical studies using a 
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matching function which do not control for region specific characteristics and 
demand conditions, Munich et al. (1998) control for the following regional variables:  
the proportion of unemployed who have secondary or tertiary education, the density 
of population in the region and a range of variables to account for labour demand 
and economic activity and the distance from the district capital to account for labour 
mobility.  The study did not find any significant effect of ALMPs in outflow from 
unemployment.  
Since ALMPs induce can externalities in the labour market, such as substitution 
effects and deadweight loss, macroeconomic studies are capable of capturing these 
effects by using aggregate data. Two of the studies conducted in transition countries 
have found that these externalities may be significant. To assess whether active 
programmes have any indirect effect or whether they can prevent unemployment to 
occur in the first place, Puhani and Steiner (1996) and Puhani (1999) use two 
dependent variables: the outflow from unemployment into employment and the 
outflow from employment into unemployment. Puhani (1999) finds evidence of a 
weak positive effect of expenditure of ALMPs on outflows from employment into 
unemployment suggesting that these active programmes induce substitution effects; 
i.e. firms might want to fire workers who are employed without a subsidy in order to 
hire unemployed individuals whose wage is partially subsidised. Findings from 
Puhani (1999) indicate that an increase of €100 on the expenditure on public training 
and intervention works will lead to one employee being substituted by an 
unemployed individual who has completed one of these active measures. 
Nevertheless, Puhani and Steiner (1996) and Boeri (1996) emphasise that ALMPs 
can still serve a purpose to promote equality if they are targeted at the disadvantaged 
groups.  
Some of these studies recognise that ALMP variables might be endogeneous if more 
resources are allocated to regions within a country where the unemployment rate is 
high the results might be biased through this reverse causation (Boeri and Burda, 
1996; Puhani, 1999; Dmitrijeva and Hazans, 2007; Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz, 2009). 
Puhani (1999) addresses the issue of endogeneity by using lagged, instead of current, 
ALMP expenditure to account for the fact that it takes some time until such 
expenditure can have an effect on the labour market. Similarly, Dmitrijeva and 
Hazans (2007) argue that the issue of endogeneity can be accounted for by using a 
74 
 
variable that measures the number of unemployed who have completed training. So, 
for instance, if there is an increase in ALMP expenditure in period t in response to 
current worsening labour market, while participants expect to complete the training 
in 4 months, these individuals will only appear in the fourth lagged variable (when 
using monthly data) thus arguing that the outcome of participants will not be affected 
by the current increase in expenditure on ALMP. This approach, however, is only 
applicable when studies use monthly data which is common for studies using 
regional level data but not for those using country level data. However, this might 
not be a good approach to account for endogeneity. Munich and Svejnar (2009) 
argue that the explanatory variables in the matching function are pre-determined by 
the matching process of the previous periods, thus they suggest that in order to 
obtain consistent estimates, a study needs to apply the first difference approach of 
estimation of the matching function (                         ). According to 
Munich and Svejnar (2009) further lags of the      will be uncorrelated to      arguing 
in favour of the method of estimation with instrumental variables. Boeri and Burda 
(1995) also use dynamic panel data models to account for endogeneity when 
assessing programme effectiveness for the Czech Republic and find small positive 
effects of ALMP expenditure on exit rates from unemployment.  
 Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz (2009) and Tomic (2012) both employ a two-stage 
stochastic frontier estimation technique. The estimations include monthly and year 
dummies. In the first stage of the estimation only the explanatory variables of 
unemployment and vacancies stocks and flows are included, along with monthly and 
year dummies. The second stage estimates technical efficiencies
10
 by accounting for 
the characteristics of local labour markets and different individual search intensities 
(Ibourk et al., 2004). The covariates included in the second stages include the 
vacancy to unemployment ratio to capture the labour market tightness, regional 
unemployment rate, share of females in total unemployment, share of young 
individuals in the pool of unemployed, share of long-term unemployed, share of low-
skilled and high-skilled unemployed among the jobless, size of the labour market, 
net income per capita and a measure to account for ALMP coverage rate (Tomic, 
                                                          
10 Technical efficiency can be defined as the ratio of observed output to maximum feasible output. If 
technical efficiency is equal to 1 it shows that the individual obtains the maximum feasible output, 
while it is smaller than 1 provides a measure of the shortfall of the observed output from maximum 
feasible output. 
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2012) or number of ALMP participants (Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz (2009). Tomic 
(2012) found a positive, but very small, effect of active measures, while Jeruzalski 
and Tyrowicz (2009) found a negative effect of active measures on matching 
efficiency.  
In conclusion, most of the studies using a matching function are limited in a sense 
that they do not account for aggregate demand. An additional limitation of the 
studies using a matching function is that the dependent variable is usually outflows 
from unemployment. This data limitation does not allow one to observe the direction 
of transitions of labour, i.e. whether the unemployed transitions to employment, to 
inactivity or if there are any job-to-job transitions. Munich at al. (1998) argue that 
when using regional level data, not accounting for regional specific characteristics 
would lead to biased coefficients while very few of studies in transition economies 
account for such differences. Based on this argument, Munich et al. (1998), Lehman 
(1995) and Dmitrijeva and Hazans (2007) used regional dummies to account for 
region specific effects, Tomic (2012) used regional population density as a proxy to 
account for the size of social network and flow of information, Jeruzalski and 
Tyrowicz (2009) used the size of labour market (the total number of unemployed, 
inflows and job offers), while Puhani (1999) ran separate regressions for different 
regions.   
With regard to effects of ALMPs at the economy wide level, the results are mixed. 
This may be a result of the: different methodologies used, different measurements of 
the ALMP variable, different control variables included in the models, the different 
period of data analysed or how studies have accounted for potential endogeneity. 
Findings from Puhani (1999), Dmytrosa (2003) and Dmitrijeva and Hazans (2007) 
suggest that training induce positive transitions from unemployment to employment 
while Lehman (1995) found no evidence of training on transition to employment. 
Lehman (1995) and Kwiatkowski and Tokarski (1997) found evidence to suggest 
that private subsidised employment increases the outflows from unemployment. The 
results from Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz (2009) suggest that all active measures reduce 
the outflow from unemployment to employment.  
The following section provides a critical review of recent empirical studies for non-
transition economies, their methodologies and the data used. It will also review 
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studies using mixed samples combining both transition and non-transition 
economies. Finally, it will provide a brief comparison of the results between studies 
of transition and non-transition economies.  
2.5 Review of Empirical Studies for Non-Transition Economies 
The evidence on the effectiveness of the ALMPs in reducing unemployment (or 
increasing employment) from studies using data for non-transition economies 
appears to be far from conclusive. Studies using regional and national level data 
differ in terms of the estimation technique used, the time frequency of the data, the 
dependent variable and also the definition of the independent variables.  This section 
will review a set of recent studies (published since 2000) of the effectiveness of 
active policies in non-transition countries. This section will initially review the 
studies using regional level data for single country samples (based on chronological 
order) followed by the studies using national level data for samples with mixed 
countries. The summary of the reviewed studies are provided in Table 2.1.  
In order to compare the effectiveness of different ALMPs in France and Sweden, 
Anxo et al. (2001) use monthly regional level data, applying a fixed effect model 
using different model specifications for the two countries depending on the data 
availability. The dependent variable used in the analysis of ALMP effectiveness for 
France is the ‗ratio between the employment demand decrease due to hirings and the 
stock of employment demands at the end of the month‟ while for Sweden is the ‗ratio 
of the flow from unemployment to employment and unemployment stock at the end of 
the month‘. One advantage of this study is that it distinguishes between three 
different ALMPs: (i) employment creation schemes in the public sector; (ii) wage 
subsidy schemes in the private sector; and (iii) training schemes. The evidence from 
this study suggests that ALMPs have in general a positive impact on outflows from 
unemployment to employment. According to the results, the most effective measure 
in both countries are employment creation schemes in the public sector. Wage 
subsidies and training measures seem to have a smaller aggregate impact. It might be 
possible that the effect of training is underestimated because training is generally 
heterogeneous and the analysis of their aggregate effect is more complex. Also, as 
argued in section 2.2.3, the effect of training takes longer to materialise due to lock-
in effect. This study does not assess the effectiveness of ALMPs in the medium or 
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long-term but only the period instantly after the completion of the measures. From 
the review of other studies, it can be observed that both wage subsidies and training 
measures might be more effective in medium or long-term hence suggesting that 
there might be a lock-in effect related to these results (Van Ours, 2001; Dauth et al., 
2011; Schmidl, 2014). Anxo et al. (2001) ignore completely the simultaneity bias by 
arguing that this is an issue only in the unemployment equations and not in the 
matching function, because in the latter the dependent variable is not the direct 
object of political decisions. Another justification why this study does not address 
the issue of simultaneity is that the authors claim there is no clear joint variation of 
the unemployment and the number of ALMP participants for the time period 
analysed. A limitation of this study is that the dependent variables, especially the one 
for France, are quite complex and difficult to interpret. 
A study by Hujer et al. (2007) investigates the aggregate effect of various ALMPs in 
West Germany using monthly regional level data for a two-year period from 2003 to 
2004. This study uses a dynamic specification of the matching function while 
accounting for spatial interactions, assuming that the changes in employment exit 
probabilities in one region depend on the changes in labour market conditions in the 
neighbouring regions. In addition, Hujer et al. are able to use detailed information on 
the duration of employment spells of participants after the completion of the 
measures. This analysis accounts for different ALMPs in Germany: training 
programmes, job creation schemes, measures promoting qualifications and wage 
subsidies. The ALMPs are measured as the stock of participants in the different 
programmes while the dependent variable is the outflows of unemployed individuals 
into regular, unsubsidised employment. The study additionally accounts for possible 
endogeneity of the ALMPs by including several lagged values of the policies in the 
matching equation. The evidence from the study suggests in general a negative to 
insignificant effect in the both short and long-run of the ALMPs analysed. According 
to Hujer et al. an explanation for this may be that after the measure ends, firms 
replace the former subsidised employees/trainees as the measure ends with new 
subsidized employees/trainees.  
To assess the effectiveness of different ALMPs in reducing the unemployment rate, 
youth unemployment rate and increasing the employment rate in Italy, Altavilla and 
Caroleo (2006) use monthly regional level data from 1996 to 2002. The study 
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employed three different estimation techniques: Fixed Effects (FE), a dynamic panel 
modelling (difference and system Generalised Methods of Moments - GMM), and 
Panel Vector Autoregressive (P-VAR).  They also distinguished between different 
active policies considered: mixed cause contracts (work contracts that include the 
training of the worker during working hours), subsidies for long-term or short-term 
employment (these subsidies consist of reducing payroll taxes or transferring a part 
of unemployment benefits to the employers), incentives for the stabilization of short-
term contracts (these measures are used to transform short-term contracts like 
internship contracts into long-term contracts) and incentives for self-employment. 
The variables measuring active policies have been constructed as the total number of 
participants in a programme in a particular region divided by the total working-age 
population in the same region. The results from the dynamic specification suggest 
that the active policies analysed are effective in reducing unemployment and 
increasing employment and there is no great discrepancy between the results from 
GMM, FE and P-VAR estimators. Additionally, the results from the P-VAR suggest 
that the unemployment rate in North and South regions of Italy respond differently to 
ALMP shocks (an increase in ALMP participants to working-age population ratio).  
The authors argue that this might be due to a higher degree of labour market rigidity 
in the South, which might suggest that the efficiency of the labour market should be 
improved.  
Dauth et al. (2010) also uses a matching function to assess the effectiveness of 
various ALMPs in Austria on a rich quarterly data at regional level from 2001 to 
2007 using a dynamic specification. To control for further influences on the 
variables of interest, the authors add data on the structure of job-seekers such as the 
shares of different age and qualification groups, the shares of female, long-term job-
seekers and the share of job-seekers with a migration background. To take into 
account a possible lock-in effect, several temporally lagged values of the policy 
variable were also included. Since the effects of different ALMP programmes can 
vary, the authors include the individual programmes as shares of all-jobseekers. 
Since the ALMPs of one region could also affect the labour outcome of other 
regions, the authors include a spatially lagged dependent variable. The study found 
that the regions with the larger shares of job-seekers older than 50 and younger than 
25 had fewer matches compared to those with higher shares of job-seekers between 
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the age 25 and 50. The same applies to the regions with large share of females and 
long-term job seekers. The study found mixed evidence with regard to the 
effectiveness of the ALMPs. The most effective measure in Austria for the period 
observed were a wage subsidy and apprenticeship scheme (this measure provides 
internship training positions to challenged young persons), while there was no 
evidence that vocational training, active job search and orientation and job training 
measures had any significant effect on the matching process. There was a strong 
negative effect of job schemes in non-profit organisations and the authors argue that 
this might be due to stigmatisation of participants. The findings also suggest that 
active measures with long-duration tend to be more likely to have lower matches 
hypothesised to be due to lock-in effects.  
Some of the recent studies use large samples of mixed countries such as Bassanini 
and Duval (2006), Estevao (2007), Oesch (2010), Murtin et al. (2014) and Escudero 
(2018), all these studies use data at national level for non-transition economies 
except for the last one which uses both transition and non-transition economies. 
Even though these studies use different estimation techniques and have different 
sample sizes, the overall findings point to the effectiveness of ALMPs in reducing 
unemployment or increasing employment and labour force participation. In a few 
cases the results become statistically insignificant but none of them found evidence 
of a negative effect of these policies. Many of the studies using mixed samples are 
aware of the potential endogeneity problem when assessing the effectiveness of 
ALMPs and have tried to control for it using instrumental variable methods. A 
common limitation of the studies using mixed samples is that they rarely 
disaggregate between various ALMPs, leaving the studies unable to distinguish the 
effectiveness of individual policies.  
Bassanini and Duval (2006) using static panel models on a sample of 21 OECD
11
 
countries do not find consistent effects of ALMPs. This study applies separate model 
specifications for the unemployment and employment rates using ALMP expenditure 
as share of GDP to assess the effectiveness of ALMPs. When using fixed effects, the 
ALMPs are found to be statistically significant in reducing unemployment and 
                                                          
11
 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and 
United States.   
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increasing employment rates. However, when using an instrumental variable 
approach (IV), where the ALMP variable is instrumented by its lagged values, the 
results become insignificant. Bassanini and Duval also examine the effect of 
different ALMPs, decomposing them into five categories: public employment 
services (PES) and administration, training programmes, youth measures, subsidized 
employment and measures for the disabled. The findings suggest the effect of 
training programmes is the only ALMP which is significant and consistent in all 
specification models in increasing the employment rate and reducing the 
unemployment rate.  
In his study, Estevao (2007) analyses the effects of ALMPs on increasing the 
business employment rate (the share of working-age population employed in the 
private sector). The study argues that the business employment rate is a better 
measure (dependent variable) compared to the unemployment rate. This is because it 
avoids overestimating the policy importance of ALMPs by automatically excluding 
cyclical increases in public sector employment, which do not represent real 
improvements in labour market functioning. Estavao used a panel dataset of 15 
industrialised countries12 for 1985 – 2000 in a linear regression specification 
accounting for a set of institutional and other control variables. To account for the 
potential endogeneity of ALMPs, the study also uses the lagged values of ALMP 
expenditure as share of GDP but the results were not different from the basic 
specification. The overall findings suggest a positive effect of ALMPs on increasing 
the business employment rate (employment in the private sector).   
Oesch (2010) focuses particularly on the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers 
to analyse the ALMPs effectiveness and policies such as wage-setting institutions, 
employment regulation, monetary policy and also globalization effects. This study 
also uses OLS regressions for 21 OECD
13
 countries during the 1991 – 2006 period 
divided into four periods. The econometric analysis does not address the endogeneity 
of the ALMPs or the persistent nature of the unemployment rate, however the 
findings consistently supported the hypothesis that investing in ALMPs results in a 
                                                          
12
 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
13 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland, Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and the United States. 
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lower unemployment rate of low-skilled workers. The main limitation of this study is 
that it uses OLS, which in case of panel data produces biased and inconsistent results 
because the country specific effects are omitted and potentially correlated with other 
regressors.  
Murtin et al. (2014) assess the effectiveness of the labour market policies on the 
unemployment outflow rate (the number of hires from the pool of unemployed 
divided by the number of unemployed) for 11 OECD countries14 for a period 
between 1985 and 2007. This is one of very few studies which use a matching 
function for cross-country analysis of the effectiveness of ALMPs. Murtin et al. use 
a two-stage instrumental variable approach where in the first stage the dependent 
variable is the labour market tightness measured as v/u (vacancy to unemployment) 
ratio. The study instrumented the labour market tightness by business cycle shocks 
(measured by the output gap) as well as labour market institutions that are 
considered to have an impact on market tightness but not on matching efficiency 
which include the tax wedge and its interaction with the characteristics of wage 
bargaining systems. In the second stage estimation the unemployment outflow rate is 
estimated on predicted market tightness and a set of other institutional variables such 
as the characteristics of unemployment benefit systems and the degree of 
employment protection. The study found consistent evidence to suggest that ALMPs 
increase labour market tightness however the effect of ALMPs on matching 
efficiency is not significant.  
Escudero (2018) increased the sample to 31 OECD countries (including some 
transition economies) using annual country-level data over the period 1985 - 2010. 
This study uses a set of dependent variables such as the unemployment rate, 
employment rate, labour force participation rate and the share of low-skilled 
unemployed in total unemployed. The author argues that using the latter dependent 
variable would assess whether ALMPs are providing incentives to the unemployed 
for acquiring new skills or to enterprises for enhancing the demand for low-skilled 
workers. An advantage of this study is that it particularly focuses on the low-skilled 
unemployed and marginalized groups. Escudero applies the instrumental variable 
approach to account for the endogeneity of the policy variables using real 
                                                          
14
 Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the 
USA 
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expenditure on ALMPs per unemployed person as the instrument. In order to control 
for multicollinearity, the study included a set of active policies (training, 
employment incentives, supported employment and direct job-creation) into one 
cluster while start-up incentives and job-rotation and job-sharing are included 
separately in the model. Another advantage of this study, which is absent in any 
other study analysing the effectiveness of ALMPs, is that it accounts for different 
aspects of implementation of the policies in trying to explain the differences in the 
performance of ALMPs between countries. Three different measures of the ALMP 
implementation were included in the specification. The first one is the overall 
expenditure on programme administration as a percentage of total expenditure on 
ALMPs. The second measure is the continuity in the implementation of programmes 
measured by the dynamics of ALMP expenditure; this is captured by the difference 
between the fluctuations (measured by the standard deviation) in real GDP growth 
and the growth rate of ALMP spending.  The third variable measures the timing of 
the ALMP expenditure, i.e. whether the policies are implemented in a counter-
cyclical or pro-cyclical manner. To assess this, a dummy variable was created taking 
the value of one if expenditure on ALMPs ran parallel to changes in the 
unemployment rate and counter the economic trend (policies were implemented 
counter-cyclically) and zero otherwise. The main limitation of the clustering of 
different ALMPs is that the separate effect of the individual policies cannot be 
estimated. 
The results from this study point to positive effectiveness of the policy cluster on all 
dependent variables. Most importantly, the findings from this study suggest that 
these ALMPs particularly improve the labour market outcomes for the low-skilled 
unemployed. The findings suggest that the start-up incentives are effective in 
reducing general unemployment and increasing employment, however with a lower 
magnitude and lower significance than in the case of the low-skilled unemployed. 
Importantly, the findings for the implementation variables also suggest that an 
increase in the share of administrative expenditure on ALMPs, which potentially 
indicates quality of administration, is associated with a reduction of unemployment 
and increase in employment and participation rates. Additionally, the study also 
included interaction terms between the policies and the implementation variables and 
found interesting results suggesting that when the ALMPs are implemented counter-
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cyclically (counter the economic trend), the effect of ALMP expenditure on reducing 
unemployment will be higher.  
Similar to the studies for transition economies reviewed in the previous section, 
studies for non-transition economies also do not find a consensus with regard to the 
effectiveness of ALMPs. Given that one of the main goals of ALMPs is to increase 
matching efficiency, studies using single country sample usually employ the 
matching function approach for both transition and non-transition economies, 
although they differ in the estimation technique used.  Altavilla and Caroleo (2006) 
found that employment creation schemes in public sector are the most effective 
among other measures in increasing matching efficiency. On the other hand, the 
results from Dauth et al., (2010) suggest that employment schemes in non-profit 
organisations have negative effect in matching efficiency possibly resulting from 
stigmatisation of the beneficiaries. Subsidies in the private sector are found to have 
more positive effect in increasing employment (Estevao, 2003; Altavilla and 
Caroleo, 2006; Bassanini and Duval, 2007; Dauth et al., 2010). However, some 
studies suggest that these measures are likely to induce deadweight and substitution 
effect (discussed in more details in section 2.2.3) hence the net effect of these 
policies could be small or even zero (Estevao, 2003; Bassanini and Duval, 2007; 
Arranz, 2013; Escudero, 2018).  Estevao (2003) suggests that subsidies in the private 
sector could be more effective in reducing unemployment if they are better targeted 
and if they are implemented with better monitoring process. To avoid deadweight 
and substitution effects, these subsidies would be more effective if they target 
specific unemployed groups such as low skilled and long-term unemployment rather 
than general unemployed (Anxo et al., 2000; Altavilla and Caroleo, 2006; Arranz, 
2013; Escudero, 2018). Similar results for subsidies in the private sector were found 
also for transition economies (Lehman, 1995; Kwiatkowski and Tokarski, 1997).  
The results for training measures for non-transition economies are mixed, similar to 
those for transition economies. Studies suggest that vocational training, on the job 
training and general training have very small or no effect at all in increasing 
employment (Anxo et al., 2001; Estevao, 2003; Hujer et al., 2007; Dauth et al., 2010; 
Arranz et al., 2013). Anxo et al., (2001) argue that the ineffectiveness of training 
might be due to the lock-in effect and it is expected that this measure might become 
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effective only in the long-run. However, in their study, Dauth et al., (2010) even 
after taking account of this issue still find the same result. In contrast, some studies 
have found evidence to suggest that training measures are the most favourable 
among all the active measures in increasing employment (Bassanini and Duval, 
2007; Escudero, 2018).  
Active job search and counselling seem to have a positive effect in increasing 
employment in the short-term (Bassanini and Duval, 2007; Escudero, 2018). 
According to the results of some studies, the self-employment and start-up measures 
also seem to be effective (Altavilla and Caroleo, 2006; Escudero, 2018).   
The focus of this research is to analyse the effectiveness of ALMPs in transition 
countries which are characterised by large informal sectors. The next section will 
review the empirical studies which investigated the existence of informal labour 
markets in transition economies.  
2.6 Labour Market Duality and Informal Labour Markets  
The estimations of Schneider et al. (2010) suggest that the size of informal 
employment is relatively large in the transition countries. Recently, there has been an 
increased interest in investigating the effectiveness of ALMPs in countries with large 
informal sectors even though there is no established theory of the interaction 
between ALMPs and informal employment. This section will focus on the 
segmented labour market and the causes of informal employment, followed by a 
review of empirical studies estimating the existence of segmented market in 
transition economies.  
The dual labour market theory was developed by Doeringer and Piore (1971) who 
directed their analysis towards the continuing poverty and unemployment amongst 
segmented and disadvantaged workers in poorer urban areas in the United States of 
America. The development of the dual labour market theory came after the failed 
attempts by government to increase the economic participation of marginalised 
workers such as women and minorities. Doeringer and Piore (1971) conceptualised 
the labour market as consisting of two different sectors with high within sector 
mobility but restricted mobility between sectors. The theory of labour market duality 
supports the idea that the two labour market sectors are able to function independent 
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of each other because both sectors are divided by demand and supply side processes. 
In this context, the supply side refers to the characteristics of the worker such as 
level of education and the level of skills but also their perceived and actual attitude 
towards work. While the labour demand side comprises of the characteristics of jobs 
such demand for certain level of education and skills and employment protection and 
security.  
Doeringer and Piore (1971) distinguished the two sectors according to individual and 
job features and refers to them as primary and secondary sectors. The privileged 
members of the labour market are allocated to the primary sector which is regulated 
and offers employment protection and job security. The employment in this sector is 
stable, provides relatively high wages and good advancement prospects. 
Additionally, the primary sector also offers individuals bargaining power and the 
protection of the trade unions which is an important feature of the job security of the 
employees.  
The secondary sector comprises mostly of low-skilled jobs which usually do not 
need specific training to perform the job. According to the dual labour market 
theory, it is raw labour power that is required in this sector. Workers do not have 
employment protection and also do not have the possibility to complain because of 
lack of support from the trade unions. The secondary sector is very much 
unregulated and there are no seniority privileges as in the primary sector. 
Additionally, individuals who work in the secondary sector display a certain set of 
individual characteristics which are different from those in the primary sector. The 
individual‘s manners such as poor discipline, carelessness and high absenteeism 
make the workers in the secondary sector less reliable and trustworthy.  
The literature on the dual labour market argues that disadvantaged individuals in the 
labour market, such as women, youth, ethnic minorities and people coming from 
poorer social class are trapped in the informal sector of the labour market. Peck 
(1996) argues that workers are social actors and their employment prospects are 
predetermined out of the labour market. In a society where females are viewed as the 
child bearers while the males are expected to be the breadwinners of the family, their 
constructed social gender identities reflect also their prospects in the labour market 
(Bauder, 2001). This typically reflects the situation in many European transition 
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economies shown in Chapter 1, where males are more prone to be engaged in formal 
employment when they are head of the family and have children while females in 
same circumstances would be more likely to be informally employed. Further, the 
allocation of workers to jobs is a reflection of the ‗social class situation‘ where the 
social groups tend to remain in the same social class. Because of social closeness, the 
entrance to the two sectors is controlled by social groups such as gender, ethnic and 
groups of different social class. In European transition economies it is the most 
deprived social class and unskilled workers are over represented in the informal 
employment (Kogan, 2011). Migrants and minorities, for instance, face higher 
barriers to entry in the formal employment because they do not always have 
information and appropriate social network about the vacancies and formal jobs 
(Julia et al., 2015). Cultural differences also play an important role in allocation of 
the labour force into the two sectors. Bauder (2001) and Jackson (2012) link the 
cultural identification with economic opportunity and labour market outcomes. The 
cultural aspect associated with behaviour, norms and ethics influence individuals to 
pursue different educational goals and occupational choices which in turn will 
impact their opportunities in the segmented labour market. When recruiting, 
employers use the level of completed education and related characteristics, such as 
full-time or part-time education, private versus public, whether the workers dropped 
out of school, as a screen. In spite of representing workers‘ productivity, these 
educational biographies represent the workers‘ vulnerability which are more prone to 
be taking up jobs in the informal sector (Kogan, 2011). As discussed in Chapter 1, in 
European transition economies workers with lower education level comprise the 
largest share in the informal sector.  
However, Fields (1990) and Maloney (2004) acknowledge that the informal sector 
also attracts a segment of workers who participate in this sector by choice. Fields 
(1990) divided the informal sector into two subsectors, one which consists of 
disadvantaged workers where entrance is easy (the easy-entry informal sector) and 
the second where there are barriers to entry such as requirement of higher capital and 
skills (the upper-tier informal sector). The upper-tier sector entails long-term 
relationships between employers and employees, operates flexible hours and 
locations and employment of family members in this sector tends to be preferred. 
Typical upper tier informal sector activities are individually-owned and operated taxi 
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cabs. There is a relatively high cost involved in purchasing a taxi which entails 
barrier to entry, hours of work can be regular or irregular and the owner can employ 
an additional driver to operate during the night shift (Fields, 1990). The easy-entry 
subsector is better understood as opportunity of last resort or as a survival strategy 
for the excluded workers, while in the upper-tier subsector workers participate 
voluntarily. 
In contrast to the view of dual labour market, the two sectors might not necessarily 
be divided by the entry restrictions but the features of two sectors may co-exist in the 
same labour market (Maloney, 1999; 2004; Cunningham and Maloney, 2001). 
Maloney (2004) argue that informal workers make the decision to enter the labour 
market taking into consideration both sectors; the worker then will choose whichever 
sector offers a higher earning opportunity and also other higher benefits. In this 
context, Maloney (2004) argues that there is high mobility of workers between the 
two sectors. When Maloney (2004) and Fields (1990) argue the voluntary 
engagement of workers in the formal sector, they use this argument only for those 
who are self-employed or micro-entrepreneurs. As observed from the information 
analysed in Chapter 1, in transition economies informal self-employment is fairly 
rare and informal workers are overwhelmingly informal dependent employees 
(Slonimczyk, 2014). In this context, informal employment in transition economies is 
predominantly characterised by easy-entry informal rather than upper-tier informal 
markets.  
There is a considerable literature which analyses the factors that contribute to the 
emergence of informal labour markets. Regulatory distortions in formal labour 
markets, such as a relatively high minimum wage and strong union bargaining 
agreements may keep the wage in the formal sector above the market clearing level. 
Labour costs might also increase when taking into account benefits and severance 
pay which would result in inflated wages. High tax burdens and social security 
contributions increase the size of the informal sector; the larger the difference 
between the labour costs and the after-tax earnings the stronger the incentive to 
engage in informal employment (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Eilat and Zinnes, 2002; 
Schneider and Williams, 2013). Thus, labour market regulations and policies may 
tend to increase artificially labour costs and cause the labour market sector to be 
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divided. Subsequently, those who are not able to get an employment in the formal 
sector will be subject to find work in the informal sector.  
There are a few empirical studies that have analysed the labour market segmentation 
in transition economies. Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (1999) estimated labour market 
transition during the early transition period and found evidence to suggest that 
Estonia experienced high levels of mobility between informal and formal sectors. 
Earle and Sakova (2000) used multinomial logit analysis to distinguish between 
employers and own-account self-employed while comparing both groups to 
employees and the unemployed in six transition economies (Bulgaria, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Russia). They distinguished between employers 
who are considered as genuine business owners and own-account self-employed 
whose background is more ambiguous. Earle and Sakova suggest that own-account 
self-employed are typically engaged in the informal economy. This study also 
examined the earnings differences between individuals in different labour market 
states. The findings suggest positive earning differentials of own-account self-
employed compared to employees for all six transition countries and also positive 
selection into informal self-employment suggesting that these workers have a 
comparative advantage at being micro-entrepreneurs.  
Pages and Stampini (2007) also analysed wage differentials in three transition 
countries (Albania, Ukraine and Georgia) but found no evidence of a positive formal 
wage premium to informal salaried jobs and also found high mobility from informal 
to formal salaried jobs. In contrast, the findings from this study suggest that there is 
very low mobility between informal self-employment jobs and formal employment 
which suggest that there exist barriers to movement in both directions.  
Another study for Serbia used regression-based models to identify the determinants 
of the level of main job earning inequality between formal and informal sector 
(Krstic and Sanfey, 2010). The findings suggest that there is greater inequality of 
earnings in the informal sector relative to the formal sector. One possible reason for 
this is the minimum wage which was enforced in the formal sector during the period 
examined (2002 – 2007). The findings from the study suggest that there is high 
between-group earnings inequality of the same educational level of informal and 
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formal workers. The earnings inequality increased between 2002 and 2007, which 
highlighted the growing advantage of the formal employment.  
Lehman (2015) analysed the labour market segmentation of the Russian labour 
market employing two different approaches. The first approach used is the wage gap 
regression to assess if there is any wage gap between workers who are employed in 
formal and informal sectors. In order to assess whether there are barriers between 
formal and informal sectors, the second approach used is an estimation of mobility 
probabilities between labour market states. In order to assess the wage difference the 
study divided the informal employees into groups of high and low skilled. The study 
also assessed if individual ‗subjective‘ risk attitudes are linked to the labour market 
states. Findings from the wage regressions suggest that low skilled informal 
employees experience a significant wage penalty, while informal employees with 
high skills have the same wages as their formal counterparts. This finding suggests 
that the labour market for high skilled workers is integrated, while low skilled 
informal workers are faced with a segmented labour market. When analysing the 
mobility of workers in different sectors, Lehman divided employment into five 
distinct states: involuntary informal dependent employment, voluntary informal 
dependent employment, formal dependent employment, informal and formal self-
employment. The study found strong evidence to suggest that formal employees are 
the most risk-averse while self-employed and informal employees have the highest 
propensity to take risk.  
Empirical evidence on the existence of segmented labour markets in transition 
economies is mixed and no straightforward conclusion can be drawn. From the 
empirical findings one can argue that in transition economies there exist earning 
differential for low-skilled workers (Krstic and Sanfey, 2010; Lehman, 2015), 
however the same result is not found for high-skilled workers (Pages and Stampini, 
2007; Lehman, 2015). When analysing the mobility between informal and formal 
sectors, findings from Pages and Stampini (2007) indicate that there is low mobility 
between the two sectors while those from Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (1999) 
indicate high mobility. However, when analysing informal self-employment, the 
findings from Earle and Sakova (2000) and Pages and Stampini (2007) suggest that 
there is low mobility between informal and formal self-employment suggesting that 
the labour market for self-employment is highly segmented.  
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Considering the large informal sectors in transition economies there are significant 
additional policy implication for the effectiveness of ALMPs. According to Katz 
(1996), the effects of lowering labour costs are conceptually equivalent to providing 
wage subsidies to employers. Katz suggests that the effect of a reduction of labour 
costs is only clear cut when the supply is perfectly elastic or perfectly inelastic. In an 
extreme case, when the labour supply is perfectly elastic the result will be the 
increase in employment. In a pool of low skilled unemployed or informal workers, 
and where there is a statutory minimum wage, firms will expand employment 
without having to raise wages. While, in the other extreme, when the labour supply 
is perfectly inelastic the result will be an increase in wages because the subsidies will 
be passed on to employees, however no additional jobs will be created. As explained 
by Lehman and Muravyev (2012), the most realistic scenario in European Transition 
Economies is when the labour supply is positively elastic, a reduction of labour cost 
can lead to higher level of employment. Based on the empirical evidence, Katz 
(1996) argues that low skilled workers face higher elasticity of labour demand and 
supply than skilled workers. Thus, an increase in wage and direct subsidies for low 
skilled workers would provide an incentive to firms to employ more formal workers 
as opposed to informal ones and comply with employment legislation such as 
providing written contracts for their workers. Lehman and Muravyev (2012) argue 
that in the case of high structural unemployment this effect would be particularly 
large because these subsidies will reduce the skill mismatch. 
Transition economies‘ labour markets might be characterised by multiple equilibria. 
As explained in Snower‘s model (1994), the good equilibrium consists of a 
predominance of high-skill workers in the formal sector, while the bad equilibrium 
consists of a high proportion of low-skill workers in the informal sector. Taking into 
consideration that low-skilled workers are more likely to be engaged in the informal 
sector in transition economies, wage subsidies can improve employment prospects 
for this category of workers through lowering labour costs of the firm. Access to 
such subsidies provides incentives for a firm to switch from informal to formal 
sector. Skills enhancement of the informal workers through training or labour 
counselling, as active measures, might also improve their employment prospects in 
the formal sector. As discussed in section 2.2.3, training and on-the-job training 
increase employee‘s skills which in turn increase their productivity and as a 
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consequence will assist a transfer of the low-skilled labour from low-productivity 
(i.e. informal sector) to high-productivity sector (formal sector). In this context, 
ALMPs perform best when designed to target the low-skilled, that are mainly 
concentrated in the informal sector in transition economies, and as such ALMPs 
provide incentives for the firms to employ more formal workers rather than informal 
ones.   
2.7 Conclusions  
This chapter has provided a critical review of different theories of unemployment 
and the effectiveness of ALMPs at the economy wide level. It also discussed the 
causes of high unemployment rates and large informal employment in transition 
economies and provided a detailed discussion on empirical methodology widely 
used to evaluate the ALMP effectiveness at the economy level. Section 2.2.3 
concluded that there is a considerable number of identified effects of ALMPs: effects 
on the matching process, productivity effects, effects on labour force and 
competition in the labour market, deadweight loss and substitution effects, reduced 
welfare losses for the unemployed and work-test effects. The effects of ALMPs have 
been analysed based on the theoretical framework of Layard, Nickell and Jackman 
(1991). The discussion of the effects of ALMPs concluded that these effects can 
counteract each other and can also cause negative externalities in the labour market. 
Having found no explicit theoretical explanation of the effectiveness of ALMPs in 
the context of high informal employment, this chapter sought to analyse the role of 
active measures as incentives for firms to switch from informal to formal 
employment. This chapter also discussed the causes of general and youth 
unemployment in European transition economies and reviewed the empirical 
evidence assessing the nature of unemployment in these economies. The findings 
from the empirical studies are mixed, with most inclining to support the structuralist 
hypothesis of unemployment in transition economies. The matching function 
approach is the empirical methodology mostly employed for the analysis of ALMPs 
at the economy wide level. Matching functions have been acknowledged in the 
empirical literature as an appropriate approach to analyse the matching efficiency in 
the labour market in transition economies since they allow for Increasing Returns to 
Scale. As discussed in this chapter, labour markets in transition economies might be 
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characterised by multiple equilibria; with many ETEs, especially in South Eastern 
Europe, being trapped in a low-skill bad-job equilibrium. 
The conceptual framework of the matching methodology has been critically assessed 
in this chapter and will be used in Chapter 3 as the basis for the empirical analysis to 
evaluate the effectiveness of ALMPs in selected European transition economies. The 
discussion in this chapter also provides the theoretical framework for the empirical 
evaluation of ALMP at the individual level which will be conducted in Chapters 5 
and 6.  
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3.1 Introduction  
The analysis of the underlying theoretical framework and review of the empirical 
studies using matching function discussed in Chapter 2 provide the basis for the 
empirical analysis to be conducted in this chapter. As argued in Chapter 2, active 
labour market policies can impact on the labour market either through the wage-
setting or the price-setting schedules. Specifically, ALMPs have been argued to have 
the following potential effects on the labour market: effects on the matching process, 
productivity effects, effects on the size of the labour force and the level of 
competition in the labour market. The review of the empirical research of the 
transition context studies indicated that there is currently no solid consensus with 
regard to the effectiveness of ALMPs. Thus, this chapter provides additional 
empirical evidence in assessing the effectiveness of different active labour market 
policies at the economy-wide level.   
Most of the empirical studies assessing the effects of ALMPs have employed a 
matching function. These investigations have typically used the flow from 
unemployment to employment as the dependent variable and have employed regional 
administrative data on a quarterly or monthly basis. Because for the selected sample 
of countries, neither quarterly nor monthly data is available for variables measuring 
ALMPs, this chapter will utilise only annual level data for the period 2010 to 2015 
for European transition economies. The sample was further expanded to account for 
European non-transition economies in order to compare the effectiveness of ALMPs 
between the two groups of countries and due to the limited data available for 
transition economies. The second empirical approach will use a different dependent 
variable and estimation approach: separately including variables to account for the 
following active measures: training, employment incentives, supported employment 
and rehabilitation, direct job creation and start-up incentives. Data and model 
specifications of the two approaches are developed separately and the final models 
will be presented at the end of each discussion.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides a description of the active 
policies analysed in this empirical chapter. Section 3.3.1 provides a discussion of the 
model specification and data sources, while 3.3.2 will discuss the possible 
endogeneity of the ALMP variable. Section 3.3.3 will provide an explanation of the 
estimation methodology used for the first model which will be followed by section 
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3.3.4 which discusses the key descriptive statistics for the matching function and the 
main empirical findings. Section 3.4.1 will provide the model specification for the 
second approach where the dependent variable is the unemployment rate. Section 
3.4.2 provides a discussion of the estimation methodology used for dynamic panel 
models, their key advantages and possible limitations. Findings from the second 
model will be provided in section 3.4.3 while section 3.5 presents the conclusions of 
this chapter.  
3.2 Classification of Active Labour Market Policies according to 
Eurostat  
The ALMP variables are derived from Eurostat databases. Policy categories used in 
this chapter thus follow the Eurostat classification and definitions (Eurostat, 2016). 
These categories are: 
1. Labour market services – ―are all services and activities undertaken by the 
PES together with services provided by other public agencies or any other 
bodies contracted under public finance, which facilitate the integration of 
unemployed and other jobseekers in the labour market or which assist 
employers in recruiting and selecting staff” (Eurostat, 2018, p.13). This 
service covers the ad hoc information about the available vacancies, training 
and other forms of assistance together with job-brokerage services for 
employers. Labour market services also include individualised counselling 
aiming to provide a planned path for job-seekers towards durable 
(re)employment. These services also include all the administration, 
management and coordination of the employers and servicers engaged for all 
categories of ALMPs.  
1. Training – includes different forms of training aiming to improve the 
employability of target groups. There are three categories of training which 
are defined depending on the amount of time participants spend in the 
classroom or workplace with purpose of instruction. The first one is 
institutional training which covers measures where majority of the time is 
spent in the training institutions (at least 75% is spent on school, college, 
training centre etc.). The second form of training is the workplace training 
which covers those activities that are mostly spent in the workplace with 
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purpose of instruction by the supervisor (75% in the workplace) or entirely 
based on learning by doing or learning by experience. The third category is 
where training in which the time is more evenly split between on and off-the-
job.  
2. Employment incentives – ―covers measures that facilitate the recruitment of 
unemployed persons and other target groups, or help to ensure the continued 
employment of persons at risk of involuntary job loss” (Eurostat, 2018, p.17). 
These are subsidies for open market jobs which might exist or can be created, 
most likely in the private sector but also in public and non-profit sectors. The 
subsidy typically covers some remuneration for the employed person while a 
majority of the labour costs is covered by the employer.  
3. Supported employment and rehabilitation – ―covers measures providing 
subsidies for the productive employment of persons with a permanently (or 
long-term) reduced capacity to work‖ (Eurostat, 2018, p.18). This measure 
consists of subsidies for the employment of individuals with a long-term 
unemployment, disabled job-seekers, those who are going through 
rehabilitation after an accident or illness, recovering drug-addicts and other 
groups who are not work-ready and may benefit from rehabilitation.  
4. Direct job creation – ―covers measures that create additional jobs, usually of 
community benefit or socially useful, in order to find employment for the 
long-term unemployed persons otherwise difficult to place” (Eurostat, 2018, 
p.19). This usually refers to subsidised jobs for temporary, non-market jobs 
which would not exist without the help of public intervention. This subsidy 
aims to assist the unemployed by increasing their employability. 
5. Start-up incentives – ―covers measures that promote entrepreneurship by 
encouraging the unemployed and other target groups to start their own 
business or to become self-employed” (Eurostat, 2018, p. 20). This form of 
subsidy can be distributed through cash benefits or indirect loans, provision 
of facilities, business advice etc. These measures may also support new 
businesses to take on their first employees from the target groups. Start-up 
incentives are accounted as ALMPs only when they target specified groups 
of unemployed or non-participants, generally available business start-up 
subsidies are not included in this category.    
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The following section provides an explanation of the approach taken in the first 
empirical investigation of this chapter. Section 3.3.1 provides the model 
specification while section 3.3.2 discusses the potential endogeneity of the ALMP 
variable and assesses the instrumentation strategies used by previous empirical 
studies. Following this discussion, section 3.3.3 provides an explanation of the 
estimation techniques for panel data employed in this empirical investigation. while 
section 3.3.4 discusses the empirical results.  
3.3 Empirical Approach for Model 1 – Matching Function  
In order to provide an overview of the effects of the ALMPs on the national labour 
markets this chapter will use two model specifications. The first model is a matching 
function where the dependent variable is the outflow from unemployment to 
employment, i.e. the number of matches made between the unemployed and unfilled 
vacancies. This section will discuss the specification of the model of the outflows 
from unemployment to employment, where the key variable of interest is measured 
as total expenditure on ALMPs as percentage of GDP. The section below provides a 
discussion of the model specification.  
3.3.1 Model Specification  
As elaborated in Chapter 2, the effectiveness of ALMPs is most appropriately 
assessed through the matching function approach. The suitability of the matching 
function approach lies in the minimal complexity of this approach. A matching 
function summarizes the mechanism of matching the vacancies advertised by firms 
and the unemployed who are searching for jobs through employment agencies, 
reading advertisements in the newspapers or utilising their social networks. The 
simplest form of a matching function is a model where the dependent variable is the 
outflow from unemployment to employment and it is regressed on two main 
explanatory variables: (i) the number of unemployed workers searching for a job and 
(ii) the number of open vacancies.  A detailed explanation of the matching function 
and its‘ appropriateness in assessing the effectiveness of ALMPs is provided in 
section 2.4. 
It was argued in Chapter 2 that not only do the stocks of unemployment and 
vacancies affect the efficiency of matching but also the flow of new entrants into the 
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pool of unemployment and flows of the new vacancies into the existing stock of 
vacancies. Chapter 2 explained that the unemployment stock at period t cannot be 
simply matched with the vacancy stock at time period t. Hence in order to find a 
match, the existing unemployed may wait until the next period when new vacancies 
(flow of new vacancies) are opened and similarly the existing vacancies may remain 
open until new entrants join the unemployment pool (inflows to unemployment pool) 
(Coles and Smith, 1996; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). Following this argument, 
only the lagged values of unemployment and vacancy stocks are included in the 
model. With regard to the flow independent variables, due to data limitations, only 
the variable accounting for the flows of new entrants into the unemployment will be 
included in the model. The stock-flow matching is depicted in Figure 3.1.  
Figure 3.1 The process of stock-flow matching 
 
Source: Munich and Svejnar (2009), p.10. 
Note: UEflow is the number of people transitioning from unemployment to employment and Uflow is 
the number of people transitioning to the unemployment pool. 
Theories of search and matching generally do not suggest a specific functional form 
but most of the studies use a Cobb-Douglas function written in a deterministic form 
of discrete observations as following:  
                                                     
                                
The observational unit is the country i, at year t. The dependent variable, 
           , is the flow from unemployment to employment during period t, 
              and                  are the number of unemployed and vacancies 
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at the end of period    , respectively,     is the unobserved time invariant country 
specific effect and      is the idiosyncratic error term. This form of matching function 
will be augmented to account for the effects of ALMP expenditure as a share of GDP 
and control variables which are presented in table 3.1 and are discussed individually 
below. 
According to Munich and Svejnar (2009), unless the matching function exhibits 
constant returns to scale, not controlling for respective labour market size may lead 
to biased coefficients (omitted variable bias). The bias arises from the positive 
correlation between                             and the labour force size 
     . The direction of bias would be negative if the unemployment and vacancy 
stocks are positively correlated with labour force size and matching displays 
increasing returns to scale. On the other hand, a positive bias would be present in 
case of negative correlation of these variables or decreasing returns to scale. The bias 
is greater the greater is the  correlation between the measures with the labour force 
size. Hence, labour force size,      , is included in the model to adjust for the labour 
market size and avoid the omitted variable problem.  
As the review of the empirical studies emphasised in Chapter 2, an individual 
recently entering unemployment (flow into unemployment) typically has a higher 
probability to match with existing vacancies (stocks) compared to those that were 
unemployed in period t-1, since it is expected that a match would have happened 
already if the previous period‘s vacancies were suitable (Coles and Smith, 1996; 
Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001; Coles and Petrongolo, 2003). To reflect this ‗stock-
flow‘ matching and assess the matching efficiencies of the new entrants, two flow 
variables accounting for the new entrants in the unemployment from the inactive 
state,          , and from employment,          , are typically included in the 
model. As section 2.3.1 pointed out, empirical studies for transition economies so far 
did not distinguish between the flows into unemployment from different labour 
market states. When comparing the two flows, individuals transitioning from 
employment to unemployment would typically be more attached to the labour 
market, thus it is expected that they would have higher matching efficiency 
compared to those transitioning from an inactive state to unemployment. Due to 
being inactive for a certain period, workers recently joining the labour market might 
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face a longer search period before finding a job because they have less information 
about the open vacancies. Moreover, employers might prefer hiring those who until 
recently were employed rather than those who were inactive because the former may 
be expected to be, on average, more productive.  
Different groups of the unemployed may have different search intensities, might be 
more adaptable and might have different willingness to accept specific job offers 
such as those for temporary jobs and also, employer attitudes may differ towards 
these groups (discrimination and expectations regarding potential productivity). 
Given the analysis presented above, the specific groups included in the model are the 
share of young unemployed (ShYoungUn), the share of long-term unemployed 
(ShLongUn), and the share of unemployed women (ShWomen).  Several studies 
using a matching function argue that the share of youths in total unemployment is 
expected to increase the number of transitions from unemployment to employment 
due in part to youths usually demonstrating higher adaptability and higher search 
intensity (Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz, 2009; Tyrowicz and Wojcik, 2010; Tomic, 
2012). In addition, young people are more likely to accept temporary jobs and they 
are expected to move in and out of employment more often compared to their older 
counterparts. The share of long-term unemployed as percentage of total 
unemployment is included in the model because the long-term unemployed (more 
than one year) might be expected to have different unobserved characteristics 
compared to those short-term unemployed. As discussed in Chapter 2, the long-term 
unemployed may be discouraged, stigmatised as being less-productive and have 
deteriorated human capital. According to Tomic (2012), the share of long-term 
unemployment may capture both business cycle effects and more structural 
difficulties (employers‘ behaviour, skill or occupational mismatch). An increase in 
the share of long-term unemployment is expected to reduce the number of 
individuals transitioning from unemployment to employment, ceteris paribus, thus 
the sign of this variable is expected to be negative. Women are also expected, ceteris 
paribus, to have lower search efficiency and experience lower matching compared to 
men (Tomic, 2012; Barnichon and Figura, 2015). This is because of discrimination 
in the labour market: some employers tend to prefer men for certain occupations for 
reasons unrelated to potential productivity (Anker, 1997). Also, women are expected 
to spend more time with childcare and other family responsibilities hence reducing 
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their search intensity. Due to occupational segregation and perceived and actual 
discrimination, women may reduce their search for higher paying and more desirable 
positions but disproportionately search for temporary jobs and lower ranking jobs. In 
this context, Tomic (2012) argues that labour markets with a larger percentage of 
females searching for jobs will tend to have lower matching efficiency.  
The augmented matching function will include a variable measuring the expenditure 
on ALMPs as share of GDP, ALMPExp. The effects of ALMPs were extensively 
discussed in section 2.2.3; it is expected that an increase in the ALMP expenditure as 
a percentage of GDP will increase the number of individuals transitioning from 
unemployment to employment. As also discussed in Chapter 2, Snower (1994) 
argues that there should be a large infusion of ALMPs in the labour market in order 
for these policies to be effective in shifting the bad-job equilibrium to the good-job 
equilibrium. Hence, the size of ALMPs might exhibit nonlinear relationship with the 
dependent variable and the quadratic form of ALMP is included in the model to 
adjust for this potential nonlinear relationship.  
Control Variables  
A control variable measuring Passive Labour Market Policies (PLMP) (the total of 
Out-of-Work income maintenance and support and Early Retirement policies) 
measured as expenditure on PLMP as a percentage of GDP (PLMPExp)
15
 is included 
in the model based on the theoretical rationale that more generous unemployment 
benefit systems affect the willingness to accept a job via different mechanisms 
(Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell, 1997, Cazes, 2003). Bassanini and Duval (2006) argue that 
higher unemployment benefits available to the unemployed for a longer period 
reduce job search intensity thus weakening the job-matching process. Also those 
unemployed receiving unemployment benefits will tend to have higher reservation 
wages, thus reducing the effectiveness of these unemployed as potential fillers of 
vacancies since it becomes more costly for employers to hire new workers. Nickell 
(1997) also points out that when unemployment is high and more persistent, 
                                                          
15
 A variable measuring the expenditure per PLMP beneficiary was considered to be included in the 
model instead of the PLMP expenditure as share of GDP. However according to Eurostat (2016), data 
on the number of beneficiaries are not reliable, hence variable expenditure per PLMP beneficiary 
could not be calculated.  
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countries may increase the level of benefits to support the unemployed, so the 
causality is not from benefits to unemployment but rather the other way around. 
However, the empirical evidence does not show a clear consensus with regard to this 
relationship (Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell, 1997; Cazes, 2002; Nunziata, 2002; Lehman 
and Muravyev, 2009). It is expected that an increase in PLMP expenditure as 
percentage of GDP will reduce the number of individuals transitioning from 
unemployment to employment, i.e. will reduce matching efficiency.  
As argued in section 2.4, a variable measuring the size of the informal economy 
(Informality) is included in the model to assess its effect on the matching efficiency. 
Schneider and Williams (2013) emphasise that there is a dispute regarding the most 
appropriate methodology to assess the scope of the informal economy since because 
of its‘ nature it is quite difficult to measure. This investigation uses estimates of the 
size of informality by Schneider (2015) based on the MIMIC (Multiple Indicator and 
Multiple Cause) estimation procedure. Schneider and Williams (2013) explain that 
the informal economy can be estimated quantitatively based on the causes and 
indicators of the informal economy. The causes of informal economy include the 
level of the tax burden and the intensity of regulation, while indicators include 
money demand, official national income figures and total hours worked in the 
economy. According to Buehn and Schneider (2012), the relationship between 
unemployment and the size of the informal economy is theoretically ambiguous. 
When the unemployed search and take jobs in the informal labour market the 
behaviour of unemployment depends on whether or not informal workers are 
considered unemployed in official statistics. In the case when the informal worker is 
considered unemployed, the flow from unemployment to employment estimate 
would not change. On the other hand if informal workers are considered employed, 
the flow from unemployment to employment increases and one would observe a 
positive relationship between the dependent variable (lnUEflow) and the size of the 
informal economy (Informality). The data used for this empirical analysis are based 
on national Labour Force Surveys which are designed to cover informal 
employment. Considering the arguments presented above, the expected sign of 
informal economy is positive: i.e. the higher the informal economy the higher the 
flows from unemployment to employment. It can also be argued that there might be 
a reverse causality between the informality variable and the dependent variable 
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which could result in endogeneity. Schneider and Williams (2013) argue that higher 
unemployment might give rise to informal employment because those unemployed 
who are unable to find a job in the formal sector will be compelled to work in the 
informal sector.  Having argued a possible endogeneity issue, the lagged value of 
variable Informality is included in the model.  
GDP growth (GDPgrowth) is another control variable included in the model 
specification to capture the labour demand fluctuations within countries. The values 
of this variable are expressed in annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market 
prices based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Following the theoretical arguments of 
Cazes (2002) and Lehman and Muravyev (2009), GDP growth aims to better account 
for macroeconomic shocks and demand fluctuations. It is expected that an increase 
in GDP growth, ceteris paribus, increases the number of transitions from 
unemployment to employment
16
.  
The model also incorporates the relationship between the matching efficiency and 
the level of the economic freedom. The testable hypothesis is that countries with 
greater economic freedom have a larger number of transitions from unemployment 
to employment. Greater economic freedom encourages a higher level of 
entrepreneurial activity and creation of small businesses (Kreft and Sobel, 2005). It 
also affects the transitions from unemployment to employment by reducing the 
regulatory and financial costs on employers in the country (Karabegovic and 
McMahon, 2008). This investigation will use the Economic Freedom Index 
(EcoFreeIndex) constructed by the Heritage Foundation which is based on a set of 
10 different aspects (Property rights, Freedom from corruption, Fiscal freedom, 
Government spending, Business freedom, Labour freedom, Monetary freedom, 
Trade freedom, Investment freedom, Financial freedom). The economic freedom 
indices are based on a 10 point scale with higher values representing greater 
freedom. The expected sign of this variable is positive, i.e. the higher the economic 
freedom of a country, the larger the number of matches.  
Labour Freedom Index (LabFreeIndex) is included in the model to account for 
various aspects of the legal and regulatory framework of a country‘s labour market, 
                                                          
16
 GDP growth may not affect transitions into employment positively if at the same time productivity 
increases proportionately (Nordhouse, 2005; Balls, 2008). 
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including regulations concerning minimum wages, laws inhibiting layoffs, severance 
requirements and measurable regulatory restraints on hiring and hours worked. This 
index is also derived from the Heritage Foundation and is also based on a 10 point 
scale with higher value of the indicator representing a more flexible labour market. 
In general, empirical research supports the argument that rigid labour markets have 
the tendency to hinder job creation and tend to be associated with higher levels of 
unemployment (Nickell, 1997; Bassanini and Duval, 2006; Bernal-Verdugo et al., 
2012) and those mostly affected are the young unemployed (Botero et al., 2004). It is 
expected that greater labour market freedom, ceteris paribus, increases the number of 
transitions from unemployment to employment. The model uses lagged values of 
EcoFreeIndex and LabFreeIndex because it is believed that a lag exists between the 
time when the government policies are implemented and the effect of these policies 
on the labour market, hence it is reasonable to model the transition from 
unemployment to employment as a function of previous period‘s government 
policies (Heckelman, 2005; Garrett and Rhine, 2011). 
Given that education has a major influence in the labour market outcomes (Card, 
2001; Grossman, 2006; Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2009), this investigation will test 
the hypothesis that more educated individuals are more likely to find jobs than their 
less educated counterparts. The level of education is included in the model with two 
variables that capture the share of labour force that attained or completed secondary 
(EduSecondary) or tertiary education (EduTertiary) as the highest level of education. 
An increase in share of individuals in the labour force with higher levels of 
education, ceteris paribus, is expected to increase the number of transitions from 
unemployment to employment.  
The Population Density (PopDensity) variable intends to capture the probability that 
a contact is established between the right worker and employer (Ibourk et al., 2004; 
Tomic, 2012). The variable measuring population density serves as a proxy for the 
size of social networks and the efficiency of information transmissions. Ibourk et al. 
(2004) argue that the population density variable tends to adjust for the effects 
‗labour market thickness‘. A thick labour market represents a higher and more 
effective number of participants in the market, employers and workers, which tends 
to improve the search efficiency either through increasing returns to scale in search 
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or through increased flexibility in each agent‘s choice of where to search (McLaren, 
2003). Coles and Smith (1996) argue that search efficiency improves in a labour 
market with a higher population density because the communication between parties 
close to each other requires lower effort and costs. However, Kano and Ohta (2005) 
suggest that the heterogeneity of the job seekers and vacancies may be higher in 
more densely populated areas increasing search frictions. Thus there might be 
difficulties in the matching process despite the agents being close to each other in a 
geographical sense. Ibourk et al. (2004) and Wahba and Zenou (2005) introduce the 
quadratic form of the population density variable. Wahba and Zenou (2005) 
conclude that as long as population density remains an (undefined) ‗reasonable size‘, 
it has a positive impact on matching efficiency, but this effect might become 
negative for labour markets with very high population densities. Following this 
argument, the quadratic form of Popdensity is included in the model to capture the 
potential nonlinear relationship between population density and the dependent 
variable. It is expected that an increase in population density increases the number of 
transitions from unemployment to employment up to a point and then have a 
negative impact of the matching efficiency.  
In order to examine the difference in matching efficiency between transition and 
non-transition economies an additional variable (Transition) is created: a dummy 
variable taking value of 1 if it is a transition or post-transition economy and 0 
otherwise. Also, an interaction term between Transition and ALMPExp (TransAlmp) 
is also introduced to examine potential differences in the effectiveness of ALMPs in 
the two groups of countries.  
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Variable description, labels, the expected signs and data sources are summarised in 
table 3.1 presented below.  
Table 3.1 Variable Specifications and Expected Signs – 1st approach 
Variable Name  Variable Description  Expect
ed Sign  
Data Source  
Dependent Variable 
UEflow  
 
The flow from unemployment to employment at the end of 
period  , i.e. the number of successful matches  
  
EUROSTAT  
Main Variables of Interest    
UnemSt  The number of unemployed at the end of the period 
 
 EUROSTAT  
Vacancies  The number of job vacancies at the end of the period  EUROSTAT  
IUflow  The number of new entrants from inactive to 
unemployment stock at the end of the period  
 EUROSTAT 
EUflow The number of new entrants from employment to 
unemployment stock at the end of the period  
 EUROSTAT 
ShYoungUn  The share of youth unemployment in total unemployment   + EUROSTAT  
ShLongUn The share of long-term unemployment in total 
unemployment 
- EUROSTAT 
ShWomenUn The share of women unemployment in total 
unemployment 
- EUROSTAT 
ALMPExp 
 
 
 
 
1.TrainSh 
2.EmpIncSh  
3.SupportSh 
4.DirectJobSh 
5.StartupSh 
Active labour market policies measured as expenditure as 
percentage of GDP and  
Different types of active policies measured as share of 
ALMPExp: 
  
1. Share of expenditure on training in total ALMP 
expenditure,  
2. Share of expenditure on employment incentives in 
total ALMP expenditure,  
3. Share of expenditure on supported employment and 
rehabilitation in total ALMP expenditure, 
4. Share of expenditure on direct job creation in total 
ALMP expenditure  
5. Share of expenditure on start-up incentives in total 
ALMP expenditure. 
+ EUROSTAT 
Control Variables     
LFor Total labour force comprises people aged 15 and older 
who meet the International Labour Organization definition 
of the economically active population: all people who 
supply labour for the production of goods and services 
during a specified period. It includes both the employed 
and the unemployed.  
+/- WORLD 
BANK 
Informality MIMIC index measure of the size of the shadow economy. + Schneider 
(2015)  
PLMPExp 
 
Passive labour market policies measured as expenditure as 
a % of GDP 
- EUROSTAT 
PopDensity Population density is midyear population divided by land 
area in square kilometres. Population is based on the de 
facto definition of population, which counts all residents 
regardless of legal status or citizenship.  
+ WORLD 
BANK 
EduSecondary 
 
 
EduTertiary 
1. Labour force with secondary education - The share of 
the total labour force that attained or completed 
secondary education as the highest level of education. 
2. Labour force with tertiary education - The share of the 
total labour force that attained or completed tertiary 
+ 
 
 
+ 
WORLD 
BANK 
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education as the highest level of education. 
GDPgrowth  Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices 
based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on 
constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for 
depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
+ WORLD 
BANK 
LabFreeIndex  A quantitative measure that considers various aspects of 
the legal and regulatory framework of a country‘s labour 
market, including regulations concerning minimum wages, 
laws inhibiting layoffs, severance requirements, and 
measurable regulatory restraints on hiring and hours 
worked. 
+ The Heritage 
Foundation  
EcoFreeIndex The overall measure of economic freedom based on 10 
different aspects (Property rights, Freedom from 
corruption, Fiscal freedom, Government spending, 
Business freedom, Labour freedom, Monetary freedom, 
Trade freedom, Investment freedom, Financial freedom). 
+ The Heritage 
Foundation  
Transition Dummy variable taking value of 1 if it is a transition 
economy 
  
TransAlmp Interaction term between Transition and ALMPExp   
 
3.3.2 Endogeneity of Active Labour Market Policies and Potential 
Instrumental Variables 
In macroeconomic evaluation studies of ALMP effectiveness in reducing 
unemployment and improving matching efficiency, a fundamental issue is that 
ALMP cannot be treated as strictly exogenous. The level of ALMP expenditure may 
depend on the labour market situation, so it is not only ALMP expenditure that may 
affect the unemployment rate but it is also possible that the unemployment rate 
affects the level of ALMP expenditures, e.g. governments base their ALMP 
expenditure decisions on the magnitude of the problem they face. Ignoring the latter 
could lead to a correlation of the ALMP variable with the error term and 
consequently to inconsistent estimates of the effects.  
In attempting to address this causality issue, studies have applied different 
approaches and used different instrumental variables. Scarpetta (1996) and Elmeskov 
et al. (1998) have used a time invariant variable measuring the average ALMP 
expenditure per unemployed person relative to GDP per capita over the period of the 
available data. Since these are time invariant country-specific averages over the 
observed period of time, the authors argue that there is no endogeneity bias. An issue 
with this approach is that it requires the assumption that country-specific effects are 
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randomly distributed. Similarly, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) apply country-
specific effects while using the same instrumental variable as Scarpetta (1996) and 
Elmeskov et al. (1998). This approach seems not suitable because, this empirical 
analysis needs variation in ALMP expenditure over time in order to estimate its 
effect on the unemployment rate. This is especially important for the second model 
of this empirical analysis, given the long period of data used (2005 to 2014). When 
analysing ALMP effectiveness for the Czech Republic, Boeri and Burda (1996) use 
quarterly data while using the average of ALMP expenditure per unemployed for a 
period of four quarters. In conducting a cross-country analysis, Escudero (2018) 
assumes that the ALMP expenditure as a share of GDP is not endogenous if each 
government commits a given fraction of GDP to ALMP which does not change with 
the unemployment rate, effectively assuming away the possibility of endogeneity.  
To create an instrument for the ALMP expenditure variable, Nickell and Layard 
(1999) and Boone and Van Ours (2004) have renormalized the percent of GDP 
expenditure on ALMP on the lagged unemployment rate.
17
 Boone and Van Ours 
(2004) also introduced shares of expenditure on separate ALMP categories in total 
expenditures as explanatory variables. Whereas the variable measuring the ALMP 
expenditure may be subject to endogeneity, share variables are not expected to be 
endogenous.   
Potential instrumental variables proposed in previous studies include political 
factors, the proportion of welfare recipients, national unemployment rate and 
vacancy rate (Hagen, 2003; Hujer and Zeiss, 2005; Escudero, 2018). It has been 
argued that left-wing political parties have a stronger preference for expenditure on 
ALMP than liberal-conservative parties (Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995; Büttner and 
Prey, 1998; Hagen, 2003; Escudero, 2018).  Hagen (2003) when analysing the 
matching efficiency of ALMPs in Germany, uses the proportion of votes in the 
national election for liberal-conservative parties as an instrument to account for the 
potential endogeneity of the ALMP measure. Escudero (2018) uses a set of different 
indicators of the political party in office: the first one is the cabinet composition 
measured as the percentage of right-wing or left-wing parties in total cabinet posts 
                                                          
17
 The instrumental variable is:       
       
              
, where u is the unemployment rate and l is the labour 
force. 
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weighted by the days in office while the second indicator corresponds to the 
Schmidt-Index which takes the value of 1 to 5 depending on whether there is a 
dominance of right-wing or left-wing parties in office. Other instruments used by 
Escudero (2018) include a continuous variable accounting for the number of years 
that have passed since a change in government in that country and an indicator 
taking the value of 1 if a reform to ALMPs was put in place in that year in the 
country and 0 otherwise. Despite their wide use in empirical studies, these particular 
instrumental variables may not to be appropriate when analysing the effectiveness of 
ALMPs in transition economies. One reason is that the political system in many 
transition economies is not defined strictly based on a left-right dimension as in the 
Western economies. 
Another instrumental variable proposed by Hagen (2003) and Escudero (2018) is the 
national unemployment rate. They argue that because it is the central issue in 
determining the judgement by the voters, then a government might seek to reduce 
open unemployment by increasing the number of participants in active measures. 
Since this variable is used as the dependent variable in the second model and is 
highly correlated with the dependent variable in the first model in this empirical 
analysis, it cannot be used as an instrument. Hagen (2003) also argues that the 
national vacancy rate
18
 can be used as instrumental variable arguing that with a 
reduction in the national vacancy rate, government might increase the ALMP 
expenditure in an attempt to reduce unemployment, thus this instrumental variable 
might serve as a business cycle indicator. In the first model, the level of vacancies is 
used as one of the components of the matching functions thus the vacancy rate is not 
an appropriate instrument. Another instrumental variable used by Munich and 
Svejnar (2009) is the share of unemployed who are within 0-3 months before the 
expiration of their unemployment benefits. They argue that the ALMP funds are 
often allocated preferentially to those who lose their entitlement to unemployment 
benefits. Munich and Svejnar (2009) include another variable as an instrument to 
account for ALMPs which is the share of high-school graduates in the total 
population of their age cohort arguing that a significant portion of ALMP funds is in 
employment subsidies for school leavers. This study is specifically modelled for 
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 Measured as: Number of job vacancies / (number of occupied posts + number of job vacancies) * 
100 
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Germany and both these instrumental variables are appropriate for this country but 
not necessarily for other countries. Hence, these instrumental variables may not be 
appropriate to use for the empirical analysis in this chapter. In general, the 
instrumental variables mentioned above which are commonly used to account for 
endogeneity when assessing the ALMP effects at the economy level do not provide 
an adequate set of instruments. They typically have hardly any predictive power of 
the effectiveness of ALMP measures and are still likely to be correlated with the 
residual term of the regression equation. Most of the studies analysing the 
effectiveness of the ALMPs at the economy wide level suggest a lagged ALMP 
variable as the more appropriate instrumental variable (Puhani and Steiner, 1996; 
Puhani, 1999; Hagen, 2003; Hujer and Zeiss, 2003; Munich and Svejnar, 2009). 
Puhani and Steiner (1996) argue that it takes a period of time until the ALMP 
policies can show any effect on the labour market. In this context, they suggest that 
lagged policy variable adjusts for endogeneity of the ALMPs. Thus, the dynamic 
panel model seems to be the preferred model when analysing ALMP effectiveness 
(Puhani, 1999; Hujer and Zeiss, 2003; Hujer et al., 2004; Munich and Svejnar, 
2009). Hujer et al. (2004) also point out the importance of the number of lags to be 
included in the specification. In Hujer et al. (2004) where they use quarterly data in a 
dynamic panel model (system Generalised Methods of Moments), they include four 
lags of the ALMP measure because, in context of their study, ALMPs have a 
duration of about 8 to 10 months. Boeri and Burda (1995) also apply a dynamic 
panel in a quarterly dataset; however, in attempting to avoid endogeneity, they use 
the yearly average of ALMP expenditure per unemployed. As discussed in Chapter 
2, Munich and Svejnar (2009) apply three different estimators for several Central 
and Eastern European economies (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland). 
They use a monthly dataset and apply fixed and random effects, instrumental 
variable estimator and a dynamic panel data model for a matching function 
approach. Considering the possible endogeneity of the ALMP measure and that of 
other components of matching function, unemployment and vacancies, it is 
concluded that dynamic panel modelling is the preferred approach because the 
‗internal instruments‘ account for endogeneity.  
In order to address the potential endogeneity of ALMP expenditure, we applied an 
instrumental variable approach using two different instruments: the lagged value of 
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ALMPExp and variable Cabinet Party Composition Index which takes value of 1 to 
10 depending on whether there is a dominance of left-wing or right-wing parties in 
the cabinet (CompGov). The endogeneity test from instrumental variable approach 
suggested that ALMPExp can be treated as exogenous in the model specification 
including all explanatory variables in the matching function (the estimation from 
instrumental variable approach can be seen in Appendix A3.8). However, taking into 
account theoretical considerations that the ALMPExp is likely to be endogenous we 
use the lagged value ALMPExp in FEDK and FEVK and difference GMM which 
accounts for endogeneity. The following section provides a detailed discussion of 
estimators which will be used in the first model while section 3.4.2 will discuss the 
estimation approach for the second model.  
3.3.3 Estimation Methodology  
According to Baltagi (2005), using panel data would be beneficial to the analysis 
since it provides more information, more variability, less collinearity among the 
variables, more degrees of freedom and it also the accounts for heterogeneity among 
the units and the dynamics of adjustment. The most commonly used methodological 
approach using panel data are fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE). A crucial 
assumption of the random effects estimator is that the unobserved individual effect, 
  , is assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables whereas the fixed 
effects estimator allows for correlation between the unobserved individual effect and 
the explanatory variables. In the case when the cross-country component is assumed 
to be correlated with the explanatory variables, the FE estimator allows for the 
constant term to vary across different countries while the coefficients from the RE 
would be biased and inconsistent. Hausman (1978) introduced a test to determine the 
appropriateness of the random effects estimator (Greene, 2002; Wooldridge, 2009). 
The rejection of null hypothesis of the Hausman test suggests that the fixed effects 
are favoured (Greene, 2002; Wooldridge, 2009).  
A potential problem for the fixed effects estimator is the cross-sectional dependence, 
i.e. the dependence of errors across different sectional units. This may be a result of 
spatial dependence, omitted unobserved common components (common shocks) or 
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economic differences (Pesaran, 2004; Sarafidis et al., 2009).
19
 Cross-sectional 
dependence is a common feature of panel data analysis because during the periods of 
global shocks, such as those observed in the 1970s and Global Financial Crisis in 
2008, labour markets across countries are influenced (Gabrisch and Buscher, 2006; 
Bakas and Papapetrou, 2012).
20
 In the presence of cross-sectional dependence, not 
correcting for cross-sectional dependence would result in statistically spurious 
results (Pesaran, 2004). An alternative to the standard FE estimator which corrects 
for cross-sectional dependency is proposed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998). According 
to their results from Monte Carlo simulations, the estimation from the Driscoll-
Kraay estimator provides standard errors which are simultaneously robust to 
autocorrelation heteroscedasticity, and cross-sectional dependency (Driscoll and 
Kraay, 1998; Hoechle, 2007). Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are highly 
likely to be present in panel data analysis. Heteroskedasticity is likely to be present 
because countries with differences in terms of their level of economic development 
and size are included in the sample. Autocorrelation can also occur in panel data 
since errors associated with a given period may carry over from the previous time 
period. Hoechle (2007) emphasises that one should be cautious when using Driscoll-
Kraay estimator in panel models which contain a large cross-section but only a very 
short time dimension. 
An important disadvantage of the fixed effects estimator is the inability to estimate 
the time-invariant variables because it uses a transformation to remove the 
unobserved country specific effect and all the time-invariant explanatory variables 
before estimation (Wooldridge, 2009). The fixed effects vector decomposition 
(FEVD) is an estimator which allows for time-invariant variables and slowly moving 
variables through time. It is a three-step estimator where in the first step the standard 
FE is estimated with time-variant variables. The second step uses unit effects which 
is extracted from the regression in the previous stage, and is estimated on time-
invariant and slowly changing variables. During this stage it becomes possible to 
decompose the unit effects into the observed component which is explained by these 
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 It is important to emphasise that for unbalanced panel data it is not possible to verify the presence 
of cross-sectional dependence. 
20
 Theoretically, studies suggest it is reasonable to think that there is cross dependency of the 
countries included in the sample. There is some empirical evidence that suggests that there are 
common factors and interdependence of labour markets in European countries (Cuestas and Gil-
Alana, 2011; Gozgor, 2013). 
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variables and the unobserved component which is the unexplained part. In stage 
three, it uses all time-variant and time-invariant explanatory variables and the 
residuals (unexplained part) from the stage two in a pooled OLS model. Plümper and 
Troeger (2007) after conducting a series of Monte-Carlo simulations suggested that 
this estimator is preferred to pooled OLS and RE in treating time-invariant and 
slowly changing variables. They suggest that this estimator has better finite sample 
properties and it produces more accurate estimates. Plümper and Troeger (2007) 
argue that even inconsistent FEVD estimates might be more reliable than consistent 
FE estimates because the presence of slowly changing variable in a FE setting can 
produce imprecise coefficients. Moreover, they argue that a FEVD estimator is more 
efficient because it produces a smaller within and between variance.
21
 In the case of 
this empirical investigation using FEVD becomes possible to account for time-
invariant variables in our model, such as Transition (dummy variable accounting for 
transition or post-transition economies in the sample), and the slowly-changing 
variable TransALMP (the interaction term between Transition and ALMPExp).  
Munich and Svejnar (2009) suggest that in panel data analysis a suitable within 
transformation of equation (3.1) can be used to remove the unobserved effect using 
both mean deviations from country specific means (fixed effects) and first 
differences. In the matching function, explanatory variables, unemployment and 
vacancy stock, are predetermined by the previous matching process through flow 
identities. Following Munich and Svejnar‘s (2009) argument that the components of 
the matching function (UnemSt, Vacancies) are predetermined by their previous 
values but also considering the endogenous nature of ALMPExp variable, 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) would be the ideal choice in this case. 
However, it could not be used due to a small sample size.  
The following section presents evidence from the matching function with fixed 
effects estimator using lagged level of the explanatory endogenous variable 
ALMPExp. Moreover, all the models for this analysis have been augmented by 
including a set of time dummies to account for universal time-related shocks 
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In contrast, some studies criticised this estimator suggesting that the efficiency gains are not as 
evident as argued by the previous study (Breusch et al., 2011; Greene, 2011). Greene (2011) 
emphasised a drawback of this estimator being its unreliability because it produces small standard 
errors. However, Plümper and Troeger (2011) argued that the updated Stata ado file has taken into 
account this critique and the new standard errors are closer to the true sampling variance.    
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(Roodman, 2006). According to Sarafidis et al., (2009), these dummies are expected 
to diminish the cross-sectional dependence arising from time shocks. Assuming that 
all countries are affected by these shocks in the same way, the time-dummies will 
remove the ‗homogenous‘ component of the cross-sectional dependence.   
3.3.4 Empirical Results  
To empirically test the hypotheses developed in this chapter, a panel dataset 
consisting of 14 European transition and non-transition economies for the period 
2010 to 2015 is used. The choice of countries and time period for this empirical 
analysis was determined by data availability. The data for the dependent variable, the 
flow from unemployment to employment, is available only for 2010 to 2015 and for 
the following European transition economies: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. 
While data for the European non-transition economies are only available for the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Norway. The analysis using a matching function should 
ideally be conducted with frequent periods of observation such as quarterly or 
monthly. However, the variables measuring the expenditure of ALMPs are not 
available quarterly for country level analysis and this empirical investigation is 
therefore compelled to use annual data. 
The descriptive statistics in table 3.2 show that some of the variables have a high 
number of missing values so a major concern for this empirical analysis is the low 
number of observations. It seems that there are missing values for more recent years 
since the data have not been collected for some of the variables. From table 3.2 one 
can observe that there are some variables that exhibit a large difference between the 
transition and post-transition economies (TE) and western economies (WE). Table 
3.2 shows that the TEs unemployment consists of a large share of long-term 
unemployed. The mean of variable ShLongUn shows that almost 50 percent of 
unemployment stock is comprised of individuals who have been unemployed for 
more than a year in TEs. The same variable for WE in the sample is 25 percent. 
There is also a difference between two sets of countries for the variable ShYoungUn 
where the young unemployed as share of total unemployment stock in transition 
economies is only 19.3 percent compared to 34 percent for western economies. 
There is a considerable difference between the two sets of countries in the 
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expenditure on Active and Passive Labour Market Policies; table 3.2 shows that 
western economies have higher expenditure as percentage of GDP dedicated to both 
Active and Passive LMPs compared to transition economies. The Informality 
variable shows that transition economies have much higher informality size with the 
mean of the MIMIC index of 24.7 compared to western countries with 12.5.   
Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Transition and Non-Transition Economies – 1st approach 
Transition Economies: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia 
    Variable |        Obs     Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
    lnUEflow |         66    10.53        .77        9.21      12.44 
     ALMPExp |         54    .24          .16         .02       .77 
    lnUnemSt |         66    12.54        .88       10.64     14.39 
 lnVacancies |         57    9.60         .88        7.60     11.47 
    lnEUflow |         66    10.25        .74        8.98     12.18 
    lnIUflow |         66    10.34        .92        8.98     12.49 
      lnLFor |         55    14.83        .96       13.44     16.72 
    ShLongUn |         66    49.61       9.16       31.1      70.2 
   ShYoungUn |         66    19.27       3.66       12.46     27.62 
   ShWomenUn |         66    45.57       3.65       36.69     53.35 
  PopDensity |         66    84.23      34.94       30.95    136.62 
     PLMPExp |         54      .42        .18         .13       .91 
 Informality |         66    24.72       5.12       14.1      32.6 
   GDPgrowth |         66     1.95       2.17       -3.79      7.6 
LabFreeIndex |         66    61.77      11.81       39.4      85.5 
Western European Countries: the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway  
    lnUEflow |         18    11.14        .69       10.12     11.79 
     ALMPExp |         17      .68        .26         .37      1.08 
    lnUnemSt |         18    12.52        .79       11.35     13.39 
 lnVacancies |         17    11.26        .32       10.82     11.79 
    lnEUflow |         18    10.89        .69        9.74     11.74 
    lnIUflow |         18    11.38        .62       10.51     12.17 
      lnLFor |         15    15.41        .51       14.77     16.01 
    ShLongUn |         18    24.78       8.07       17.7      42.9 
   ShYoungUn |         18    34.01       4.19       25.73     38.82 
   ShWomenUn |         18    46.08       2.98       39.78     51.03 
  PopDensity |         18   178.39     232.53       13.39    503.02 
     PLMPExp |         17      .87        .60         .33      2.20 
 Informality |         18    12.50       2.32        9        15.1 
   GDPgrowth |         18     1.68       1.62       -1.06      5.99 
LabFreeIndex |         18    53.48       6.25       44.6      66.3 
 
The variance inflation factors (VIFs) presented in table 3.3
22
 and the correlation 
matrix in appendix A3.1 indicate that there is high collinearity between some of the 
variables. Flow variables, lnUEflow, lnEUflow and lnIUflow, lnUnemst, Vacancies 
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 The final models also include the quadratic terms of ALMPExp and Popdensity. 
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and lnLFor are by definition correlated with each other. From the correlation matrix 
in appendix A3.2, it is observed that correlation among these variables goes up to 
0.97. With regard to the VIF values, when the VIF value is higher than 10 it 
indicates a problem of multicollinearity (Kutner et al. 2004). Appendix A3.1.2 shows 
that there are variables that pass this threshold. According to Wooldridge (2009), to 
deal with potential multicollinearity one should increase the sample size or drop 
variables that are causing the problem. In the case of this empirical analysis, it is 
impossible to increase the sample, whilst dropping variables may cause omitted 
variable bias. 
The variable with the highest VIF value is lnLFor, however as explained in section 
3.2 it is a key variable in the matching function and not including this variable in the 
model would result in biased coefficients. The variable with the second highest VIF 
value is EduSecondary with 51.71 and from the correlation matrix it can be observed 
that it is highly correlated with variable measuring the share of long-term 
unemployment ShLongUn and with EduTertiary, thus this variable is dropped from 
the model. In order to gain degrees of freedom, a choice was made between variables 
EcoFreeIndex and LabFreeIndex
23
; the latter is kept in the model because 
LabFreeIndex captures the government policies, the labour laws and regulations 
which more directly tend to improve labour market performance. Furthermore, 
combining the flow variables, lnEUflow and lnIUflow, into one variable was 
considered however, it does not significantly improve the collinearity diagnostics 
therefore they are included separately in the final model (see Appendix A3.1.2). 
Variables ShLongUn and ShYoungUn are also highly correlated with each other 
while variable ShYoungUn is also highly correlated with lnVacancies. Dropping the 
share variables, ShYoungUn, ShLongUn and ShWomenUn from the model improves 
the mean VIF. These three variables assess the matching efficiency of these 
subgroups of unemployed, however, they are not considered essential in this 
empirical analysis. Hence, the first specification includes these variables and the 
second does not. The VIF collinearity diagnostics of the final model are presented in 
table 3.3. The mean VIF value has dropped significantly from 27.91 from the initial 
model to 14.05. The only variables with VIF values above threshold of 10 (Kutner et 
al., 2004) are components of the matching function (lnLFor, lnUnemst, lnVacancies, 
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 Neither of these variables has high VIF value nor are highly correlated with other variables.  
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lnUEflow, lnEUflow and lnIUflow), which are expected to be correlated with each 
other, but are essential and hence they are kept in the model.  
Table 3.3 VIF Collinearity Diagnostics – 1st approach  
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
      lnLFor |     56.66    0.017649 
    lnIUflow |     20.37    0.049101 
    lnEUflow |     19.80    0.050512 
lnVacancie~1 |     19.53    0.051207 
lnUnemplST~1 |     14.52    0.068868 
  PopDensity |      8.94    0.111806 
 PLMPExplag1 |      8.09    0.123612 
 ALMPExplag1 |      6.44    0.155202 
 EduTertiary |      5.08    0.196992 
Informalit~1 |      5.00    0.200001 
   GDPgrowth |      2.10    0.476909 
LabFreeInd~1 |      2.04    0.489056 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |     14.05 
Following the analysis of different estimation methodologies presented in section 
3.3.2, the empirical results and diagnostic tests from the preferred estimator will now 
be presented. The first estimations for RE and FE are presented in appendix tables 
A3.2.1 to A3.2.3 in the appendix section A3. The Hausman test was used to 
determine the appropriateness of the RE estimator for this empirical analysis
24
. The 
null hypothesis of no systematic differences between the FE and RE coefficients is 
rejected, though with a borderline p-value = 0.089. Thus, the FE estimator is 
considered the more appropriate approach.  
The next step is to check the diagnostic tests of the models. The results from several 
diagnostic tests (modified Wald test for group wise heteroskedasticity, the 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data and the test for serial correlation in 
the residuals) suggest that there is no presence of serial correlation but there is the 
presence of heteroscedasticity in the errors in the econometric models (see Appendix 
A3.2.4 and A3.3.4). For unbalanced panel data the cross-sectional dependence 
cannot be tested, however, as argued in section 3.3.2, panel data usually are subject 
to this issue. In order to be sure that the effects of cross-sectional dependence are 
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 Option sigmamore is used as it is recommended by Cameron and Trivedi (2009) which specifies 
that both covariance matrices, from FE and RE estimates, are based on the estimated disturbance 
variance from the efficient estimator. 
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rectified, the Fixed Effects Driscoll-Kraay (FEDK) estimator is used. As discussed in 
the previous section, this estimator corrects for heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional 
dependence and serial correlation even though serial correlation is not an issue in 
this case. The estimated results from FEDK are presented in table 3.4.  
Table 3.4 Estimated Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FEDK FEDK FEVD FEVD 
VARIABLES lnUEflow lnUEflow lnUEflow lnUEflow 
  
 
  
  ALMPExplag1 0.369* 0.269* -0.0159 -0.439 
 
(0.118) (0.0868) (0.258) (0.398) 
lnUnemplSTlag1 0.227 0.476*** 0.419** 0.742** 
 
(0.135) (0.0784) (0.166) (0.321) 
lnVacancieslag1 -0.112 -0.159 0.00986 -0.135 
 
(0.143) (0.156) (0.121) (0.229) 
lnEUflow 0.0969 0.0558 0.299 -0.0838 
 
(0.101) (0.108) (0.178) (0.386) 
lnIUflow 0.431 0.435* 0.353** 0.754* 
 
(0.189) (0.139) (0.147) (0.360) 
lnLFor 1.443 -0.264 -0.233 -0.684 
 
(1.027) (0.991) (0.330) (0.638) 
ShYoungUn 0.00873 
 
0.0163 
 
 
(0.00734) 
 
(0.0173) 
 ShLongUn 0.0152 
 
-0.00512 
 
 
(0.00774) 
 
(0.00556) 
 ShWomenUn 0.00461** 
 
-0.00584 
 
 
(0.000852) 
 
(0.0117) 
 PLMPExplag1 0.0674 -0.0402 0.140 0.0350 
 
(0.157) (0.148) (0.208) (0.574) 
Informalityl1 -0.168 -0.104 -0.0151 0.0231 
 
(0.145) (0.134) (0.0188) (0.0363) 
GDPgrowth -0.0164 -0.0124 -0.0175 -0.0108 
 
(0.0120) (0.00907) (0.0141) (0.0260) 
LabFreeIndlag1 0.0129** 0.0124** 0.00520 0.0121 
 
(0.00262) (0.00268) (0.00662) (0.00880) 
EduTertiary 0.0134 0.0175* 0.0232 0.0614** 
 
(0.0128) (0.00736) (0.0134) (0.0232) 
PopDensity 0.0334 0.0788** 0.00412 0.0285 
 
(0.0361) (0.0193) (0.0103) (0.0192) 
PopDen2 -2.35e-05 -7.57e-05*** -8.37e-06 -5.45e-05 
 
(3.85e-05) (1.08e-05) (1.78e-05) (3.32e-05) 
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Transition 
  
0.0254 -2.350 
   
(0.850) (1.940) 
TransAlmp 
  
0.216 -0.569 
   
(0.271) (0.462) 
Constant 0 0 1.230 3.477 
 
(0) (0) (2.637) (4.923) 
Observations 49 49 49 49 
R-squared 
  
0.997 0.996 
Number of groups 14 14 14 14 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
Because within estimators do not allow for time-invariant variables, an alternative 
estimator is used. The discussion provided in section 3.3.2 introduced Fixed Effects 
Vector Decomposition as the estimator with similar features with fixed effects that 
produces consistent estimates for the coefficients of the time invariant variable, 
Transition and slowly changing variable, TransAlmp. The preferred models for 
interpretation remain FEDK models 1 and 2 because they address the issues 
mentioned in the previous paragraph while FEVD models 3 and 4 will be referred to 
only for time-invariant variables.
25
  
Table 3.5 presents the means of the variables and the calculations of the effects of 
the selected independent variables of interest on the dependent variable for models 1 
and 2. This will help to establish a clearer idea of the scale of the effects. As may be 
seen from table 3.4, the estimated coefficient of the lagged value of ALMPExp is 
significant and has the expected sign in models 1 and 2. Since the quadratic term of 
ALMPExp was insignificant in all the specifications and considering the small 
sample size used for this analysis this variable was excluded from the final 
specifications (Appendix A3.4.5 and A3.4.6 provides estimations with the quadratic 
term of ALMP). Because it is highly unlikely that ALMP expenditure as share of 
GDP will increase by 1 percentage point during a single year (this would imply a 
huge increase), the results for this variable will be interpreted using an increase of 
0.1 percentage point.  
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 Year dummies are included in the models, however they are not presented in table 3.4. 
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Table 3.5 Calculation of the effects of the selected variables 
  Mean 
An increase 
by 0.1 pp 
An increase by 
1 % 
Model 1 Model 2 
UEflow 63900 - -  - - 
ALMPExp 
(%) 
0.3548 0.4548 
  
0.0369*63900 = 
2357.91 
0.0269*63900= 
1718.91 
UnemSt 307055.6 
  
3070.556 - 
(0.476*63900)/1
00 = 304.164 
IUflow 65055.56 
  
650.5556 - 
 
(0.435*63900)/1
00 = 277.965 
 
The estimated results presented in table 3.5, suggest that an increase by 0.1 
percentage point of expenditure on ALMPs as a share of GDP, from a sample mean 
value of 0.35 to 0.45 (see table 3.5), will increase the flow from unemployment to 
employment in the following year by 3.69 percent, ceteris paribus; to be more 
specific it would increase the number of matches made each year by about 2,358 on 
average. As seen in table 3.4, in model 2 (where variables ShLongUn, ShYoungUn 
and ShWomenUn are excluded from the model) ALMPExp has a somewhat smaller 
coefficient; an increase by 0.1 percentage point of expenditure on ALMPs as a share 
of GDP will increase the flow from unemployment to employment in the following 
year by 2.69 percent, thus it would increase the number of matches made each year 
by 1,718 on average. 
While the estimated coefficients on the main components of the matching function, 
unemployment stock and flow from inactivity to unemployment, are significant only 
in model 2, other components of the matching function are insignificant in both 
models.  The elasticity of flows from unemployment to employment with respect to 
the unemployment stock is highly significant in model 2 where the share variables 
(ShLongUn, ShYoungUn and ShWomenUn) are excluded from the model which 
suggests that a part of the effect of unemployment stock might be captured by these 
variables. The estimated results from model 2 suggest that an increase by 1 percent 
in the unemployment stock from the mean value in the sample, i.e. an increase by 
about 3,070 persons in the unemployment stock, is associated with outflows to 
employment increasing by 0.476 percent from the mean value, or approximately by 
304 persons each year, ceteris paribus.  
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The variable measuring the flow from inactivity to unemployment is significant at 10 
percent significance level only in model 2 while that measuring the flow from 
employment to unemployment is insignificant in both models. The estimated results 
suggest that an increase by 1 percent of IUflow from the mean value in the sample, 
or an increase by 650 persons who join the unemployment pool from inactivity, is 
associated with an increase in the number of matches made by 277, other variables 
remaining constant. Based on the results presented in table 3.5, more than 42 
percent
26
 of those who enter the unemployment pool from inactivity get employed in 
the same year compared to approximately 10 percent of those already in the 
unemployment pool in line with the expectation that new entrants might have better 
matching efficiency compared to those already in the unemployment pool.   
In view of the theoretical discussion in chapter 2, the results in table 3.6 present 
returns to scale (RTS) for matching function, i.e. whether the following terms are 
jointly significant and equal unity,                                        
                           . When the sum of coefficients equals to unity it 
implies constant returns to scale, meaning that an increase in the size of labour 
market in terms of one of the matching function components would increase the 
matching efficiency by the same magnitude. When the sum of coefficients is lower 
than the unity, the labour market exhibits decreasing returns to scale meaning that an 
in increase in labour market would increase the matching efficiency by a lower 
magnitude. Finally, when it exceeds unity it implies increasing returns to scale where 
positive externalities of the search intensity of unemployed workers and vacancies 
might prevail, creating more than one possible equilibrium. In this analysis, the 
hypothesis that the sum of these coefficients is not significantly different from 0 is 
rejected in all the estimated models (see table 3.6 below, and table A3.5 in appendix 
3). However, while the sum of the coefficients from models 1 and 2 point to 
decreasing returns to scale (0.64 and 0.81) the sum of coefficients from models 3 and 
4 suggest that there is increasing returns to scale in the matching efficiency (1.08 and 
1.28).  
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 The ratio of employed people to those entering unemployment pool from inactivity is 277.9/650.5= 
0.4272; the ratio of employed people to those the unemployment stock 304.164/3070.556=0.099.  
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Table 3.6 Returns to Scale (RTS) 
lnUEflow   |      Coef.               Std. Err.           t           P>|t|         [95% Conf. Interval]  
Model (1) |   .6421577        .1653083          3.88       0.030       .1160728    1.168242 
Model (2) |   .8081077        .1892566          4.27        0.024       .2058087    1.410407 
Model (3) |    1.08037         .2345406          4.61        0.000       .5773303    1.583409 
Model (4) |    1.276409        .4374473        2.92        0.010       .3534757    2.199342 
Model (5)
27
|    1.310651        .161662        8.11       0.004        .7961702    1.825132 
Model (6) |    1.141365        .2996006        3.81       0.032        .1879018    2.094827 
However, the estimation of RTS should be interpreted with caution because the 
sample includes both transitional and non-transitional countries with different labour 
market characteristics. The reviewed studies for transition economies reviewed in 
Chapter 2 consistently found evidence to suggest that the labour markets in these 
countries experience increasing returns to scale, thus multiple equilibria, but such a 
pattern is not observed in non-transition economies. Hence, additional regressions 
were run only for transition countries using the same specification as in model 1 and 
2 (see Appendix A3.5); the sample was reduced to only 37 observations. The RTS 
estimations from these additional models are presented in table 3.6 as model 5 and 6. 
These estimations both point to increasing returns to scale suggesting that in 
transition economies labour markets might exhibit multiple equilibria consistent with 
the results from other empirical studies (Camarero et al., 2008; Munich and Svejnar, 
2009) However, the sample is small and these results should be treated with caution.  
With regard to control variables, in model 1 variables ShWomenUn is significant but 
does not have the expected sign while LabFreeIndex is significant and has the 
expected sign. In model 2, LabFreeIndex, EduTertiary, PopDensity and its‘ 
quadratic term are significant and have the expected signs. The coefficient of 
ShWomenUn suggests that an increase in share of women in the pool of 
unemployment by 1 percentage point is associated with an increase of matching 
efficiency by 0.4 percent. This result might suggest that women accept more often 
temporary jobs compared to their male counterparts. The lagged value of 
LabFreeIndex is significant in both models 1 and 2 and has the expected sign; this 
result suggests that an increase by 1 unit of LabFreeIndex will increase the 
transitions from unemployment to employment by 1.29 percent in the following year 
in model 1 and 1.24 percent in model 2, other variables remaining constant. The 
variable EduTertiary is significant at 10 percent level only in model 2. An increase 
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 Models 5 and 6 only include transition countries; see appendix A3.3.2 for estimated results. 
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in the share of individuals who have attended or completed tertiary education as the 
highest level of education in the labour force by 1 percentage point will increase the 
matching efficiency by 1.75 percent. In accordance with our expectations, the 
estimated population density coefficients imply a concave relationship between 
matching efficiency and density. The calculation of the turning point suggests that if 
population density increases beyond 1,676 people per square kilometre then it would 
impact negatively the flow from unemployment to employment
28
. Other control 
variables are consistently insignificant. As explained above, FEVD is used to 
account for the invariant variable Transition and slowly changing variable 
TransAlmp. These variables are insignificant in both models.   
Due to the small sample size used for analysis of the matching efficiency, it was not 
possible to distinguish between the effects of different types of ALMPs. The 
following section will expand the analysis of the effectiveness of ALMPs using a 
GMM estimator for a larger number of countries included in the sample and with a 
longer time period.  
3.4 Empirical Approach for Model 2  
3.4.1 Model Specification   
As argued by Munich and Svejnar (2009), GMM would be a better choice for the 
matching function considering that the components of the matching function 
(UnemSt and Vacancies) have a dynamic nature thus are in part predetermined by 
their previous values and the endogenous nature of the ALMPExp variable. However, 
it was not possible to utilise this approach since the data for the dependent variable 
(the flow from unemployment to employment – lnUEflow) and the main variables 
composing the matching function (lnVacancies, lnEUflow, lnIUflow) are available 
only for a short period of time and for a limited number of countries thereby 
restricting the size of the sample. The small size of the sample also does not allow an 
assessment of the effectiveness of different types of ALMPs (training, employment 
incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation and start-up 
incentives).  
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 Turning point = - Popdensity/(2*Popden2)= -0.0788168/ (2*(-0.0000235)) =1,676.95 
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Hence, the second empirical approach (GMM) uses a different model specification 
where a new dependent variable is used, the unemployment rate (UnemRate). The 
data for the second empirical approach is available for a longer time-span and for a 
higher number of countries which allows overcoming the disadvantages of the first 
empirical approach – the endogenous nature of the ALMPExp and the dynamic 
nature of the dependent variable UnemRate. The justification for using this second 
approach is thus twofold. Firstly, to assess the effectiveness of the ALMPs in 
reducing the unemployment rate in a larger dataset for a higher number of countries 
and the larger sample allows a comparison of the effectiveness of the different types 
of ALMPs mentioned above.  
As in the matching function model, the quadratic form of ALMP is included in the 
model to account for a possible non-linear relationship between ALMP expenditure 
and the unemployment rate. Since an increase in ALMP expenditure as a share of 
GDP is expected to reduce the unemployment rate, see Section 2.2.3, the expected 
sign for ALMPExp is negative while the expected sign for the square term of 
ALMPExp is positive.The dependent variable for this analysis is the unemployment 
rate, UnemRate, defined as the unemployment as a percentage of the active 
population.  
Table 3.7 presented at the end of this section summarizes the variable description, 
labels, the expected signs and data sources. 
Control Variables  
Studies consistently have argued that the relatively high unemployment benefits for a 
relatively long duration have a positive effect on the unemployment rate (Scarpetta, 
1996; Nickell, 1998; Elmeskov et al., 1998; Nunziata, 2002; Bassanini and Duval, 
2006). Unemployment benefits may increase the unemployment rate via two 
mechanisms. First they reduce job search intensity, thus reducing the willingness of 
the unemployed to accept job offers. Secondly, because they lower the economic 
cost of being unemployed, unemployment benefits put upwards pressure on workers‘ 
reservation wages thus reducing the number of filled vacancies and increasing job 
separations (Bassanini and Duval, 2006). The variable PLMPExp, measured as the 
PLMP expenditure as share of GDP, is included in the model to account for this 
relationship. The expected sign of this variable is positive, thus an increase in 
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PLMPExp is expected to lead to an increase in unemployment rate. As argued in 
section 3.3.1, unemployment benefits are frequently higher when the unemployment 
level is high and persistent, pointing out the potential endogeneity of this variable 
(Nickell, 1997). Following this argument PLMPExp is treated as endogenous.  
The variable Informality, as in the model specification for matching function, is 
based on Schneider‘s (2015) MIMIC estimation procedure. In this model 
specification the size of informality and unemployment rate are expected to have a 
negative relationship, thus an increase the size of informal economy might attract 
unemployed to search for jobs in the informal sector thus reducing the 
unemployment rate
29
. Additionally, as explained in section 3.3.1, there is potential 
reverse causality between the two variables: a high unemployment rate may give rise 
to a larger informal economy as due to lack of jobs in the official sector, the 
unemployed turn to the informal sector for job opportunities. Thus, Informality 
should be treated as endogenous.  
In order to control for the possible influence of demographic factors on the 
unemployment rate, this specification also includes the variable PopDensity
30
. 
Population density tends to capture the geographical concentration of economic 
activity and the size of social networks, i.e. a labour market with higher population 
density tends to reduce the unemployment rates (Coles and Smith, 1996; Ibourk et 
al., 2004; Lahtonen and Hynninen, 2005; Tomic, 2012). On the other hand, a high 
population density may also have an adverse effect on the unemployment rate 
because labour markets with a higher population density are associated with higher 
labour supply. In a labour market with a constant labour demand, all other variables 
remaining equal, higher population density, i.e. higher labour supply will tend to 
increase unemployment rate. Thus the expected sign of this variable for this model 
specification is ambiguous.  
According to theoretical expectations, the likelihood of being unemployed is 
unequally divided among groups with different education qualifications (Card, 2001; 
Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2009; Nunez and Livanos, 2010). Less educated people 
                                                          
29
 As argued in section 3.3.1, informal workers are considered employed by the Labour Force Survey, 
thus an increase in the informal employment will lead to a reduction of the unemployment rate.  
30
 A variable measuring population growth, PopGrowth, was also considered, however this 
specification did not have the correct diagnostic tests.  
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tend have higher unemployment rates compared to better educated people. 
EduTertiary, measured as the share of labour force with tertiary education as their 
highest level of education, is included in the model to test the hypothesis that a 
higher share of individuals in the labour market who have completed higher 
education will have a negative effect on the unemployment rate.  
It is assumed that the unemployment rate is partly determined by the demand 
conditions which in this specification is captured by the growth rate of GDP (Cazes, 
2002; Lehman and Muravyev, 2009; Escudero, 2018). Theoretically, it is expected 
that an increasing demand has a negative impact on the unemployment rate, although 
this effect might not be immediate. As Levine (2013) pointed out, as long as GDP 
growth exceeds the growth in labour productivity then employment will rise, and if 
employment growth is more rapid than labour force growth, the unemployment rate 
will fall. Thus over an extended period of time, the relationship between GDP 
growth and unemployment rate is expected to be negative. GDPgrowth is included in 
the model to account for this relationship.  
As discussed in section 3.3.1, the Labour Freedom Index (LabFreeIndex) accounts 
for various aspects of the legal and regulatory framework of the labour market (see 
also table 3.7 for details of the variable definition). Theoretically, labour markets 
with lower flexibility will obstruct job creation and will tend to keep labour markets 
rigid, especially at the turning points of the business cycle (Tasci and Zenker, 2011).  
More rigid labour institutions are consistently found to be associated with higher 
unemployment rate over a longer period of time (Nickell, 1997; Bassanini and 
Duval, 2006; Tasci and Zenker, 2011; Bernal-Verdugo et al., 2012). Following this 
argument, the expected sign of LabFreeIndex is negative, i.e. a higher degree of 
labour market freedom, ceteris paribus, is expected to reduce the unemployment rate.  
Because there the current implementation of labour market policies will need a 
period of time to have an effect on the labour market the lagged value of 
LabFreeIndex is included in the model.  
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Table 3.7 Variable specifications and expected signs – 2nd approach 
Variable Name  Variable Description  Expect
ed Sign  
Data Source  
Dependent Variable 
UnemRate  
 
Unemployment as a percentage of the active population 
  
EUROSTAT  
Main Variables of Interest    
ALMPExp 
 
 
 
1.TrainSh 
2.EmpIncSh  
3.SupportSh 
4.DirectJobSh 
5.StartupSh 
Active labour market policies measured as expenditure as 
a percentage of GDP and  
Different types of active policies measured as a share of 
ALMPExp: 
1. Share of expenditure on training in total ALMP 
expenditure,  
2. Share of expenditure on employment incentives in 
total ALMP expenditure,  
3. Share of expenditure on supported employment and 
rehabilitation in total ALMP expenditure, 
4. Share of expenditure on direct job creation in total 
ALMP expenditure  
5. Share of expenditure on start-up incentives in total 
ALMP expenditure. 
- EUROSTAT 
Control Variables     
Informality MIMIC index measure of the size of the shadow economy. - Schneider 
(2015)  
PLMPExp 
 
Passive labour market policies measured as expenditure as 
a % of GDP 
+ EUROSTAT 
PopDensity Population density is midyear population divided by land 
area in square kilometres. Population is based on the de 
facto definition of population, which counts all residents 
regardless of their legal status or citizenship.  
+/- WORLD 
BANK 
EduTertiary Labour force with tertiary education - The share of the 
total labour force that attained or completed tertiary 
education as the highest level of education. 
 
- 
WORLD 
BANK 
GDPgrowth  Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices 
based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on 
constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products.  
- WORLD 
BANK 
LabFreeIndex  A quantitative measure that considers various aspects of 
the legal and regulatory framework of a country‘s labour 
market, including regulations concerning minimum wages, 
laws inhibiting layoffs, severance requirements, and 
measurable regulatory restraints on hiring and hours 
worked. 
- The Heritage 
Foundation  
 
3.4.2 Estimation Methodology – Generalised Methods of Moments 
(GMM) 
Since the data used for this empirical investigation is panel data, there are several 
estimators that can be utilised including standard Fixed Effects (FE) and Driscoll-
Kraay FE and Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM). As discussed in Chapter 2, 
unemployment is persistent over time since the current rate of unemployment is 
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dependent upon the past rate of unemployment, thus possible endogeneity is an 
issue. It is necessary to apply a dynamic panel analysis in this case since the 
unemployment rate is determined by an adjustment of the unemployment rate toward 
a ‗natural‘ or ‗equilibrium‘ rate of unemployment which will differ across states 
(Heckman, 1981; Layard et al., 1991; Mühleisen and Zimmermann, 1994; Hyslop 
1999; Arulampalam et al., 2000; Stewart, 2007; Frijters et al., 2009). The inclusion 
of the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation will allow us 
to examine the state dependence of unemployment from the previous rate of 
unemployment. Given the possible endogeneity using FE or OLS would be subject 
to different drawbacks and the best possible choice would be a dynamic model 
(Munich and Svejnar, 2009; Escudero, 2018). When using an OLS estimator, 
particularly when not controlling for country specific effects, the most severe issue is 
endogeneity. Nickell (1981) established that OLS and FE estimates of the lagged 
dependent variable‘s coefficient in a dynamic panel model are biased because they 
are correlated with the error term and this possible bias cannot be ignored. As 
discussed by Baltagi (2005), the OLS estimator tends to be upward biased with 
respect to the autoregressive parameter thus violating the classical OLS assumption. 
In contrast to the OLS estimator, the within estimator, such as FE, accounts for 
country specific effects correlation by transforming the data so that the country 
specific effect is removed. However, this transformation is appropriate for static 
models only, generating biased results in dynamic panel data models because it 
produces a correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term. 
This bias has been corrected by Kiviet (1995) and Bruno (2005) who suggested 
applying least squares dummy variable estimator (LSDVC). However, the 
disadvantage of this approach is that it assumes that explanatory variables are 
exogenous thus it is not appropriate in this empirical study. As discussed in section 
3.3.2, variable ALMPExp is expected to be determined by a policy reaction function, 
i.e. the level of ALMP expenditure is determined by the level of unemployment for 
each country. In order to handle the endogeneity issue a dynamic panel model is 
applied, as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998).  
A common strategy to deal with the above-mentioned problem is to use a difference 
or system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
According to Roodman (2009), the GMM estimator is an appropriate methodological 
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approach for samples with shorter time periods (T) relative to the number of groups 
(N). Moreover, this approach is appropriate for samples where the independent 
variables are not strictly exogenous; have heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
within groups and are not normally distributed. 
The sample used for this empirical analysis has a time-dimension (T) of 9 years and 
number of groups (N) of 28 countries. The time period available is from 2005 to 
2014, though a few countries in the sample such as Croatia and Malta have data 
available only for a shorter time period. The time period used in this chapter seems 
to be larger than the period used previously by Arellano and Bond (1991) and other 
studies (Blundell and Bond, 1999; Mangan et al., 2005; Pugh et al., 2008). This 
seems to not be a concern, because as suggested by Hayakawa (2008), the GMM 
estimator can generate efficient estimates even with a time dimension of 20. 
Roodman (2006, p.42) argues that ‗if T is large, dynamic panel bias becomes 
insignificant, meanwhile, the number of instruments in difference and system GMM 
tend to explode with T‘. The unbalanced panel dataset of 28 countries included in 
this analysis is quite low compared to Monte Carlo simulations based on Arellano 
and Bond (1991) where they use about 140 groups. However, according to Roodman 
(2006) ‗large number of groups‘ has no precise definition, but a panel with number 
of groups lower than 20 would be worrisome. Based on Roodman (2006), the panel 
data used for this chapter passes the ‗threshold‘ of the number of groups and time 
dimension.   
As discussed in section 3.3.2, empirical studies have difficulty justifying the 
appropriate external instruments for ALMPs for countries under analysis. GMM is 
specifically designed to account for endogeneity of the explanatory variables through 
the matrix of internal instruments. Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest estimating a 
first difference model where the differenced lagged dependent variable is 
instrumented by either the level or the first difference of the second lag of the 
dependent variable. This would be valid under the assumption that the error term in 
not serially correlated and the lag of explanatory variables are weakly exogenous. If 
the error term in the differenced equation is correlated with the first difference of the 
lagged dependent variable (        , Anderson and Hsiao (1982) suggest using the 
lag of the second difference (       ) or second lagged level (        of the 
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dependent variable as instrument. Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest that in the first 
difference model the lagged dependent variable can be instrumented not only the 
first lagged level but also for longer lags such as       ,        etc. Arellano and Bond 
(1991) and Kiviet (1995) conclude that lagged levels as instruments are more 
efficient with relatively smaller variances compared to levels or differences. 
Evidence from the Monte Carlo simulations from Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest 
that the estimates from GMM estimators yield much smaller variances compared to 
other estimators using instrumental variables hence the main approach used in the 
empirical analysis will be GMM.  
A potential shortcoming of the difference GMM estimator is that the coefficient 
estimated may be biased if variables follow a random walk (Roodman, 2009), if the 
explanatory variables are persistent over time and if the time dimension of the 
sample is small (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Some studies have identified some 
further limitations of the GMM estimator, arguing that the lagged levels may be 
weak in explaining the dynamic nature of the dependent variable especially when the 
dependent variable is persistent (Ahn and Schmidt, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
According to Roodman (2006), the difference GMM would perform poorly when the 
dependent variable follows a random walk because past levels cannot predict the 
future changes suggesting that the lagged levels are not good instruments for 
differenced dependent variable. Another disadvantage of the difference GMM, when 
using unbalanced panel data, is that it magnifies the gaps in the data and it does not 
make use of all available information i.e. when one observation is missing it means 
two observations will be lost because the difference cannot be calculated.  
In order to address these problems, a system GMM estimator is developed to 
combine two different equations; (i) the equation of first differences, (ii) the equation 
in levels (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998). A system GMM 
estimator increases the efficiency of the estimates by allowing for exploitation of 
additional moment conditions from the data in levels (Arellano and Bover, 1995). 
Additionally, when the dependent variable follows a random walk, studies argue that 
the past changes are a better predictor of future levels than the levels (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998; Roodman, 2006). System GMM also performs better for unbalanced 
panel data because it makes use of more information than the difference GMM and 
allows for inclusion of time invariant variables as opposed to difference GMM which 
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wipes out all the time invariant variables. However, despite the noted advantages of 
system GMM, it proved not to be feasible in the sample used for this empirical 
analysis because it uses a higher number of instruments compared to the number of 
countries. Hence, the estimator used for this analysis is the difference GMM because 
it uses a smaller number of instruments.   
As mentioned earlier in this section, the GMM estimators allow for 
heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and do not require any assumption about the 
distribution (Greene, 2002; Roodman, 2006). There are two options in GMM that 
can produce robust estimation; one-step and two-step estimation. In the one-step 
estimation, standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within 
individuals using a covariance matrix which is independent of the estimated 
parameters (Roodman, 2006). The two-step estimation constructs a sandwich proxy 
for the covariance matrix with initial parameter obtained from one-step estimation 
and the second step where this matrix is used to reweight the moment conditions 
(Roodman, 2006). Two-step GMM estimation is robust to heteroscedasticity and 
within-individual autocorrelation. An important issue with the two-step estimation is 
that when the number of instruments is large and the sample is small size, the 
standard errors are found to be downward biased (Arellano and Bond, 2001; Bond, 
2002; Windmeijer, 2005). In this case the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample 
correction, which is superior to the cluster-robust one-step standard errors; without 
correction the standard errors tend to be severely downward biased. This correction 
is found to greatly reduce the problem of bias, especially for difference GMM 
estimator for which the simulation is performed. Hence, based on this discussion, the 
efficient two-step difference GMM estimator will be used with Windmeijer (2005) 
robust standard errors with small-sample correction using option ‗two robust small‟. 
Furthermore, Sarafidis et al. (2009) suggest that all models should include time 
dummy variables to control for possible cross-sectional dependency arising from 
spatial dependence, common shocks and economic distance.  
As mentioned previously in this section, because the first difference equations (both 
in difference and system GMM) are constrained to lose information when using 
unbalanced panel data, Arellano and Bover (1995) suggest using a common 
transformation called the ‗forward orthogonal deviations‘. Roodman (2006, p.20) 
notes that ―the orthogonal deviations, instead of subtracting the previous 
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observations from the contemporaneous one, it subtracts the average of all future 
available observations of a variable‖, thus it minimizes data loss in unbalanced 
panels because it uses all the information available. In this context, Rodman (2006) 
also suggests that the lagged observations remain valid instruments because they are 
not involved in computation of the orthogonal deviations. Therefore, as suggested by 
Roodman (2006), since unbalanced panel data is used for this empirical analysis and 
in order to preserve the sample size, orthogonal deviations will be applied using 
option ‗orthog‟.  
A major drawback of GMM estimators is that they may use a large number of 
instruments which may overfit endogenous variables, weaken the diagnostics used 
for validity of the instruments and provide biased estimates of the covariance matrix 
of the moments. There is no specific guidance on what is the optimal number of 
instruments; however, the general rule of thumb proposed by Roodman (2006) is that 
the number of instruments should be lower or equal to the number of groups in the 
sample. According to Roodman (2006), the instrument matrix can restrict the lag 
ranges that are used in generating the set of instruments, thus the number of 
instruments will be reduced. Roodman (2006) suggests this can be done by using the 
‗collapse‟ option.   
As discussed above, the instrumentation of the dependent variable in a dynamic 
model is justified because it is predetermined within the model by the previous 
values of other regressors, while being independent of their present values. This 
instrumentation can also be used to address the issue of endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables which are correlated with the past error terms. The validity of 
the instruments for treatment of endogenous variables is diagnosed with the Sargan 
and Hansen tests of overidentifying restrictions, which are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. According to Roodman (2009), the p-value of the Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions approaching unity and those lower than 0.25 should be 
viewed with caution. Difference in Hansen test is also used to test the subset of 
instruments for individual variables since it can affect the overall Hansen test.  
The GMM estimator can create a large number of moment conditions and a large 
number of instruments; the estimator creates an instrument for each variable, for 
each period and each lag distance of the corresponding period (Roodman, 2006). The 
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instruments as lags of the explanatory variables are used under the assumption that 
errors are not autocorrelated, which would mean that they are correlated with the 
instruments. Considering this, to ensure the validity of the instruments a test for 
autocorrelation is used, first-order and second-order serial correlation (referred to as 
m1 and m2), which examines the hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in 
the error terms. The GMM estimator requires that there is first-order serial 
correlation but no second-order serial correlation in the residuals.  
3.4.3 Empirical Results 
As discussed above, the dataset for this model is larger, comprising of a larger 
number of countries and longer time period. The descriptive statistics in table 3.8 
show that this dataset is unbalanced since some of the variables have a number of 
missing values for some countries. However, there is no indication of data missing 
for a specific reason other than randomly, thus this not expected to influence the 
reliability of the estimations. Table 3.8 shows that there are some differences in the 
summary statistics between transition and non-transition countries which might 
affect the final estimated results for this empirical analysis.  
The collinearity diagnostics do not suggest there is cause for concern. From table 3.9 
one can see that the mean VIF value is 4.47 while none of the individual VIF values 
exceed the threshold of 10. The correlation matrix presented in Appendix A3.5 also 
shows that correlation among independent variables is not likely to cause 
multicollinearity in this case.  
Table 3.8 Descriptive Statistics for Transition and Non-Transition Economies - 2
nd
 approach  
Transition Economies: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
    UnemRate |        143      10.001      3.73         4.3       19.8 
     ALMPExp |        122        .21       .142        .019       .768 
     TrainSh |        122      25.45      23.38        .130      91.30 
    EmpIncSh |        122      27.93      18.33        .757      82.61 
   SupportSh |        122      11.45      17.96           0      64.96 
 DirectJobSh |        122      28.12      23.36           0      91.28 
   StartupSh |        120       7.22       9.76           0      44.59 
     PLMPExp |        123        .37        .21          .08      1.35 
 Informality |        143      25.93       5.32         14.1      35.9 
   GDPgrowth |        143       2.98       4.62        -14.81     11.89 
LabFreeIndex |        121      61.02      11.79         39.4      85.5 
 EduTertiary |        132      23.42       7.09           10      39.7 
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  PopDensity |        143      85.02      34.06         30.95    136.62 
Western European Countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,  the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
 UnemPActPop |        234       8.18        4.48         2.5       27.5 
     ALMPExp |        213        .54         .33         .03       1.56 
     TrainSh |        213       39.73      19.02        7.73      80.21 
    EmpIncSh |        213       30.62      21.19        2.91      85.35 
   SupportSh |        208       16.53      18.51           0      74.71 
 DirectJobSh |        194       10.74      11.12           0      49.33 
   StartupSh |        212        3.75       7.16           0      43.81 
     PLMPExp |        216        1.24        .68         .16       3.05 
 Informality |        234       16.41       5.75         7.5       28.7 
   GDPgrowth |        234        1.28       2.82        -9.13       8.46 
LabFreeIndex |        198       60.11      15.20          31        100 
 EduTertiary |        216       29.34       7.86         10.8       47.8 
  PopDensity |        221      153.62     123.07         12.5     503.02 
 
Table 3.9 VIF Collinearity diagnostics – 2nd approach  
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
     TrainSh |      9.94    0.100554 
   SupportSh |      9.42    0.106180 
 DirectJobSh |      8.47    0.118106 
    EmpIncSh |      7.97    0.125412 
     PLMPExp |      2.98    0.335200 
     ALMPExp |      2.94    0.340154 
  PopDensity |      1.94    0.516439 
 Informality |      1.87    0.534752 
LabFreeIndex |      1.25    0.797896 
 EduTertiary |      1.22    0.820811 
   GDPgrowth |      1.13    0.884683 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      4.47 
 
Based on the model discussed in section 3.4.1, the empirical estimation utilised the 
empirical software STATA using the xtabond2 command developed by Roodman 
(2009). Both system and difference estimators were considered, however only 
difference GMM was feasible in the case of this analysis because it uses a smaller 
number of instruments compared to system GMM (the estimation from system 
GMM is provided in the Appendix A3.7.3).  The lagged dependent variable, 
ALMPExp and its square term and PLMPExp are treated as endogenous and as such 
are instrumented with their own lagged levels. The choice of lags is determined by 
model diagnostics. The initial specifications included a minimum number of lags, i.e. 
starting from one lag for the lagged dependent variable and other variables. Since the 
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initial specification failed diagnostic tests for instrument validity, higher order lags 
(three or four lags) are included until the specification achieves acceptable 
diagnostics. In addition to limiting the number of lags, as suggested by Roodman 
(2006), collapsing the instruments is used to reduce the count of instruments and to 
obtain more parsimonious model. Considering the potential endogeneity of 
Informality and LabFreeIndex, they are also specified as endogenous and 
instrumented through internal instruments via GMM. However, the specification 
failed the instrument validity tests and increased the number of instruments higher 
than the number of cross-sectional units (see Appendix A3.4). Both these variables 
are instrumented with their first lagged levels in the instrumental variable equation. 
The results show that the Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions take the value 
of 0.310 and 0.370 in the two models respectively, suggesting the validity of the 
instruments for treatment of the endogenous variables. The null hypothesis of 
autocorrelation in differences of errors is rejected for the autocorrelation in 
differences of errors. It is also important to check the validity of subsets of 
instruments; the difference-in-Hansen test also known as C-test (Baum, 2006). The 
null hypothesis of the difference-in-Hansen is that the specified variables are proper 
instruments, i.e. that the set of examined instruments is exogenous. The results 
suggest that there is no sufficient evidence to reject the hypothesis (see Appendix 
A3.7.1 and A3.7.1).  
The difference-in-Hansen test was also conducted in order to test for cross-sectional 
dependence. The results suggest that the null hypothesis of the validity of the 
instruments for lagged dependent variable cannot be rejected in both models. 
Following the suggestion of Bond et al. (2001), an additional test of the validity of 
dynamic panel estimation is performed to check whether the lagged dependent 
variable lies between the lower bound of FE and upper bound of OLS estimates. As 
appendix A3.7.3 shows, both model specifications satisfy this condition. Having 
analysed all these diagnostic tests, it is concluded that the model is well specified 
which can be used for interpretation of the results presented in table 3.10. As 
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discussed in the previous section, the preferred estimator is two-step robust 
difference GMM which accounts for heteroscedasticity.
31
   
Having obtained the final specification with acceptable diagnostics, the final 
estimated results are presented in table 3.10. The F-test for the joint significance of 
the independent variables rejects the null hypothesis, suggesting that the independent 
variables collectively have explanatory power with respect to the dependent variable. 
The dynamic specification, through the lagged dependent variable, contains the 
history of the independent variables. This variable is highly significant in both 
models, suggesting that there is a high persistency of the unemployment rate. The 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable suggests that a 1 percent increase in 
unemployment rate in the previous period is associated with an increase of about 
0.80 percent in the unemployment rate in current period. The results in table 3.10 
show that the variables of interest, ALMPExp and its quadratic term are not 
significant in either of the models 1 or 2. Model 2 includes variables measuring the 
share of each individual ALMPs (TrainSh, EmpIncSh, SupportSh and DirectSh, 
while StartupSh is a left out of the regression as the omitted category) to assess 
whether different active policies are effective in reducing unemployment rate. These 
variables TrainSh, EmpIncSh, SupportSh and DirectSh are also insignificant in 
model 2. The insignificant result might be because the dataset is combined to 
account for two different sets of countries which have distinctive differences.  As 
discussed in section 2.4 and 2.5, different ALMPs might have different effects in 
different contexts and for different sub-groups of unemployed and those differences 
might cause the overall insignificance.  
Of the control variables, GDPgrowth is significant in both models. The estimated 
results indicate that an increase in the GDPgrowth of 1 percent will reduce the 
unemployment rate by 0.32 percent, other variables remaining constant (0.34 in 
model 2). Variable LabFreeIndex is significant in model 1 and in line with our 
expectations, an increase in the labour freedom index of 1 unit will reduce the 
unemployment rate by 0.05 percent. Other control variables have signs in line with 
our expectations but are insignificant in both models.  
                                                          
31
 There is no need to test for a normal distribution because the GMM estimator does not rely on that 
assumption.  
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Table 3.10 Estimated results from Difference GMM 
 
3.5 Conclusions  
This chapter has applied two different empirical approaches. The first one is the 
matching function using FEDK and FEVD in a panel dataset for 11 countries for 
years 2010 to 2015 while the second approach is a dynamic panel data estimator, 
  Model 1 Model 2 
VARIABLES UnemRate UnemRate 
      
L.UnemRate 0.803*** 0.811*** 
 
(0.0898) (0.125) 
ALMPExp -1.766 -2.654 
 
(4.305) (5.008) 
ALMPEx2 0.654 1.866 
 
(1.844) (1.944) 
TrainSh 
 
-0.00624 
  
(0.0294) 
EmpIncSh 
 
0.000588 
  
(0.0286) 
SupportSh 
 
0.0227 
  
(0.0252) 
DirectJobSh 
 
0.00301 
  
(0.0378) 
PLMPExp 1.507 1.220 
 
(1.019) (1.102) 
Informality -0.284 -0.0840 
 
(0.731) (0.655) 
GDPgrowth -0.320*** -0.340*** 
 
(0.0537) (0.0449) 
LabFreeIndex -0.0545** -0.0243 
 
(0.0260) (0.0220) 
EduTertiary -0.0696 -0.00906 
 
(0.0641) (0.0577) 
PopDensity 0.0306 0.0428 
 
(0.0297) (0.0324) 
Observations 211 194 
Number of CountryID 28 27 
F-test 
F(21, 28)     =    300.67                                       
Prob > F      =     0.000                                  
F(25, 27) =  1230.04  
Prob > F      =     0.000                                  
Arellano-Bond (AR1) test  Pr > z =  0.008 Pr > z =  0.016 
Arellano-Bond (AR2) test  Pr > z =  0.163 Pr > z =  0.182 
Sargan test Pr > chi2 =  0.404 Pr > chi2 =  0.553 
Hansen test Pr > chi2 =  0.310 Pr > chi2 =  0.371 
No. of Instruments 23 27 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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difference GMM, using a panel data for 28 countries for years 2005 to 2014. Section 
3.3.2 provided a critical review of the endogeneity of the ALMP variable and 
discussed possible choices for the instrumental variables used by empirical studies. 
However, the instrumental variables used by empirical studies were argued not to be 
the optimal choice for this empirical analysis.  
As discussed in section 3.3.2, the preferred empirical approach in previous studies 
analysing the effectiveness of the ALMP was a matching function using a dynamic 
panel estimator because it addresses the potential endogeneity of the ALMPs. Since 
the data for matching function component variables are not available for a long 
period, the dynamic panel estimator could not be applied hence FEDK and FEVD 
using the first lag of the ALMPExp were applied. The results from FEDK suggest 
that an increase in ALMP expenditure as a share of GDP will increase the flow from 
unemployment to employment, however this effect is not economically significant. 
Consistent with the findings from other studies, the estimated results from FEDK, 
when using a restricted sample of transition countries only, point to increasing 
returns to scale in the transition from unemployment to employment, suggesting that 
transition economies‘ labour markets might exhibit multiple equilibria. Same results 
are also found when using FEVD.  
The second approach uses a larger dataset with a larger number of countries included 
in the sample and a longer time period. With the larger dataset it became possible to 
include variables which measure expenditure on individual ALMPs: training, 
employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation 
and start-up incentives. The difference GMM estimations did not find any evidence 
of a significant relationship between ALMPExp and unemployment rate. Variables 
measuring the shares of different types of ALMPs to total ALMP expenditure are 
also insignificant. As discussed above, one possible explanation for the insignificant 
results might be that different ALMPs have different effect in different contexts and 
for different sub-groups, hence cancelling out their effect.  The results also show that 
the lagged value of the dependent variable, the unemployment rate, is highly 
significant with a coefficient one of 0.8 which suggests that the unemployment is 
highly persistent. As argued in section 2.2, when unemployment exhibits 
persistency, besides applying labour market policies, the focus should be on 
increasing aggregate demand to stimulate job creation. Having found no significant 
139 
 
effect of ALMP expenditure at the country level on the transitions from 
unemployment to employment and reducing the unemployment rate, the following 
empirical chapters 5 and 6 will investigate the effect of the ALMPs at the individual 
level on increasing an individual‘s probability of being employed, having an 
employment contract and actively searching for jobs.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Having analysed the labour market in the European transition and non-transition 
economies in chapter 1 and established the potential importance of ALMPs as a 
factor in reducing unemployment in chapter 2, the thesis followed with an empirical 
analysis of the effectiveness of ALMPs in the European countries at the country 
level in chapter 3. This chapter will provide an assessment of the methodology 
applied in evaluating ALMPs in preparation for the upcoming empirical analysis in 
chapters 5 and 6. The aim of this chapter is to: (i) analyse the evaluation 
methodologies employed in microeconomic policy analysis and identify the key 
assumptions within the common frameworks; and (ii) review the empirical evidence 
specifically for European transition economies.  
The central problem faced by microeconomic evaluation is the issue of 
counterfactual data since an individual cannot be in two different states at the same 
time. Thus, the key role of this chapter is to examine the evaluation problem and the 
construction of counterfactuals for the reliability of the results, since it is the 
important part of making the comparison between two different states. It is crucial to 
understand whether a particular active programme has been successfully designed, 
targeted and implemented and at the same time to evaluate the impact of ALMPs on 
the participants‘ future labour market outcomes. Assessing the effectiveness of the 
ALMPs is not an easy task and it remains a concern to researchers. The evaluation 
analysis becomes even more difficult in a quickly changing environment, which is 
the case in most transitional economies. There have been a substantial number of 
evaluations of ALMP effectiveness in Europe conducted by independent researchers 
and researchers commissioned by government bodies, though there are very few 
evaluations for transition economies.  The evaluation studies in transition economies 
have mostly used different matching estimators and have had less focus on other 
evaluation methods.  
According to Heckman et al. (1999), the choice of the most appropriate estimator 
depends on three factors: the assignment of individuals into the programmes, the 
quality of data available and the specific question to be answered. In social 
experiments the assignment of the participants into the programmes is performed 
randomly, hopefully assuring balance in observed and un-observed characteristics of 
142 
 
the treated and control persons i.e. the characteristics of the two groups are similar 
hence comparable (Heckman et al., 1996; 1999). In contrast, in observational studies 
the assignment into the programmes is not random and thus causes possible selection 
bias. Choosing from the wide range of available evaluation methods when analysing 
the microeconomic effectiveness of active policies is a big challenge for researchers  
Heckman et al. (1996; 1999) place a high emphasis on the importance of the quality 
of data to produce unbiased impact estimates. The observational data should ideally 
be obtained from the same source for the treatment and control groups and it should 
provide a rich set of variables. Evidence from some studies suggests that evaluations 
using observational data produce different estimates and generate conclusions which 
deviate from those drawn from experimental studies (LaLonde, 1986; Smith and 
Todd, 2005). Since social experiments are considered to represent the ‗gold 
standard‘, researchers have tried to find an evaluation method that by using 
observational data will produce unbiased results just as social experiments ideally 
do. However, some studies found evidence that matching estimators succeed in 
replicating experimental results while also arguing that this method does not 
represent a ‗magic bullet‘ that can solve the selection problem in every case (Deheija 
and Wahba, 2002; Smith and Todd, 2005). 
The chapter is organised as follows.  Section 4.2 provides a detailed explanation of 
the evaluation problem, with particular emphasis given to the construction of the 
counterfactuals. This section will provide arguments for using Propensity Score 
Matching and more specifically how this method may correct for any selection bias 
followed by an assessment of the efficiency of different matching methods. Section 
4.3 will provide a review of the evaluation methodologies used when investigating 
the effectiveness of ALMPs at the individual level while section 4.4 reviews the 
evaluation methodologies adopted to date in transition economies. Section 4.5 
provides the conclusions of the chapter.  
4.2 Evaluation Methodology: The evaluation problem and the 
construction of counterfactuals  
Most microeconomic evaluation studies of active labour market policies are based on 
the potential–outcome approach to causality (Rubin, 1974; Heckman et al., 1999; 
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Caliendo et al., 2011; Schmidl, 2014; ) persons are expected to occupy one of two 
mutually exclusive states: treated or un-treated.  The individual indicator    is 
associated with the indication of receiving a treatment, where      if a person 
participates in the programme and      otherwise. The ideal assessment is what 
would happen to individual   in the labour market if   participated in a programme 
       relative to the state when   did not participate in a programme       . 
The second term is not possible to observe. 
The outcome for the individual   who has participated is denoted as         while 
the outcome in the case where the individual   has not participated in a programme is 
             Where increasing the employability of those undertaking treatment 
is the key objective of the intervention then the labour market outcomes can be 
defined as ‗‘0‘‘ if not employed and ‗‘1‘‘ if employed which gives the possibilities 
of an individuals‘ outcome before and after the treatment as             
              . The evaluation analysis seeks to assess the causal impact of the 
treatment on labour market status. The actual outcome (  ) for individual   can be 
written as: 
                                                                               4.1 
The individual treatment effect would be given by the difference 
                                                                                 4.2 
Equation 4.2 is the fundamental evaluation problem. To evaluate the impact of the 
treatment, both outcomes with and without the treatment need to be observed. 
Unfortunately, the outcome of both states of one individual at the same time can 
never be observed. The outcome of the treated individual had he not been treated 
(   ) is not observable hence it needs to be estimated which also implies that the 
treatment effect cannot be directly observed but needs to be estimated.  
Some studies, focus on the population average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) 
(Caliendo et al., 2011; Schmidl, 2014) which is formally given by:  
       |         |         |                                      4.3 
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The final term of equation 4.3,     |   ), is the expected outcome had treated 
individuals not participated in any programme. This is regarded as the counterfactual 
outcome that is impossible to be observed. Thus, the evaluation problem is the 
problem of finding an appropriate counterfactual that can be identified from the 
observational data. The only distribution of the individual outcomes that can be 
directly observed are the frequency distribution of the outcome        for 
participants and the outcome             for non-participants. The frequency 
distribution of the outcomes of both individuals in different groups can be observed 
by the set of the individuals‘ characteristics    and also by the outcome of the pre-
treatment period    
 ; the pre-treatment period is denoted as   . Taking into account 
this conditioning information will allow correcting for selection on observable 
characteristics. Therefore, constructing an appropriate control group of non-
participants will help to alleviate the evaluation problem.  
In order to understand the identifying assumptions of the evaluation approaches used 
in the literature, a brief explanation of experimental and non-experimental designs is 
provided below. 
Experimental studies completely replicate the intervention that will be implemented 
in the field; these studies provide, in principle, a convincing approach to the 
evaluation problem. The main idea of the experiment is the randomised selection of 
individuals into treatment and control groups. Individuals who would have chosen to 
participate in the programme would be excluded from the programme participation 
through a random mechanism. The process is under considerable control of the 
researcher about the individual compliance with the programme. As a consequence, 
randomization will generate a complete balancing of the relevant observable and un-
observable variables across treatment and control groups (when the sample size is 
sufficiently large enough), which will enable comparability between the groups and 
does not require any sophisticated statistical analysis.  
Non-experimental or observational studies are not conducted under the control of the 
researcher. This evaluation design gathers information on the labour market 
outcome(s) of participants and non-participants and utilises this information to 
achieve results similar to those from the experimental design. In this case the 
selection or assignment into the active programmes is done by labour office 
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administrators or individuals may select themselves for programmes they anticipate 
to be beneficial for themselves. While the randomised experiment guarantees the 
balancing of observables and un-observables of the treatment and control 
individuals, the non-experimental study tends to use the observable information 
while the remaining difference in characteristics will be attributed to chance. 
Accordingly, the difference in the means of outcomes for participants and non-
participants will be attributed to the programme effect.  
In non-experimental designs, the treated and untreated are selected groups that would 
be likely to have different outcomes even in the absence of the programme, thus 
leading to a selection bias problem (Rodríguez-Planas and Benus, 2010). Even when 
treated and untreated individuals have comparable observed characteristics, the two 
groups are likely to differ in unobserved characteristics (Hämäläinen, 1999). The 
problem of selection bias can be diminished through imposing some identification 
assumptions. The evaluation methods are designed to estimate the counterfactual and 
at the same time taking into account the problem of selection bias. Matching 
estimators, as one of the evaluation methods, will tend to balance the characteristics 
in the two groups when using observational data. While in contrast in the social 
experiments a difference in baseline characteristics may exist (Austin, 2011). 
According to Rosenbaum (1998), matching estimation is feasible where there are 
differences in the pre-treatment characteristics of the treated and untreated 
individuals that are important for the outcome.  If treated and control individuals 
have similar pre-treatment characteristics the selection bias would not arise and as 
such a simple estimator would be sufficient to assess the difference in outcome.  
The choice of which evaluation method to use is an important one because  the 
impact estimates are sensitive to the estimator chosen and deviate from the 
benchmark of experimental estimates (LaLonde, 1986; Heckman et al., 1999). 
According to Smith and Todd (2005), this is not surprising since the different 
estimates are dependent on different identification assumptions about the outcome 
and participation used by different estimators. The following section provides an 
overview on the evaluation approaches commonly used in ALMP evaluations and 
alternative methodologies using observational data. 
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4.3 Evaluation strategies for observational studies  
An evaluation approach involves a comparison between the treated and untreated 
individuals. Evaluation methods are designed to take into account the estimation of 
counterfactual outcomes as well as to control for selection bias. Despite the fact that 
the quality of data available is one determining factor, the choice of the evaluation 
methodology also depends on the mechanism by which the individuals are allocated 
to programmes. Blundell and Dias (2009) refer to this as the ‗assignment rule‘ and it 
is an important component in the choice of the evaluation method used. Each method 
employs different assumptions and unless an appropriate method is being used the 
results will not be reliable (Blundell and Dias, 2009). The adequacy of each of the 
approaches, the data required and the necessary assumptions are briefly discussed 
below. This discussion will provide the motivation for the later use of Propensity 
Score Matching in the analysis of the effectiveness of ALMPs considering the 
available data.  
Heckman et al. (1999) distinguish three prototypical solutions to the evaluation 
problem:  
Before and after estimator – this is the most common approach for constructing a 
plausible counterfactual. It comprises a comparison of treated individuals with 
themselves in the pre-treatment period t‟. The underlying identification assumption 
of this method is that taken over the population of all treated individuals, the average 
of actual outcome in period t‟ is equal to the population average of what these 
individuals would have experienced in period t had they not participated in the 
programme. It therefore requires considerable stability in the economic environment. 
The validity of this assumption may be violated due to the changes in the overall 
state of the economy between different points of time, or changes in the life cycle 
position of the cohort. Even the anticipation of the individual participating in a 
programme may change an individual‘s motivation and behaviour in the pre-
treatment period. This type of study requires longitudinal or repeated cross-section 
data from the same population where at least one section is from the pre-treatment 
period. 
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Cross-section estimator – this method compares the labour market outcomes of 
treated and untreated individuals at the same point of time. The results from this 
approach would be biased when using non-experimental or observational data since 
there will presumably be permanent difference in personal characteristics of 
individuals who participated and those who did not. This approach would be more 
suitable in an experimental design where individuals are randomly selected in 
treatment and control groups in which case the characteristics of the two groups 
would be closely related. The main assumption of this approach is that, on average, 
individuals who do not receive treatment have the same no-treatment outcome as 
those who do, had they not been treated.  This assumption will be satisfied if the 
participation in the programme is independent of outcomes in the no-programme 
state in the post-programme period (Heckman et al., 1999). In addition, this approach 
is not vulnerable to the problems that arise in the before-after estimator if the 
macroeconomic environment and aging process have the same effect on both 
participants and non-participants. 
Difference-in-difference estimator – is defined as the difference in average outcome 
of the before and after the treatment of treated individuals minus the difference in 
average outcome before and after treatment of the control individuals. The 
interpretation of this technique is the difference of a simple estimator between the 
actual outcome and the outcome that would occur in the post-treatment period in a 
hypothetical case where the treatment group had no treatment. This is a widely used 
evaluation method and considered by many to be the most efficient method when 
combined with propensity score matching (Smith and Todd, 2005). However, it 
requires longitudinal or repeated cross-section data.  
4.3.1 Matching estimation – Propensity Score Matching  
Matching estimation is used to estimate the treatment effect based on observational 
data. This estimation is based on the principle that participants should be matched 
with non-participants (control group) conditional on pre-treatment observed 
covariates. The outcome is then compared between the matched pairs and the 
difference in outcomes is attributed to the treatment. There are two matching 
techniques: Exact Covariate Matching and Propensity Score Matching. Exact 
Covariate Matching creates matched pairs of treated and un-treated individuals based 
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on identical covariates, i.e. identical age, gender, educational level etc. Matching can 
be difficult when the dimension of conditioning variables is large, i.e. the more 
variables used to match by the more difficult it gets to match individuals. This 
phenomenon is known in the literature as the ‗curse of dimensionality‘ (Stuart, 2010; 
Todd, 2010). Since the dimensionality increases exponentially with the number of 
covariates X, it becomes impossible to find a match for each observation when more 
than a few variables are being used. This is a serious limitation of Exact Covariate 
Matching even in cases of a large sample since it leads to many individuals not being 
matched (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Blundell and Dias, 2009). Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) suggest that it is sufficient to match on Propensity Scores, i.e. to match 
the treated and un-treated individuals by their probabilities to enter a given 
programme conditional on the observed covariates. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
have shown that if the Conditional Identification Assumption (CIA - explained 
below) is valid for the variables X it would also be valid for the estimated propensity 
scores. Replacing the set of variables X with the estimated propensity scores to 
match the observations will reduce the matching problem to only one dimension, that 
of propensity scores, thus simplifying the matching procedure. In this context, 
participants are similar to non-participants based on their propensity to be treated in 
a particular active programme but it does not necessarily mean that all the 
characteristics of the matched pair are exactly the same. The propensity score of each 
of the individuals is estimated from a bivariate model (either logit or probit) using a 
set of variables determining the treatment participation and the outcome. The set of 
variables to be accounted for in the propensity score estimation is discussed in more 
detail below. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that matching on propensity 
scores, instead of matching on a high-dimensional matrix of potential characteristics, 
will also balance the characteristics of the two groups through balancing the 
propensity score values and will lead to a higher number of matched pairs. In other 
words, conditioning on the propensity scores allows one to replicate an experiment 
setting, conditional on observed covariates.  
Regardless of the type of matching, matching estimation is based on two 
assumptions. The first assumption is the Conditional Independence Assumption 
(CIA) (also referred to as un-confoundedness or selection on observables) which 
denotes that there are sufficient observable data (X) such that the outcomes or the 
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treatment effects (Y) are independent from the programme participation (D) (Rubin, 
1974; Gerfin and Lechner, 2002; Christensen, 2009; Bonin and Rinne, 2014):  
            |                                                                4.4 
The CIA is in general a strong assumption and obliges inclusion of a range of 
relevant independent variables influencing both participation in the active 
programmes and the outcome variables (Bryson et al., 2002; Bonin and Rinne, 
2014). This assumption tends to mimic as much as possible the experimental 
approach of random assignment (Austin, 2011). According to this, it is assumed that 
the unobserved characteristics are trivial and do not particularly affect the outcome 
in the absence of treatment. Participants may adjust their behaviour in order to 
become eligible to participate in a programme and this information may not be 
observable to the evaluator. However, when a rich dataset is available this 
assumption is likely to hold and conditional on observable characteristics the 
selection process will mimic randomisation just as in an experimental setting.  
The second assumption is common support or the overlapping of the covariates of 
the participants and non-participants. As explained by Schmidl (2014) this 
assumption ―requires that all characteristic values appearing in the treatment group 
also appear in the control group” (p. 137). In the case when the characteristics are 
observable only for treated individuals, one is unable to predict how these 
characteristics are related to the outcome of the control individual. The condition is 
written as:  
       |                                                          4.5 
Under these assumptions, the distribution of the counterfactual and the observed 
outcome for the participants and the comparison group are the same, conditional on 
the vector of covariates.  
    |            |                                                4.6 
Even when using propensity scores instead of exact covariates to create matching 
pairs, the problem of finding quality matches does not disappear completely.  The 
non-treated group may not have some of propensity scores similar to the treated 
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group which may lead to omitting the treated observations from the sample resulting 
with a narrow common support. The essence of matching estimators is to compare 
similar individuals and the common support assumption assures that the matched 
treated and control individual share similar characteristics. In the absence of 
common support, incomparable individuals are likely to have different observable 
characteristics and are more likely to differ in unobservable characteristics. 
However, in an attempt to increase the quality of matching one may lose too many 
observations from the treated group which is important, particularly for multiple 
treatment programmes (Bryson et al., 2002).  
One of the most important steps when evaluating with propensity score matching is 
choosing the relevant covariates X. The literature suggests that a rich set of variables 
that simultaneously affect the choice probabilities and the outcome should be 
included in the estimation of the propensity scores; however, there is no consensus 
regarding which variables to include (Heckman et al., 1999; Austin 2011). Possible 
sets of variables to be accounted for when estimating the propensity scores include: 
the set of all measured baseline covariates (i.e. variables which are not influenced or 
modified by the treatment such as age, gender, household condition, etc.);  the set of 
variables that are associated with treatment assignment (this set of variables depends 
on the specific characteristics related to the assignment or selection on the 
programmes such as the admission criteria, distance from the employment/training 
centres etc.); the set of variables that affect the outcome (potential confounders, 
basically all the variables that affect the labour market state or earnings such as 
demographic variables, labour market histories, economic condition etc.); and the set 
of variables that affect both treatment assignment and outcome level (true 
confounders) (Austin, 2011). Brookhart et al. (2006) suggest that including the 
variables that only affect the treatment assignment will produce greater variance of 
the estimated treatment effect. In many settings, it is safer to include in the 
propensity score model all baseline covariates that affect both treatment assignment 
and the outcome (Austin, 2011). Steiner et al. (2010) also suggest that the optimal 
modelling strategy is to include a large set of covariates since this approach will be 
more likely to satisfy the CIA condition. The socio-demographic characteristics of 
potential participants along with their educational background are likely to be very 
important in the context of ALMP evaluations (Bonin and Rinne, 2014). Previous 
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studies suggest that individuals‘ labour market histories are important determinants 
of the participation in active labour market programmes, as they are of the 
individuals‘ labour market outcomes (Heckman et al., 1999). Therefore, dummies 
representing different intervals of duration of unemployment before the treatment 
should be included in the analysis. As explained, selection bias may arise also from 
unobserved characteristics, such as motivation to participate in a particular 
programme and orientation to paid employment. It is more likely that highly 
motivated individuals will be more likely to get a job. On the other hand, selection 
bias may also be attributed to the role of administrative staff in selecting participants. 
In such cases administrators may choose the best of applicants to participate in a 
programme, thus the programme effects may be over-estimated. Therefore, 
controlling for differences in observable characteristics may yield unbiased results 
(Bryson et al., 2002). As recognised by Bryson et al. (2002), motivation to 
participate and get a paid job may be correlated with the pre-treatment 
unemployment duration; thus including this variable in the propensity score 
estimation may capture the motivation effect and thus reduce the bias.  
Even though the discussion so far has implicitly assumed that individuals can 
participate only in one homogenous programme, the type of treatment may be 
heterogeneous in terms of duration, content of training courses or provider of 
courses.
32
 The discussion in section 2.2.3 showed that labour market outcomes may 
be affected by the intensity and the quality of the programme that an individual has 
participated in and there may also be dynamic selection effects when participating in 
programmes one after the other (possibly to remain eligible for state transfer 
payments). Based on Rubin‘s model of binary choice of participation, more recent 
studies extended it to account for multiple treatment (Imbens, 2004; Hirano and 
Imbens, 2001; Gerfin and Lechner, 2002; Emsley et al., 2008; Tan, 2010). Gerfin 
and Lechner (2002) show that similar properties as in the binary treatment model 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) also hold in the multiple treatment framework.  
A relevant issue in the Propensity Score Matching technique is the choice of the 
matching algorithm. Previous evaluations suggest different algorithms for matching 
                                                          
32
 In the case where a person participates in more than one programme, the effect of each programme 
in isolation would be very difficult to assess.  
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of treated and untreated units and there is no consensus on which matching algorithm 
is superior to the other (Morgan and Harding, 2006). Appendix 4.1 provides an 
assessment of different matching algorithms, their advantages and disadvantages and 
identifies potential cases when these methods are more appropriate.  
4.3.2 Inverse Probability Weighting – Regression Adjustment 
Based on the assumptions outlined in section 4.2 and the previous discussion, the 
treatment and control groups can become comparable by conditioning on the 
propensity scores which then can identify the treatment effect. Section 4.3 focused 
on methods based on matching with propensity scores while this section will expand 
the discussion of methods based on doubly robust estimation, because of its‘ 
advantages in the case of analysing multiple treatment programmes. Given that the 
aim of chapter 5 is to investigate the relative effectiveness of three different active 
measures, the chosen method for this empirical analysis is a doubly robust model, 
the Inverse Probability Weighting – Regression Adjustment (IPWRA). This 
estimator produces the parameter of interest while allowing for multinomial 
treatment modelling. Given this major advantage, the IPWRA seems to be a suitable 
choice in our setting. The discussion on the multivalued treatment variable is a recent 
one (Imbens 2000 and Lechner 2001). The doubly robust approach has been 
discussed by Hirano and Imbens (2001), Emsley et al. (2008) and Tan (2010), but to 
the best of our knowledge there is no study that combines regression and weighting 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the active labour market programmes. However, a 
few studies have used this technique in other fields such as estimating the earnings 
returns to different educational programmes (Uysal, 2015).  
IPWRA is a doubly robust model estimator because it uses one model to predict the 
treatment probability and an outcome model to predict the outcomes for each 
specific treatment. The IPW tends to adjust the outcomes of the control subjects by 
weighting them with the inverse of the estimated propensity scores. It creates 
weights similar to the sampling weights that are used to weight survey samples 
which are representative of specific populations. This estimator forms a synthetic 
sample in which the distribution of measured covariates is independent of the 
treatment assignment (Austin, 2011). 
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IPWRA uses a three-step approach to estimate Average Treatment Effects on 
Treated (ATET). The first is the estimation of treatment model and computation of 
the propensity score weights. These weights are defined by the inverse of the 
propensity score if the subject has joined a treatment and the inverse of 1 minus the 
propensity score if the subject is in the control group (received no treatment or 
received another treatment). The second step is to predict outcomes for each subject 
through fitting the weighted regression models of the outcome for each treatment. 
The third step is to produce the average treatment effects on the treated which is the 
difference in the means of specific treatment outcomes. 
An estimation of the parameter of interest     , using the inverse weights equal to 
1/  ̂ if      or 1/     ̂  if       is obtained as the difference between the 
average outcome of the treated and the reweighted average outcome of the non-
treated. According to Lunceford and Davidian (2004) the doubly robust estimator is 
defined as follows:  
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 Where   (  )      |  =       for D = 0 or D = 1 are predicted values from the 
regressions of the outcome on the baseline covariates where the coefficient estimates 
and predicted values are obtained from the regressions carried out separately for each 
treatment group with the same model specification. This approach provides 
consistent estimates of the effects because the treatment is assumed to be 
independent of the potential outcomes after conditioning on the covariates.  
The standard errors reported in the doubly robust estimators correct for the three 
steps in the process when producing the parameter of interest. A particular concern 
associated with IPWRA is that it is very sensitive to large values of the propensity 
scores as they receive disproportionately large weights in the construction of the 
counterfactual. However, the common support (overlap) assumption ensures that 
predicted inverse-probability weights do not get too large. This estimator deals with 
the poor properties of the finite sample by normalising the weights of the propensity 
scores to one (Imbens, 2004; Emsley et al., 2008; Uysal, 2015). 
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The most important advantage of this estimator is that it gives unbiased estimates if 
only one of the models, the treatment or the outcome model, is specified correctly 
(Bang and Robins, 2005; Emsley et al., 2008; Uysal, 2015). This allows for two 
opportunities to obtain the accurate results. The simulations of Emsley et al. (2008), 
Tan (2010) and Uysal (2015) demonstrated that the doubly robust estimates remain 
consistent even if one of the underlying models is mis-specified. Because of the 
frequency of model mis-specification, the doubly robust model is desirable.  
4.4 Review of empirical studies   
The previous sections provided a review of the available evaluation methodologies 
usually used to assess the effectiveness of the ALMPs. In addition, sections 4.3.2 and 
4.3.3 reviewed in more depth the Propensity Score Matching approach and also 
offered justification for using this method in evaluating active measures. In chapter 2 
it was argued that the ALMPs, including measures such as job search assistance, 
labour market training, and wage subsidies among others, have a potentially 
important impact in combating unemployment. Seeking to identify the evidence that 
allows us to draw a conclusion with regard to the effectiveness of the ALMPs this 
section provides a critical review of the recent studies that used Propensity Score 
Matching in European countries. In addition, the review will focus more specifically 
on studies for European transition economies.   
4.4.1 Evidence from Europe with special reference to European 
transition economies 
The adoption of ALMPs was seen as an important instrument to tackle the relatively 
high unemployment rates in transition economies. It is therefore valuable to question 
this perception and to assess what level and type of these policies could be 
appropriate in the context of the labour markets of transition economies. It is widely 
known that labour markets in these countries have different characteristics compared 
to those in Western countries (see chapters 1 and 2). There are relatively few studies 
analysing the impact or the effectiveness of ALMPs in the transition contexts and 
their results are diverse. Summaries of the main microeconomic evaluations in 
European transition economies and selected non-transition economies are presented 
in table 4.1. While in Western countries the quality of data has been increasing, the 
most important issue for transition economies remains the quality of the micro data. 
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Administrative records do not usually provide enough information to carry out 
micro-econometric evaluations, thus most of the studies in transition economies do 
not rely only on this data source. Follow-up surveys of the registered unemployed or 
participants of the programmes in general are also rare and do not support the ever 
increasing need to conduct a thorough micro-econometric evaluations. Most 
programme evaluations analyse only the partial effect on the treated. The mean 
effect of ‗the treatment on treated‘ is measured by the labour market outcome, either 
employment probability or earnings after the treatment. Table 4.1 shows that for 
transition economies the outcome variable tends to be unemployment and 
employment probability, which is in line with the objective of these policies in 
ETEs, while only a few studies investigate the effect of active measures on the level 
of earnings. The methodologies of evaluation studies in transition economies tend to 
follow the same identification strategies as those in other European countries. The 
studies have relied either on hazard rate analyses or on different variants of selection 
on observables, mostly through different matching estimators.  Matching estimators 
seem to be mostly used in transition economies (Puhani, 2002; Leetmaa and Vork, 
2003; Rodriguez-Planas and Benus, 2006; Kluve et al. 2008; Bonin and Rinne, 2014; 
Mojsoska-Blazevski and Petreski, 2015; Bratti et al., 2017; Potluka, 2017; Štefánik 
et al., 2018; Popescu and Roman, 2018; Adamecz-Völgyi et al., 2018) along with 
duration models (Puhani, 2002; Van Ours, 2001; Micklewright and Nagy, 2005), 
with a few exceptions  using selection models (Vodopivec, 1999; Petreski, 2018). 
The following sections provide a review of the main empirical studies of the 
effectiveness of ALMPs in transition economies. 
In terms of the data used, European evaluations mostly use cross-sectional data 
controlling for selection bias. In recent years, active policies have become more 
diverse and policymakers seem to have increased their focus on measures for 
specific target groups. The majority of the micro-econometric evaluations are based 
on non-experimental designs, while with respect to the identification strategies most 
of the studies use matching estimators or duration models. Regarding the time-span 
effectiveness of the active measures, evaluations in European countries mostly focus 
on the short-term effects (outcomes six to twelve months after completion of the 
programme), while in more recent years some studies consider also the long-term 
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effects (outcomes between two to three years after completion of the programme) 
(Mojsoska-Blazevski and Petreski, 2015; Card et al., 2017; Štefánik et al., 2018).  
It is common for evaluation studies to estimate the impact of active measures on 
unemployment and employment probabilities rather than on earnings, which is 
consistent with the objectives of policies (the main objective of the European 
policies is to increase employment rather than alleviate poverty (Eurostat, 2018).  
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Table 4.1 Summary of studies on the effectiveness of ALMPs for European Transition Economies and selected Non-Transition 
Economies, based on chronological order (year of publication) 
Study Country Measure Target 
Group  
Observation 
Period 
Outcome of 
interest  
Methods of estimation Results 
Van Ours 
and 
Lubyova, 
1998 
Slovak Republic 1)PUJ – publicly 
useful jobs 
(employment in 
public sector),  
2)SPJ – socially 
purposeful jobs 
(subsidies in 
private sector) and   
3) Training 
Unemployed  1993 – 1998  
Administrative 
data  
Dummy variables 
 1. value 1 if: 
unemployed did 
not participate in 
ALMP but found 
job 
2. value 1 if: 
unemployed 
participated in 
ALMP and then 
found job,  
3. value 1 if: 
unemployed part. 
ALMP but did not 
find job 
4. value 1 if: 
unemployed 
neither 
participated 
neither found job.  
Multivariate Duration Models  
  
Training and PUJ reduce 
duration of remaining 
unemployed.  
SPJ increase probability of 
being unemployed.  
Puhani, 1998 Poland 1)Training,  
2)Intervention 
Works (subsidies 
in the private 
sector) 
3)Public Works  
Registered 
unemployed  
1992-1996 
Labour Force 
Survey  
Re-employment 
probability 
Propensity Score Matching and 
Exact Matching 
Nearest neighbour without 
replacement  
And a Duration Model  
Training : 
Positive effect for men. 
Significantly positive effect for 
women for one month only.  
Significant positive effect of 
Intervention works and Public 
works for men.  
Vodopivec, 
1999 
Slovenia  1)Public works Unemployed 1992 – 1996  
Administrative  
Exit in individuals 
labour market 
status after 
searching n 
Heckman Two Stage Model  Participants have higher success 
rate of finding employment.  
Women after 6 to 12 months of 
job search have lower rate of 
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months for a job.  
Three values: 0 if 
after n months is 
still unemployed; 
1 if after n months 
is employed; 2 if 
after n months is 
out of labour force 
being unemployed. Young 
participants: +  
Vocational education: -  
Gerfin and 
Lechner, 
2002 
Switzerland  1)Training (5 
types), 
2)Employment 
Programmes(priva
te 
and public; job 
creation which 
does not compete 
with regular jobs), 
3)Temporary 
wage subsidy (in 
the regular labour 
market) 
Unemployed
, UI 
recipients  
1997-1998 – 
Administrative 
data  
The probability of 
being in 
employment and 
out-of-labour 
force 
Propensity Score Matching 
(Multivalued treatment)  
Temporary wage subsidy shows 
a positive effect, employment 
programmes show a negative 
effect and training has mixed 
results. 
Leetmaa and 
Vork, 2003  
Estonia  1)Training  Unemployed
, UI 
beneficiaries  
2000 – 2002  
Administrative, 
Follow-up 
Survey  
Employment,  
Earnings 
conditional on 
being employed 
Propensity Score Matching  
Nearest neighbour with 
replacement 
 
Training increases the 
employment probability and 
earnings.  
Micklewrigh
t and Nagy, 
2005 
Hungary  1)Job search 
monitoring 
 
UI claimants  2003 – lasted 
four months 
Administrative, 
LFS  
Employment 
hazard 
  
Multivariate Duration Model Large significant effect for 
women over 30. , The effect is 
even larger if women over 30 is 
married.   
Men and younger women: no 
effect 
Dorsett, 2006 United 
Kingdom  
Two stage 
programme:  
1.Job-search 
activity 
2. one of the 
options:  
1) Subsidised 
employment,  
Young 
unemployed 
1998 
Administrative 
data 
Employment in 
the week starting 
28 May 2001 
Propensity Score Matching 
 
Subsidised employment is more 
effective in securing 
unsubsidised employment than 
the other options available. 
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2) Full-time 
education and 
training, 
3) Environmental 
task force or 
voluntary sector 
Rodriguez-
Planas and 
Benus, 2006  
Romania  1) Training 
and retraining ,  
2) Small business 
assistance,  
3) Public 
employment, and 
4) Employment 
and relocation 
services 
Disadvantag
ed and long-
term 
unemployed 
1999-2002 
Administrative 
and Follow up 
Survey 
Re- employment 
probability and 
earnings  
Propensity Score Matching 
Kernel-based matching with a 
caliper of 1%. 
 
. 
Training, small business 
assistance and employment 
relocation services have 
positive effects on re-
employment probabilities and 
wages. Public employment 
programme has a negative 
effect.  
Kluve, 
Lehman and 
Schmidt, 
2008 
Poland 1) Training,  
2) Wage subsidies 
in private sector 
 
Unemployed 1992–1996 
Labour Force 
Survey  
 
Out of labour 
force – 0, 
employed – 1 and 
unemployed -2 
Exact Covariate Matching  
  
Training increase employment 
probability for men and women, 
IW does not have any effect for 
women but has a negative effect 
on men.  
Ramos et al., 
2009  
Spain 1)Training  
2)Retraining 
3)Personalised 
employment 
support  
4)Social 
Guarantee 
programmes  
5)Job Creation 
scheme 
6) Integrated 
programmes 
Unemployed 2005  
Administrative 
data  
The probability of 
being employment 
Propensity Score Matching – 
Nearest neighbour without 
replacement  
 
Participation increases the 
probability of becoming 
employed by more than 5%.  
Participating in more than one 
programme is more effective 
than participating in only one.  
Christensen, 
2009 
Denmark  1)Public and 
private on the job-
training,  
2)Residual 
programmes (a 
combination of 
active measures 
targeted at the 
weakest 
Unemployed 
25-50 years, 
UI recipients 
2002-2006 – 
Administrative 
data 
The probability of 
being employed 
and earnings 
(indexed to 2005) 
Propensity Score Matching  Training increases employment 
and earnings 
Women, middle age or older, 
and unskilled benefit the most 
from participation in these 
programmes. 
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unemployed - 
specific in 
Denmark) 
Caliendo et 
al., 2011 
Germany  1) JUMP Wage 
Subsidies, 
2)Wage subsidies,  
3)Short-term 
training,  
4)Further training,  
5) Preparatory 
training,  
6) Job search 
assistance,  
7) Job creation 
Scheme.  
Young 
unemployed  
2002-2008  
Administrative 
data – detailed 
daily 
information 
Short-term and 
long-term effects 
in employment  
Propensity Score Matching –  
Inverse Probability Weighting – 
Matching with strata 
 
Positive long-term employment 
effects for almost all measures 
aimed at employment. 
Insignificant effect on youth 
and low positive effect on low 
educated youth.  
Public sector job creation is 
found to be harmful for the 
medium-term employment 
prospects and ineffective in the 
long-run.  
 
Borra et al., 
2012 
Spain Combination of 
1)Training,  
2)Labour 
Orientation and  
3) Work 
Placements 
Registered 
unemployed 
2004 
Administrative 
data and  
Two follow-up 
Surveys in 2005 
and 2008  
Employment 
probability,  
Earnings, 
Job Security 
Working hours   
at different time 
periods (at 6 and 
36 months of 
completion of the 
programme) 
Propensity Score Matching  
Epanechinikov and Gaussian 
Kernel matching and Radius 
matching 
  
Short-run (6 months): Positive 
effect on employment, job 
security and working hours.  
 
Long-term (36 months):No 
significant effect  
Maibom  et 
al., 2014  
Denmark 1) More frequent 
meeting, 
2) Job search 
assistance and  
3) Early 
mandatory 
participation in 
activation 
programmes  
Young 
uneducated 
and 
educated 
unemployed  
2009 
Administrative 
data  
The probability of 
being in 
employment 
Randomly Controlled Trial   For young uneducated there is 
negative impact of all measures 
on employment 
For young educated there is a 
positive effect for more 
frequent meeting (counselling), 
job search assistance but no 
effect for early activation. 
ILO, 2014  Albania  1)On-the-job 
training,  
2)Wage subsidies 
for job-seekers in 
difficulty (long-
term unemployed, 
young, 
Registered 
unemployed  
2008 – 2013  
Survey  
The probability of 
being in 
employment 
Propensity Score Matching  
Nearest neighbour matching 
with replacement; caliper of 
0.0001. 
  
All three programmes have a 
positive impact; the largest 
impact is that of wage subsidies 
for job-seekers in difficulty.   
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unemployed with 
disability, older 
than 45 with 
lower level of 
education etc.) 
and 3)Internship 
programme 
 
Bonin and 
Rinne, 2014  
Serbia  1)Vocational 
Training, 
2)Temporary jobs 
Unemployed
, UI 
recipients  
2005 –  
Survey  
Unemployment, 
employment in a 
regular job 
including self-
employment, 
employment in a 
seasonal job and  
 
Subjective 
wellbeing 
variables.  
Propensity Score Matching 
using Nearest neighbour 
matching  
The study does not find any 
effect of the programmes on the 
labour market outcomes. 
However, the survey was 
conducted a short period after 
the completion of the ALMPs, 
authors suggest that this might 
have affected the results.  
The positive Impact appears to 
be strong when judged by 
subjective well-being. 
Mojsoska-
Blazevski 
and Petreski, 
2015 
Macedonia  1)Self-
employment 
programme, 
2)Internship, 
3)Training for 
known employer, 
4)Training for 
deficient 
occupations, 
5)Training for IT 
skills   
Registered 
Unemployed 
2012  
Cross-sectional 
Survey data 
Several outcome 
variables 
regarding 
employment and 
subjective 
wellbeing 
Nearest Neighbour Matching 
with replacement and with 
caliper 
Mixed results. Internship 
scheme and Training for known 
employer are more effective in 
increasing employment 
probability. 
Caliendo et 
al, 2017  
Germany 1)Short-term 
training,  
2)Long-term 
training and  
3)Wage subsidies 
Registered 
unemployed 
June 2007 – 
May 2008 
Administrative 
and Survey data  
The probability of 
being in 
employment and 
the level of 
earnings 
Propensity Score Matching 
using Kernel matching and 
Inverse Probability Weighting  
No effect of short-term and 
long-term training on 
employment probability and 
negative effects on earnings. 
Positive effects of wage 
subsidies on employment 
probability and earnings.  
Popescu and 
Roman, 2018  
Romania 1)Vocational 
training  
Registered 
unemployed 
2014  
Survey data  
The probability of 
being in 
employment  
Propensity Score Matching and 
Inverse Probability Weighting 
Positive but modest effect on 
employment probability 
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Štefánik et 
al., 2018 
Slovakia  
 
 
 
 
1)Training and 
2)Internship 
schemes 
Registered 
unemployed  
January 2007 -
April 2008 
Administrative 
data  
The probability of 
being in 
employment 
Propensity Score Matching, 
Inverse Probability Weighting 
and Two-Stage Least Square 
Estimations Using An 
instrumental Variable 
Strong positive effect in the 
long-term after completion of 
the active measures.  
Potluka, 
2017 
Czech Republic 1)Public works in 
social enterprises  
Unemployed  April 2010 - 
June 2014 
Administrative 
data  
The probability of 
being in 
employment 
Propensity Score Matching  Positive effect increasing 
individuals‘ employment 
probability. Strong effect for 
women and beneficiaries older 
than 40 years.  
Petreski, 
2018  
Macedonia, 
Serbia, 
Montenegro, 
Russia, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova and 
Armenia 
1) Public 
employment 
support services  
Young 
unemployed 
2014 or 2015  
Cross-sectional 
Survey data  
Informal 
employment 
(measured by 
whether the 
individual had an 
employment 
contract) and 
wages  
Two stage Heckman selection 
model  
 
Public employment support 
services decrease probability of 
being employed in the informal 
sector. Insignificant results for 
wages equation.  
Bratti et al., 
2017 
Latvia 1) Vocational 
training 
programme 
Young 
unemployed 
June 2013 -
December 2015 
Administrative 
data 
 
The probability of 
being in 
employment 
Propensity Score and Coarsened 
Exact 
Matching estimators. 
Insignificant effect 
Adamecz-
Völgyi et al., 
2018 
Hungary  1)Supported 
employment 
programme  
Disabled 
unemployed 
January 2004 – 
December 2011 
Administrative 
data  
Probability of 
finding a job and 
not re-entering the 
unemployment 
registry 
Propensity Score Matching 
Use time-window approach of 
matching the treated and 
controls 
Positive significant effect on 
employment probability. 
Positive but smaller effect on 
not re-entering the 
unemployment registry.  
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The definition of the set of characteristics to be included in the propensity score 
estimation is a crucial part of the statistical analysis in Propensity Score Matching 
evaluations. The choice of variables to be included in the propensity score estimation 
varies across European countries and this is partly due to the limitations of available 
data. Variables that capture social demographic characteristics such as age, gender, 
educational attainments are commonly included in the propensity score estimation; 
rarely included are variables that capture living conditions and household situations. 
Due to fertility or other reasons, the effect of ALMPs may differ by gender and it is 
apparent that this covariate needs to be balanced for the two groups (Puhani, 1998; 
Bonjour et al., 2001). Rodriguez-Planas and Benus (2006) point out that the family 
composition and whether the person is the main breadwinner in the family is likely 
to impact upon the decision to participate and should be accounted for. Additionally, 
Caliendo et al. (2011) find evidence that characteristics such as being married and/or 
being a parent increases the probability of participation in active measures.  
Covariates such as region and rural residence are usually included in the studies to 
capture regional heterogeneity in different geographic areas since it is considered 
that regions are an important  determinant of participation in active programmes 
(Kluve et al.,2002; Dorsett, 2006; Rodriguez-Planas and Benus, 2006; Bonin and 
Rinne, 2014; Mojsoska-Blazevski and Petreski, 2015; Bratti et al., 2017). Regional 
variables capture the unobservable local aspects that are correlated with programme 
implementation, with local policies, local infrastructure and labour mobility which 
are relevant for participation decision and participants‘ future labour market 
experience. In order to capture the economic variation, more specifically, some 
studies include regional unemployment rates (Bonjour et al., 2001; Dorsett, 2006; 
Schmidl, 2014) and also regional GDP growth during the year of participation 
(Schmidl, 2014). Schmidl (2014), in addition, captures the seasonal labour market 
conditions by matching individuals by the calendar month of the entry into 
unemployment.  
 The empirical studies usually rely on meaningful approximations to account for 
unobserved characteristics (Kluve et al., 2002; Dorsett, 2006; Schmidl, 2014; 
Caliendo et al., 2017; Adamecz-Völgyi et al., 2018). The pre-treatment labour 
market histories and earnings have been found to be good variables to approximate 
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labour market attachment and aspirations that may affect the programme 
participation (Bryson et al., 2002; Lechner et al., 2013; Bratti et al., 2017). The 
timing of entry into the programmes may vary for participants with different 
characteristics. As an important determinant of the decision to participate in active 
programmes, Caliendo et al. (2011) include the unemployment duration before 
participation over a period of 12 months for youths in Germany. However, due to the 
low number of monthly treatment entries, the study divided this duration into three 
strata (1 to 3 months of unemployment duration; 4 to 6 months and 6 to 12 months of 
unemployment duration) and only individuals with similar unemployment duration 
intervals were compared. Kluve at al. (2002) when using Exact Covariate Matching 
for Poland apply the time-window approach which matches the treated and control 
individuals based on their exact pre-treatment labour market state (being 
unemployed, employed or inactivity state) up to 12 months before participation and 
in addition to other covariates the study matches pairs of treated and untreated based 
on identical pre-treatment histories. Adamecz-Völgyi et al. (2018) in their study for 
Hungary also use the time-window approach to match the treated and controls 
attempting to capture the similar labour market conditions for the two groups. In a 
recent study for Germany, Caliendo et al. (2017) as well as using labour market 
histories they also control for other, usually, unobserved individual characteristics 
such as personality traits, attitudes, expectations, social networks and 
intergenerational information. However, their findings suggest that if comprehensive 
control variables, such as those usually used in modern ALMP evaluations, including 
labour market histories are accounted for in the treatment specification, then the 
addition of other usually unobserved variables add little explanatory power.  
On the other hand, the empirical review of Heckman et al. (1999) suggests that when 
matching with pre-treatment earnings at different times result in biased estimates 
since the matching is created with serial correlated pre-treatment outcomes. In 
addition, Heckman et al., (1999) argue that when these variables are eliminated from 
the estimation, the estimates from non-experimental studies are consistent with those 
from experimental studies. Heckman and Smith (1999) argue that labour force 
dynamics, i.e. being unemployed or out of the labour force, rather than earnings 
determine the participation decision, and thus should be accounted for in the 
propensity score estimation.  
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There are a few studies that capture the impact of the quality of employment services 
in the effectiveness of active programmes (Dorsett, 2006; Schmidl, 2014). Schmidl 
(2014) account for the number of placement offers by the case workers and the last 
contact with the employment services which may be of particular importance to 
measure the labour market performance of youths. The findings of the study suggest 
that young unemployed with the lowest and the highest number of offers are less 
likely to participate in active programmes compared to those with average 
employment offers (Scmidl, 2014). Dorsett (2006) argues that the regional dummies 
included in the estimation would account for the job centre the participant attends, 
hence effectively controlling for the level/quality of services provided to the 
participants.   
Main Findings by Programme 
 Training  
Training usually accounts for the largest share of expenditure on active programmes 
in European countries.  Accordingly, as Table 4.1 shows, more than half of these 
studies investigate the effectiveness of training as an active measure. Earlier studies 
usually did not differentiate between the types of training programmes implemented 
(general training
33
 e.g. training to improve literacy skills and firm-specific training) 
and as such were unable to capture the relative effects of a specific training scheme 
(e.g. Puhani, 1998; Kluve et al., 2002; Leetmaa and Vork, 2003; Rodriguez-Planas 
and Benus, 2006). Hence, one may argue that the results of those studies do not 
provide any clear message to policy-makers as to which training scheme is more 
effective in reducing unemployment.  
More recent studies conducted in European countries have differentiated between the 
types of training (e.g. Lechner, 2001; Schmidl, 2014; Mojsoska-Blazevski and 
Petreski, 2015).  Schmidl (2014) investigated the effectiveness of short-term training 
(from two to eight weeks duration), long-term training (up to one year), participatory 
                                                          
33
 Lowenstein and Spletzer (1999) distinguish between general and specific training: ‗‘...general 
training is defined as a human capital investment that raises a worker‟s productivity at other 
employers to the same extent as at the employer that provides the training. Similarly, completely 
specific training is defined as a human capital investment that increases productivity only at the 
employer that provides the training.‘‘(Lowenstein and Spletzer, 1999, p.711) 
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training (a practical training within a company that tends to help participants to find 
and successfully participate in regular vocational training or unsubsidised education) 
and other active programmes for Germany using an IZA Evaluation Dataset. This 
administrative dataset (composed of more than twelve thousand observations for 
young ALMP participants only) provides detailed daily information on spells in 
employment and social security contribution, unemployment, labour market history, 
socio-demographic characteristics and participation in ALMPs. This amount of data 
allowed the author to estimate monthly treatment effects as the difference between 
the treated and control outcome; for most measures the outcome variable was the 
probability of becoming employed with the exception of participatory training for 
which the outcome was the probability to participate in a vocational training or 
unsubsidised education. The results from the study suggest that the participatory 
training does not improve the post-training level of completed education and 
training. The evidence suggests that training increases the probability of becoming 
employed by 10 percentage points. The study also finds evidence of lock-in effects 
of long-term programmes (participants reduce their effort to search for regular jobs 
during the period of participation) of up to 20 percentage points. The findings 
suggest that training programmes help to overcome the barriers which youths face in 
entering the labour market. A similar study for Switzerland using a very informative 
dataset from the local labour offices analysed the impact of basic short-term training 
and long-term training (Lechner, 2001). The study employed a matching method 
using multinomial choice model to obtain the propensity scores and found no clear 
evidence that the initial training (job counselling and courses in the local language) 
and further vocational training (a combination of trainings including information 
technology courses with longer duration than basic training) affected the probability 
of participants entering employment after completion. 
The majority of the evaluations of training programmes in transition economies tend 
to find a positive effect in the short-term (6 to 12 months) as compared to the long-
term effect (more than a year). The evidence from Poland suggests that individuals 
participating in training programmes have much higher prospects of getting 
employed than they would have in the absence of such measures. Puhani (2002) 
analysed the impact of different active programmes (training and employment 
subsidies) on employment using a Propensity Score Matching and Duration Model 
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employing data from Polish Labour Force Survey (LFS) collected during 1992 to 
1996. Training at the time the data was collected took place within companies and 
also at centres run by the employment offices. The training targeted a very wide 
range of the unemployed, from white collar to blue collar unemployed and the 
training lasted from 3 to 6 months. One important feature of all the active measures 
in Poland at that time was the link of participation in these programmes with the 
entitlement to unemployment benefits.  Participating in one of the programmes made 
the participant eligible for another 12 months of benefit entitlement. The data 
allowed controlling for socio-demographic characteristics, education level, labour 
market history, occupation and industry of employment and place of residence. The 
results from the matching estimator suggest a positive effect on getting re-employed 
for participants in training for both genders although this effect is larger for men (20 
percentage points for men compared to 10 percentage points for women). This 
finding is also supported by the duration model which suggests significant positive 
effects of training for both men and women – participation in training reduced 
unemployment duration by five months for men while two months for women. In 
addition, the results from the duration model suggest that training in comparison to 
private subsidies and public works was more effective.  
Kluve et al. (2008) applied Exact Covariate Matching on the same Polish LFS 
dataset as Puhani (2002). To capture the treatment assignment, the study divided 
individuals‘ labour market history in quarters and matched individuals who were 
unemployed during at least one quarter over the sampling period. This approach 
tends to capture more effectively the changes in institutional set-up and economic 
conditions which are common in transition countries. The labour market history was 
also observed after the treatment; this information was condensed to summarize the 
post-treatment labour market outcome of each individual by the individuals‘ average 
employment rate over the three quarters after the treatment. Kluve et al. (2008) 
estimated the effects of treatment using two samples: the first one without 
accounting for the individuals‘ labour market history while the second taking that 
into account. The results suggest different effects from the two samples. According 
to the findings from the first sample, there is no significant effect of training while 
the results from the second one found that participants have higher post-treatment 
employment rates, by 14 percentage points on average, compared to those who did 
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not participate. Moreover, this finding suggests that had the study not accounted for 
the individuals‘ labour market history, the true effect of the programmes would have 
not been accurately estimated. According to Kluve et al. (2008), training seems to be 
more effective than other programmes and also the trained participants in general 
seem to be equipped with better observable and unobservable characteristics 
enabling them to have better employment prospects.  
An evaluation for Albania also suggests positive effect of on-the-job trainings (ILO, 
2014). The study evaluates the impact of three different active programmes: on-the-
job training, job-seekers in difficulty and an internship programme. It uses a cross-
sectional data from the registered job-seekers who had participated between 2008 
and 2013 or had been selected to participate in the future. The dataset provides a 
limited number of variables on personal characteristics, but no information on 
household or community characteristics except for the region variable dummies. The 
evaluation based on Propensity Score Matching uses age, gender, educational level, 
unemployment duration and regional controls to estimate the propensity scores.  
According to the results, participating in on-the job-training increases the probability 
of becoming employed by 55% after one year compared to non-participants. This 
estimated large effect however, should be interpreted with caution as the control 
group used for analysis was very small. Out of 730 individuals from the treated 
group 608 were out of common support (section 4.3.2 discusses the assumption of 
common support in more detail); only 50 individuals comprised the control group.  
In contrast, the study evaluating the effect of training in Serbia by Bonin and Rinne 
(2014) does not find any effect of vocational training on participants‘ prospects of 
finding a job. Active measures evaluated in this study comprised of vocational 
training and also temporary jobs in the construction sector targeted at the long-term 
and disadvantaged unemployed. Participation in vocational training lasted for three 
months and was full-time. The study used a matching estimator based only on age, 
educational level and place of residence. The active programmes started in January 
2004 while the data was collected through a survey in November 2005. However, the 
survey did not trace the individuals‘ employment histories which seem to be an 
important factor in assessing the effectiveness of ALMPs. The authors also suggest 
that one reason for the insignificant results may be that the survey was conducted 
169 
 
only a short period after the completion of the vocational training thus the full effect 
was not captured. 
Positive effects of general training and literacy skills on earnings and re-employment 
probabilities were found for Romania by Rodriguez-Planas and Benus (2006). 
Rodriguez-Planas and Benus used a very rich dataset from Romanian employment 
offices for registered unemployment during the period 1999 to 2002 followed by a 
survey of the participants and non-participants. Propensity Score Matching was used 
to create matching based on a wide range of covariates including socio-demographic 
characteristics, pre-treatment employment history, regional dummies and variables 
that capture local labour market conditions to measure the different employment 
opportunities in specific regions. The study also includes participants‘ earnings 
during the two years period prior to the survey as a proxy for productivity. Training 
targeted the disadvantaged unemployed and comprised vocational training, general 
education and literacy skills. Those who participated in active measures in Romania 
were entitled to one or two months of benefits after they have completed the 
programme. The findings from the study suggest that the effect on earnings is 
particularly large; training increases earnings of participants by 58% compared to 
non-participants. The study also found that training is more effective for young 
participants than for older ones. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that training has 
shortened considerably the duration of receiving unemployment benefits and made it 
almost non-existent among the training participants.  
A more recent study, Mojsoska-Blazevski and Petreski (2015) employ a nearest 
neighbour propensity score matching using a cross-section dataset which allows 
assessing the impact of different training programmes designed and implemented 
specifically in the FYR Macedonia. These measures include training for known 
employer, training for deficient occupations and training for IT skills. The findings 
of this study suggest mixed effects. The most effective of the training programmes is 
the training for known employer which is found to improve the long-term 
employment, reduce the chances of non-employment at any time after the training 
and increases beneficiaries‘ wage. The least effective seems to be the training for IT 
skills which only improves the subjective well-being of the beneficiaries. According 
to the authors, this result might be due to a targeting issue where in training for IT 
170 
 
skills there is a high share of long-term unemployed while for other active measure 
the participants seems to have had a much shorter spells of unemployment of less 
than 1 month.  
Other studies using Propensity Score Matching to evaluate the effectiveness of 
training measures are Štefánik et al. (2018) for Slovakia, Popescu and Roman (2018) 
for Romania and Bratti et al. (2017) for Latvia. The first study also employs Inverse 
Probability Weighting and Two-Stage Least Square Estimations using an 
instrumental variable. Štefánik et al. (2018) find evidence to suggest that the 
vocational training programme increases participants‘ employment probability 
moderately in the medium-term of up to 36 months. After 3 years, the employment 
probability starts to grow to its maximum in the 54th month after the end of 
participation where the difference between treated and control is about 4 percentage 
points. Popescu and Roman (2018) also find a significant positive effect of 
vocational training programme on employment probability of 14 percentage points 
higher than that of a similar control individual. The findings from this study suggest 
that the effect is larger amongst younger beneficiaries than those older than 25, for 
women compared to men and for those who have lower education levels. These 
findings are in line with the expectations that the active measure might be more 
effective for the disadvantaged given that these individuals benefit more from the 
skill enhancement. Bratti et al. (2017) found a positive but insignificant effect of the 
vocational training programme for youths in increasing beneficiaries‘ employment 
probability. Bratti et al. suggest several possible explanations for this result. The data 
used for this study is from a period where there was an increase in the employment 
rate of youths in Latvia hence both treated and control might have found jobs 
independently from the vocational training. Additionally, in order to increase the 
effectiveness of this measure, the authors suggest that vocational training should be 
combined with a job-creation scheme such as tax rebates for employers hiring 
unemployed individuals.  
Van Ours (2001) carried out a multivariate duration model using rich administrative 
data from registered unemployed from 1993 to 1998 in the Slovak Republic to 
analyse the effectiveness of training, public and private employment subsidies. The 
targets of this training were the disabled unemployed, older people, long-term 
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unemployed, young workers and school leavers. The study accounted for pre and 
post-treatment durations of unemployment, personal characteristics, regional 
differences and a variable indicating whether the individual has participated in any of 
the programmes to estimate the transition rate to employment (the speed with which 
participants find a regular job) and the job separation rate (the speed with which they 
terminate a regular job). The analysis concluded that participating in training gives 
participants an advantage in getting a regular job.  According to the findings, training 
participants have a 6 times higher job finding rate than non-participants. This high 
observed impact may have been a result of unemployed entering in training 
programmes only after they have been promised a job. Participation in training did 
not have any impact on the job-separation rate, suggesting that the trained workers 
were not more valuable to retain in the company than those employees who had not 
participated in any training scheme.  
 Job Search Assistance/Employment Services  
There are very few studies evaluating the effectiveness of employment services in 
European transition economies. Job search assistance is typically the least costly 
active measure and most evidence from transition economies also suggests that this 
measure has a positive impact on labour market outcomes. Through raising 
motivation and through monitoring their job-search behaviour these programmes 
generally have a positive effect on the probability of an unemployed individual 
getting back to work.  
The evidence for the Czech Republic suggests that the receipt of employment 
services reduces unemployment duration. Terrell and Storm (1999) utilised a 
duration model to assess both active and passive labour market programmes during 
1992 to 1994 which was in general a period of developing labour market institutions. 
The analysis is focused particularly on one active programme called job brokering 
where the case worker assists the unemployed to set up interviews with potential 
employers. The methodology assesses the probability that someone finds a job with 
the assistance of the case worker comparing to the probability of someone finding a 
job without assistance. The evidence suggest that the unemployment duration is 
shortened only for unemployed groups with longer duration spells, especially 
women, minorities and the less educated.  
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Rodriguez-Planas and Benus (2006) found evidence of positive effects of 
employment services on employment outcome. This study evaluated the 
effectiveness of small business assistance and employment relocation services 
(consisting of job and social counselling, job search assistance, job placement 
services, and relocation assistance). The first one assisted displaced unemployed 
entrepreneurs to facilitate start-ups while the second helped recently unemployed to 
find employment. Their study suggests that participants in the employment 
relocation services in Romania had an 8.45 percentage points higher probability of 
being employed compared to non-participants. However, the positive impact of 
receiving employment relocation services was found for men but not for women. 
The findings for the small-business assistance also suggest positive effects; receiving 
this assistance increases the probability to become self-employed by 8.38 percentage 
points compared to those who did not receive it. This measure also reduced the 
period of receiving unemployment benefits by almost one month. 
Micklewright and Nagy (2008) assess the effectiveness of an increase in the 
monitoring of job search for benefit claimers in Hungary during 2003. The 
experiment uses data from LFS and employment registers to randomly select 
individuals into treatment and control groups. The study includes actions from case 
workers to increase the intensity of job search activity of benefit claimants. The 
treatment group was asked to increase the number of visits to every three weeks; 
during these visits they were asked about the job search activity and reasons for 
those who admitted little or no search activity. There were no actual sanctions of no 
job search activity but the treated were uncertain of the implication of failure. 
Control individuals were not asked to change their intensity in job search activity 
and were required to have a visit in the employment offices only once every three 
months. Multivariate duration models were used to assess the exit rates to 
employment while accounting for personal observed characteristics, a vector of 
employment office dummies, dummy variables with different duration time intervals 
and dummy for membership of the treatment. According to the findings, the treated 
did not, in general, find a job more quickly than the control individuals. However, 
there were positive effects found for married women over 30. 
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A more recent study evaluated the effectiveness of employment services on the 
probability of being employed in the informal sector and the level of wages for seven 
transition economies (Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova and Armenia) (Petreski, 2018). This study uses a Heckman two stage 
selection model where the variable of interest is measured as a dummy variable 
taking value of 1 if the person received a public employment-support service in any 
of the following forms: advice on how to search for a job; information on vacancies; 
guidance on education and training opportunities; placement in education or training 
programs; and 0 otherwise. The study attempts to address the econometric challenges 
such as the selection into informal job and employment and the endogeneity of the 
variable measuring the public employment-support service. Petreski argues that the 
selection arises because persons who are informally employed may be systematically 
different from those who are unemployed and hence whose (in)formal-employment 
status is unobserved. In the first stage, the probability of having used at least one 
public employment service is regressed on a set of independent variables such as: 
marital status, the number of children living in the household, education of parents 
and the household‘s financial situation. The second stage uses the probability of 
being in informal work as the dependent variable. The study also attempts to address 
the selection issue where the second stage employs an instrumental variable that 
correlates with the endogenous regressor, but is not directly correlated with the 
outcome variable, informal employment. The study uses two instrumental variables: 
the country employment rate at the time the person finished schooling and the 
number of years since the person finished school. The findings suggest that public 
employment support services reduce the probability of being employed in the 
informal sector by 64% compared to a person that did not use this service. In 
addition, in order to assess the effectiveness of different ALMPs, the study separated 
the sample for each active measure using the same methodology. Education and 
training programmes are the most effectives in reducing the probability of being 
employed in the informal sector by more than 21% while advice and guidance 
reduce it by 15%. Providing information on the available job vacancies seems to 
have no effect on the probability of being employed in the informal sector.  
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 Public and Private Sector Employment Subsidies  
Evidence from the evaluations in transition economies suggests mixed results for 
private and public sector employment subsidies. Van Ours (2001) came to 
conclusion that the unemployed that had participated in public employment subsidies 
had significantly higher transition rates to a regular job and very low job separation 
rates compared to those that did not participate. Public employment schemes in the 
Slovak Republic mainly targeted the less qualified unemployed and lasted for 6 
months at the beginning of observed period which was later extended to 9 months 
and after that to 12 months. The author argues that this effect may come as a result of 
signalling; participating in a public subsidy signals a positive attitude towards work 
to potential employers. In contrast, those who participated in the private employment 
subsidies had a lower transition rate to a regular job compared to nonparticipants. 
The private employment subsidies targeted the more qualified unemployed and was 
set for a duration of minimum two years period. Since the duration of this 
programme is quite long, the lock-in effect may be the explanation for its‘ negative 
effect.  The findings of Van Ours (2001) suggest that females, the less educated and 
older participants had lower transition rates to employment i.e. lower speed with 
which they find regular jobs compared to similar non-participants.  
Puhani (2002) suggests that participants of public and private employment subsidies 
are less likely to become employed than non-participants. In this study for Poland, 
the results from the duration model suggest that participation in these programmes 
decrease the transition rate into employment for both men and women but will also 
decrease the rate into inactivity for men. This latter finding may be a positive 
indication that at least these programmes increase labour market attachment. 
Rodriguez-Planas and Benus (2002, 2006) also investigate the effectiveness of 
public employment subsidies along with training, employment services and small 
business assistance using a propensity score matching estimator for Romania. In this 
evaluation, the public employment subsidies are the only active measure that did not 
have positive effect on increasing the employment probabilities or earnings. These 
public employment subsidies were offered in regions with very low employment 
prospects which is argued to be the main reason for their negative effect.  
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A more recent study by Adamecz-Völgyi et al. (2018) uses Propensity Score 
Matching to evaluate the effectiveness of wage subsidies designed to assist the 
disabled unemployed to enter and remain in the labour market through employment 
in public institutions in Hungary. The findings suggest that these policies are 
effective in increasing beneficiaries‘ employment probability by up to 25 percentage 
points compared to that of the control group. The effect is found to be larger for 
women compared to men. A similar study by Potluka (2017), which uses the same 
methodology for a dataset for Czech Republic, also finds positive effects of public 
works in social enterprises on increasing beneficiaries‘ employment probability of 
about 17 percentage points.  
The evidence from a study in Slovenia conducted by Vodopivec (1999) suggests that 
there is an immediate positive effect of public works on employment. Vodopivec 
(1999) utilised a Heckman two stage selection model with a dataset from three 
different sources: the dataset from registered unemployed, the dataset on the receipt 
of benefits and the dataset of the participants of employment subsidies. The study 
controlled for personal characteristics, human capital characteristics and variable 
indicating participation to analyse their effects on the probability of leaving 
unemployment (taking three different states: 0 if unemployed, 1, if employed and 2 
if out of the labour market). These policies gave priority to the long-term 
unemployed, low skilled, disabled unemployed and those living in material hardship. 
The findings suggest an immediate positive effect of public works on employment. 
However, this effect becomes insignificant after 3 months which may be due to 
stigmatisation of the participants. An important finding of the study is that it reduces 
the probability of becoming inactive, thus increasing labour market attachment. 
 ALMPs for Youths  
As there is no evidence on specific youth programmes in transition countries, this 
section will review the evidence found for other European countries. Training 
programmes for youths have mixed effects, however mostly positive, results. The 
evidence from the meta-analysis conducted by Kluve (2010) suggests that active 
programmes that target youths in European countries are less likely to be effective 
than non-targeted programmes. Larson (2009) also found evidence that training 
programmes for youths in Sweden have short-term negative effects on the labour 
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market while zero effects in the long-term. According to some studies, the most 
successful active programme for youths was the New Deal implemented in the UK 
(Blundell et al.; 2004, Dorsett, 2006). The New Deal for Youth Programme 
combined a job-search assistance programme with one of other four programmes: 
subsidised employment, full-time education and training, environmental task force or 
voluntary sector. Dorsett (2006) provides strong evidence, when analysing the New 
Deal for Youth Programme, that the combination of the two programmes job-search 
assistance and subsidised employment for young unemployed were more effective 
than training programmes and job creation schemes. Ehlert et al. (2012) also 
provides evidence that combination of different programmes had positive impact in 
the labour market. According to the authors, the combination of coaching, training 
and temporary work had positive impact, increasing the probability of finding 
employment.  Van den Berg et al. (2012) also found evidence that meeting and 
consulting with case workers had a positive impact on job finding rates for young 
unemployed in Denmark. In addition, Schmidl (2014) suggests that a wage subsidy 
is the most effective programme in the long-term for young German unemployed 
while public sector job creation is found to be harmful for the participants.  
 Explaining the divergence in the findings of evaluations  
From the discussion above one can observe significant differences in the results of 
the studies conducted in transition economies. The overall evidence suggests that 
training, as an active measure, has a positive short-term effect (6 to 12 months). One 
explanation for this finding is that since there is lack of necessary skills and 
qualifications of the unemployed in transition economies and particularly, since the 
long-term unemployed have experienced human capital depreciation, training helps 
directly to rebuild their human capital and increase their productivity. Training may 
work better than other active programmes since its primary aim is to reduce the skill 
mismatch and increase knowledge needed to get back to work.  
The findings reveal that the impact of active measures varies widely between 
different subgroups in the population, emphasising the importance of targeting to 
maximise the effect of the measures. Taking into consideration the level of 
unemployment and extent of long-term unemployment in transition economies, most 
of active measures in these countries target the long-term unemployed and in general 
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the more disadvantaged unemployed which is the case for Slovenia, Romania and 
Serbia (Vodopivec, 1999; Van Ours, 2001; Rodriguez-Planas and Benus, 2006; 
Bonin and Rinne, 2014; Mojsoska-Blazevski and Petreski, 2015, Bratti et al., 2017; 
Adamecz-Völgyi et al., 2018). In addition, the ALMPs in the Slovak Republic used 
different targeting for the active measures; public employment subsidies and 
trainings mostly target long-term disadvantaged unemployed, whereas private 
subsidies target more qualified participants. The findings from the studies in 
transition economies suggest that when targeting long-term and disadvantaged 
unemployed the impact on employment is positive while when targeting the more 
qualified the effect is either negative or there is no effect. The effects also seem to 
differ when comparing different age groups and gender; training and internship 
measures seems to be more effective for the younger unemployed than for older 
ones, while job-search assistance and vocational training seem to be more important 
for women than for men (Terrel and Storm, 1999; Micklewright and Nagy, 2008; 
Mojsoska-Blazevski and Petreski, 2015; Popescu and Roman, 2018). However, there 
seems to be no clear explanation why these active measures are effective for certain 
groups of unemployed and not for others.  
Theoretically, the duration of the active policies is hypothesised to be an important 
determinant of their effectiveness due to lock-in effects:  the participant reduces job-
search effort for a regular job during the period of participation in employment 
subsidies, i.e. the longer the duration of the subsidy the lower probability of getting a 
regular job. Van Ours (2002) and Caliendo et al. (2017) compare different durations 
for subsidised employment for transition economies. The findings seem to be in line 
with the theory; short-term public employment subsidies (6 to 9 months and 9 to 12 
months) seem to have a positive effect on getting employed and while the duration of 
the subsidy increases the effect becomes smaller. The study also suggests that private 
employment subsidies which last for a minimum of 2 years have negative effect on 
getting employed.  
One particular feature of the effectiveness of the active measures is its relation to 
unemployment benefit entitlement. In Poland, participation in one of the active 
measures made the participant eligible for 12 months of benefits after the 
participation (Puhani, 2002; Kluve et al., 2008). This created a cycle of some 
unemployed workers participating in the active programmes in order to claim 
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unemployment benefits afterwards. In both studies for Poland the results suggested 
negative effects of the public and private employment subsidies on employment 
probabilities. In the case of the Slovak Republic, the public employment subsidy also 
made the participants eligible for another round of benefits after completing the 
programme. This made participants shift between unemployment and subsidised 
employment making this subsidy ineffective. In contrast, the study for Romania, 
suggests in general positive effects when the participant receives unemployment 
benefits for only one or two months at most after completion of the active measure 
(Rodriguez-Planas and Benus, 2006). When there is no enforced link between 
passive and active policies no clear pattern of the effect of active measure can be 
observed.  
Since regions vary in economic strength and as such vary in employment 
opportunities, it is very important for the studies to account for these differences. In 
labour markets where the employment prospects are low the expectation is that the 
active measure will not be very effective. Most of the studies include regional 
dummies to account for this variation. Some ALMPs are designed for specific 
regions with low economic conditions aiming to increase employment such as the 
case of public employment subsidies in Romania. As explained above, these 
employment subsidies had a negative effect on employment which is in line with the 
expectations; when the labour market performance is weak active measures would 
not help in reducing unemployment. A similar finding could be observed in the study 
for the Slovak Republic when evaluating the private employment subsidies.  
It is crucial to note the potential importance of the labour market history of 
participants, because it is likely to capture unobserved characteristics such as 
motivation. Hence, when studies do not account for this variable the results might be 
biased. Studies that have used the same methodology to estimate the employment 
probabilities with and without labour history found quite different results (Kluve et 
al., 2008). Hence, the results of the studies that do not account for this characteristic 
should be interpreted with caution, such as studies for Estonia and Serbia (e.g. 
Leetmaa and Vork, 2003; Bonin and Rinne, 2014).  
Puhani (2002) suggest that stigmatisation may have caused the negative results of 
public and private employment subsidies. When the programme stipend is paid to the 
179 
 
employer and not to the unemployed, the employer may perceive participation in 
such programmes as a negative signal of an individual participants‘ productivity. The 
study for Slovenia also suggests that the negative result on employment may be due 
to the stigmatisation of participation in public works. This effect is argued since it is 
known to employers that participants in these programmes are the most 
disadvantaged unemployed and employers perceive them to have low productivity 
(Vodopivec, 1999). 
The studies reviewed above, however, do not evaluate whether active measures have 
any impact at the aggregate level i.e. whether they reduce the overall unemployment 
rate. A positive effect on the individual level does not guarantee a positive effect at 
the aggregate level. It is important to account for displacement and substitution 
effects when assessing the effectiveness of active measures and it cannot be assessed 
through microeconomic evaluation. One method to assess these effects is through 
simulation of active measures in a model of a general equilibrium economy (Jongen 
et al., 2000; De Koning, 2007). However, assessing the impact of the active 
measures at the aggregate level is not easy to conduct as this methodology is more 
sensitive to flawed data and to the model specification than microeconomic analysis.  
4.5 Conclusions   
This chapter has provided a critical review of the evaluation methodologies used to 
assess the effectiveness of the ALMPs. After analysing the evaluation problem and 
the creation of counterfactuals the review has identified several approaches to 
address the issue of selection bias when analysing the effectiveness of ALMPs. The 
Propensity Score Matching approach is analysed in more details and arguments are 
provided as to how this approach tends to replicate the setting of an experiment 
which is highly desirable in these analyses. Further, different matching estimators 
are analysed and comparisons are offered as to which of the estimators is more 
appropriate to create quality matching pairs. Inverse Probability Weighing 
Regression Adjustment is argued to be the most appropriate choice of estimator in 
the context of this thesis. This method provides unbiased estimates if only one of the 
models, the treatment or the outcome model, is specified correctly and it also allows 
multiple treatment modelling in the same framework.  
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In addition, this chapter provides a critical review of studies which evaluate the 
effectiveness of ALMPs. The quality of data available remains one of the issues in 
evaluations in transition economies. The methodologies used for estimation are also 
diverse, however they have mostly focused on matching techniques and duration 
models. The review finds a wide range of results reported in studies conducted for 
different countries and did not provide a clear overview as to which programme is 
more effective and for which target group. Most of the studies from transition 
economies report that training as an active measure improves the employment 
prospects of the unemployed in the short term, however there is no solid evidence 
provided for the long term. At the same time, there is inconclusive evidence on the 
effectiveness of employment subsidies. Chapter 5 will examine the effectiveness of 
the three different active measures: (i) on-the-job training; (ii) internship scheme; 
and (iii) institution and enterprise training, targeted at the young unemployed in 
Kosovo. This evaluation provides additional evidence and contributes to the on-
going debate on the effectiveness of a specific active measure targeted at particular 
unemployed groups.  
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5.1 Introduction  
 The empirical evidence presented in Chapter 4 provided a cross-country analysis of 
the effectiveness of different active labour market programmes with a special focus 
on transition countries. The review of empirical studies suggests that training 
programmes in general are the most effective in improving an individual‘s 
employment prospects; however, it is unclear which type of training is more 
effective. Together with internship measures, trainings seem to be relatively more 
effective when targeted at the young unemployed, while job-search assistance and 
vocational training seem to be more effective when targeted at women. Some studies 
also found that counselling and guidance on small business start-ups increases an 
individual‘s probability of being employed. The evidence from the review of general 
public works subsidies in the private sector is inconclusive. However, none of the 
studies have evaluated the relative effectiveness of different active programmes in 
transition economies, while there are very few relative effectiveness evaluations for 
European countries in general. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to fill this gap in 
the empirical literature by providing an assessment of the relative effectiveness of 
the three different active measures in Kosovo. Since there is a range of active 
programmes in which an individual can participate, the choice of participation 
should be extended from ‗participation vs. non-participation‘ into a multiple choice 
model (Lechner, 2001).  As Chapter 2 elaborated, this approach provides information 
on whether participants of one programme would have performed better if they had 
participated in another programme. Therefore the main aim of this chapter is to 
evaluate the relative effectiveness of three active measures: On the Job Training 
(OJT), Internship Scheme (IS) and Institution and Enterprise Training (IET). 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 provides a description of the three 
active programmes delivered in Kosovo, the groups targeted by these programmes 
and their specific aims while section 5.2.1 provides a critical review of two previous 
evaluations of these programmes. Section 5.3 offers an overview of the available 
data and provides detailed descriptive statistics. Section 5.4 analyses the 
specification of three models of the main determinants of: the probability of being in 
employment at the time of the survey, the probability of actively searching for a job 
for those unemployed at the time of the survey and the probability of having a 
contract for those employed. The models specified in this section will be used for 
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estimating the results of the multinomial choice analysis and for the main analysis of 
this chapter, the Inverse Probability Weighting – Regression Adjustment (IPWRA).  
Section 5.5 presents the findings from both estimation approaches.  Section 5.6 
offers the conclusion on the relative effectiveness of the active measures for Kosovo.  
5.2 Programmes under consideration   
As Chapter 1 elaborated in more detail, the implementation of active measures in 
Kosovo started in 2005 and continues to date. Up to 2013, 11,154 individuals 
benefited from active measures such as: public works, wage subsidies, pre-
employment training, on the job training, internship scheme and institution and 
enterprise training. This chapter will analyse the relative effectiveness of the three 
most prevalent active measures. This section provides an overview of these three 
active programmes under consideration of the analysis which were implemented 
during the period of 2008 to 2010:  Institution and Enterprise Training (IET), 
Internship Scheme (IS) and On the Job Training (OJT). While Chapter 1 provides 
more detailed information on the scale of the active measures for Kosovo, table 5.1 
presents the population of the beneficiaries of the three programmes of interest 
during this period. 
Table 5.1 Beneficiary population over the period 2008 to 2010 in Kosovo 
  2008 2009 2010 Total % 
On the Job Training (OJT) 266 86 632 984 52 
Internship Scheme (IS)  148 211 274 633 33 
Institution and Enterprise Training (IET) 54 79 153 286 15 
Total 468 376 1059 1903 100 
Source: Kavanagh (2012) 
Two of these programmes aimed to give priority to young job-seekers without skills, 
without previous work experience and with low levels of completed education, 
whilst the IS targeted university graduates. At the same time these active 
programmes aimed to balance the gender mix of participants and include ethnic 
minorities and individuals with disabilities. The aim of the programmes was to 
achieve 15% of minority participants. With regard to age, the programme‘s strategic 
aim was to primarily target the age group of 15-29; however the age requirement was 
often modified to achieve a more equitable representation either of women or 
minorities. These programmes targeted young job-seekers who had been 
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unemployed for at least 6 months; this requirement was frequently not applied to 
minorities and women. Employers were required to make efforts to retain the interns 
after the completion of their programmes; not to displace current employees in order 
to employ the participants of the active programmes; and to provide training 
participants access to an experienced supervisor from the company during their 
placement.   
Institution and Enterprise Training (IET) was aimed at supporting job-seekers by 
enhancing their skills and abilities through classroom training in the vocational 
training centres (VTC) and also acquiring job-specific skills and the essential 
knowledge in enterprises, providing the possibility of becoming a permanent 
employee in that enterprise. The target group for this scheme were young, low-
skilled job-seekers who were registered unemployed for at least 6 months, had no 
previous work experience and had not had the benefit of attending and completing 
vocational training. The last criterion was changed subsequently to accept also those 
who had graduated from vocational training. Participants in this active measure 
firstly had to attend pre-employment training of one to three weeks at a VTC to 
enhance their employability skills, team-work skills, work readiness skills, 
information and communication technology and other non-vocational skills. During 
this period the trainer in association with the prospective company specified a list of 
skills that the trainee needed to acquire during the period at the company. Training at 
the company was designed to last 3 months and provide participants with specific 
vocational skills to enable them to remain employed at that company.  
On the Job Training (OJT) mainly targeted vocational education students and 
provided career, occupational health and safety guidance by Public Employment 
Services, and practical learning and training in partner enterprises. OJT offered 
counselling and job-search assistance to potential participants for a four week period 
prior to participation in the training in order to assess the job-seekers‘ suitability for 
alternative employment opportunities. The employment adviser and the job-seeker 
then agreed on an employment plan specifying a suitable occupational profile for 
job-search. If the job-search was unsuccessful, participants were identified by the 
employment adviser as requiring further support. In agreement with the VTC and 
potential employers, the employment adviser prepared a training plan which outlined 
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the competencies to be developed during the training period. OJT provided a 3 
months period of training at companies. In both the OJT and IET programmes the 
employer was paid 50 euros per month for each participant, while the participant was 
paid 100 euro per month. This provided an incentive for the employer to train the 
participant as this amount was expected to cover the net cost of training job-seekers. 
In cases when at the completion of the training the participant was not accepted as a 
regular employee in the company, the employment services supported the job-seeker 
further through advising on other potential employment opportunities.  
The target group of the Internship Scheme (IS) was young university graduates 
without work experience, registered as unemployed for at least 6 months and who 
lived in poor family conditions or received social assistance benefits. This 
programme aimed to help the participants to acquire necessary job experience, gain 
skills and knowledge to perform in the workplace and become unsubsidised 
employees. The interns worked for 6 months in a public institution or private 
enterprise, mainly in human resources, accounting and administration departments. 
Initially, employment service advisers screened and referred job-seekers to 
employers. After the completion of the internship the employer was expected to hire 
the intern; if the intern was not employed then their adviser supported the job-
seekers in finding another job.  
With regard to the design of the active measures, IET programme was designed to 
partially take place in VTC-s as classroom training (up to three weeks) where the 
participant was expected to enhance employability skills, team-work skills, work 
readiness skills, information and communication technology and other non-
vocational skills. The rest of the IET programme would take place in the enterprise. 
The design of the OJT programme, on the other hand, required the training to be 
fully completed within the company. Private employers seem to prefer programmes 
where the candidates were required to complete the full training within the 
companies (Kavanagh, 2012).  Having the candidate in the company during the 
whole training period was viewed to be more beneficial to the employer since it 
equips the participants with the specific skills required for that job.  
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5.2.1 Studies assessing the effects of ALMPs in Kosovo  
There are two studies assessing the effectiveness of ALMPs in Kosovo. The first one 
is by Mukavilli (2008) which covers several ALMPs implemented during 2007 and 
the second study by Kavanagh (2012) which covers the ALMPs analysed in this 
empirical chapter.  
Mukavilli analyses the effect of On the Job Training, Pre-Employment Training, 
Internship Scheme and Employment Subsidies by comparing the percentages of 
beneficiaries and control groups in employment and earnings. This study used a 
small sample of 299 out of 1426 beneficiaries and 100 control individuals. The 
report does not provide any information with regard to how the control individuals 
were selected for the study and whether they are suitable for comparison with the 
beneficiaries. Another limitation of this control group is that the some non-
beneficiaries have claimed to have also participated in some training during this 
period which might have been organised by Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) or Donor organisations. The findings from the study suggest that the 46% of 
beneficiaries were employed at the time of the survey compared to 20% of the 
control group. More than 38% of OJT beneficiaries have remained employed in the 
same company where they completed their training. With regard to the earnings, 
non-beneficiaries seem to have earned more at the time surveyed of about 193 Eur 
per month compared 175 Eur per month for beneficiaries. The study also found that 
the targeting of beneficiaries was not strictly based on the pre-defined criteria. 
Except for the Internship Scheme which was targeted at young university graduates, 
other active measures targeted mainly young unemployed with less than secondary 
education. However, the beneficiaries seem to have completed higher levels of 
education compared to those in the control group. Mukavilli argues that there are 
several possible reasons for the issue with targeting: the lack of active measures for 
more educated unemployed, possible understating of the educational qualifications 
by applicants in order to become beneficiary, or issues with screening the applicants.  
The second study assessing the effect of ALMPs in Kosovo is the study by 
Kavanagh (2012) which analyses three active measures: On the Job Training, 
Internship Scheme and Institution and Enterprise Training implemented during 2008 
to 2010. This study used the same dataset which is being used for this empirical 
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chapter. The methodology used in this study is also descriptive in nature where the 
effect is assessed based on simple comparison of descriptive means between 
beneficiary and control groups.
34
 The findings from this study suggest that all three 
programmes are very well designed and improve the labour market prospects of the 
participants. With regard to relative effect of the active measures, participants of OJT 
will be more likely to get employed and remain employed in the same company 
compared to other two programmes. Similar to the first study, Kavanagh also 
suggest that there might be an issue of targeting and selecting the beneficiaries. 
According to Kavanagh (2012), IET programme seemed to have had issues with 
recruitment as most of the applicants did not meet this eligibility criterion (not 
having vocational education) and consequently most of the applicants were placed in 
OJT or IS. Afterward, this criterion was adapted to reflect candidates‘ level of 
education thus IET also accepted those who have completed vocational education. 
Even after adapting this criterion, the target number of participants was not met; only 
27% of the initial target was achieved (Kavanagh, 2012). As explained by Kavanagh 
(2012), in order to increase the number of marginalised groups such as women, 
ethnic minorities, and disabled participants in the programmes, the eligibility criteria 
were frequently relaxed.  
Both studies attempt to assess the effectiveness of the ALMPs only through 
descriptive statistics and do not use an advanced evaluation methodology. As 
explained in chapter 4, the experimental data used to analyse the effectiveness of 
these policies are usually not randomised and might be subject to potential selection 
bias. Neither of the studies reviewed above recognise this as a potential issue, hence 
their findings are likely to be unreliable. This chapter will analyse the effectiveness 
of the selected ALMPs in Kosovo by using an advanced evaluation methodology 
which attempts to address the problem of selection bias based on observable 
characteristics.  
The following section will discuss the data used in this empirical analysis followed 
by the model specification for three models. These specifications will be used in both 
empirical approaches: multinomial probit and IPWRA.  
                                                          
34 The control group used by Kavanagh (2012) was not available to use in this empirical chapter, 
hence chapter 6 will utilise LFS data to create a new control group.  
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5.3 Data and descriptive statistics  
The evaluation analysis employs survey data from the Active Labour Market 
Programmes for Youths in Kosovo which was administered by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). The data used for the empirical investigation 
presented in this chapter is from a survey carried out by Riinvest, a professional 
research institution in Kosovo, in 2012 on behalf of the UNDP. The interviews were 
conducted face-to-face with a sample of those who had completed participation in 
these Programmes. This dataset contains information on individuals‘ socio-economic 
characteristics, level of education and previous labour market history. Table 5.2 
presents descriptive statistics for individuals who participated in one of three 
categories of the active measures. 
Interviewees had participated in one of these three programmes in 2008, 2009 or 
2010. Since the dataset offers information on participants in three different years, it 
gives the opportunity to observe the treatment effect for different duration periods 
after completing the active programmes. During this three-year period 1903 job-
seekers participated in the three programmes and out of them only 1081 could be 
contacted and surveyed
35
.   
As table 5.2 shows, the distribution of interviewees was similar to the total number 
of beneficiaries, OJT with 52% compared 55%, IS with about 33% compared to 29% 
and IET accounted for 15% of both those surveyed and total participants. More than 
55% of the population of the beneficiaries started their programme in 2010, 20% 
started in 2009 while almost 26% started in 2008. The sample also consists of similar 
distribution; 53% of beneficiaries surveyed started the programme in 2010, 26% 
started in 2009 while 21% started in 2008.   
  
                                                          
35
 There is no information on whether those who dropped out of the active measures are included in 
the sample of the study or not.  
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Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics (selected variables) 
  OJT   IS   IET   
No. of observation 
(share of beneficiaries) 
    303        296         599  
                                   (52%) 
    160          153           313 
                                   (33%) 
78            91             169 
                                   (15%) 
  Male Female 
 
Total  
Male Female 
 
Total  
Male  Female Total  
Active measure duration (in 
months) 
3.81 3.92 3.86 3.94 4.12 4.03 3.62 3.94 3.78 
 
(1.29) (.362) (1.33) (1.27) (1.29) (1.31) (1.16) (1.14) (1.29) 
Employment/training plan 
(discrete variable) 
62.24 62.50 62.37 70.67 65.99 68.33 76.71 87.91 82.31 
Certification (discrete v.)  66.34 70.95 68.64 75.63 71.90 73.76 58.97 70.33 64.65 
Age (in years)* 26.83 26.08 26.46 26.65 25.99 26.32 27.03 25.99 26.51 
 
(4.59) (4.01) (4.33) (3.97) (2.94) (3.52) (4.76) (2.76) (3.85) 
Education (discrete variables)* 
 
  
  
  
  
 Primary School or 
lower  
18.15 15.2 16.68 14.38 11.11 12.74 21.79 18.68 20.24 
High School  44.88 37.5 41.19 43.75 45.1 44.42 50 38.46 44.23 
Tertiary Education or 
higher  
36.96 47.3 42.13 41.88 43.79 42.83 28.21 42.86 35.53 
Unemployed  before 
participation (discrete 
variables) 
86.18 90.71 88.45 77.98 85.05 81.52 87.71 85.07 86.39 
Unemployment duration before participation (discrete 
variables) 
  
  
  
  
 Less than 6 months  19.65 12.58 16.12 6.33 10.45 8.39 10.42 9.26 9.84 
6 to 12 months  29.48 22.52 26 22.78 10.45 16.62 33.33 12.96 23.15 
12 to 24 months  15.03 16.56 15.8 10.13 8.96 9.55 18.75 9.26 14 
More than 24 months  35.84 48.34 42.09 60.76 70.15 65.46 37.5 68.52 53.01 
Unemployed (discrete v.)* 50.38 61.3 55.84 53.33 72.32 62.83 67.16 69.01 68.09 
Active job search (discrete v.) *† 72.73 64.1 68.41 83.61 82.81 83.21 87.5 77.55 82.53 
Employed (discrete variable)* 49.62 38.7 44.16 46.67 27.68 37.17 32.84 30.99 31.91 
Contract (discrete variable)*‡     63.33 80.25 71.79 71.43 93.1 82.27 66.67 80 73.33 
Region (discrete variables)     
 
    
  Prishtina 14.85 19.59 17.22 10.625 7.84 9.23 21.79 32.97 27.38 
Ferizaj  7.26 11.49 9.37 13.75 9.8 11.78 10.26 12.09 11.17 
Gjakova 14.85 11.15 13 16.25 13.73 14.99 8.97 0 4.49 
Gjilan 16.17 21.28 18.73 18.75 24.84 21.79 30.77 32.97 31.87 
Mitrovica 15.51 11.15 13.33 16.25 17.65 16.95 3.85 5.49 4.67 
Peja 8.91 10.14 9.52 12.5 19.61 16.05 8.97 4.4 6.68 
Prizren  22.44 15.2 18.82 11.875 6.54 9.21 15.38 12.09 13.74 
Notes: Standard deviations are presented in parenthesis in the second row of each of the selected variable. 
Discrete variables are measured in %. Averages are presented for continuous variables.  
*At the time of the survey  
 † The variable measuring Active job search was constructed from the following question and includes only 
individuals who were unemployed at the time of the survey: ―Have you actively searched for a job in the last four 
weeks?‖ 
‡ The variable measuring whether an individual had an employment contract was generated from answers to the 
following question only for those who were employed at the time of the survey: ―Do you have (an) employment 
contract at the current job?‖ 
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As pointed out, these active measures were designed to have specific durations; OJT 
and IET active measures were planned to take place over three months, while for IS 
it was six months. Figure 5.1 shows presents that there is a deviation from the initial 
plan for the duration of active measures.  
Figure 5.1 Distribution of the duration for each active measure (months) 
 
One possible explanation for this deviation might be related to the performance of 
the beneficiary during training, i.e. the beneficiaries might have been asked to stay 
longer in the training because they were performing better than those who left early 
or they were less successful and were asked to extend the training duration to 
achieve all of the learning outcomes. Another explanation might be that the firms 
and beneficiaries conspired to extend the training in order to continue to receive 
financial benefits from the government. 
Table 5.2 shows that more than 82% of IET beneficiaries had an 
employment/training plan before training. In contrast, only about 68% of IS 
beneficiaries and 62% of OJT beneficiaries had the individual plan before training. 
This might indicate that this part of the process was not implemented as intended 
which calls into question the quality of the administration of these plans. The highest 
percentage of beneficiaries receiving a certificate of completion at the end of the 
training is for the IS beneficiaries with more than 75% for males and almost 72% for 
females. IET males have the lowest percentage of having a certificate of completion 
with about 59%. There seems to be a relation between receiving the certificate of 
completion and the duration of the active measure as figure 5.2 shows. As the 
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duration of the active measure increases the percentage of individuals having a 
certificate increases. A possible explanation might be that receiving certificate might 
be related to the performance of the beneficiaries; i.e. duration of the measure may 
have been adjusted depending on how much time the beneficiary needed to complete 
the training successfully and receive the certificate.  
Figure 5.2 Percentage of individuals receiving certificate of completion 
 
 In general, there are no substantial differences in the characteristics between the 
participants in three programmes. Table 5.2 shows that the mean age of interviewees 
was slightly above 26 years for each of three categories. There seem to be a very 
small difference in age between men and women. In terms of region, the highest 
number of participants is those living in region of Gjilan with 21% of the sample 
followed by Prishtina with 16% and Prizren with 15%.  Gender seems to be balanced 
in OJT and IS programmes while there was a slightly higher percentage of women 
participants in the IET programme. Even though the aim was to achieve 15% 
participants from minority ethnic groups, the sample consists of 92% participants of 
Albanian ethnicity, 2% Serbian and 3.1% Roma ethnic participants and the rest are 
from other ethnic groups. Having in mind that these programmes targeted job-
seekers receiving social assistance, one would expect to have a high number of this 
category of participants in the sample. However, only 8.9% of the sample consists of 
job-seekers on social assistance. Over 43% of the surveyed beneficiaries had two of 
household adult members registered unemployed, while only 10% have received 
remittances from the family members living abroad.  
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The level of education of the participants was also not as expected. The expectation 
was that OJT and IET participants would not have completed tertiary education. 
Even though the OJT and IET targeted groups were vocational students and low 
skilled young job-seekers, table 5.2 shows that about 42% of OJT beneficiaries and 
35% of IET beneficiaries had completed more than secondary education. However, 
one explanation for this could be that since the completion of the programmes some 
individuals might have pursued higher education. Individuals who participated in the 
IS programme were expected to have a higher level of education since the target 
group was the new university graduates. In contrast, IS participants with a lower 
level of education seem to dominate. Table 5.2 presents a gender difference in 
education between men and women; more women from the sample seem to have 
completed the tertiary level of education than men. This seems to be the case for all 
three active measures. The largest gender difference in education is between the IET 
participants where 43% of women in the sample have completed tertiary level of 
education compared to only 28% of men.  
Women seem to have been subject to higher unemployment before participating in 
the active measures; except for IET women participants. Table 5.2 shows that 88% 
of the IET male participants were unemployed before joining the programme 
compared to 85% of IET females. In contrast, larger percentage of IS and OJT 
females were unemployed compared to men. One of the criteria for eligibility for the 
programmes was to be unemployed before participating in the active measures. 
However, as table 5.2 shows, there seems to be a percentage of beneficiaries that 
‗were not‘ unemployed before training. This information was drawn from the 
question ‗Were you unemployed before the training?‘36 .  An explanation could be 
that they were employed in the informal sector before participating in active 
measures and did not report this to the Employment Office. As table 5.2 shows, 
many of those who answered the questions on their unemployment duration prior to 
treatment had long durations of unemployment; 67% of participants of IET were 
                                                          
36
  In the question ‗In the period before participating in active measure, did you look for work?‘, about 
21% of OJT, more than 16% of IS and 9.5% of IET beneficiaries responded that they were looking for 
work. This suggests that some beneficiaries were not actively looking for work independently before 
participating in one of the active measures (as a person being registered as unemployed is by 
definition looking for work through the Employment Office, which is a key eligibility criterion for 
participation in ALMPs).  
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unemployed for more than 12 months while there are 75% of participants of IS and 
58% of OJT participants with the same duration of unemployment. Women, on 
average, were subject to a much longer unemployment duration than men, on 
average; 62% reported to have been unemployed for more than two years. Men 
reported shorter unemployment spells; 45% of them were unemployed for more than 
two years. The largest gender difference in unemployment duration is amongst the 
IET participants. Table 5.2 shows that 68% of women who completed IET 
programme seem to have been previously unemployed for more than 24 months 
compared to 37% of men.   Table 5.2 shows that there are noteworthy differences 
between the unemployment before the participation in the programmes and current 
unemployment. 
Almost 90% of the OJT participants reported to have been unemployed before 
participation while 55% of OJT participants were unemployed at the time of the 
survey. The difference of unemployment before and after completing the active 
programmes is narrower for the IS and IET programmes. At first sight, these figures 
may indicate that OJT was more effective than the other two programmes. 
Individuals in the sample seem to have had high job search activity at the time of the 
survey; IET and IS participants have higher job search activity (83% and 82%) than 
individuals participating in OJT programme (68%) which may also suggest that 
participants in OJT may have performed better in the labour market. 
With regard to employment at the time of the survey, the data show that OJT 
participants had a higher percentage in employment than participants in the other two 
programmes. Forty four percent of OJT beneficiaries, followed by 37% and 31% of 
IS and IET were employed at the time of the survey. Mostly it is the private sector 
that offers employment to the participants. Out of 344 employed individuals in the 
sample, 63% were employed in the private sector followed by 20% employed in 
public enterprises, 10% in government agencies and slightly over 6% were self-
employed.  
It is important to emphasise that half of the employed from the sample have been in 
their current job for more than one year and more than half of them were employed 
at the companies in which they had been beneficiaries of one of the active 
programmes. Of those employed, 63% IS participants had been at the current job for 
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at least a year compared to 56% of their IET and 44% of OJT counterparts. In 
addition, fewer of the OJT participants were employed in the company in which they 
were trained than participants in the other two programmes. It is worth pointing out 
that 78% of those who were employed at the time of the survey claimed to use the 
knowledge and skills gained from the active programmes in their current jobs.  
Table 5.2 also confirms the importance of informality in the labour market in 
Kosovo. Despite OJT participants having a higher employment percentage, the data 
show that only 71% of the employed had a contract in their current job. The figures 
for other two programmes are slightly better; around 82% and around 73% of the IS 
and IET employed participants had employment contracts at their current job while 
62% and 56% were entitled to health insurance and social security contributions and 
paid leave.    
Table 5.3 shows that a higher percentage of female beneficiaries were inactive at the 
time of the survey compared to male beneficiaries of these three active measures. 
Considering that the average age of females in the sample is 26 and the fertility rate 
is highest for age-group 25 to 29 (KAS, 2011), this might be a possible explanation 
for the high percentage of inactivity of females in the sample. The employment 
figures for females who participated in OJT and IS are lower than those of males in 
the same active measures. However, this is not the case for female participants in 
IET. About thirty five percent of OJT male participants in 2008 were employed at 
the time of the survey however this figure declines sharply over the following two 
years. 
Table 5.3 Labour market state by year of participation in the programme and by 
gender, at the time of the survey 
    Inactive Unemployed Employed 
Total  
    Female Male Female Male Female Male 
OJT 2008 4.9% 3.7% 22.2% 21.0% 13.6% 34.6% 100% 
 
2009 8.5% 3.6% 20.6% 27.3% 17.6% 22.4% 100% 
  2010 14.1% 8.2% 27.0% 21.3% 11.3% 18.2% 100% 
IS 2008 17.2% 11.1% 18.2% 19.2% 11.1% 23.2% 100% 
 
2009 16.4% 8.2% 17.8% 21.9% 12.3% 23.3% 100% 
 
2010 7.9% 6.3% 38.6% 28.3% 7.1% 11.8% 100% 
IET 2008 14.7% 5.9% 20.6% 23.5% 20.6% 14.7% 100% 
 
2009 13.3% 6.7% 26.7% 36.7% 
 
16.7% 100% 
  2010 11.0% 6.0% 32.0% 25.0% 14.0% 12.0% 100% 
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A similar pattern, however a smaller decline, can be observed for IS participants. 
The data also suggest higher employment figures for females in all three 
programmes who completed their programme in 2008 compared to females who 
completed in 2010, however the differences are much smaller than those of males. 
The largest employment difference is for females who completed IET, ranging from 
21% of those who participated in 2008, to 0 and 14% of those from 2009 and 2010, 
respectively. These figures may indicate that the active programmes might have 
more of a long-term rather than short-term effect for male participants than for their 
female counterparts. Other explanations for the differences across the years might be 
the variation of labour market conditions or the quality of the delivery of the active 
measures offered in particular years.  
5.4 Model Specification 
This chapter investigates the relative effectiveness of the three different programmes 
described in section 5.2. This section focuses on the specification of three probit 
models of the main determinants of: the probability of those surveyed being in 
employment, the probability of those respondents currently not in employment 
actively search for a job and the probability of those in employment having a 
contract. The objective of this section is: initially, to explain the justification for 
including variables in these model specifications for the multinomial probit 
estimation and secondly, to use these model specifications to create the outcome 
models for IPWRA approach. The multinomial probit model uses a three category 
outcome variable of the individual‘s state in the labour market (unemployed, 
contractually employed and employed without contractual agreement). This 
estimation serves as an initial analysis for evaluating the effects of the alternative 
programmes while the emphasis will be given to the IPWRA approach since it 
attempts to correct for a possible selection bias explained in more details in section 
5.5.2. The justification for using multinomial probit as an initial analysis prior to the 
main estimation approach, IPWRA, in this empirical chapter is not only to 
investigate the relative effectiveness of the three active measures but also other 
relevant determinants of an individual‘s probability of being employed. Multinomial 
probit is chosen since it allows for a three category dependent variable differentiating 
between the probability of an individual not only being employed but rather the 
sector (formal/informal) in which he/she is employed which is an objective of the 
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analysis in this chapter. On the other hand, as explained in details in section 4.3, 
IPWRA is chosen as the most appropriate evaluation methods to analyse the 
effectiveness of ALMPs for several reasons. Firstly, it addresses the possible 
selection bias. Secondly, IPWRA allows for a multiple-choice dependent variable for 
the treatment model, which is appropriate for this analysis because three different 
ALMPs are being assessed (OJT, IET and IS). And thirdly, in comparison to other 
evaluation methods, IPWRA has a doubly robust property meaning that even if one 
of the models, treatment or outcome model, is mis-specified, this method will still 
produce reliable estimates. 
The dependent variable for the initial analysis, multinomial probit model estimating 
the probability to be in one of three labour market states, is defined as:  
- Labour market state (Labstate): equals 0 if the individual is unemployed at 
the time of the survey, equals 1 if the individual is employed and has an 
employment contract and equals 2 if the individual is employed but has no 
employment contract.
37
  
Since IPWRA does not allow for multinomial choice for the outcome model but only 
for the treatment model, this estimation uses three outcome models where the 
dependent variables are defined as follows: 
- Employment (Emp): equals 1 if the individual is employed at the time of the 
survey, zero otherwise;  
- Active job search (Actsrcat): equals 1 if the unemployed individual has 
actively searched for a job in four weeks before the survey, zero otherwise;  
- Employment contract for those employed (Contract): equals 1 if the 
employed individual has signed an employment contract at the time of the 
survey, zero otherwise.  
Models for three dependent variables are analysed and developed separately and the 
final model specifications will be presented at the end of each discussion. The model 
specification and the justification for each variable included in the employment 
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 If a respondent answers that he/she is inactive (in school, training, student, inactive due to family 
responsibilities) the survey was terminated. Hence, the inactive individuals at the time of the survey 
are excluded from the model since they do not answer a set of questions. 
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(Emp) model will be used for estimation of the multinomial probit model. Table 5.4 
presents variable descriptions and their labels.  
Table 5.4 Variables, names and specification 
Information category  Specification details  
Dependent – Outcome 
variables  
Employment (dummy=1 if the individual is employed at the time of the 
survey) 
Active job search for unemployed (dummy=1 if the individual has actively 
searched for a job in four weeks before the survey) 
Employment contract for the employed (dummy=1 if the individual has 
signed a contract with the employer at the time of the survey) 
Emp  
 
Actsrcat  
 
Contract 
Dependent variable of 
the treatment model  
Types of the active measures the individual participated  (dummy =1 if the 
individual received OJT; 2 if the individual received IS; 3  if the individual 
received IET) 
AmType 
Socio-demographic 
characteristics  
 
Male (dummy= 1 if the individual is male)  
Age   
Minority (dummy = 1 if the individual is a member of a minority)  
Disability (dummy = 1 if the individual has disability) 
Received social assistance (dummy = 1 if the if the family of the individual 
receives social or disability assistance or pension at the time of the survey) 
Two members of the family unemployed (dummy =1 if two members of the 
family are unemployed at the time of the survey)  
Received remittances (dummy =1 if the individual received remittances at the 
time of the survey)  
Male 
Age and AgeSq 
Minority 
Disability 
Socialassist 
Twouunemp 
 
Remittance 
Education level  Education level at the time of the survey:  
- Four years or primary school completed - dummy=1 if the individual 
completed four years, primary school or is a high school drop-out  
- High school completed - dummy=1 if the individual completed high 
school 
- University and post-graduate degree  – dummy=1 if the individual 
completed university or post graduate studies 
 
 
Primaryeduc 
 
Secondaryeduc 
 
Tertiaryeduc 
Active measure 
characteristics  
- On the job training (dummy=1 if the individual received this active 
measure)  
- Internship scheme (dummy=1 if the individual received this active measure) 
- Institution and enterprise training (dummy=1 if the individual received this 
active measure) 
Year of completion of active measure  
- 2008 (dummy = 1 if the individual completed active measure in 2008)  
- 2009 (dummy = 1 if1 if the individual completed active measure in 
2009) 
- 2010 (1 if the individual completed active measure in 2010) 
Duration of the active measure  
- 2 months  
- 3 months  
- 4 months  
- 5 months  
- 6 months  
Agreed on an employment plan before participation (dummy = 1 if the 
individual agreed on an employment plan) 
Received certificate after completion (dummy = 1 if the individual received 
certificate)  
OJT 
 
IS 
 
IET 
 
 
AM2008 
 
AM2009 
 
AM2010 
AMDuration 
 
 
 
 
 
EmPlan 
 
Cert 
Labour market history  Job-search 4 week prior to participation (dummy = 1 if the individual actively 
searched for job) 
Duration of unemployment before participation (dummy variables)  
- Less than 6 months  
- 6 to 12 months 
- 12 to 24 months  
- More than 2 years  
Jobsearchbt 
 
 
Undur6 
Undur12 
Undur24 
Undurmore24 
Regional characteristics  Regional dummy variables:  
- Prishtina  
- Mitrovica  
- Gjilan 
- Ferizaj 
- Gjakove 
- Peja  
- Prizren 
Regional Unemployment  
Municipality (dummy = 1 if individual lives in the city where the Vocational 
Training Centre is located)  
 
Pri  
Mit  
Gjil 
Fer 
Gjak  
Pej 
Prz 
Regunmp 
Vtcmncp 
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Model Specification for Employment  
The dependent variable of this specification is employment (Emp) which is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 is the individual is employed at the time of the survey 
and 0 otherwise.   
Variables depicting participation in different active measures are included (OJT and 
IS compared to IET). As discussed in section 2.2.3, the duration of the active 
measures may induce lock-in effects for participants thus a continuous variable of 
the duration of the active measure is included in the model (Amduration), even 
though the active measures to be analysed do not last more than six months (Van 
Ours, 2001). As discussed in section 5.3, the duration of the active measures might 
also be dependent on the performance of the beneficiaries; the beneficiaries might 
have stayed longer if they performed well during the training or they were asked to 
finish their training in shorter period if they achieved all the learning outcomes. 
Another reason to include this variable is because the variation of active measure 
duration might have changed because beneficiaries and employers might have 
conspired to extend the duration in order to claim the financial benefits of the active 
measures. In this case, the expected sign of variable Amduration is ambiguous.  
Variables indicating the year in which the participant completed the active measure 
are included in order to capture year-specific differences in labour market conditions, 
the duration of post-completion job search, and potentially the quality of provision of 
the active measures over the years (AM2008 and AM2009 compared to AM2010). 
There is no expectation on the signs of these variables. Variables on whether the 
individual along with employment office administrator/trainer
38
 prepared a plan for 
skills to acquire during the training and for employment before participation 
(EmPlan) and whether he/she received a certificate (Cert) when they had finished 
their programme are also included in the model. The employment plan variable is a 
proxy for the individual‘s utilisation of employment office and VTC services which 
gives potential signals of the labour market performance, motivation and 
commitment to find a new job (Schmidl, 2014). EmPlan may also capture the quality 
of employment office and VTC services. Administrators are aware that close 
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 In this programme, each VTC had a designated trainer whose responsibility was to prepare the 
individual employment/training plans and monitor the implementation of these plans.  
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cooperation with the beneficiaries may result in a higher probability of being 
employed and higher success of the programmes. Hence it is expected that an 
individual who prepared a pre-treatment plan, ceteris paribus, will have a higher 
probability of being employed post-treatment. Receiving a certificate provides a 
signal of successful completion of the active measure and also the skill and ability 
level of the individual. Being certified by the training programme is expected, ceteris 
paribus, to increase the probability of being employed post-treatment. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the employment gender gap in Kosovo is very high: only 
12.7% of working age women were employed compared to more than 46% of men 
(KAS, 2017). As explained in chapter 2, this gender difference might be partly 
explained by the strength of stereotypical gender roles and the social expectations for 
women in Kosovo and the perception that certain types of jobs are not suitable for 
women. Women are generally expected to take care of housework, children and the 
elderly. The LFS 2012 (KAS, 2012) reports that 28% of women decide not to 
participate in the labour market due to family or personal responsibilities compared 
to only 4% of men. Moreover, the average fertility rate is highest among the females 
aged 25 to 29 in Kosovo as suggested by KAS (2011). Considering that the dominant 
age group of interviewees in the sample is that in which female fertility is high in 
Kosovo it is expected that females will be less likely to participate in the labour 
market. Thus the expectation is that men (variable Male), ceteris paribus, are 
considered to have a higher probability of being employed compared to women.   
Age and its squared term (Age and AgeSq) are also included in the model. According 
to neoclassical theory, age is considered as an important determinant of the labour 
supply and employment since it reflects experience in the labour market. The view in 
the model is that the probability of gaining employment increases with age at a 
diminishing rate (Pencavel, 1974). The human capital theory predicts that the 
probability of being employed increases with age due to an increase in productivity 
until it reaches a peak and then starts to diminish reflecting a decline in productivity 
and deterioration in human capital (Luong and Hebert, 2009). Age might not be a 
good proxy for experience in case of Kosovo due to high levels of unemployment 
and especially the high levels of long-term unemployment. However, this dataset 
does not offer a better measure for experience and therefore age and its‘ square are 
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included in the model to account for a potential non-linear relationship between age 
and the probability of being employed.  
There are empirical studies from other countries confirming persistent ethnic 
inequalities in the labour market (Julia et al., 2015; Zwysen and Longhi, 2018). The 
ethnic background represents differences in cultural background and other 
differences which might reflect a difference in employment opportunities. In the case 
of Kosovo the effect of the Minority variable is ambiguous, since a recent study for 
Kosovo suggests that minority women are more likely to participate in the labour 
market compared to Albanian women (Democracy for Development, 2015).  
 It is recognised from empirical studies that individuals with disability typically face 
more obstacles in finding regular employment (Patterson and Block, 2014; Ameri et 
al., 2018). Hence variable Disability (defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
individual has a disability) is expected to have a negative sign in the employment 
model.  
 It is a well-established theoretical and empirical proposition that education has a 
substantial impact on labour market outcomes such as earnings and employment 
(Becker, 1964; Brown, 1995; Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2009; Riddell and Song, 
2011). As discussed in section 2.4, the human capital gained through education is 
expected to increase productivity which is expected to subsequently lead to higher 
labour market performance. Two dummy variables representing secondary 
(Secondaryeduc) and tertiary (Tertiaryeduc) levels of education are included in the 
model (primary education, Primaryeduc, is the reference category).  Higher levels of 
completed education are expected, other things being equal, to increase the 
probability of an individual being in employment post-treatment.  
A variable depicting if the individual has two or more adult family members 
unemployed (TwoUnemp) is included in the model. The intention of this variable is 
to capture several potential mechanisms. This variable is a proxy for an individual‘s 
family connections to the labour market and also for individual‘s motivation to find a 
job. Some studies suggest that the main source of social capital for a youth is their 
family (Yan and Lam, 2006; Knight and Yueh, 2008; McGowan et al., 2015). If 
members of the family (most likely parents) of a young individual are unemployed 
they might lack the necessary social contacts to secure jobs for themselves and their 
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family members. Moreover, the social position of their family might be of a great 
importance to access greater employment opportunities and it also might indicate the 
applicant‘s level of trust to those who are hiring. A recent study for Kosovo found 
that having an additional household member employed (as a proxy for social capital) 
increases women‘s probability of participating in the labour market by 9 percentage 
points, on average (Democracy for Development, 2015).  According to the World 
Bank (2008), in Kosovo neither the unemployed nor enterprises rely to a significant 
extent on the public employment services as a mediator in the job search and 
employment process. As the extended internal labour market hypothesis predicts, 
firms usually use recruitment channels through existing employees who spread the 
knowledge of vacancies to their families (Manwaring, 1984). According to ILO 
(2007), 59% of young workers in Kosovo found jobs through family and friends‘ 
connections which confirm that informal networking is a preferred method for 
recruitment (21.5% were employed through direct recruitment from employer, 
16.6% through advertisements while just 2.9% were placed through the Public 
Employment Services). On the other hand, variable, TwoUnemp, might also pick up 
an individual‘s motivation to become employed and support the family. The impact 
this variable might have on employment is twofold, it might increase the probability 
to be employed due to higher motivation or it might decrease this probability due to 
a lack of social capital, thus the expected sign of the coefficient is ambiguous.  
The model also includes a dummy variable that controls if the individual‘s family 
receives remittances (Remittance). According to the neo-classical theory of labour-
leisure choice, receiving remittances will, other things being equal, reduce the 
probability of an individual being employed in a family receiving remittances 
(Killingsworth, 1983). The individuals receiving the remittances are expected to 
increase their reservation wage
39
 and as such are expected to reduce effort to find a 
job since they are less likely to receive a job offer with wages above their reservation 
level (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006). Previous research has found consistent 
evidence that receiving remittances is associated with a large decrease in the labour 
force participation of both men and women (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; 
Kim, 2007; Shapiro and Mandelman, 2016). Similar findings are also found in a 
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 In a model of labour force participation, the reservation wage is the lowest wage rate at which a 
job-seeker is willing to accept employment.  
202 
 
study for the impact of remittances on labour force participation and employment in 
Kosovo. Findings suggest that being a remittance recipient is associated with a 
higher probability of being unemployed and not searching for job compared to a 
non-recipient (UNDP, 2012). On the other hand, receiving remittances might be a 
result of the individual coming from a poor family and he/she is unemployed. This, 
in turn, might translate into additional pressure to find employment. In contrast to 
findings of the negative effect of remittances on wage-employment, Funkhouser 
(1992) found evidence that remittances have a positive effect on self-employment. 
This is mostly evident when remittances are viewed by the receiving individual as a 
temporary source of income and are used to cover the start-up costs of self-
employment which promises future incomes (Funkhouser, 1992; Adams and Page 
2005; Shapiro and Mandelman, 2016). In the sample used for this chapter, self and 
wage employment are combined into one category, however the number of self-
employed individuals in the sample is only 22 out of 344. Considering these 
arguments the sign of the variable Remittance is ambiguous.  
The variable Socialassist (if the family of the individual receives social or disability 
assistance or a pension) is included in the model to account for non-labour income 
and family wealth.
40
 Research findings suggest that welfare programmes, in general, 
decrease labour force participation and hence the probability of being employed 
(Moffit, 2002; Rejda, 2015; Farber and Valletta, 2015). Williams and Windebank 
(1998) suggest that the social benefits may induce a welfare dependency culture 
among the people who receive it and consequently will reduce the probability of 
being employed. Receiving social assistance for a long period of time induces a 
detrimental attitude and behaviour in terms of self-efficacy, morale, motivation and 
subsequently the level of skills which will make them less attractive in the labour 
market (Harvey, 2014; Abramovitz, 2017). Even though the level of social assistance 
in Kosovo is low, it is believed to increase dependency while also increasing the 
probability to work in low paid or low-quality jobs, often in informal employment 
(World Bank, 2015). On the other hand, this variable also indicates that the 
individual belongs to a poor family hence this might mean that an individual may put 
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 This variable is created from the question: ‗Your family receives social assistance, disability 
benefits and pension?‘ From this question it is not exactly clear whether the beneficiary him/herself or 
someone within the family receives the benefits.  
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more effort into searching for a job or have a lower reservation wage. The overall 
effect of receiving social assistance on the probability of an individual being in 
employment is thus ambiguous.  
The model also includes dummy variables controlling for the duration of 
unemployment before participation in one of the active measures. Three dummy 
variables measuring the individual‘s pre-treatment unemployment duration were 
included: whether the individual had been unemployed for less than 6 months 
(Undur6), from 6 to 12 months (Undur12) and from 12 to 24 months (Undur24). 
Dummy variable measuring whether the individual had been unemployed for more 
than 24 months (Undurmore24is used as a reference category).  As discussed in 
section 4.3.2 the inclusion of these variables in the model may capture unobserved 
characteristics of the individual, such as motivation for getting a job or labour market 
attachment (Bryson et al., 2002). As the review of empirical studies in section 2.5 
suggests, there may also be a stigmatisation associated with a longer duration of 
unemployment because employers might perceive individuals with long 
unemployment spells as having lower productivity and/or motivation. Thus, shorter 
unemployment spells are expected, ceteris paribus, to increase an individual‘s 
probability of being employed post-treatment.  
The model also includes regional dummies to account for the large regional 
differences labour market conditions in Kosovo. This set of variables is included in 
the model to account for variations in business activity, regional unemployment 
rates, specific labour market environment and the cost of living. This set of dummy 
variables represent the seven regions of Kosovo, the benchmark category being 
Prishtina (Pri) while the others being: Mitrovica (Mit), Gjilan (Gjil), Ferizaj (Fer), 
Gjakove (Gjak), Peja (Pej) and Prizren (Prz). The omitted variable is Prishtina, since 
the interest is focused at the comparison of other regions with the capital city. It is 
expected that individuals living in regions other than Prishtina will have a lower 
probability of being employed due to the lower employment opportunities and level 
of infrastructure development in these regions (including transportation and 
childcare opportunities for women).  The regional unemployment level (RegUnemp) 
was also initially included, but it was subsequently dropped from the model due to 
collinearity thus the regional differences are to be explained only through regional 
dummy variables.  
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The final specification for the employment model is:  
                                                                 
                                                                   
                                                                          5.1 
Model Specification for Active Job Search  
The dependent variable in this specification is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 
if the individual in the sample has actively searched for a job in the four week period 
before the survey, and 0 otherwise. This variable was constructed from the question: 
“Have you actively searched for a job in the last four weeks?” This question was 
only asked to individuals who were unemployed at the time of the survey, thus the 
sample for this specification includes only unemployed individuals. The independent 
variables accounted for in this model are reviewed below.  
Active measure types (OJT and IS, compared to the reference category IET), the 
duration of active measures (Amduration), year of completion of active measures 
(AM2008 and AM2009 compared to AM2010) and whether the participant prepared a 
training/employment plan (EmPlan) are included in the model to assess the impact of 
active measures and their characteristics on the probability to search for jobs. Having 
an EmPlan might increase the probability to search for a new job given that it may 
strengthen an individual‘s motivation and commitment to remain in the labour 
market.  
As discussed in section 1.5.3, women in Kosovo face disproportionate house and 
childcare responsibilities which make them less likely to search for a job. Hence, 
other factors remaining constant, men (indicated by dummy variable Male) are 
expected to have higher probability to engage in active job search compared to 
women. The unemployment rate for youths in Kosovo is the highest among all age 
groups with 52.7% of youth population being unemployed (KAS, 2017). However, 
there is no evidence and thus no clear expectation on whether the young unemployed 
are more likely to engage in active job search. Variables Age and AgeSq are included 
in the model to account for effect of age on active job search.   
In general, the unemployed from ethnic minorities are expected to have lower job 
search intensity due to discouragement from the discrimination they face in the 
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labour market (Thomas and Renick, 1981; Kaas and Manger, 2012). Low social 
capital might also negatively impact their decision to search for a job. However, as 
discussed in the previous model specification, a recent study (see Democracy for 
Development, 2015) found evidence that ethnic minority women are more likely to 
participate in the labour market compared to Albanian women. Taking this finding 
into consideration, there is no clear expectation of the sign of the variable Minority. 
Discrimination in the labour market, lack of workplace facilities necessary for 
disabled people and lack of meaningful employment opportunities are reasons for the 
discouragement of the disabled in the labour market (Burchadt, 2003; Patterson and 
Block, 2014). Hence, the expected sign of variable Disability in this specification is 
negative.   
In the context of the individuals‘ labour-leisure choice, the higher the level of 
education completed the higher is the cost of not participating in the labour market, 
given that the potential wage will be higher if the individual is more educated 
(Riddell and Song, 2016; Ondoa, 2018). In this context, having a higher level of 
education is expected, other things being equal, to increase an unemployed 
individual‘s probability to search for a job.   
Empirical studies also find evidence that those unemployed who receive remittances 
will increase their reservation wage and thus will be less likely to search for a job 
(Kim, 2007). According to a study, the average annual value of remittances in 
Kosovo is EUR 418 per capita in the household which may be considered high 
relative to local wage rates (Democracy for Development, 2015). As discussed in the 
employment model specification, Emp, it is expected that it is mainly individuals 
from poor families with little or no other income receive remittances. This might put 
pressure on the individual to search for jobs. Given these two counteracting 
mechanisms the expected sign of Remittance is ambiguous. Receiving social 
assistance (Socialassist), which is used as a proxy for family wealth, picks up the 
pressure of the individual to search for job more intensely thus it is expected to 
increase active job search.  
Variables measuring unemployment duration spells are included in the model to pick 
up the individuals‘ motivation to participate in the labour market (Undur6, Undur12 
and Undur24 reference category is Undurmore24). Individuals with shorter 
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unemployment spells are expected, ceteris paribus, to have higher active job search 
under the assumption that these signal individuals‘ motivation to remain in the 
labour market thus they will be more willingly to search for jobs.  
As in the previous model, regional dummy variables are included in the model to 
control for regional differences in labour market conditions. It is expected that 
individuals living in regions other than Prishtina, ceteris paribus, to have a lower 
probability to actively search for a job search since other regions offer lower 
employment opportunities and people might more easily become discouraged.  
The final model for active job search model is specified as below: 
                                                                 
                                                                   
                                                                                             
Model Specification for Employment Contract  
The dependent variable for the third model is generated from answers to the 
following question only for those who were employed at the time of the survey: ‗Do 
you have an employment contract at the current job?‘ Therefore, this specification 
uses a dependent dummy variable indicating the incidence of informal employment, 
taking a value of 1 if the employed individual has an employment contract at the 
time of the survey, and 0 if the employed individual does not have an employment 
contract. The explanatory variables included in this specification are discussed 
below.  
Active measure types (OJT, IS and IET) and their characteristics (Amduration and 
Cert) are included as in the previous models. The expected sign of variable Cert is 
positive since it signals a certain level of skills acquired from the training and also 
abilities thus employer may offer him/her better job opportunities. 
Workers search for high quality jobs if they are possible, however their ability to 
acquire this kind of jobs depends on their bargaining power. As discussed in more 
detail in section 2.6, disadvantaged, low-skilled and workers with longer duration 
spells tend to have a lower probability of obtaining employment with a contract, are 
less likely to have health insurance and retirement benefits and are engaged in less 
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secure jobs (McGovern et al., 2004; Julia et al., 2015). As pointed out in the 
literature review in Chapter 2, in most countries women are concentrated in lower 
quality, irregular and informal employment, such as domestic labour work and care 
assistance to the elderly, assistance in small family enterprises which does not offer 
social security and protection (Carr and Chen, 2002; Abramo and Valenzuela, 2006; 
Chen et al., 2006). In contrast, results from the Kosovo LFS (KAS, 2017) suggests 
that women in Kosovo are less likely to work in vulnerable jobs i.e. in unpaid family 
business or being self-employed without employees; 18.3% of employed women 
compared to 24.4% men (KAS, 2017). However, this is mainly driven by the fact 
that employed women in Kosovo are, in general more likely to be employed in the 
public sector. Since this is not the case for the sample being used in this empirical 
chapter (women in this sample are not mainly employed in the public sector), hence 
it is expected that men (Male), ceteris paribus, will be less likely to work without a 
contract compared to women.  
Older workers are expected to have a higher probability to be in formal employment 
than their younger counterparts, other things being equal, because they are likely to 
have gained more labour force experience and seniority (Eilat and Zinnes, 2002; 
Schneider and Williamson, 2013; McCaig and Pavcnik 2015). According to 
McGovern et al. (2004), young workers usually tend to occupy low skilled jobs 
supporting the concept of ‗McJobs‘. The Kosovo LFS (KAS, 2017) also suggest that 
46.2.8% of Kosovo young workers (15 to 25 years of age) work without a contract 
compared to about 21% for all age groups. It is expected that the probability of 
having an employment contract, other things being equal, is lower for young 
individuals and it increases with age. A squared term of this variable is also included 
to test for potential non-linearity in the relationship.  
Section 2.6 also emphasises that skilled workers are more likely to have higher 
quality jobs than low skilled workers (Kogan, 2011; Ondoa, 2018). Since the 
education signals the degree of skills acquired and the educated employees are 
expected to be more productive, they have more bargaining power thus the 
employers will tend to offer better job opportunities to them (Heywood and  Wei, 
2004; Chevalier et al., 2004; Backes-Gellner and Werner, 2007; Schneider and 
Williams, 2013). It is expected that higher levels of education, other things being 
equal, increase the probability of having an employment contract.   
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With regard to minorities, the discussion in section 2.6 emphasises that in addition to 
having barriers to being employed, they also face barriers to progress in their career 
and consequences such as wage differentials, contract types and stability in work, 
hours worked and self or part- time employment. Empirical studies confirm that 
minorities as disadvantaged groups are more likely to be employed in lower quality 
jobs than their counterparts (McCaig and Pavcnik, 2015; Julia et al., 2015).  
According to ILO (2007), there is a difference between Albanians and minorities in 
terms of the employment contracts. Young Serbs and the community of Roma 
Ashkali and Egyptian (RAE) reported twice as high informal employment compared 
to young Albanians. Discrimination has also been argued to be an important factor 
for disabled persons to be employed in the informal sector (Sanderson et al., 2017). 
Thus, the minority (Minority) and the disabled (Disability), if employed, are 
expected to be less likely to have an employment contract.  
Variable TwoUnemp in this context picks up the pressure to be employed regardless 
of the work conditions; hence, if an individual have two or more members of the 
family unemployed, he/she will be more likely to be employed in the informal sector 
(without a contract). The impact of variable Socialassist on the quality of 
employment might be negative; working informally, rather than formally, may be 
preferred by social assistance beneficiaries since it enable them to remain eligible for 
benefits.  
The set of duration variables (Undur6, Undur12 and Undur24 while reference 
category is Undurmore24) are included in the model, for the same purpose as in the 
previous models, to account for unobserved characteristics of the individual such as 
motivation, labour market attachment and employers‘ perception of his/her 
productivity. It is expected that employed individuals with longer unemployment 
spells, ceteris paribus, will more likely be employed in the informal sector. 
Regional differences are also accounted through regional dummy variables as in the 
two previous specifications. Those residing in cities with higher unemployment rates 
are expected to be disproportionately employed in the informal sector, other factors 
remaining constant.  
The final model specification for Contract is as follows:  
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Table 5.5 presents the expected signs of each variable in the three model 
specifications. The following section discusses the results from the multinomial 
probit and the IPWRA.  
Table 5.5 Independent variable – expected sign 
Variable   Expected sign 
Dependent – Outcome variables  EMP ACTSRCAT  CONTRACT 
Male 
Age   
 
Minority 
Disability  
Family receives social assistance 
Two members of the family 
unemployed  
Received remittances   
+ 
+ up to a point; - after 
the turning point 
? 
- 
? 
-/+ 
 
- 
+ 
? 
 
? 
- 
+ 
+ 
 
- 
- 
- up to a point; + after 
the turning point 
? 
- 
-+ 
 
NA 
Four years or primary school 
completed (omitted variable) 
High school completed  
University and post-graduate 
degree   
 
 
 
+ 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
+ 
 
- On the job training   
- Internship scheme  
- Institution and enterprise 
training (omitted variable) 
Year of completion of active 
measure  
- 2008   
- 2009  
- 2010 (omitted variable) 
Duration of the active measure  
Agreed an employment plan before 
participation  
Received certificate after 
completion  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-/+ 
+ 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-/+ 
+ 
 
NA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
NA 
 
+ 
Duration of unemployment before 
participation   
- Less than 6 months  
- 6 to 12 months 
- 12 to 24 months  
- More than 2 years (omitted 
variable) 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
Regional dummy variables:  
- Prishtina (omitted variable) 
- Mitrovica  
- Gjilan 
- Ferizaj 
- Gjakove 
- Peja  
- Prizren 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
210 
 
5.5 Results  
5.5.1 Multinomial Probit Model  
The initial analysis uses a multinomial probit model to assess the relative 
effectiveness of the three active measures: On the Job Training (OJT), Internship 
Scheme (IS) and Institution and Enterprise Training (IET). The dependent variable 
used in this model is three categorical variable which: equals 0 if the individual was 
unemployed at the time of the survey, 1 if the individual was employed and had an 
employment contract and 2 if the individual was employed but had no employment 
contract at the time of the survey.
41
 To use a dependent variable with another 
category of whether the unemployed were actively seeking for jobs at the time of the 
survey would be highly data demanding and was not possible with the data at hand.
42
  
Both multinomial probit and logit were considered initially for estimation. Two tests 
were used to check whether the multinomial logit model violates the independence 
from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption.
43
 Comparing the coefficients of 
unrestricted with the first restricted model (where the category formally employed 
was excluded), the calculated standard Hausman test statistic is negative thus no 
conclusion can be drawn regarding the null hypothesis that the ‗difference in the 
coefficients is not systematic‘ (see Appendix 5.1). In addition, a suest-based 
Hausman test was carried out to verify the difference of coefficients on the models; 
the results indicate that the null hypothesis that ‗the odds are independent of other 
alternatives‘ cannot be rejected therefore there is no evidence of a violation of the 
IIA assumption. The same tests were carried out for the unrestricted and the second 
restricted model (where the category informally employed was excluded). For the 
second restricted model, output results from both tests indicate that there is no 
evidence of a violation of the IIA assumption.  
Long and Freese (2006, p.191) suggest that the results from both tests used for IIA 
assumption (Hausman and suest-based Hausman test) should be consistent otherwise 
the results from these tests are unreliable, they quote McFadden (1973): a 
                                                          
41
 In the rest of the section category 1 and 2 of the dependent variable are referred to as formally and 
informally employed.  
42
 200 participants who were inactive at the time of the survey were not included in the sample.  
43
 The IIA assumption implies that adding an additional alternative or changing the characteristics of 
one alternative does not change an individual‘s evaluation of one alternative relative to another 
(Wooldridge, 2010). 
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multinomial logit should be used only in cases where the outcome categories are 
―plausibly assumed to be distinct and weighted independently in the eyes of the 
decision maker‖. Additionally, Wooldridge (2002) suggests that the multinomial 
probit is preferred over the multinomial logit model since it relaxes the IIA 
assumption. Therefore, based on the considerations from the literature, the 
inconsistent results from the standard Hausman and suest-based Hausman tests the 
multinomial logit model seems not to be preferred and only the results from the 
multinomial probit model will be presented. 
44
 
The rest of this section presents the findings of the model on the determinants of 
individual‘s labour market status. The full results from the estimation of multinomial 
probit are presented in Appendix 5.2 while only the average marginal effects are 
interpreted based on suggestions by StataCorp (2013) and are presented in table 5.6. 
In order to interpret the multinomial probit coefficients, one set of coefficients is 
normalised to zero (the reference category), however such normalisation is not 
required when interpreting the average marginal effects. The average marginal 
effects are interpreted for all the three categories of the dependent variable Labstate 
(unemployed, employed in the formal sector and employed in the informal sector) 
and the sum of the average marginal effects for each variable should be equal to zero 
because in order for an increase in one category there should be a decrease in another 
category.  
As the main aim of this chapter is to identify the relative effectiveness of active 
measures, the first variables to be interpreted are those associated with participation 
in three active measures (OJT, IS, Amduration, AM2008, AM2009, Emplan and 
Cert). Results indicate that, other things being equal, participating in OJT decreases 
an individual‘s probability of being unemployed when surveyed by 12.1 percentage 
points (pp) in comparison to participating in IET. An OJT beneficiary, other factors 
being constant, is more likely to be employed informally by 7 pp in comparison to an 
IET with similar characteristics. In contrast, participating in OJT seems not to 
significantly impact the probability to be formally employed though the sign is 
                                                          
44
 When analysing the effect of non-normality for probit models, Wooldridge (2002; 2012), argues 
that when estimating partial effects, it is practically irrelevant if the Beta estimates are inconsistent 
resulting from non-normality. Thus, focusing on the inconsistency of the Beta parameters "largely 
misses the point" of probit modelling. 
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positive. Participating in IS, holding other variables constant, decreases the 
probability to be unemployed by 9.9 pp compared to participating in IET, however it 
is statistically significant only at 10% significance level. Results also indicate that 
participating in IS does not have any different effect on the probability of being 
employed (neither formal nor informal) compared to participating in IET. Overall, 
the OJT programme, compared to the two other programmes, seems to have 
positively influenced the prospects of the participants; however the effect seems to 
be larger for the informal sector employment.  
The duration of the active measure (Amduration) is found to have a statistically 
significant impact in increasing an individual‘s probability to be engaged in informal 
employment.  Informal employment provides much-needed employment 
opportunities which are lacking in Kosovo‘s formal sector, though working 
conditions are often poor. Gaining an income, for most individuals, which supports 
the economic well-being of a worker and his/her family is the primary reason to 
work. Considering that receiving the social assistance is insufficient source of 
income to live a decent life in Kosovo, being informally employed is preferred 
relative to being unemployed. An increase of active measure duration by a month, 
other things being equal, increases an individual‘s probability to be informally 
employed by 2.8 pp. As discussed in section 4.4.2, some studies found strong 
evidence of negative effects of long-term active measures on the probability to find 
employment post-treatment, due to the ‗lock-in effect‘ (Van Ours, 2001; 
Hamalainen, 2002; Sianesi, 2008; Schmidl, 2014). Yet, no study, to the author‘s 
knowledge, has examined the effect of active measure duration on informal 
employment thus these previous results should be taken with caution. 
Results indicate that the impact of active measures becomes more pronounced over 
time. An individual who completed the programme in 2008 (AM2008), holding other 
variables constant, will have lower probability of being unemployed by 13.9 pp 
compared to an individual who completed in 2010. Completing in 2008 also 
increases an individual‘s probability to be employed in the formal sector by 11.7 pp 
compared to those who completed in 2010. AM2008 is statistically significant at 1% 
significance level for both outcomes, unemployed and formally employed. Having 
participated in 2009, decreases an individual‘s probability of being unemployed by 
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8.4 pp while increasing his probability of being formally employed by 8.9 pp   
compared to an individual who completed in 2010. 
Table 5.6 Average Marginal Effects from Multinomial Probit 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Unemployed Formally employed  Informally employed 
OJT -0.121** 0.050 0.071** 
 
(0.047) (0.043) (0.031) 
IS -0.099* 0.072 0.028 
 
(0.054) (0.049) (0.036) 
Amduration -0.016 -0.011 0.028*** 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.010) 
AM2008 -0.139*** 0.117*** 0.022 
 
(0.045) (0.040) (0.029) 
AM2009 -0.084** 0.090** -0.005 
 
(0.038) (0.035) (0.025) 
Emplan -0.036 0.018 0.017 
 
(0.038) (0.034) (0.026) 
Cert -0.033 0.098*** -0.065*** 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.023) 
Age -0.062** 0.019 0.042** 
 (0.029) (0.026) (0.021) 
Agesq 0.001* -0.0001 -0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Male -0.129*** 0.026 0.103*** 
 (0.033) (0.030) (0.023) 
Disability 0.278* -0.226 -0.051 
 (0.147) (0.149) (0.096) 
Minority 0.233*** -0.117* -0.116** 
 (0.074) (0.071) (0.050) 
Socialassist 0.142** -0.147** 0.005 
 (0.066) (0.062) (0.041) 
Twounempl 0.075** -0.092*** 0.017 
 (0.037) (0.033) (0.024) 
Remittance 0.042 -0.065 0.023 
 
(0.060) (0.056) (0.038) 
Secondaryeduc -0.015 -0.018 0.034 
 
(0.049) (0.046) (0.028) 
Tertiaryeduc -0.053 0.171*** -0.117*** 
 
(0.053) (0.047) (0.036) 
Undur6 -0.277*** 0.180*** 0.096*** 
 
(0.056) (0.051) (0.032) 
Undur12 -0.017 0.022 -0.005 
 
(0.047) (0.044) (0.030) 
Undur24 -0.114** 0.064 0.049 
 
(0.056) (0.051) (0.035) 
Fer 0.129** -0.040 -0.088** 
 
(0.061) (0.055) (0.040) 
Gjak 0.177*** -0.106* -0.070* 
 
(0.065) (0.058) (0.042) 
Gjil 0.116** -0.046 -0.069** 
 
(0.054) (0.048) (0.033) 
Mit 0.385*** -0.335*** -0.049 
 
(0.065) (0.063) (0.036) 
Pej 0.164** -0.021 -0.143** 
 
(0.071) (0.060) (0.056) 
Prz 0.228*** -0.159*** -0.068* 
 
(0.062) (0.056) (0.038) 
Observations 751 751 751 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The discussion in section 4.4.2 pointed out that very few studies have analysed the 
short vs. long-term effects of active measures. Results obtained from the estimation 
presented in table 5.6 are broadly in line with these previous studies. This finding 
might also be explained by the economic environment and the quality of training 
over the period when the training took place, which could not be controlled for in the 
analysis. However, as Chapter 1 indicated, the labour market did not experience any 
significant changes during this period.    
Having acquired a certificate of completion of the active measures (Cert) is 
associated with an increase in the individual‘s average probability of being in formal 
employment by 9.7 pp while it decreases the probability to be in informal 
employment by 6.5 pp. This result reflects the expectations that a certificate signals a 
higher level of individual‘s skills and competences which might imply higher 
productivity (Chan, 2013). As discussed in section 5.3, the percentage of individuals 
who received a certificate of completion increases with the time spent in training. 
This might indicate that receiving a certificate might reflect the individuals‘ ability to 
acquire more skills from the training. Furthermore, being certified may be perceived 
by companies as indicating that the individual have higher abilities and thus are less 
likely to be offered low quality jobs or informal jobs.  
Having an individual plan on acquiring skills during the training (Emplan) seems not 
to be important for any of the outcomes since it is statistically insignificant. One 
explanation for this result could be that these individual plans might have not been 
well implemented and might not be of high enough quality to guide the beneficiary 
in acquiring the necessary skills and employment opportunities.  
The signs of the marginal effects of variables Age and AgeSq are in line with the 
expectations of a non-linear relationship between age and an individual‘s probability 
of being unemployed: the probability of being unemployed reduces with age up to a 
certain point after which it increases. With regard to informal employment, there is 
also a non-linear relationship between age and the probability of being employed in 
the informal sector where the individual‘s probability of being employed in the 
informal sector increases with age up to a turning point after which it reduces. 
However, the squared terms of age are only significant at the 10 percent significance 
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level.
45
 In accordance with expectations, men are less likely to be unemployed and, if 
employed, they are more likely to be informally employed than women.  Holding 
other variables constant, men are found to have a lower probability of unemployment 
by 12.8 pp. Moreover, men are more likely to be employed informally, other things 
being equal, by 10.3 pp.  
As expected, having a disability increases the individual‘s probability to be 
unemployed by 27.8 pp compared to an individual without disability, although it is 
statistically significant only at 10% significance level. A possible explanation for 
this finding might be the low employment opportunities and social barriers that 
disabled individuals face in the labour market.  
These results suggest strong evidence that being an ethnic minority is associated 
with a higher probability of being unemployed at 1% significance level, while being 
associated with a lower probability of being employed formally and informally at 
10% and 5% significance level respectively. Holding other variables constant, being 
from an ethnic minority increases the probability to be unemployed by 23.3 pp while 
decreasing the probability to be in formal employed by 11.7 pp and informal 
employment by 11.6 pp, compared to being an Albanian. This finding is in line with 
empirical studies from other countries, suggesting that lower employment 
opportunities remain for minority ethnic groups (Julia et al., 2015; Zwysen and 
Longhi, 2018).   
Results indicate that whether an individual‘s family receives social assistance and/or 
a pension is an important determinant of an individual‘s probability to be 
unemployed and formally employed. Findings indicate that if an individual‘s family 
receives social assistance and/or a pension, holding other things constant, increases 
an individual‘s probability of being unemployed by 14.2 pp and decreases an 
individual‘s probability of being formally employed by 14.7 pp. However, given that 
to receive the social assistance in Kosovo, it is a criterion that all family members 
should be unemployed, there is a potential endogeneity issue and this result should 
be treated with caution. Receiving remittances does not have a statistically 
significant effect for neither of the outcomes. 
                                                          
45
 The turning point for the unemployment outcome= - Age/(2*AgeSq)= 0.062/(2*(0.001)) = 31;  
The turning point for the informal employment outcome= - Age/(2*AgeSq)=  - 0.042/(2*(- 0.001)) = 
21 
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In accordance with the expectations of the social capital hypothesis, holding other 
variables constant, having two or more unemployed family members increases an 
individual‘s probability to be unemployed by 7.5 pp. Accordingly, other things being 
equal, it decreases an individual‘s probability to be in formal employment by 9.2 pp 
while it seems to have no impact on an employed individual‘s probability to be 
engaged in informal employment. A possible explanation for this finding might be 
the effect of nepotism which seems to be an important determinant of being 
employed in Kosovo. Another explanation could be that the individual might be 
discouraged from the labour market since he/she believes that the probability of 
being employed is low.  
In accordance with theoretical expectations, having completed university, other 
things being equal, increases an individual‘s probability to be formally employed by 
17.1 pp while decreasing the probability to be informally employed by 11.7 pp 
compared to having just primary level education. Having completed secondary 
education seems not to affect individual‘s labour market state compared to having 
primary education.  
In general, results are in line with the evidence from the previous studies suggesting 
that an individual with shorter unemployment spells prior to entering training is 
more likely to be employed (Terell and Storm, 1999; O‘Leary, 2001; Van Ours, 
2002; Micklewright and Nagy, 2008; Kroft et al., 2013). There is evidence that 
having an unemployment spell of no longer than 6 months increases an individual‘s 
probability of being employed, both in formal and in informal employment, 
compared to having an unemployment spell of more 24 months. Results suggest that 
an individual‘s unemployment spells, Undur12 and Undur24, are not statistically 
significant in determining the probability of being employed compared to 
Undurmor24 (the reference category). In conclusion, the findings suggest that 
individuals who have been unemployed for up to 6 months have a higher probability 
of getting employed compared to those with longer unemployment spells (6 to 12 
months, 12 to 24 months and more than 24 months).  
Undur6 is statistically significant at 1% significance level for all three outcomes. 
Results indicate that an individual‘s probability of being unemployed, other things 
being equal, decreases by 27.2 pp for and individual with less than 6 months 
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unemployment spell compared to one with more than 24 months unemployment 
spell. Having only 6 months unemployment spell also increases probability to be 
formally employed by 18 pp and to be informally employed by 9.6 pp. Undur12 
(having unemployment spell between 6 to 12 months) is not statistically significant 
in any of the outcomes. In contrast, having 12 to 24 months unemployment spell 
before participating in the active measures (Undur24) decreases an individual‘s 
probability to be unemployed compared to an individual with more than 24 months 
unemployment spell, other things being equal. The variable Undur24 does not seem 
to influence an individual‘s average probability to be in formal nor informal 
employment.  
Consistent with initial expectations, being from a region other than Prishtina (the 
base category) increases an individual‘s probability to be unemployed and decreases 
the probability to be employed (formally and informally).  An individual‘s 
probability to be unemployed increases by 11.6 pp for individuals living in Gjilan, 
12.9 pp for Ferizaj, by 16.4 for Peja, 17.7 pp for Gjakova, 22.8 for Prizren and 38.5 
pp for Mitrovica in comparison to an individual living in Prishtina. With regard to 
the formal employment, being from Gjakova, Mitrovica and Prizren decreases the 
average probability to be formally employed, other things being equal.  With regard 
to the informal employment, being from a region other than Prishtina, holding other 
variables constant, decreases an individual‘s probability of being informally 
employed.  
5.5.2 Results from the Inverse Probability Weighting - Regression 
Adjustment 
As explained in section 5.2, individual selection into different active programmes is 
not randomised. Selection is a general issue in a non-random sample such as the one 
being used in this empirical analysis. The selection of the participants into 
programmes was based on a set of pre-determined criteria such as age, individuals‘ 
unemployment spells, gender, the level of education etc. As emphasised by Winship 
(1992, p. 328) ―when observations are selected so that they are not independent of 
the outcome variables in the study, this sample selection leads to biased inferences 
about the processes‖. This empirical analysis attempts to address the selection issue 
based on the observable factors. This estimation accounts for the type of the active 
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programme that the individual participated in, the year of participation and the 
duration of the active programme participated and a set of individual characteristics. 
Certain unobserved factors might also influence the treatment model, hence a set of 
variables which may help to capture these unobserved effects are also included in the 
model.  
Firms did not have any influence on selecting participants into programmes, but 
were allowed to choose the active measure in which they participated; hence the 
probability of selection bias arising from firms‘ actions is very small. The issue of 
selection bias can be diminished through imposing the assumptions discussed in 
section 4.3.2; i.e. the conditional independence assumption (CIA) which is also 
referred to as the un-confoundedness or selection on observables and the common 
support or the overlapping assumption. Explained in more details below, all the 
available relevant variables to control for selection into programmes are included in 
the selection model which makes the CIA a reasonable identification strategy in this 
context.  
As explained in section 4.3.4, IPWRA models the treatment assignment and the 
outcome variable in the same estimator (Robins et al., 1995; Robins 2000; Bang and 
Robins 2005). This estimator has a doubly robustness property because it provides 
unbiased estimates even if one of the models (treatment or outcome) is mis-specified 
(Emsley et al., 2008; Wooldridge, 2009; Farell, 2015; Linden et al., 2016). If the 
outcome model functions are correctly specified and selection-on-observables (CIA) 
holds conditional on independent covariates, then the weighted estimators using any 
function of independent variables consistently estimate the coefficients on the 
control and treated sample. Therefore, even if the propensity score estimation is mis-
specified, weighting by functions of propensity score does not cause inconsistency 
for estimating the parameters of the correctly specified outcome model (Wooldridge, 
2009). The IPW estimator weights observations on the outcome variable by the 
inverse of the probability that is observed to account for the counterfactual. When 
the propensity score model is correctly specified, the IPW estimator (under selection-
on-observables assumption) consistently estimates the solution to the unweighted 
population problem. In this case, even if the outcome model is mis-specified but the 
propensity model is specified correctly, IPWRA produces consistent estimates.  
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IPWRA is operationalised in a three-step process. First, the parameters of the 
propensity score model are estimated by multinomial logit modelling and the inverse 
weights are computed for each treatment level. Inverse probability weights are 
derived from the predicted propensity scores, where these are defined by the inverse 
of the propensity score if the individual receives treatment and the inverse of 1 minus 
the propensity score if the individual receives the control. Second, using the 
estimated weights, the outcome models are fitted by a weighted regression for each 
treatment level. Using the coefficients from this weighted regression, treatment 
specific predicted outcomes for each individual are obtained. The final step is to 
produce the average treatment effects on the treated which is the difference in the 
means of the specific treatment and control outcomes.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, a crucial assumption, the conditional independence 
assumption
46
, cannot be tested, thus it is required to include all the presumed 
important variables which affect both the outcome and treatment. Section 4.3.2 
provides an extended discussion of the relevant variables to account in the treatment 
model. Emsley et al. (2008) recommend that the treatment model should include 
variables even if they are thought not to be confounders since it helps to improve the 
prediction of the propensity scores and lowers the bias. The availability of 
informative data is therefore crucial. Based on the selection process of individuals 
into active measures explained in section 5.2, the treatment model controls for all the 
likely important factors in the selection process, such as age, level of education, 
socio-demographic factors and regional variables. Section 4.3.2, explained the 
importance of including the past labour market histories since these variables may 
capture unobservable selection factors such as motivation and interpersonal skills. 
Assuming that the individuals‘ pre-treatment labour market histories might capture 
these unobservable effects, variables measuring an individuals‘ pre-treatment 
unemployment duration (Undur6, Undur12 and Undur24; Undurmore24 is the 
reference variable) and pre-treatment job search activity (Jobserachbt) are included 
in the treatment model. In addition, the administrative staff may select participant 
with better prospects for getting employed after the completion of the training so as 
                                                          
46
 This assumption denotes that the unobserved characteristics are trivial and do not particularly affect 
the outcome in absence of the treatment; thus there are sufficient observable data such that the 
outcomes or the treatment effects are independent from the programme participation. 
220 
 
to improve the success rate of the active measures. Also, given that in Kosovo 
nepotism is common, the selection into programmes might have also been influenced 
by it. Besides the pre-treatment unemployment duration, the variable Emplan is 
included in the treatment model. This variable is used as a proxy for unobserved 
characteristics (individual‘s motivation and labour market skills) and might also be a 
signal of the closeness between the VTC administrator and the beneficiary. As 
pointed out in section 5.4, Emplan is also used as a proxy for the quality of 
employment and VTC services. Additionally, the variable Vtcmncp is included in the 
model which controls whether the individual lives in the city where the vocational 
training centres are located. This variable is a proxy for individual‘s proximity to the 
vocational training centre. Economic theory suggests that living closer to the 
vocational centre reduces the costs of attending and therefore, other things being 
equal, makes it more likely that the discounted expected benefits of attending the 
treatment exceed the expected costs (Heckman et al., 1999). Providing that there is a 
large number of variables accounted in the treatment model, it can be concluded that 
the CIA is a reasonable identification strategy in the context of this chapter. It has 
been suggested that the correct specification of the treatment model will increase the 
precision of the doubly robust estimators; therefore, we put particular emphasis on 
the treatment model and balancing the covariates in the treatment and control groups. 
The dependent variable of the treatment model is a three-category dummy variable 
which takes the value of 1 if the individual participated in OJT, 2 if the individual 
participated in IS and 3 if the individual participated in IET. The covariates chosen 
for propensity score estimation are as follows:  
                                                              
                                                                       
                                                                                      
The best fitting treatment model is determined by the Akaike Information Criteria 
(AIC) using ‗bfit‘ command in Stata (Burnham and Anderson, 2004).47  This 
command generates a series of candidate multinomial logit models by maximum 
likelihood. These models range from a model including only the first independent 
                                                          
47
 Both Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) were considered, however considering the 
number of observations, AIC is used since it does not depend on the sample size (Burnham and 
Anderson, 2004).  
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variable specified in the model as a single covariate to a model including a fully 
interacted polynomial of the specified order. The sorted treatment model based on 
AIC is considered to be the best fit model and is chosen for the analysis below.  
As an essential objective of the IPWRA is to balance the observable characteristics 
between treated and control subjects. A balancing diagnostic check has been 
performed to find out whether the treatment model specification has balanced the 
covariates or whether there is a difference in the distributions of the covariates.  The 
diagnostics used to verify the balance of the covariates are based on the standardised 
differences in means and ratio of variances before and after weighting of the 
propensity scores for each covariate. Rubin (2001) suggest that the threshold for the 
standardised difference in means should be 0.25.  This diagnostic test is used to 
verify the balance for weighted propensity scores for the three outcome models Emp, 
Actsrcat and Contract. Since the sample is restricted to account only for the 
unemployed and employed respectively for Actsrcat and Contract, the covariate 
balance should be tested separately for each model.  
Figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 show the non-parametric kernel density estimation with a 
triangular kernel and optimal bandwidth chosen by Stata for the propensity scores for 
each treatment for the whole sample. Table 5.7 presents the weighted standardised 
differences for these models. 
 
Figure 5.3 Overlap graph of the probability  assignment to the OJT programme 
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Figure 5.4 Overlap graph of the probability assignment to the IS programme 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Overlap graph of the probability of assignment to the IET programme 
 
For each treatment level, the overlap plots depict the estimated density of the 
predicted propensity scores for that specific treatment level conditional on other 
possible treatment level. IPWRA requires that the predicted propensity scores not to 
be bigger than one or smaller than zero and ‗sufficient‘ (undefined) propensity scores 
to be between this range. The three estimated Kernel density plots show that there is 
enough overlap and the estimated densities cover most of their respective masses. 
Therefore, there is no evidence that the overlap assumption (common support) is 
violated. However, this is the case only when the whole sample is accounted, thus 
only for Emp outcome.  In the cases of the Actsrcat and Contract outcome models 
the sample is restricted to unemployed or employed individuals, respectively. The 
sample is reduced to 385 for Actsrcat and 284 for Contract. With the restriction of 
the sample the weighted propensity scores tend to be less balanced. Nine of the 
weighted standardised mean differences for Actsrcat and twelve for Contract are 
above the 0.25 cut-off recommended by Rubin (2001), thus the results for these two 
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outcomes should be interpreted with caution (the imbalanced means are highlighted 
in table 5.7).   
Table 5.7 Weighted characteristics of three different programme participants in the 
multivalued treatment model. 
   Weighted Standardised Differences  
Outcome 
Variable Emp Actsrcat Contract 
Sample size  775 385 284 
 Variables 
IS vs. 
OJT 
IET vs. 
OJT  
IET vs. 
IS  
IS vs. 
OJT 
IET vs. 
OJT  
IET vs. 
IS  
IS vs. 
OJT 
IET vs. 
OJT  
IET vs. 
IS  
AM2008 -0.102 -0.027 0.079 -0.138 -0.224 0.218 -0.070 -0.366 -0.227 
AM2009 0.000 -0.231 -0.211 -0.129 -0.296 -0.393 0.008 -0.025 0.270 
Emplan -0.067 0.118 0.101 -0.142 0.064 0.193 -0.057 0.157 -0.205 
Age -0.002 -0.014 0.117 -0.118 -0.182 0.146 0.071 0.019 -0.155 
Male 0.047 0.239 0.074 0.067 0.187 0.207 -0.040 0.116 -0.106 
Disability 0.026 0.087 0.069 0.019 0.041 0.027   
 
  
Minority 0.014 0.097 0.124 0.028 0.040 0.228 0.113 0.036 -0.088 
Socialassist -0.037 0.149 0.034 -0.115 -0.043 -0.312 0.029 -0.426 -0.367 
Twounempl -0.032 0.062 0.033 0.044 -0.029 0.054 -0.125 -0.282 -0.356 
Remittance 0.003 -0.031 -0.051 0.022 0.268 0.213 0.003 -0.154 -0.217 
Secondaryeduc 0.074 0.230 0.150 0.073 0.147 0.002 0.008 0.153 0.031 
Tertiaryeduc -0.029 -0.202 -0.153 -0.017 -0.128 -0.202 -0.030 -0.151 0.068 
Jobserachbt 0.048 0.172 0.309 0.171 0.392 0.648 -0.038 0.423 0.561 
Undur6 0.020 -0.011 0.033 0.018 0.063 -0.074 0.034 0.002 0.204 
Undur12 0.027 -0.079 0.005 -0.010 -0.038 -0.249 0.113 0.084 0.176 
Undur24 0.083 0.180 0.203 0.103 0.276 0.227 0.079 0.615 0.402 
Vtcmncp -0.042 -0.160 -0.057 -0.050 -0.058 0.156 0.034 0.190 -0.056 
Fer 0.029 -0.142 0.010 0.170 -0.019 0.159 0.001 -0.103 -0.157 
Gjak 0.091 0.038 -0.018 0.062 -0.083 -0.083 0.056 -0.025 -0.272 
Gjil -0.046 0.199 0.021 -0.028 0.274 -0.141 -0.076 0.131 0.024 
Mit -0.018 -0.187 -0.147 -0.205 -0.361 -0.260 0.149 -0.460 -0.344 
Pej 0.013 0.138 -0.085 0.188 0.350 -0.046 -0.032 -0.163 -0.062 
Prz -0.036 -0.037 0.035 0.018 0.075 0.180 -0.104 0.017 0.419 
 
The employment outcome model is specified as described in section 5.4.1. The same 
approach is followed for the Actsrcat outcome model. However, due to a loss of 
observations the regression model is specified differently for the Contract model. In 
the third outcome model, whether the employed individuals had an employment 
contract, variable Disability and the set of unemployment duration dummies 
(Undur6, Undur12 and Undur24) are excluded from the model. In addition, the 
outcome model also excludes the following variables: Socialassistt, Remittance and 
Twounemp, since there is little variation in these variables for Contract model. Since 
the sample size shrinks to only 284 observations, the outcome model for Contract 
could not converge with these variables included in the model. As the multivariate 
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treatment model has only recently started to be used, there is no discussion in the 
literature of the choice of diagnostics to account for in such cases, thus we follow the 
same approaches as in the binary treatment models (e.g. Austin, 2011).  
The final results from IPWRA approach are presented in table 5.8 and Appendix 5.3, 
5.4 and 5.5. In order to analyse all possible comparisons, (i.e. OJT vs. IET, OJT vs. 
IS and IET vs. IS), two control groups were considered; the first control group is 
those who completed OJT and the second those who completed IS.  
Table 5.8 Average treatment effects on treated (ATT) and Potential Outcome Means 
(POM) for three outcome variables Emp, Actsrcat and Contract 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Model specifications for outcome Emp, Actsrcat and Contract, are based on the specification in section 5.4, In order to gain 
more degrees of freedom, instead of using regional dummy variables, the variable measuring the regional unemployment 
rate, Regunemp is included in the outcome model. In specification of Contract model, due to small sample size few 
variables were dropped from the outcome model, Twounemp, Disability, Socialassist and Remittance and variables 
measuring the individual‘s unemployment duration, Undur6, Undur12 and Undur24. Because it is crucial to attempt 
addressing the selection bias, the treatment model includes all the variables specified in equation 5.4, except for variable 
Disability for Contract model. The complete results of the three outcome models are provided in Appendix 5.3 to 5.5. 
 
OJT as the control group: There seems to be no significant difference in the 
probability of being employed between participants of the IS and OJT programme. 
On the other hand, participating in the IET programme leads to a reduced probability 
to be employed, 18.7 pp lower from the average of OJT participants. Participating in 
an IS programme leads to a 19.2 pp higher probability of an unemployed participant 
being engaged in active job search at the time surveyed compared to the average of 
participants in OJT. Results also indicate that IET employed have an 18.9 pp higher 
 Variables Emp Actsrcat Contract 
No. of obs. 775 385 284 
 Average 
Treatment 
on Treated  
Potential 
Outcome 
Mean 
Average 
Treatment 
on Treated 
Potential 
Outcome 
Mean 
Average 
Treatment 
on Treated  
Potential 
Outcome 
Mean 
 IS vs. OJT -0.055 
 
0.192***  0.059  
Control 
group: 
OJT 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.0642)  (0.060)  
IET  vs. 
OJT -0.187*** 
 
0.105  0.189***  
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.0690)  (0.071)  
OJT 
 
0.432***  0.647***  0.717*** 
  
(0.033)  (0.0542)  (0.051) 
 
 
Control 
group: 
IS 
OJT  vs. 
IS 0.013  -0.192***  -0.104**  
 (0.049)  (0.0416)  (0.052)  
IET  vs. IS -0.162***  -0.0887**  0.073  
 (0.055)  (0.0388)  (0.062)  
IS  0.422***  0.864***  0.799*** 
  (0.045)  (0.0262)  (0.043) 
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probability of having an employment contract from the average probability of OJT 
employed.  
IS as the control group: In case when IS was defined as the control group, the results 
suggest that participating in IET decreases an individual‘s probability of being 
employed by 16.2 pp compared to the average probability of being employed of IS 
participants. Participants in the IET programme who were unemployed at the time 
surveyed are also less likely to be engaged in active job search by 8.8 pp compared 
to the average job search probability of IS participants. OJT unemployed have a 19.2 
pp lower probability to actively search for jobs compared to the average job search 
probability of IS participants. According to the findings, employed OJT participants 
are 10.4 pp less likely to have an employment contract compared to the average 
probability of having a contract of IS participants. As discussed, the model 
specification was modified and some variables were omitted due to issues with non-
convergence thus this last result should be interpreted with caution. 
In conclusion, these findings suggest a highly significant difference in the 
probability of being employed between OJT and IET participants. OJT participants 
are more likely to be employed, other factors being equal, compared to the IET 
participants. There seems to be no difference between OJT and IS on the probability 
of being employed at the time surveyed. When comparing the IET and IS 
programmes, the findings provide evidence suggesting that IET beneficiaries, other 
things being equal, had a lower probability of being employed compared to their IS 
counterparts. With regard to the job search activity at the time of the survey, the 
findings indicate that unemployed OJT are less likely to search for jobs, other factors 
being equal, than their IS counterparts. Furthermore, IET unemployed beneficiaries 
are less likely to search for jobs, other things being equal, compared to IS 
unemployed beneficiaries. Other factors being equal, an employed OJT participant is 
less likely to have an employment contract then an employed IET. For employed 
individuals in the sample, the difference in probability of having an employment 
contract is insignificant when comparing OJT and IS beneficiaries.   
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5.6 Conclusions 
This empirical chapter used a cross-sectional dataset collected through a survey in 
2012 to evaluate three different active measures, OJT, IS and IET, implemented in 
Kosovo from 2008 to 2010. This chapter utilised two methodologies. The first one is 
the multinomial probit model to evaluate the effectiveness of these policies and their 
characteristics such as the duration of the ALMPs, the year of completion, having 
received a certificate of completion and having prepared an employment/training 
plan.  As argued in this chapter, the non-random data might be subject to selection 
bias, hence a second empirical approach, IPWRA was chosen since it attempts to 
address this issue based on observable factors.  
The results from the IPWRA suggest that participating in OJT and IS increases the 
probability of being employed compared to participating in IET. The results are in 
line with those from the multinomial probit where both OJT and IS are found to 
reduce beneficiaries‘ probability of being unemployed. Beneficiaries of OJT, 
however, are also more likely to be employed in the informal sector compared to 
beneficiaries of IS and IET; this is also in line with the findings from multinomial 
probit which suggest that OJT beneficiaries are more likely to be employed in the 
informal sector. With regard to the characteristics of the active measures, the results 
from multinomial probit suggest that the longer the duration of the active measure 
the beneficiary is more likely to be employed in the informal sector. The impact of 
the active measures seems to diminish during the years of implementation; i.e. those 
who participated in 2008 and 2009 were less likely to be unemployed and more 
likely to be employed in the formal sector compared to those who participated in 
2010. As discussed above, this may mean that the effect of the ALMPs is more 
pronounced in the long-term rather than shorter-term. Alternative explanations 
include changes in aggregate labour market conditions and/or changes in the actual 
or perceived quality of the active measures implemented in specific years. The 
findings from multinomial probit suggest that receiving a certificate also improves 
beneficiaries‘ probability of being employed in the formal sector and reduces the 
probability of being employed in the informal sector. On the other hand, having an 
employment/training plan before training had no impact on being employed in either 
formal or informal sector which puts in question the quality of these plans.  
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Given that the ALMPs in Kosovo are on a small scale, it is important not only to 
evaluate the effectiveness of participating in one of the measures relative to one 
another but rather to compare the outcomes of those who participate with those who 
do not. This would provide a clearer picture of the effectiveness of ALMPs in 
achieving their main objective, increasing employment prospects of the treated 
compared to that of the untreated. The analysis presented in the following chapter 
provides such a comparison. 
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6.1 Introduction  
Chapter 5 empirically investigated the relative effectiveness of three active labour 
market measures implemented in Kosovo: On the Job Training (OJT); Internship 
Scheme (IS) and Institution and Enterprise Training (IET). That analysis used two 
different estimation techniques: Multinomial Probit and Inverse Probability 
Weighting – Regression Adjustment (IPWRA). This investigation came to the 
conclusion that participants in both OJT and IS had a higher probability, post-
treatment, of being employed compared to their IET counterparts. On the other hand, 
employed IET participants were more likely to have an employment contract 
compared to participants in OJT, i.e. they were more likely to be employed in the 
formal sector. The empirical investigation in this chapter will extend the analysis of 
chapter 5 by assessing the overall effectiveness of the three policies compared to 
being a non-participant. 
As elaborated in chapter 4, when using observational data ideally the control group 
data should be derived from the same data source. In the absence of a control group 
from the same source, the empirical analysis presented in this chapter will construct 
a control group acquired from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) for Kosovo for 2012, 
the same year as the UNDP data used in chapter 5. The estimation techniques used 
for this empirical investigation are Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Inverse 
Probability Weighting – Regression Adjustment (IPWRA). Both estimation 
techniques attempt to address the potential selection bias. As discussed in chapter 4, 
while PSM uses only binary treatment assignment model, IPWRA allows us to 
extend treatment assignment from the ‗participant vs. non-participant‘ analysis of 
PSM to a multivalued treatment assignment model while utilising an appropriate set 
of covariates which are available for both the treated and control groups. The 
combination of the two estimation techniques sheds light on the importance of 
multivalued treatment model and assessing the effectiveness of each active measure 
in comparison to the control group. Therefore the aim of this chapter is to further 
investigate whether being a participant in one of the three active measures improves 
the likelihood of gaining employment in general and being engaged in the formal 
labour market in particular compared to being a non-participant.  
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This chapter is organised as follows: section 6.2 provides the details on the 
construction of the control group, section 6.3 discusses the specification for both the 
treatment assignment and outcome models while section 6.4 provides descriptive 
statistics for the treated and control groups and presents the results from the PSM 
and IPWRA estimations. Section 6.5 provides a summary of conclusive remarks. 
6.2 Construction of the Control Group 
A key concern in any evaluation of the effectiveness of ALMPs is the construction of 
an appropriate control group based on the selection process that leads the 
unemployed to participate in the programme. Section 5.2 provides a detailed 
description of the three active measures in Kosovo along with the selection criteria 
specified for each of the measures, their duration and descriptive statistics of 
participants. In many studies evaluating programme effectiveness and also in the 
case of this analysis, the choice of the control group is constrained by data 
availability. This section will compare the LFS questionnaire used to construct the 
control group with the questionnaire from UNDP used to construct the dataset for 
participants in the active measures implemented in Kosovo and will assess the 
suitability of the control group for this evaluation.  
Heckman et al. (1999) pointed out the desirability of deriving both the treated and 
control groups from the same data source. Using two different datasets for the treated 
and control might induce measurement differences due to the possibility of different 
definitions and instrumentations of the same outcome variable and covariates. This 
may add an important potential source of bias to the impact estimates reported for an 
active programme (Smith, 1997).  In the case where a survey from a different source 
is used to construct the control group, it is important to ensure that the questions for 
the treatment groups closely match those for the control group. According to Card et 
al. (2011), even minor differences in question phrasing can lead to a quantitative 
difference in the measured outcomes. Hence, identical wording is desirable when 
constructing the dataset. This section identifies these differences and assesses how 
they can be mitigated. Table 6.1 presents the key differences in the questions in the 
two surveys which will be discussed in more detail here.     
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Questions about the labour market status of respondents are more detailed and 
precise in the LFS dataset compared to those in the UNDP data. The variable 
employed is constructed from the first questions presented in table 6.1. If an 
individual responded to options 3 to 6 in UNDP data and 1 to 5 in LFS data, the 
variable emp takes the value of one while if he/she responded to option 1 in UNDP 
survey and option 6 in LFS then the variable takes the value of zero. Those who 
responded as inactive in the UNDP data are excluded from the sample. From the 
LFS question ‗Why did you not work last week?‘, those who responded that they 
were in school, education or training, maternity leave, had illness or temporary 
disability, personal or family responsibilities are considered inactive and hence were 
also excluded from the sample.  
From table 6.1, one can see that the questions measuring the variable contract are 
quite similar. The constructed variable contract is a dummy variable which takes the 
value of one if an employed individual responded that he/she has an employment 
contract in the UNDP survey. In the LFS data, the variable takes a value of one if the 
answer was options 1 to 4 to the question ‗What kind of contract do you have?.  The 
variable contract takes a value of zero if an individual responded to options 2 and 5 
in the respective surveys.  
The variable measuring social assistance, socialassist is constructed from the 
question in the UNDP questionnaire: ‗Does your family receive any kind of 
assistance (social assistance, assistance for disability, pension etc.)?‘ while in the 
LFS questionnaire the question is ‗Do you receive unemployment benefits?‘. In 
Kosovo, although there are no unemployment benefits per se, the eligibility criteria 
for social assistance are related to unemployment: families must fall within one of 
the following two categories: a) all family members are dependants
48
 and b) there is 
a family member able to work (registered as unemployed) and there is at least one 
child under the age of five and/or an orphan under the age of fifteen. Thus, 
considering the criteria for social assistance in Kosovo, for practical purposes, the 
two indicators can be used interchangeably. Therefore, the variable socialassist takes 
                                                          
48
 Persons with disabilities rendering them unable to work for remuneration, persons who are sixty-
five years of age or older, full-time carers of a person with disability, single parents with at least one 
child under the age of five etc.  
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the value of one if the respondent‘s household receives social 
assistance/unemployment benefits and zero otherwise.  
Table 6.1 Differences of variable definition in the two datasets 
Question in UNDP survey Question in LFS Variables constructed  
Employment  
Today, you are:  
1) Unemployed 
2) Inactive (in school, training, 
student, engaged in family 
responsibilities) 
3) Self-employed  
4) Employed in a public 
agency (central or local) 
5) Employed in a public 
enterprise  
6) Employed in a private 
enterprise  
 
Employment 
During last week, you have: 
1) worked in a regular job (at least one 
hour) for pay (in cash or kind)  
2) worked (at least one hour) in the non- 
agricultural sector  
3) done any occasional job (at least one 
hour) for pay or profit  
4) worked (at least one hour) on a farm  
(if at least part of the production is 
intended to be sold or bartered) 
5) worked (at least one hour) on a farm  
 (if the whole production is only for own 
consumption) 
6) none of the above 
Variable employed 
UNDP survey: 
The variable employed equals 
one for options 3, 4, 5, and 6, 
zero otherwise.  
 
LFS: 
The variable employed equals 
one for choices 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, 
zero for option 6. 
  
Inactive respondents are 
excluded from the sample.  
Contract (only for employed) 
Do you have employment 
contract?  
1) Yes 
2) No 
 
Contract (only for employed)  
What kind of contract do you have?  
1) Individual 
2) Group 
3) Collective with syndicate  
4) Collective with employer 
5) Without contract 
Variable contract 
UNDP survey: 
The variable contract equals one 
for choice 1, zero for option 2.   
LFS: 
The variable contract equals one 
for options 1, 2, 3 and 4, zero for 
choice 6.  
Received social assistance 
Does your family receive any 
kind of assistance (social 
assistance, assistance for 
disability, pension etc.)? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
Received social assistance 
Do you receive unemployment benefits? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
 
Variable socialassist 
UNDP survey: 
The variable socialassist equals 
one for option 1, zero for option 
2.   
LFS: 
The variable socialassist equals 
one for option 1, zero for option 
2.   
Employment History  
Variable emp2011  
How many jobs did you have 
in 2011?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable emphist 
Constructed from the 
following questions:  
- How many jobs did you 
have in 2008?  
- How many jobs did you 
have in 2009?  
- How many jobs did you 
have in 2010?  
- How many jobs did you 
have in 2011?  
Employment History  
Variable emp2011 
What was your main activity status one 
year ago? 
1) Carrying out a job, including unpaid 
work for family business or farm, 
including an apprenticeship or paid 
traineeship etc.  
2) Unemployed  
3) Pupil, student, in further training etc.  
4) In retirement or early retirement 
5) Permanently disabled 
6) Fulfilling domestic tasks  
7) Other inactive person  
Variable emphist 
Have you ever been in a regular 
employment before? (job as employee, 
self-employed, unpaid family member; 
purely occasional jobs or work during 
vacations should not be considered as 
previous work experience) 
1) Yes 
2) No 
 
 
 
Variable emp2011 
UNDP survey: 
The variable emp2011 equals 
one if the respondent was 
employed in 2011, zero 
otherwise. 
 
LFS: 
The variable emp2011 equals 
one for option 1, zero otherwise.   
 
 
Variable emphist 
UNDP survey: 
The variable emphist equals one 
if the respondent has been 
employed at least once during 
period 2008-2011, zero 
otherwise. 
 
LFS: 
The variable emphist equals one 
for option 1 and if the respondent 
has been employed in 2011, zero 
otherwise.   
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Additionally, when constructing the dataset for programme evaluation, it is 
important to acquire information about the pre-treatment employment status variable 
in order to capture whether the two groups followed a similar outcome path prior to 
treatment. The design of the evaluation would be threatened if this is not the case, 
since there is no assurance that the employment path of the two groups would remain 
constant except for the impact of the treatment. Therefore, in order to generate a 
credible programme evaluation, it is necessary to find a control group for which the 
information on their employment status for several periods prior to joining the 
programme is available (typically at least a year and ideally a longer period) 
(Heckman et al., 1999; Card et al., 2011). 
As discussed in section 4.4.1, the labour market history of the pre-treatment period 
has frequently been found to be a good proxy for an individual‘s motivation to find 
employment, their labour market attachment, interpersonal skills and employers‘ 
preference towards certain workers which might affect programme participation. In 
an attempt to capture these unobserved characteristics, two different variables are 
created. As Emsley et al. (2008) suggest, the treatment model should account for as 
many characteristics as possible, even if these factors are not strictly related to the 
treatment selection, in order to improve the prediction of the propensity scores and as 
such to lower the bias.  
Considering the relevance of labour market history variables, we constructed two 
different variables which measure the employment history of the respondents in the 
sample. If an individual from the UNDP dataset claimed that he/she had at least one 
job during 2011 the variable emp2011 takes value of one and takes the value of zero 
if he/she had no job at all during the same year. While if an individual in the LFS 
dataset responded that he/she was carrying out a job, including unpaid work for 
family business or farm etc. then the variable emp2011 takes value of one, otherwise 
it takes a value of zero.  
Also, to construct an additional variable, emphist, the combined responses to the 
following questions in UNDP survey were used: ‗How many jobs did you have in 
2011?... in 2010?... in 2009? …in 2008?‟. If respondent was employed at least once 
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during this period, variable emphist takes value of one while it takes value of zero if 
he/she was unemployed during the whole period. Considering the high long-term 
unemployment rate in Kosovo, one might argue that if a person was unemployed for 
the whole period 2008 to 2011 it is highly unlikely that this person was ever 
employed. Additionally, because the mean age of the sample of participants is about 
26 and that of the control is about 29, a large group of young individuals might have 
not even been economically active 5 years prior to the survey, therefore, treating 
these individuals as unemployed for the whole period prior to the survey is a 
reasonable assumption in this case. To construct this variable for the control group 
from the LFS survey the combined responses to two questions were used. The first 
question, which was addressed only to the unemployed at the time of the survey in 
2012, is: ‗Have you ever been in a regular employment before?‘. If a respondent was 
in regular employment before, the variable emphist takes a value of one, otherwise 
the variable takes a value of zero. Since the first question does not collect 
information from those who were employed at the time of the survey, the second 
question used is the same one used to create the variable emp2011 which is answered 
also by those who were employed at the time of the survey. Bearing in mind that six 
questions are used to create the variable emphist, it is clear that there are 
measurement differences, hence this variable is used only in the first specification 
and the results are interpreted with caution.   
It should also be acknowledged that the LFS questionnaire does not have a question 
as to whether the individual surveyed has participated in any active labour market 
measure. Thus the estimation might induce contamination bias as some members of 
the control group are likely to have been participants of treatment being evaluated 
(Heckman et al. 1999). However, there is no clear suggestion from the studies that 
discussed evaluation methodology on how to proceed in such case. As chapter 1 
explained, the number of people that participated in active measures from 2005 to 
2012 was just 11,154. The argument for using LFS despite missing information 
about ALMP participation is that the number of participants in Kosovo is very small 
compared to more than one 1 million working age population, which is just 0.9 
percent of total working age population (or compared to more than 400 thousand 
people actively seeking work in 2012) (KAS, 2012) making this source of bias 
negligible.   
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After considering all the measurement differences in the two surveys, the following 
section will discuss the model specification for the treatment and outcome models. 
Section 6.4 will present and discuss the empirical findings from the evaluation 
methodology.  
6.3 Model Specification   
This chapter assesses the overall effectiveness of the three active programmes 
described in chapter 5. Following the discussion in section 4.3.2, one of the most 
important points in evaluation methodology is the selection of relevant covariates for 
the treatment assignment model specification. Empirical studies using evaluation 
methodology suggest using a rich set of variables that affect treatment assignment. 
The potential set of variables include baseline covariates which are not influenced or 
modified by treatment, such as age and gender, while another set of variables include 
those that are related to the selection criteria for the treatment assignment. Section 
5.2 provides a more detailed discussion of the selection of individuals into different 
active measures. This discussion suggests that the participants are not randomly 
selected into these programmes which might lead to a potential selection bias. As 
explained in section 4.3.2, controlling for all the relevant variables that affect the 
selection into these active programmes makes the conditional independence 
assumption (CIA)
49
 a reasonable identification strategy. The second assumption of 
the evaluation methods ―require that all characteristic values appearing in the 
treatment group also appear in the control group” (Schmidl, 2014, p. 137)50. 
Considering both assumptions, the choice of variables to be accounted for in both the 
treatment and outcome models will be restricted to those variables that are defined 
(measured) similarly in both the LFS and UNDP datasets.  
In order to satisfy the CIA and considering the selection criteria of participants into 
the programmes, the treatment assignment model accounts for the main relevant 
factors in the selection process. Since active programmes under consideration for this 
analysis are targeted at the young unemployed, the variable age is accounted for in 
                                                          
49
 Also referred to as the un-confoundedness or selection on observables, CIA assumes that there are 
sufficient observable data such that the outcome or the treatment effects are independent from the 
programme participation. Under this assumption, it is assumed that the unobserved characteristics are 
trivial and will not affect the outcome in absence of the treatment.  
50
 This is the assumption of common support or overlapping of the covariates of the participants and 
non-participants. See section 4.3.2 for more details. 
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the treatment model. The descriptive statistics of UNDP data in section 5.3 show that 
the age criterion was not strictly respected and sometimes participants in ALMPs 
were older than 35 in order to increase the number of women or ethnic minorities. 
Taking this into account, both samples are restricted to include individuals of 
working age who are younger than 40 years of age. The treatment model also 
accounts for gender because it was one of the criteria to select the more 
disadvantaged unemployed in the labour market. Individuals receiving social 
assistance and ethnic minorities were also targeted by these programmes considering 
their disadvantage in the labour market. Additionally, an important factor in the 
selection process of these programmes is the education level of participants. The 
OJT programme targeted those unemployed who have completed vocational 
education, the IET targeted those who had not had a chance to start or complete 
vocational education while the IS targeted those who had recently graduated from 
university and had no work experience. To account for the education level, two 
dummy variables are included in the model, secondaryeduc (equals one if individual 
completed secondary education, zero otherwise) and tertiaryeduc (equals one if 
individual completed tertiary education, zero otherwise) while primaryeduc (equals 
one if individual completed primary education, zero otherwise) is the benchmark 
category. As suggested by many studies, individuals‘ labour market history is also 
included in the treatment model since it might capture some unobserved 
characteristics such as motivation, skills and employers‘ preferences towards 
workers with certain characteristics (Heckman et al., 1999; Emsley et al., 2008; 
Kluve et al., 2008; Schmidl, 2014). Variables emp2011 (equals one if individual was 
employed in 2011, zero otherwise) and emphist (equals one if individual was 
employed at least once during the period 2008 to 2011, zero otherwise) are included 
in the treatment model in an attempt to capture these unobserved effects. A variable 
measuring the family size, hhsize, is included in the treatment model since it is 
expected that individuals with larger families are more likely to participate in a 
treatment considering that they might feel more pressured to find employment. An 
interaction between the variable measuring household size and gender is also 
included in the model because it is expected that women are less likely to participate 
in the labour market and in training if the size of their families are large due to caring 
responsibilities.  
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Studies have also emphasised the importance of accounting for regional differences 
since, as explained in section 4.4.1, they capture the local aspects of programme 
implementation, local policies, infrastructure etc. which influence an individual‘s 
decision whether to apply for active programmes. The regional dummy variables, or 
a variable accounting for regional unemployment, are included in the treatment 
model, depending on the size of the sample of the outcome models. Since this 
empirical analysis uses two different outcome models, employed and contract 
(discussed in detail below), the sample for the latter outcome model will be restricted 
to account only for those who are employed. Due to this smaller sample for contract 
model, instead of using regional dummies, regional unemployment rates are included 
to gain more degrees of freedom and improve the balancing of covariates between 
the two groups. 
Similar to the analysis presented in chapter 5, the variable vtcmncp (equals one if 
individual lives in the city where the vocational training centre (VTC) is located) 
was considered to be included in model to account for individuals‘ proximity to the 
vocational training centres. According to Heckman et al., (1999) living closer to 
VTCs reduces commuting costs and other costs related to attending the active 
programmes in the training centres. However, this variable could not be constructed 
for both the treated and control datasets. In section 5.5.2 it is emphasized that firms 
did not have any particular influence on the selection of participants into 
programmes, hence it is considered that the selection bias arising from firms‘ 
preferences is negligible in the context of this analysis. A relevant factor in 
determining an individual‘s programme participation and labour market status is 
nepotism which is considered to be widespread in Kosovo (Corbanese and Rosas, 
2007). The prevailing culture of nepotism in Kosovo might have increased distorted 
selection into the treatment programmes, however no relevant proxy is available in 
either survey.  
Interpersonal skills (which might also capture some unobservable characteristics) 
and an individual‘s health might also be relevant in determining programme 
participation and employment outcome. Neither of the questionnaires provides any 
information about these factors. However, these effects might be captured by 
variables measuring the individuals‘ employment history, emp2011 and emphist. 
Also, some studies point out the importance of accounting for the influence of the 
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behaviour of administrative staff in the employment offices in selecting participants 
into active programmes (see chapter 4). This might capture the closeness of the 
unemployed worker to the employment office and their persistence and motivation to 
remain in the labour market. Considering that the main relevant factors are included 
in the treatment model and assuming that the impact of the variables excluded is 
minimal, then one can assume that CIA is satisfied in the context of this empirical 
analysis.  
Two dependent variables are used in the treatment model. The first one is a binary 
variable which equals 1 if an individual participated in one of the three active 
measures and 0 otherwise. The second is the multivalued variable with four 
categories which equals 0 if an individual is in the control group, equals 1 if he/she 
participated in OJT, equals 2 if he/she participated in IS and equals 3 if he/she 
participated in IET. The model specification for treatment selection is provided in 
the equation below:  
                                                                 
                                                                                  
6.1 
As discussed in section 4.3.4, IPWRA has a double robust property and even if one 
of the models (treatment or outcome) is mis-specified, this estimator will produce 
consistent estimates (Wooldridge, 2009; Emsley et al., 2014). This technique will 
use the following three steps to generate the average treatment effects on the treated. 
The first step is to estimate the parameters of the treatment model and compute 
inverse-probability weights using a multinomial logit model. Using these estimated 
weights, this technique will fit weighted regression models of the outcome for each 
treatment level and will predict treatment specific outcomes for each individual. The 
third step is the computation of the means of treatment predicted outcomes and the 
differences in the means of the treatment effects. 
Model specification for Outcome models – Employment and Employment Contract   
To estimate the overall effectiveness of the active measures, two outcome variables 
are used.  
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- Employment (employed): equals one if the individual was employed at the 
time of the survey, zero otherwise;  
- Employment contract (contract): equals one if the employed individual had a 
signed employment contract at the time of the survey, zero otherwise. 
The following subsection provides the model specification for each of the outcome 
models. Variable description and definitions are presented in table 6.2.  
The variables age and its square term (age and agesq) are included in the model to 
account for a possible non-linear relationship between age and employment. 
Theoretically, age variables tend to capture the experience effect on employment 
probability suggesting that the probability of being employed increases with age, 
reaches a peak and starts to drop after that point. There are empirical studies that 
found evidence that youths are faced with higher levels of economic and social 
uncertainty and hence face a lower likelihood of finding a job, however their 
employment prospects increase with age (Russel and O‘Connell, 2001; Bell and 
Blanchflower, 2015). As discussed in section 5.4, in Kosovo age might not reflect 
the experience considering very high levels of general and long-term unemployment. 
Disadvantaged groups in the labour market are more likely to accept low quality 
jobs, particularly jobs in the informal market. The expectation is that, other factors 
remaining constant, the probability of having an employment contract for a young 
person is low but increases with age. As explained in section 2.5.1, youths in 
transition economies, especially in Kosovo, usually transit from school to low paid 
jobs or informal employment (Corbanese and Rosas, 2007). Bosch and Maloney 
(2010) argue that youths use informal employment as a stepping-stone in the school 
to work transition in order to gain skills that would allow them to get employed in 
the formal sector in the future. Hence, suggesting that the probability of being 
employed in the informal sector is higher for young people but reduces with age. 
Thus, variables age and agesq are included in the employment contract model to 
account for this nonlinear relationship.  
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Table 6.2 Variables, names and specification 
Information category  Specification details Name 
Dependent – Outcome 
variables  
Employment (dummy=1 if the individual was employed 
at the time of the survey) 
Employment contract for the employed (dummy=1 if the 
employee had signed a contract with the employer at the 
time of the survey) 
employed  
 
contract 
Dependent variable of 
the treatment model  
Multivalued treatment (dummy = 0 if the individual is 
part of the control group; 1 if the individual received 
OJT; 2 if the individual received IS; 3  if the individual 
received IET) 
Binary treatment (dummy = 0 if the individual is part of 
the control group; 1 if the individual received any of the 
three active measures) 
mtreatment 
 
 
btreatment 
Socio-demographic 
characteristics  
 
Gender (dummy= 1 if the individual is male)  
Age   
Ethnicity (dummy = 1 if the individual is a member of an 
ethnic minority)  
Received social assistance ( dummy = 1 if the if the 
family of the individual receives social,  disability 
assistance or pension or unemployment benefits)  
Household size (continues variable measured in number 
of the household members) 
gender 
age and agesq 
ethnicity 
 
socialassist 
 
 
hhsize 
Education level  Education level:  
- Four years or primary school completed (dummy=1 
if the individual completed four years, primary 
school or is a high school drop-out) 
- High school completed  (dummy=1 if the individual 
completed high school)  
- University and post-graduate degree  (dummy=1 if 
the individual completed university or post graduate 
studies) 
 
 
primaryeduc 
 
secondaryeduc 
 
tertiaryeduc 
Labour market 
history  
Whether the individual was employed in 2011 (dummy 
=1 if the individual was employed in 2011) 
Whether the individual has been employed at least once 
(dummy = 1 if individual has been employed at least 
once)  
 
emp2011 
 
emphist 
Regional 
characteristics  
Regional dummy variables:  
- Prishtina  
- Mitrovica  
- Gjilan 
- Ferizaj 
- Gjakove 
- Peja  
- Prizren 
 
Regional Unemployment Rate 
 
prishtina 
mitrovica 
gjilani 
ferizaj 
gjakova  
peja 
prizreni 
 
regunmp 
 
A gender variable is included in the model to account for gender differences in the 
probability of being employed. As elaborated in chapter 1, the female unemployment 
rate is substantially higher than that for males. The large employment gender gap in 
Kosovo can be explained by the prevailing social expectations about women. 
Women are more likely to withdraw from labour market due to household and caring 
responsibilities (KAS, 2017). Given this expectation and the prevalent gender 
stereotypes in Kosovo that they are more suitable for certain occupations, employers 
may prefer employing men to employing women. Thus, the expectation is that 
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women have a lower probability of being employed compared to men ceteris 
paribus.  Section 2.4 also emphasised that, in general, marginalised workers, such as 
women, are more likely to participate in the informal labour sector compared their 
counterparts (Chen, 2005; Jackson, 2012).  This is related to social gender identities 
where the male who is the head of the family and has children is considered as the 
breadwinner of the house while women in the same situation are more likely to be 
engaged in vulnerable jobs. However, a report from KAS (2017) suggests that 
women in Kosovo are less likely to engage in informal jobs compared to men, 
however, as pointed out in chapter 5, this is mainly because women are more likely 
to be employed in the public sector. Given that in this sample women are not 
predominantly employed in the public sector, in this empirical analysis employed 
men are expected to be less engaged in the informal sector compared to women, 
other variables remaining constant. 
The relationship between education and labour market performance has been 
theoretically established and analysed empirically by many studies (Becker, 1964; 
Card, 2001; Grossman, 2006; Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2009; Bussemakers, 2017). 
Human capital formation is expected to translate into increased direct productivity, 
hence individuals with higher levels of education are expected to have a higher 
probability of being employed compared to those with lower levels of education, 
other factors remaining constant. Additionally, through the positive effect of income 
returns, education is expected to reduce the necessity to participate in the informal 
sector (Buehn and Farzanegan, 2013). With higher levels of education, employees 
have more bargaining power thus they will be more likely to have an employment 
contract (Heywood and Wei, 2004; Chevalier et al., 2004; Backes-Gellner and 
Werner, 2007; Corbanese and Rosas, 2007). Variables measuring the level of 
completed education secondaryeduc and tertiaryeduc are included in the model to 
account for the effect of education on the probability to be employed and the 
probability of having an employment contract if employed (primaryeduc is left out 
of the outcome regression as a benchmark category).  
It has been widely recognised by empirical studies that ethnic minorities typically 
have lower employment opportunities due to their ethnicity (McCaig and Pavcnik, 
2015). Ethnic minorities face barriers in the labour market due to their different 
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cultural background, different language and other differences which might induce 
discrimination. The variable minority is included in the model in order to account for 
these differences. As explained in more details in section 2.4, ethnic minorities face 
greater barriers to enter the formal sector due to lack of information about vacancies 
in the formal market, lack of social networks and other related factors (Julia et al., 
2015). They are also more likely to face barriers to professional advancement in their 
existing jobs and improving their employment status from informal to formal status 
(McGovern et al., 2004; Julia et al., 2015). Therefore, the expectation is that ethnic 
minorities, if employed, will be less likely to have an employment contract, ceteris 
paribus.  
According to a number of empirical studies, if an individual‘s family receives social 
assistance, he/she is associated with a lower probability of participating in the labour 
market and as consequence a lower employment probability (Moffit, 2002; Farber 
and Valletta, 2015). There is disincentive for individual to find employment with 
higher levels of unemployment benefits and also benefits that cover long periods of 
unemployment (Nickell, 1997). Considering that in Kosovo the level of social 
assistance is quite low it is unclear whether it influences one‘s decision to join the 
labour force. Thus, the impact of variable socassist on the probability of being 
employed in the context of this analysis is ambiguous. In a study by World Bank 
(2015), receiving social assistance was found to increase the probability of actively 
searching for jobs in the informal market, hence they might feel pressured to be 
employed regardless of work conditions. With regard to the impact of this variable 
on the probability of having an employment contract, it is expected that if the family 
receives social assistance, the person is more likely to be employed in the informal 
sector rather than in formal one in order to continue to claim the social assistance, 
however small in the case of Kosovo. 
The importance of accounting for an individual‘s labour market status history has 
been emphasised by many studies (Rodrigues-Planas and Benus, 2006; Kluve et al., 
2008; Schmidl, 2014). Moreover, these empirical studies have highlighted that when 
an individual‘s status history is not accounted for in evaluations of ALMPs, the true 
effect of these policies cannot be estimated. An individual‘s labour market history is 
a relevant variable since it captures the unobservable characteristics of the individual 
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such as motivation to find a job, non-schooling human capital and preference of 
firms towards specific potential workers (the review of literature in section 4.4.2 
provides more discussion about the importance of this variable). To account for the 
above mentioned effects two variables, emp2011 and emphist, are again included in 
the employment contract outcome model. It is expected that an individual who was 
employed during 2011 or at least once during period 2008-2011, other variables 
remaining constant, will have higher a probability of being employed in 2012 
compared to their counterparts who were unemployed in those years.  Also, if 
employed in 2012, it is anticipated that those employed during 2011 or at least once 
during period 2008-2011 will be more likely to be employed in the formal market, 
i.e. more likely to have an employment contract, compared to individuals who were 
unemployed.  
The place of residence is a relevant variable to account for the differences in the 
demand and supply for labour in different regions. The regional differences are 
expected to arise due to variations in regional unemployment rates, in regional 
economic growth, total job opportunities and alternative jobs available in local 
labour markets. To assess the regional effect on the employment probability six 
dummy variables are included which represent the seven regions of Kosovo 
(Mitrovica, Gjilan, Ferizaj, Gjakove, Peja and Prizren), while the capital Prishtina is 
the benchmark category. The expectation is that individuals living in Prishtina, the 
capital city of Kosovo, will have a higher probability of being employed compared to 
those living in other regions due to their greater employment opportunities, lower 
commuting costs and better care facilities for children and elderly. In the contract 
model a variable measuring the regional unemployment rates is included instead 
because of a smaller sample and in order to gain more degrees of freedom. Other 
factors remaining constant, it is expected that regions with a higher unemployment 
rate increase an individual‘s probability of being employed in the informal sector.  
A potentially important determinant of the future employment status is the household 
size, hence a variable accounting for family size, hhsize, is included in the model. In 
the context of Kosovo where public and private childcare facilities are scarce and 
expensive, it is expected that a larger household will increase a women‘s 
participation in the labour market and might also increase the probability of being 
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employed. However, this depends on the health of the elderly in the family who 
alternatively might need to be taken care of. In order to observe the impact of family 
size on the probability of women‘s employment an interaction between household 
size and gender is included in the model, hhsizegen. The final specifications from 
outcome models, employed and contract are presented below: 
         
                                                           
                                                                   6.2 
                                                                    
                                                                     6.3 
The following section will discuss the descriptive statistics of the covariates for the 
treated and control groups and will present empirical evidence of the treatment 
effects of the binary and multivalued treatment models using different estimation 
techniques.   
6.4 Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Results   
The descriptive statistics for the covariate variables are presented in table 6.3. The 
control group sample is much larger compared to the sample of three active 
measures with 6,906 observations for outcome variable employed and 2,943 for 
observations for outcome variable contract. When initially comparing the means of 
the variables between each active measure and the control group, the differences 
were quite substantial for some variables. Considering that the selection criteria for 
active measures were being young and unemployed the control sample was adjusted 
to account only for individuals within the same age range as that in the treated group. 
As explained in section 6.2, age is restricted to account for individuals of working 
age younger than 40 years of age. In this case, just 12 observations from the 
treatment group (individuals older than 40) are dropped from the sample
51
. Table 6.3 
indicates that the mean of age is lower for the treated with an average of 26 years of 
age compared to the control group with more than 29 years on average.  The mean 
                                                          
51
  The decision to restrict the age at 40 (rather than at 35 as per the programmes‘ eligibility criteria) 
was used in order not to reduce the sample for the treatment group further, as it is crucial to have as 
many treated individuals in the sample as possible.  
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values for the covariates do not show large differences except for the gender 
variable. After excluding the inactive individuals from the sample, the gender 
balance in the control group differs from that of the treatment group: the former is 75 
percent male compared to 47 to 54 percent in the treatment samples.  
Observational data covariates must be balanced either by matching or by weighting 
since, as explained in section 6.3, treatment assignment is related to specific 
covariates which consequently might affect the outcome results. The methodology 
used has to balance the observable characteristics between treated and control 
individuals thus a balancing check will be performed in order to assess whether these 
differences in means will be a problem.  
 
Table 6.3 Descriptive statistics for treated group (OJT, IS and IET) and control 
group 
Because the aim of this chapter is to assess the outcome state of participants in 
ALMPs compared to the outcome state of the control individuals, initially the 
analysis will estimate a binary treatment model where the treatment dependent 
  OJT IET IS Control group 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Outcome Dependent 
Variables         
employed  470 0.447 241 0.390 136 0.316 6,906 0.567 
contract 192 0.698 85 0.788 41 0.732 2,943 0.850 
Covariates 
        age 470 26.27 241 26.50 136 26.51 6,906 29.41 
agesq 470 702.5 241 715.4 136 713.7 6,906 902.9 
male 470 0.540 241 0.548 136 0.478 6,906 0.748 
socialassist 470 0.083 241 0.120 136 0.074 6,906 0.011 
minority 470 0.064 241 0.083 136 0.081 6,906 0.063 
secondaryeduc 470 0.398 241 0.427 136 0.434 6,906 0.627 
tertiaryeduc 470 0.421 241 0.415 136 0.353 6,906 0.152 
hhsize 470 6.226 241 6.071 136 6.022 6,906 7.716 
hhsizegen 470 3.366 241 3.369 136 3.118 6,906 5.775 
emp2011 470 0.343 241 0.303 136 0.338 6,906 0.577 
emphist 470 0.579 241 0.506 136 0.684 6,906 0.614 
gjakova 470 0.145 241 0.145 136 0.052 6,906 0.121 
gjilani 470 0.206 241 0.199 136 0.257 6,906 0.063 
mitrovica 470 0.134 241 0.166 136 0.059 6,906 0.096 
peja 470 0.109 241 0.154 136 0.066 6,906 0.136 
prizreni 470 0.162 241 0.104 136 0.125 6,906 0.163 
ferizaj 470 0.113 241 0.149 136 0.132 6,906 0.123 
prishtina 470 0.132 241 0.083 136 0.309 6,906 0.298 
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variable equals 1 if the individual was a participant and 0 if he/she is in the control 
group. Secondly, the multivalued treatment model will be used to assess the 
effectiveness of each active programmes, OJT, IS and IET, relative to being a non-
participant. Both sets of estimations will use the following estimation techniques 
Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW), Regression Adjustment (RA), and the doubly 
robust estimator Inverse Probability Weighting - Regression Adjustment (IPWRA) 
because these methods allow for both binary and multivalued treatment models. For 
the binary treatment model Propensity Score Matching (PSM) with nearest 
neighbour will also be used (PSM uses a binary treatment model only, hence it 
cannot be used for multivalued treatment).  
The fundamental evaluation problem is the construction of appropriate 
counterfactuals because an individual cannot be in both states, with and without 
treatment. Studies using propensity score methods have usually estimated the 
Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATET). ATET estimates the outcome of 
the treated individuals had they not been treated by any active measures. Section 4.2 
has provided a more detailed discussion of the evaluation problem and appropriate 
counterfactuals.  
The balancing diagnostics are provided before estimation results. For models using 
PSM, the following diagnostics are presented: standardized differences in means 
after matching, kernel density plots and propensity score plots. For models using 
IPW and IPWRA only standardized differences in means after weighting are 
presented, since kernel density plots are generated only for specific covariates while 
propensity score balance box plots can be generated only for models using PSM. 
Since both IPW and IPWRA use the same treatment model to generate weights their 
diagnostics are exactly the same, only one diagnostic will be presented for both 
techniques. RA estimation cannot generate any balancing diagnostics because this 
technique does not use a treatment assignment model, thus it does not use weighting 
nor matching methods but only uses the outcome model to generate the treatment 
effects. The differences in variance ratios before and after matching/weighting for all 
models are presented in Appendices A6.3 to A6.5. According to Rubin (2008), a 
perfectly balanced covariate has a mean standardized difference of zero while the 
acceptable threshold is the standardised difference of 0.25.   
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Evidence using the outcome dependent variable Employed 
The balancing diagnostics for the outcome variable employed presented in table 6.4 
suggest that the covariates have been balanced. The weighted standardised 
differences in means are all below the threshold of 0.25. The kernel density plots, 
which graph the model-adjusted estimated probability density functions of 
covariates, and diagnostics, which use box plots to verify whether the covariates are 
approximately equal, are presented in figure 6.1. The graphs show the kernel density 
functions and the box plots for PSM model before and after matching which suggest 
that the covariates have been balanced after matching. Therefore, one can conclude 
that the estimation techniques applied to the datasets achieve well-balanced 
covariates of the treated and control for treatment models.  
 
Table 6.4 Weighted standardized differences in the means of the characteristics of 
treated and control in a binary and multivalued treatment model using PSM and 
IPWRA. 
  Binary treatment Multivalued treatment 
Outcome variable 
employed 
PSM IPWRA IPWRA 
  ATET ATET   ATET    
  
Treated vs. 
Control 
Treated vs. 
Control 
OJT vs. 
Control 
IS vs. 
Control 
IET vs. 
Control 
age -0.076 -0.081 -0.077 -0.062 -0.001 
agesq -0.078 -0.080 -0.077 -0.067 -0.004 
gender   0.047 0.039 0.039 0.051 0.128 
minority 0.099 0.016 0.018 0.014 -0.040 
socialassist      0.161 0.163 0.160 0.183 0.173 
secondaryeduc  0.072 0.067 0.058 0.071 0.116 
tertiaryeduc  -0.086 -0.086 -0.076 -0.095 -0.138 
emp2011        0.023 0.011 0.004 0.031 -0.047 
emphist -0.058 -0.031 -0.024 -0.033 0.042 
hhsize -0.057 -0.031 -0.034 -0.071 -0.050 
hhsizegen  0.027 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.042 
ferizaj   -0.042 -0.005 -0.007 -0.034 -0.024 
gjakova    0.149 0.053 0.057 0.073 0.071 
gjilani    -0.070 -0.064 -0.071 -0.037 -0.070 
mitrovica  0.065 0.043 0.038 0.048 0.013 
peja   -0.061 -0.021 -0.021 -0.001 0.003 
prizreni  0.060 0.054 0.052 0.002 0.005 
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Figure 6.1 Kernel density and box plot using PSM for outcome model employed 
 
 
The estimated average treatment effects on treated (ATET) using the binary and 
multivalued treatment model are presented in tables 6.5 to 6.8 (see Appendices tables 
6.1 to 6.4). Initially, all variables discussed as relevant in section 6.3 are included in 
the model and the same sample is used for subsequent estimations. The complexity 
of how variable emphist is constructed, using two different questions for the control 
group and four different questions for the treatment group, is likely to create a 
measurement error because it is unable to capture individuals‘ potential employment 
prior to 2011. Because of this, the second set of estimations excludes the emphist 
variable and includes only emp2011 (the results are presented in table 6.6). In order 
to observe whether the employment history variables have a predictive power for the 
treatment effects, both employment history variables are excluded from the 
estimations presented in table 6.7. Additionally, arguing that the effectiveness of the 
policies might be underestimated because the dependent variable employed captures 
only those who are employed in 2012, an additional dependent variable was 
constructed, emp1112 (the period after the treatment), which equals one if the 
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individual was employed in either 2011 or 2012 years and zero otherwise. The 
estimated results using this outcome dependent variable are presented in table 6.8.  
Taking into consideration the doubly robust property of IPWRA, only results from 
this approach will be interpreted. The coefficients of the ATET in the first and 
second specification (tables 6.5 and 6.6) where at least one of the employment 
history variables are accounted for, suggest a significant positive effect of the active 
measures in the binary treatment model. The results from the specification 1 (where 
emp2011 and emphist are included) suggest that participating in one of the active 
measures increases an individual‘s probability of being employed by 7.25 percentage 
points above the average of similar individuals had they not been participants, other 
factors remaining constant. The ATET from the multivalued treatment effect suggest 
that participating in OJT and IS increases an individual‘s probability of being 
employed by 9.91 pp and 8.79 pp respectively, above the average of similar 
individuals had they not been participants, other factors remaining constant. The 
ATET coefficient of the IET is insignificant. The results are very similar for 
specification 2 (where only emp2011 is included), but with only slightly larger 
estimated coefficients. 
When none of the employment history variables are included the estimated results 
suggest a significant negative effect of participation in each of these programmes. It 
appears that the negative treatment effects are due to omitted variable bias, since 
they disappear when employment history is controlled for. This result suggests the 
importance of controlling for employment history, which can in turn also capture 
unobserved beneficiary characteristics. The coefficient of the average treatment 
effects of IET is significant and negative only in specifications 3 (where emp2011 
and emphist are excluded) and 4 (where the dependent variable is emp1112).  
Participating in one of the active measures reduces an individuals‘ probability of 
being employed by 5.6 pp below the average of similar individuals in the control 
group, other factors remaining constant. The results from the multivalued treatment 
model suggest a significant negative treatment effect for IS and IET participants by 6 
pp and 19.8 pp, respectively, other factors remaining constant. The results for 
specification 4 (using the dependent variable emp1112) suggest a positive treatment 
effect only when using PSM. The results of the binary model from other techniques 
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are insignificant. The results from the multivalued treatment are more consistent 
across different methods; however, the OJT coefficient is significant only when 
using the IPWRA. The results from IPWRA suggest that participating in OJT 
increases the probability of being employed after treatment (in 2011 or 2012) by 4.6 
pp above the average of similar individuals who had not participated in OJT, other 
factors remaining constant. The treatment effect for IET is negative, suggesting that 
having participated in IET reduces the probability of being employed after treatment 
by 13.2 pp below the average of similar individuals in the control group, other 
factors remaining constant.  
 
Table 6.5 Specification 1- including both employment history variable emp2011 and 
emphist. Average treatment effects on treated (ATET) and Potential Outcome Means 
(PoMean) for outcome model employed. 
 
PSM IPW RA IPWRA 
 ATET ATET PoMean ATET PoMean ATET PoMean 
Treated vs. 
Control 0.073*** 0.079***   0.069***   0.073***   
  (0.025) (0.020)   (0.017)   (0.018)   
Control     0.331***   0.340***   0.337*** 
      (0.019)   (0.016)   (0.017) 
 
              
OJT vs. Control   0.102***   0.095***   0.099***   
    (0.027)   (0.024)   (0.024)   
IS vs. Control   0.094***   0.087***   0.088***   
    (0.033)   (0.030)   (0.030)   
IET vs. Control   -0.067   -0.043   -0.053   
    (0.042)   (0.039)   (0.041)   
Control     0.344***   0.351***   0.348*** 
 
    (0.024)   (0.021)   (0.022) 
 
              
Observations 7,753 7,753 7,753 7,753 7,753 7,753 7,753 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.6 Specification 2 – including only emp2011 variable. Average treatment 
effects on treated (ATET) and Potential Outcome Means (PoMean) for outcome 
model employed. 
 
PSM IPW RA IPWRA 
 ATET ATET PoMean ATET PoMean ATET PoMean 
Treated vs. 
Control 0.067*** 0.079***   0.075***   0.080*** 
   (0.025) (0.018)   (0.017) 
 
(0.017) 
 Control     0.330*** 
 
0.334*** 
 
0.329*** 
      (0.014)   (0.016)   (0.016) 
        
  
  
 OJT vs. Control   0.105***   0.101*** 
 
0.106*** 
     (0.024)   (0.024) 
 
(0.024) 
 IS vs. Control   0.089***   0.081*** 
 
0.083*** 
     (0.032)   (0.029) 
 
(0.029) 
 IET vs. Control   -0.062   -0.035 
 
-0.044 
     (0.041)   (0.037) 
 
(0.035) 
 Control     0.342*** 
 
0.345*** 
 
0.340*** 
      (0.022) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.021) 
        
  
  
 Observations 7,753 7,753 7,753 7,753 7,753 7,753 7,753 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6.7 Specification 3 - both employment history variables emp2011 and emphist 
are excluded.  Average treatment effects on treated (ATET) and Potential Outcome 
Means (PoMean) for outcome model employed. 
 
PSM IPW RA IPWRA 
 ATET ATET PoMean ATET PoMean ATET PoMean 
Treated vs. 
Control -0.120*** -0.079***   -0.084***   -0.057***   
  (0.027) (0.021) 
 
(0.019)   (0.020)   
Control   
 
0.489***   0.494***   0.466*** 
      (0.014)   (0.012)   (0.0139) 
    
  
        
OJT vs. Control   -0.046* 
 
-0.051**   -0.026   
    (0.026) 
 
(0.025)   (0.026)   
IS vs. Control   -0.076** 
 
-0.084**   -0.060*   
    (0.035) 
 
(0.034)   (0.035)   
IET vs. Control   -0.223*** 
 
-0.229***   -0.198***   
    (0.045) 
 
(0.043)   (0.042)   
Control   
 
0.493***   0.498***   0.472*** 
    
 
(0.015)   (0.014)   (0.015) 
 
  
  
        
Observations 7,753 7,753 7,753 7,753 7,753 7,753 7,753 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.8 Specification 4 - both employment history variables emp2011 and emphist 
are excluded. Average treatment effects on treated (ATET) and Potential Outcome 
Means (PoMean) for outcome model emp1112. 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
A relevant point worth emphasising is that when both employment history variables 
are excluded from the model, the results indicate a significant negative treatment 
effect. This might suggest that the employment history variables, emp2011 and 
emphist are likely to capture individuals‘ unobservable characteristics which might 
affect the outcome and the treatment selection. As discussed in section 6.2, the 
individual‘s pre-treatment employment history would have been ideal to capture the 
unobservable effects and to create more comparable matches, however this variable 
was not available for the control group. Also, the questionnaire for the control group 
does not provide any information about participation of individuals in this group in 
any active measure. Even though, the participation in ALMPs in Kosovo might be 
small compared to the working age population or the labour force size, to some 
extent it still might have affected the estimated results.  
Bearing in mind that the dataset used for this empirical analysis is constructed from 
two different sources for control and treatment groups and since the variables are 
constructed from different questions, the dataset is likely to contain measurement 
errors which might impose bias on the estimates. Therefore, one should not be hasty 
 
PSM IPW RA IPWRA 
 ATET ATET PoMean ATET PoMean ATET PoMean 
Treated vs. 
Control -0.054** -0.018   -0.020   0.006   
  (0.028) (0.021)   (0.0199)   (0.021)   
Control     0.507***   0.509***   0.483*** 
      (0.014)   (0.012)   (0.014) 
                
OJT vs. Control   0.026   0.023   0.047*   
    (0.026)   (0.025)   (0.026)   
IS vs. Control   -0.031   -0.032   -0.009   
    (0.036)   (0.035)   (0.035)   
IET vs. Control   -0.154***   -0.162***   -0.132***   
    (0.049)   (0.046)   (0.045)   
Control     0.511***   0.514***   0.489*** 
      (0.016)   (0.014)   (0.016) 
                
Observations 7,753 7,753 7,753 7,753 7,753 7,753 7,753 
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to draw any definite conclusions about the effectiveness of these ALMPs with regard 
to participants‘ employment probability for the case of Kosovo.  
Evidence using the outcome dependent variable Contract 
The next set estimations will use the second outcome dependent variable, contract, 
to evaluate the effectiveness of active measures in acquiring employment in the 
formal sector. The initial model specification included all variables discussed in the 
specification for the contract model in section 6.3. However, since including all the 
variables discussed imposes an imbalance in the propensity scores between the two 
groups, the dummy variables measuring the regional differences are replaced with a 
variable measuring the regional unemployment rate. The variable emphist is dropped 
from the model because it imposes imbalance on other covariates (the estimated 
model and balancing diagnostics including variable emphist and regional dummy 
variables are presented in Appendix table 6.5.1).  
The balancing diagnostics are presented in table 6.9 and figure 6.2. The figure 6.2 
presenting the kernel density plots and box plots of PSM model before and after 
matching suggests that the covariates have been balanced after matching. However, 
as figure 6.2 shows, it is worth pointing out that the propensity scores higher than 0.6 
tend to be less balanced.   
Figure 6.2 Kernel density and box plot using PSM for the outcome model contract 
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Table 6.9 Weighted standardized differences in means of the characteristics of 
treated and control in a binary and multivalued treatment model using PSM and 
IPWRA. 
  Binary treatment Multivalued treatment 
Outcome variable 
contract  
PSM IPWRA IPWRA 
  ATET ATET   ATET    
  
Treated vs. 
Control 
Treated vs. 
Control 
OJT vs. 
Control 
IS vs. 
Control 
IET vs. 
Control 
age 0.069 -0.010 0.001 0.026 0.196 
agesq 0.062 -0.010 0.0002 0.029 0.201 
gender   0.032 -0.057 -0.054 -0.070 0.197 
minority -0.078 0.011 -0.004 -0.030 -0.173 
socialassist      0.027 0.018 0.040 0.028 -0.318 
secondaryeduc  0.046 0.003 -0.005 -0.056 -0.078 
tertiaryeduc  0.038 0.066 0.069 0.119 0.218 
emp2011        0.066 0.027 0.004 -0.052 0.214 
hhsize 0.040 -0.027 -0.027 0.007 -0.106 
hhsizegen  0.070 -0.050 -0.047 -0.035 0.088 
regunmp -0.053 0.038 0.047 0.064 -0.035 
            
 
 
Table 6.9 presents the balancing diagnostics for the outcome variable contract for 
PSM and IPWRA which suggests that the covariates are balanced between treatment 
and control group. The weighted standardised differences in means for covariates of 
the IET vs. Control are higher compared to OJT and IS vs. Control, however only 
the variable socialassist passes the threshold of 0.25 (it is highlighted in table 6.9). 
Nevertheless, since it is the only variable that is above the threshold it is not 
expected to significantly influence the outcome results. Considering that a balance of 
the covariates between the groups is a prerequisite for high-quality matching 
(weighting), only specifications with the balanced covariates will be discussed and 
interpreted. 
The results from ATET for the outcome variable contract are presented in table 6.10 
(see Appendices 6.5 and 6.6). The results are consistent in terms of the sign of the 
coefficients when using different estimation techniques. However, when using only 
the treatment model (PSM and IPW), the ATET seems to be underestimated while 
when using only the outcome model (RA), the ATET seem to be overestimated. The 
IPWRA estimated treatment effects using the binary treatment model suggest that an 
employed participant from one of the active programmes has a 9.2 pp lower 
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probability of having a contract compared to the average of similar individuals who 
had not participated in any of the active programmes, other factors remaining 
constant. The IPWRA results using the multivalued treatment model indicate that the 
treatment effects is significant and negative only for the OJT participation. The result 
suggests that a participant in OJT, if employed, is less likely to have an employment 
contract by 12.5 pp below the average of similar individuals in the control group, 
other factors remaining constant. Though insignificant, the treatment effects for IET 
and IS are also negative.  
Table 6.10 Specification 1 – using emp2011. Average treatment effects on treated 
(ATET) and Potential Outcome Means (PoMean) for outcome model contract. 
  PSM IPW RA IPWRA 
  ATET ATET PoMean ATET PoMean ATET PoMean 
Binary treatment model                
Treated vs. Control -0.081** -0.053*   -0.104***   -0.092***   
  (0.034) (0.029)   (0.026)   (0.026)   
Control 
 
  0.780***   0.830*** 
 
0.818*** 
      (0.021)   (0.013)   (0.014) 
Multivalued treatment 
model            
 
  
OJT vs. Control   -0.089**   -0.134***   -0.125***   
    (0.036)   (0.033)   (0.033)   
IS vs. Control   0.037   -0.025   -0.009   
    (0.042)   (0.045)   (0.043)   
IET vs. Control   -0.044   -0.114   -0.059   
    (0.128)   (0.084)   (0.056)   
Control     0.787***   0.832*** 
 
0.823*** 
      (0.023)   (0.015) 
 
(0.016) 
            
 
  
Observations   4,023 4,023 4,023 4,023 4,023 4,023 
In the second specification, where the emp2011 is excluded from the model, the 
estimated results shown in table 6.11 are very similar to those of the previous one. 
An exception is that when using the RA method the treatment effect for IET 
becomes significant thus for an employed individual, participating in IET reduces an 
individuals‘ probability of having a contract by 11.6 pp below the average of similar 
individuals in the control group. The treatment effects from IPWRA in the second 
specification are slightly higher compared to the first one, however the difference is 
negligible. Considering that the sample for the outcome variable contract is 
restricted to employed individuals only, controlling for employment history seems to 
have no significant impact on the probability post-treatment of an employed 
individual having a contract. 
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Table 6.11 Specification 2 – excluding emp2011. Average treatment effects on 
treated (ATET) and Potential Outcome Means (PoMean) for the outcome model 
contract. 
  PSM IPW RA IPWRA 
  ATET ATET PoMean ATET PoMean ATET PoMean 
Binary treatment model            
 
  
Treated vs. Control -0.089*** -0.079***   -0.116***   -0.095***   
  (0.033) (0.0271)   (0.024)   (0.025)   
Control     0.806***   0.842*** 
 
0.821*** 
      (0.0167)   (0.011)   (0.0133) 
Multivalued treatment 
model            
 
  
OJT vs. Control   -0.121***   -0.154***   -0.134***   
    (0.033)   (0.031)   (0.032)   
IS vs. Control   0.001   -0.046   -0.022   
    (0.041)   (0.045)   (0.043)   
IET vs. Control   -0.042   -0.128*   -0.111   
    (0.086)   (0.0719)   (0.069)   
Control     0.819***   0.852*** 
 
0.832*** 
      (0.0179)   (0.013) 
 
(0.015) 
            
 
  
Observations 4,034 4,034 4,034 4,034 4,034 4,034 4,034 
 
6.5 Conclusions  
This chapter has focused on analysing the effectiveness of three different ALMPs 
implemented in Kosovo during the period 2008 to 2010: OJT, IET and IS. The 
effectiveness of these ALMPs has been analysed using several evaluation techniques 
to estimate the treatment effects in binary and multivalued treatment models. 
Following a discussion about selection bias in chapter 4 and the pre-determined 
selection criteria to participate in the above-mentioned active measures, the 
treatment model was specified to adjust for potential selection bias.   
After achieving a balance of the propensity scores between the treatment and control 
groups, when using the same specification and assuming that all relevant variables 
are included in the model all estimation techniques arrive at a broadly similar 
conclusion. Because it is uncertain which of the models is correctly specified, from a 
practical standpoint, a doubly robust estimator was utilised because it increases the 
likelihood of estimating accurate treatment effects. Hence, only the results from 
IPWRA are discussed.  
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Depending on the model specification, the empirical findings from the analysis 
presented in this chapter suggest mixed results for the effectiveness of the active 
measures. The results suggest that participating in OJT and IS are associated with an 
increase in the probability of being employed compared to not participating in any 
active measure.  The treatment effect of IET is negative when employment history is 
not controlled for, but becomes insignificant when accounting for employment 
history variables, suggesting that this result could be driven by omitted variable bias. 
The change in sign of the treatment effects after including the employment history 
variable indicate the importance of this variable which is in line with the findings of 
other evaluation studies reviewed in chapter 4. In addition to the findings from the 
employment probability model, the empirical findings from the binary treatment 
model suggest that participating in active measures is associated with employment in 
the informal sector. Furthermore, the evidence from the multivalued treatment model 
indicates that this effect derives predominantly from participating in the OJT. This 
empirical evidence might suggest that when labour market is characterised by low 
employment opportunities in the formal sector, ALMPs increase the probability of 
individuals post-treatment being engaged in the informal labour market.  
However, the assumption of selection of unobservables (CIA) might have not been 
satisfied in this analysis since crucial factors influencing the selection into treatment, 
such as a pre-treatment employment history, could not be accounted for. The 
limitations of this empirical analysis also include the measurement errors caused by 
the different data sources used for treatment and control group. In the absence of a 
control group derived from the same source as that for treatment, this empirical 
analysis was compelled to construct a control group from an alternative source, the 
LFS. This is considered the most profound limitation of this empirical analysis since 
the questions in the two surveys are phrased differently thus creating measurement 
errors. Another relevant limitation of this analysis is the unavailability of 
information on whether individuals in the control group have participated in any 
ALMP at some point before year 2012, creating a specific bias in the estimates. 
Given the limitations presented, the estimated treatment effects could not be used as 
a convincing basis for drawing firm conclusions about the effectiveness of these 
ALMPs.  
 
258 
 
 
7 Chapter 7 
 
 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
   
7.1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 259 
7.2 Main Empirical Findings ........................................................................... 261 
7.3 Contribution to Knowledge ....................................................................... 271 
7.4 Policy Implications .................................................................................... 273 
7.5 Limitations and Future Work .................................................................... 277 
  
259 
 
7.1 Introduction  
The aim of this thesis was to empirically investigate the effectiveness of ALMPs in 
reducing unemployment in European transition economies (ETEs), in the context of 
labour markets with large informal sectors. Given that increasing unemployment 
became a persistent feature in most of the transition economies during the transition 
period, one of the objectives of the first chapter of this thesis was to discuss the rise 
and consequences of unemployment. Considering these high rates of unemployment, 
the first chapter also emphasised the potential importance of labour market policies, 
in particular ALMPs, in reducing unemployment. Following the discussion of the 
context analysis in chapter 1, this thesis had six inter related objectives:  
1. To provide a comprehensive and critical review of the theoretical framework 
of unemployment and the multiple effects of ALMPs in reducing it; 
2. To provide a critical review of the empirical studies analysing the 
effectiveness of ALMPs in European Transition and Non-Transition 
economies;  
3. To empirically analyse the effectiveness of ALMP expenditure as share of 
GDP in reducing unemployment at the economy-wide level in European 
transition and non-transition economies; 
4. To critically review different evaluation methodologies and empirical studies 
analysing the ALMP effectiveness at the individual level in addressing the 
issues of the missing counterfactual and selection bias; 
5. To empirically evaluate the overall and relative effectiveness of three active 
measures implemented in Kosovo: On-the-Job Training, Institution and 
Enterprise Training and Internship Scheme on finding employment, 
searching for jobs and, conditional on being employed, having an 
employment contract; 
6. To synthesise policy recommendations for improving the effectiveness of 
these policies as a tool to reduce unemployment among vulnerable groups 
such as youths and the low-skilled unemployed. 
The second chapter established the theoretical framework to analyse the 
effectiveness of ALMPs. Since the theoretical framework developed for the Western 
economies is not fully appropriate in context of transition economies, the second 
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chapter further established the theoretical relationship between the effectiveness of 
ALMPs and the size of the informal sector based on a review of the Layard, Nickell 
and Jackman (1991) and Snower (1994) models. Having found no consensus after a 
review of the empirical studies for transition economies the initial research question 
was formulated: whether ALMPs in European transition and non-transition 
economies are effective in reducing unemployment at the economy-wide level. This 
research question was addressed in chapter 3 using two methodologies: a matching 
function using a static panel model to assess the matching efficiency between the 
stock of unemployed and vacancies and a dynamic panel model to investigate the 
effect of ALMPs on reducing the unemployment rate. Because of data limitations, 
the analysis was extended to include European non-transition economies in order to 
achieve more reliable results.   
Following a critical analysis of the effectiveness of ALMPs at the national level, the 
next research question was to investigate the relative effectiveness of three specific 
active labour market policies in Kosovo in increasing an individual’s employment 
probability, the probability of unemployed of increasing active job search and the 
probability those in employment of having a contract. In chapter 4 the evaluation 
and selection problems which can arise when evaluating the effectiveness of ALMPs 
at the individual level were discussed and the most appropriate methodologies to 
address these issues were considered. The empirical studies of the effectiveness of 
ALMPs at the individual level for transition economies, reviewed in chapter 4, had 
reached no definite conclusion. Hence, an empirical investigation was conducted in 
chapter 5, focused on addressing the second research question using a cross-section 
dataset for Kosovo employing two different methodologies: Multinomial Probit and 
to address the selection bias, Inverse Probability Weighting – Regression Adjustment 
(IPWRA). After assessing the relative performance of active policies, the final 
research question was to empirically investigate the overall effectiveness of the 
three active policies analysed in chapter 5 in increasing employment probability 
and the probability of having an employment contract. This investigation was 
conducted in chapter 6 using the same dataset as in the previous chapter and also 
using an additional dataset to construct the control group to assess whether the 
ALMP participants achieved a better performance in the labour market compared to 
that of non-participants.  
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This chapter will discuss the main findings of this research and synthesise the 
contribution to knowledge resulting from the empirical analysis. It will further 
examine the policy implications of the main findings and provide a discussion of the 
main limitations which have constrained the research analysis and how these may be 
addressed in future research work. This chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 
presents the main empirical findings of the thesis with regard to the research 
questions presented above while section 7.3 provides a discussion on the main 
contribution to knowledge. Section 7.4 develops the policy implications resulting 
from the main findings of this research project. Section 7.5 discusses the limitations 
that have been encountered while conducting the empirical analysis and provides 
recommendations for further research in the future. 
7.2 Main Empirical Findings  
The discussion of the context of this research programme in the introductory chapter 
examined the state of the labour markets in European transition and non-transition 
economies, with a particular focus on Kosovo. The aim of this chapter was to 
analyse the differences in the labour market indicators of European transition 
economies compared to non-transition economies. The first chapter and section 2.3 
established that the dramatic initial output collapse and the shift from the rigid labour 
markets of the central planning to market planning system were the main causes of 
the high rates of unemployment in early transition. The analysis of chapter 1 
revealed that there is a substantial difference in the ALMP expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP between the transition and non-transition countries. Regardless 
of their generally high rates of unemployment, the spending on ALMP in European 
transition economies is comparable only to the lowest spenders in European non-
transition economies. Balkan countries allocate an even lower amount of expenditure 
on ALMPs despite increases in recent years. After the global financial crisis, 
expenditure on ALMPs increased in EU countries but remained, on average, constant 
after the 2012 for both sets of countries.  
Following this discussion, chapter 2 addressed the first objective of this research 
project by critically analysing the theoretical framework through which the ALMP 
effectiveness could be evaluated. This chapter initially evaluated the NAIRU 
framework developed by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) which has been used 
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as a basis for analysing the effectiveness of the ALMPs in Western countries. 
However, given the specific nature of labour markets in transition economies this 
theoretical framework was not considered to be completely appropriate for this 
investigation. The labour market in transition economies was argued to be 
characterised by multiple equilibria. In its simplest form, based on a model by 
Snower (1994), the equilibrium initially predominant in transition economies was 
argued to be a ‗low-skill bad-job equilibrium‘ with low productivity workers, 
insufficient human capital and low wages because of scarce vacancies for skilled 
jobs. One of the initial findings of this research was that in many ETEs the bad-job 
equilibrium has been associated with a large informal labour market. This chapter 
also provided a concise and critical assessment of the mechanisms through which 
ALMPs could incentivise informal employers to switch to the formal sector. It is 
argued that the effect of ALMPs on the firm is similar to reduction in their labour 
costs. As examined in chapter 2, in a demand-constrained labour market (as that in 
many transition economies), a reduction in labour costs can increase the 
employment. The second objective of the thesis is also addressed in this chapter by 
critically reviewing the empirical studies that investigated the ALMP effectiveness at 
the country level. This topic is still not extensively investigated for ETEs mainly 
because of data unavailability hence only a handful of studies were reviewed. The 
findings for transition economies are inconclusive and no clear implications could be 
drawn. In contrast, the review of the empirical studies in Western European 
economies point to a generally positive effect of ALMPs on increasing employment 
and reducing unemployment. 
Section 2.2.3, discussed in more details the theoretical explanations for the main 
effects of the ALMPs in the labour market where six possible effects were identified. 
The main function of ALMPs is raising the efficiency of the matching between the 
unemployed who are searching for jobs and employers who are searching for 
workers. These policies tend to increase the efficiency of matching through 
enhancing the human capital of participants, re-locating jobs or workers, increasing 
the search intensity of the job-seeker, reducing the hiring costs and reducing 
employers‘ uncertainty about the employability of applicants hence allowing the 
firms to create more vacancies and fill them more quickly.  
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To answer the research question: Are ALMPs in European economies (transition and 
non-transition) effective in reducing unemployment at the economy-wide level?, 
chapter 3 addresses the third objective using two empirical analyses: the first one is 
the matching function using Fixed Effect estimator while the second is the dynamic 
panel analysis using difference General Methods of Moments. In order to investigate 
whether ALMPs in European economies have any influence on improving the 
matching process between the number of unemployed in the labour market and the 
number of unfilled vacancies, the first model in utilised outflows from 
unemployment to employment as the dependent variable. The estimation approach 
used for this empirical analysis was the Fixed Effects Driscoll Kraay (FEDK) 
standard errors, which is robust to cross-sectional dependency, heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation. Because of the inability of FEDK to estimate the time-invariant 
factors, an additional estimator, Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition (FEVD), was 
employed. This estimator allowed assessing whether the transition economies 
showed a different pattern of matching efficiency and also whether the ALMPs have 
the positive effect in reducing unemployment in transition compared non-transition 
economies. Following the theoretical expectations and the review of the empirical 
studies for transition economies expressed in chapter 2, this empirical analysis also 
analysed whether the labour markets in transition economies exhibit multiple 
equilibria.  
The empirical evidence obtained from this investigation suggests that ALMPs in the 
selected countries of analysis have a statistically significant and positive effect on 
increasing matching efficiency between the unemployment stock and unfilled 
vacancies. However, this effect is quite small when translated into economic terms 
since only a relatively small number of unemployed were found to flow from 
unemployment into employment. In accordance with the evidence from other 
empirical studies (Munich and Svejnar, 2008; Camarero et al., 2008), this model also 
found evidence to suggest that the labour markets in transition economies might 
exhibit multiple equilibria. However, in contrast to the expectations, from the results 
provided in this empirical investigation there seem to be no relationship between the 
size of informality and matching efficiency. As argued in chapter 3, one possible 
explanation that this relationship could not be confirmed from the analysis at the 
national level is that the sample includes both transition and non-transition 
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economies. The results from FEVD, however, do not suggest any significant effect 
of ALMPs in transition economies. 
Given that current aggregate unemployment is partly determined by its values in 
previous time periods and also considering the potentially endogenous nature of the 
variable total expenditure of ALMPs as share of GDP, chapter 3 implemented a 
second empirical investigation of the effectiveness of these policies employing a 
dynamic panel analysis using difference GMM. This analysis assessed the 
effectiveness of the total expenditure on ALMPs as a share of GDP in reducing the 
unemployment rate. Additionally, using a larger dataset (i.e. including both 
European transition and non-transition economies) it became possible to assess the 
effectiveness of the five different ALMPs: training, employment incentives, 
supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation and start-up incentives. 
The results from this model could not confirm that the increased total expenditure of 
ALMPs as share of GDP had an impact on reducing the unemployment rate. The 
results also indicated that there were no significant differences in the effectiveness of 
the active measures analysed.  Section 3.4.3 provides one possible explanation for 
the overall insignificance. As the review of empirical studies in chapter 2 revealed, 
the effectiveness of individual ALMPs is diverse and the same ALMPs might have 
not be effective in different countries, in different time periods and for different 
groups of unemployed. This diversity in the effectiveness of individual ALMPs 
might be a result of different targeting, different design specifics and different levels 
of economic development of countries where these policies are being implemented. 
Additionally, some of the ALMPs might also induce negative effects such as a 
deadweight effect (the beneficiaries of active measures were going to be employed 
even in absence of such measures) and substitution effect (the beneficiaries get 
employed at the expense of other potential workers). Based on the discussion in 
section 2.2, it was concluded that in order for the labour market policies and 
regulations to be effective in reducing the unemployment rate then unemployment 
should be predominantly structural or frictional in nature. In contrast, when the 
behaviour of unemployment is better explained by the hysteresis hypothesis then 
active labour market policies may have little or no effect and the policy focus should 
be primarily on increasing aggregate demand. Following this argument, one 
explanation for the findings of the empirical investigation in chapter 3 is that the 
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aggregate demand for labour in many ETEs was low.  However, referring to the 
literature review provided in section 2.3, the evidence from the empirical studies 
suggests mixed results about the dynamics of unemployment in transition 
economies; whether it is more likely to show hysteresis or a structuralist pattern. 
Thus, the argument that a lack of aggregate demand leads to the insignificant effect 
of ALMPs should be taken with caution. Additionally, one potential explanation for 
the insignificant effect of active policies analysed was argued to be the composition 
of the countries included in the sample where both transition (at different stages of 
transition) and Western European countries were analysed. Even though potentially 
important control variables are accounted for in the model, such as the level of 
economic growth, labour market institutions and policies, the level of education and 
the size of informality, there might be other factor missing in the specification which 
might have given rise to omitted variable bias.  
By critically reviewing different evaluation methodologies and empirical studies 
which analyse ALMP effectiveness at the individual level and identifying the key 
assumptions within the framework, chapter 4 addresses objective 4 of this thesis. 
The main focus of this chapter is to analyse the evaluation problem and to identify a 
suitable evaluation technique for the construction of the counterfactual and 
accounting for selection bias. Chapter 4 concluded that the most appropriate 
evaluation technique in context of the analysis in this research project is the Inverse 
Probability Weighting Regression Adjustment (IPWRA). This estimator uses both 
treatment and outcome models which helps to address the selection bias and it allows 
evaluating different ALMPs in the same setting. The critical review of the empirical 
studies analysing the ALMP effectiveness at the individual level for transition 
economies suggests that training might be an effective measure in the short-term, 
however, no conclusion can be made for the long-term.   
Chapters 5 and 6 address objective 5 of this thesis. To provide an insight on the 
effectiveness of ALMPs at the individual participant level, a cross-sectional dataset 
for Kosovo was used to assess the relative effectiveness of the active policies in 
increasing the probability of an individual to: be employed; be employed in the 
formal sector; or, if unemployed, undertake active job search. There were three 
active measures implemented in Kosovo during 2008 to 2010 which were the focus 
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of chapter 5‘s investigation: on-the-job training (OJT), an internship scheme (IS) and 
institution and enterprise training (IET). In order to test the hypothesis that 
participation in an ALMP increases the probability of being employed in the formal 
sector as opposed to the informal one, the first methodology used in this chapter is 
the multinomial probit with a three category dependent variable which equalled zero 
if the individual is unemployed at the time of the survey, one if the individual is 
employed with an employment contract and two if the individual is employed 
without an employment contract.  
The empirical evidence on the relative effectiveness of the three active measures 
suggests that participating in OJT and IS reduced the probability of being 
unemployment relative to participating in IET. Participating in OJT seems to have 
had a positive impact on increasing employed individuals‘ probability of engaging in 
the informal sector compared to participating in IET. The evidence from this 
empirical analysis also suggests that participating in an active measure for a longer 
period of time tends to increase participants‘ probability of being employed 
informally, i.e. being employed without a contract. As argued in section 5.2, 
participants in the investigated active measures were, typically, disadvantaged long-
term unemployed and getting employed in the informal sector provides a necessary 
income for them. In a labour market with few employment opportunities in the 
formal sector, participants consider the alternative of employment in the informal 
sector, rather than remaining unemployed. The findings suggest that programmes 
implemented in more recent years are less effective in increasing a participant‘s 
probability of being in employment compared to the same programmes implemented 
earlier. One possible explanation for this result is that the quality of these 
programmes, actual and/or perceived, might have declined during the observed 
period or the specific labour market conditions might have influenced their 
effectiveness over time. Another finding of this empirical analysis is that having 
acquired a certificate increases an individual‘s probability of gaining employment in 
the formal market and reduces the probability of engaging in the informal labour 
market compared to an individual who did not acquire a certificate of completion. 
This finding might suggest that having a certificate signals to potential employers 
that the individual has a certain level of ability and as a consequence will be less 
likely to be employed in low quality jobs or informal market. In contrast, the variable 
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used a proxy for quality of implementation of the ALMPs (whether the participants 
have an employment/training individual plan) is statistically insignificant. This 
might suggest that this part of the process of implementation might have not been of 
high enough quality to assist beneficiaries in acquiring skills and getting employed.  
As explained in section 5.2, participation in these active measures was supposed to 
be pre-determined based on a set of selection criteria, making the estimation of the 
study subject to a potential selection bias. Hence, in attempting to adjust for selection 
bias, the second empirical analysis in chapter 5 employed a doubly robust evaluation 
technique, IPWRA, which uses both treatment selection and outcome models. This 
approach gives unbiased estimates if at least one of the models is specified correctly. 
As discussed in section 4.4, an additional novelty of this methodology compared to 
previous evaluation methodologies is that it allows an analysis of the effects of 
treatment in the context of multiple programmes. The analysis utilised three different 
outcome models where three dependent variables were used; the first one equalled 
one if the participant was employed at the time of the survey, zero otherwise, the 
second equalled one if the unemployed participant actively searched for jobs, zero 
otherwise and the third equalled one if the participant, conditional on being 
employed, had an employment contract, zero otherwise. The empirical evidence 
from IPWRA is consistent with the estimations from the multinomial probit, 
suggesting that IET participants had a lower probability of being employed 
compared to both OJT and IS. Nevertheless, employed OJT participants were more 
likely to be without an employment contract compared to participants in the other 
two active measures.  
With regard to the relative effectiveness of these three active measures analysed, the 
evidence from all the estimations suggest that on-the-job training is the most 
effective in increasing the probability of being employed in both formal and informal 
sectors. It was argued that one possible explanation is the design of this programme: 
employers seem to prefer programmes that are designed to take place within firms 
during the whole period of training (Kavanagh, 2012). Another explanation could be 
that the quality and market-relevance of the training received by the employees is 
higher compared to the other two programmes. In contrast, institution and enterprise 
training was designed to divide the time allocated between the training at the 
vocational training centres to improve participants‘ soft and other employability 
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skills and training at the companies to enhance job-specific skills. Another reason for 
the apparent ineffectiveness of IET might be related to the stigmatisation of the 
participants because this measure targets the most disadvantaged unemployed (those 
who did not have a chance to attend or complete vocational education and had no 
previous work experience). Additionally, these active measures, in general had 
irregularities in targeting participants. In order to accept more women and minorities 
the selection criteria were not strictly met, hence accepting older participants and 
those with unsuitable levels of education. Moreover, since there is no data that can 
provide an insight on the content and quality of the programmes, a definite judgment 
of the effectiveness of these policies cannot be made.  
Chapter 6 also addresses objective 5 of this thesis by analysing the overall 
effectiveness of the above-mentioned ALMPs. The difference between relative and 
overall effectiveness of ALMPs is that the latter analyses the effects of participation 
in one of the policies in comparison to non-participation. In order to construct a 
control group of non-beneficiaries, this chapter utilised an additional dataset, the 
Kosovo Labour Force Survey data collected in the same year as the data for the 
beneficiaries. When constructing control groups from a source other than that used 
for the treatment group, it is likely that the dataset contains measurement errors due 
to differences in the two questionnaires. In order to minimise the measurement 
differences between the treatment and control datasets, variables with measurement 
differences were used in separate specifications and the results from these 
specifications were interpreted with caution. The empirical evidence suggests a 
significant positive treatment effect in increasing employment probability after 
treatment, however only when controlling for the individuals‘ employment history, 
which is in line with some evidence found in other studies (Kluve et al., 2008). 
Consistent with the empirical evidence from chapter 5, the most effective active 
measure in terms of employment probability was OJT followed by IS. When 
analysing the effectiveness of the active measures in increasing the probability of 
being employed in the formal sector, the empirical evidence from the binary 
treatment model suggests that, in general, participation in one of these three active 
measures reduces the probability of an employed individual having an employment 
contract compared to that for a non-participant. However, the findings from the 
multivalued treatment model suggest that out of these three active measures only the 
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treatment effect for OJT is significant. This result also shows that the multivalued 
treatment model presents a clearer picture of the effectiveness of measures compared 
to the binary treatment model. The evidence provided in chapter 6 suggests that, in 
the context of a labour market with low formal employment opportunities, such as in 
Kosovo, participating in an active measure might increase a participant‘s probability 
of being in employment but participants may be employed in the informal sector. 
The empirical analyses suggest that particularly OJT participants in Kosovo were 
likely to be employed informally. The findings from chapter 6 indicate that an 
employed OJT participant has a lower probability of having an employment contract 
by 12.5 pp compared to the average of similar individuals in the control group. 
Differences in outcomes for participants of different measures may be related to the 
economic sectors in which they are implemented and also the occupation of the 
participant.  
In conclusion, when analysing the relative effectiveness of the ALMPs, the evidence 
from the multinomial probit model are broadly consistent with the evidence from 
IPWRA where OJT is found to be the most effective in increasing an individual‘s 
probability of being employed followed by the IS programme. The evidence from 
the overall effectiveness of ALMPs also suggest that the OJT and IS measures are 
effective in increasing the probability of participants being employed compared to 
non-participants. The results, though, depend on the model specification used. When 
variables measuring the individual‘s employment history are not included in the 
model (even though in this analysis these variables tend to have measurement 
differences between treated and controls), the evidence indicates negative treatment 
effects for IET on the probability of being employed. This evidence suggests the 
importance of the unobserved characteristics captured by these variables in 
determining the individual‘s probability of gaining employment. When the 
probability of having an employment contract for those employed in the sample was 
analysed the results suggest that the employed OJT are more likely not to have an 
employment contract compared to the non-participants and also compared to IET. 
This result is consistent in all specifications and also in line with the findings in 
chapter 5.  
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7.3 Contribution to Knowledge  
This thesis has made four main contributions to knowledge with regard to the evaluation of 
the effectiveness of ALMPs in increasing employment.  
Firstly, this is one of very few studies that have incorporated into the evaluation of 
the effectiveness of ALMPs employment in the informal sector. The theoretical 
framework for assessing the effectiveness of ALMPs developed for Western 
economies, presented in chapter 2, was argued not to be entirely appropriate for the 
analysis in a transition economy context. Considering that the labour markets in 
many transition economies are better characterised by a low-skill, bad-job 
equilibrium, an augmented theoretical framework was required. The discussion in 
chapter 2 provides theoretical justifications that in transition economies this 
equilibrium is associated with a large informal sector. Given that the ALMPs, in 
general, target low-skilled, long-term and disadvantaged unemployed and because 
the informal sector tends to employ more of these categories of labour, it was argued 
that in this context, ALMPs such as wage and direct subsidies for low skilled 
workers could provide incentives to firms to switch to formal employment. 
Employers would benefit from such policies because they would lower firms‘ labour 
costs and therefore they would improve the employment prospects of participants in 
the formal sector. Consequently, employers would be induced to comply with 
employment regulations such as providing the participants with a written 
employment contract. This research fills the gap in the theoretical and empirical 
literature by addressing how the ALMPs perform in context of countries with large 
informal sectors. This relationship has not been assessed theoretically and to the best 
of author‘s knowledge there is only one study analysing it empirically. In contrast to 
the theoretical expectations discussed here, investigations at the individual level in 
chapter 6 find that the participants in ALMPs in a labour market characterised with 
large informal sector, if employed post-participation, are more likely to be so in the 
informal sector.  
Secondly, this research makes a contribution to knowledge by using a more 
sophisticated estimation strategy, which allows for analysing the effect of 
participating in an ALMP in a multivalued treatment selection framework. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first research study to use this empirical approach 
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in the ALMP microeconometric evaluation literature. Previous microeconometric 
evaluation methods were mostly concerned with the treatment effects of being or not 
being a participant in one of the active measures. As argued in chapter 4, ALMPs are 
heterogeneous in terms of content, quality, design, targeting of participants, duration 
etc. Thus, it is crucial to analyse these policies in a framework with a dynamic 
treatment selection, where the choice is not just participating vs. non-participating 
but a distinction is also made between which programme the unemployed 
participated in. This research fills the gap in the microeconometric evaluation of 
ALMPs by addressing the heterogeneity of the active labour market policies and the 
findings of chapters 5 and 6 confirm that this approach can lead to valuable insights.  
Specifically, the results presented in chapter 6, suggest that a treatment effect based 
on multivalued pairwise comparison can give a clearer causal explanation of the 
effects of different active measures that could be used to rank them. The estimated 
results from the multivalued treatment models provide more detailed information 
with regard to which of the active measures are more effective in comparison to non-
participation. On the other hand, the results from the binary model, which puts all 
three active measures into one category and treats them as being the same, are unable 
to reveal which of the three measures is more effective. Moreover, the evidence in 
chapter 6 suggests that the treatment effects of the three active measures, obtained 
from the multivalued treatment model might cancel each other out. Thus, the overall 
treatment effect from the binary model of participation vs. non-participation cannot 
always present the ‗true‘ situation of the effectiveness of individual ALMPs.   
Thirdly, this is the first critical evaluation study of the effectiveness of ALMPs to be 
conducted for Kosovo. As chapters 2 and 4 revealed, the effectiveness of ALMPs has 
generally been under-researched in transition economies, mainly due to the low 
quality and general unavailability of data. Given that the unemployment rate in 
Kosovo is the highest in region and in Europe, it is crucial to assess the relative 
effectiveness of active measures in attempt to increase the employment prospects of 
the unemployed. Moreover, Kosovo constitutes a country which has undergone 
conflict more than a decade ago which has distorted the labour market. This makes 
this analysis distinct from other similar studies in the transition context. ALMPs in 
Kosovo have been implemented only from 2005, and the findings of the study 
provide insights as to how to design more effective active measures. As discussed in 
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chapter 5, there are two other studies assessing the effect of these ALMPs in Kosovo, 
however, neither of them used an advanced evaluation methodology such as the one 
used in this thesis; notably, they simply compare mean outcome variables of 
participants and non-participants, not controlling for participant characteristics and 
employment history and they do not account for the potential selection bias. Both 
studies reviewed in section 5.2.1 assess the effectiveness of the programmes only 
based on the percentage of the participants employed at the time of the survey. 
According to Kavanagh (2012), who uses the same dataset as this thesis, the most 
effective programme is the IS since 59% of previous participants were employed at 
the time of the survey, followed by IET with 42% and then OJT with 35%. Given 
that this study does not control for participant characteristics or use a modern 
evaluation methodology or address selection bias, the results provided by this study 
are unreliable. In contrast, as discussed in the previous section, when using an 
evaluation methodology which controls for relevant participant characteristics 
attempts to address selection bias, the findings from this thesis indicate that OJT is 
the most effective in increasing the individual‘s employment probability, followed 
by IS, while IET is usually found to be ineffective.  
Fourthly, this research contributes to the empirical literature in assessing the 
effectiveness of ALMPs at the country level by employing a diversified empirical 
strategy. The review of theoretical framework emphasised the possible multiple 
effects of active measures in the labour market, hence the analysis at the country 
level presented in this research makes use of different approaches and different 
estimation techniques which allows more comprehensive inferences to be drawn. In 
this analysis, the choice of the estimation approaches was made based on the 
theoretical framework but also on the availability of data. As pointed out in chapter 
2, the main effect of ALMPs is the effect on the matching process, thus the first 
approach used allows assessing the matching efficiency of these policies. Given the 
potential endogeneity of the ALMPs, the second approach uses a dynamic panel 
model to assess the impact of these policies in reducing unemployment rate. It is 
worth emphasising that there are very few studies analysing the effectiveness of 
ALMPs using different approaches such as presented in this thesis. 
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7.4 Policy Implications  
The empirical evidence obtained in this investigation and theoretical arguments 
developed in this thesis have potential useful policy implications for the design and 
implementation of ALMPs in European economies. The findings are specifically 
relevant to the economies aiming to increase the effectiveness of labour market 
policies in reducing unemployment.  
 As discussed in section 7.2, the findings in chapter 3 suggest that ALMPs are 
effective in increasing matching between unemployed and vacancies, but their 
effectiveness in economic terms is limited since only a very small number of 
unemployed participants transition to employment. The findings from chapter 3 also 
suggest that the labour markets in transition economies might exhibit multiple 
equilibria where the low-skilled are trapped in a bad-job equilibrium. Given that in 
transition economies the ALMPs are provided only on a small scale, they are 
insufficient to shift the labour market from a bad to a good-job equilibrium. In 
addition, as argued in chapter 2, when the demand for labour is low, as in many 
transition economies one of the main objectives of ALMPs should be to reduce 
employers‘ labour costs. As a consequence firms would be more likely to open more 
vacancies thus increasing demand for labour. Considering these arguments and 
noting that it is difficult to escape the bad-job equilibrium, following Snower‘s 
(1994) argument, only a ‗big push‘ in the amount of expenditure/investment on 
ALMPs is likely to be effective in addressing unemployment in transition 
economies.   
ALMPs in most European Transition economies are currently fairly small-scale 
policies, hence in order to maximise their effects then the targeting of the 
participants should be clearly defined and then carefully implemented. The ALMPs 
analysed in chapters 5 and 6 targeted the disadvantaged groups in the labour market 
such as the long-term unemployed (with at least 6 months unemployment spell), 
women, younger unemployed, minority groups etc. The descriptive statistics in 
chapter 5 suggest that more than half of participants reported that they had been 
unemployed for longer than 2 years before treatment, while the findings from the 
multinomial probit suggest that this group were less likely to be employed than those 
with shorter unemployment spells. This finding might indicate that those with longer 
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unemployment spells might need more intensive and specific training. A potential 
policy implication in this case would be to group participants based on the 
unemployment spells and design the training based on their level of skills. 
Additionally, according to the findings in chapter 5, those belonging to a minority 
group and those who have two or more family members unemployed are also more 
likely to be unemployed post-treatment given that they lack the social network, 
connections and information about vacancies. As expected, young participants are 
also found less likely to be employed. Given that they are joining the labour market 
probably for the first time, they might benefit more from training focused on soft 
skills and counselling about job search activity. The target group of ALMPs in 
Kosovo are all disadvantaged groups; however they all differ from one another in a 
sense that they all require specific treatment. In order to improve their prospects in 
the labour market, policy should tailor ALMPs based on the specific needs of the 
targeted subgroups of the unemployed.   
As chapter 1 emphasised, there has been an increase in the number of beneficiaries 
of ALMPs in recent years in Kosovo, however, there are still many challenges to 
overcome. According to MLSW (2017), there are limited interactions between the 
unemployed, the employment services and the active measures because a large 
number of the unemployed are not registered and a large part of working age 
population are inactive. Most of the unemployed in Kosovo are unaware of the 
services and opportunities provided by employment offices, hence there is an issue 
in attracting the right target group. A more general policy implication with regard to 
targeting would be to pro-actively promote the target groups in order to increase 
awareness of the advantages of employing more marginalised groups who might be 
threatened by social exclusion, such as women, the long-term unemployed and 
youths.  
 This thesis also found evidence to suggest that the active measures designed to 
divide the training between activities at the regional VTCs and firms may be 
ineffective. The training activities at the VTCs were intended to enhance a 
participant‘s employability skills, team-working skills, work readiness skills, 
information and communication technology and other non-vocational skills. 
However, the absence of information about the quality and content of the training 
within VTCs did not allow us to fully assess whether the skills and productivity were 
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improved by each element of the training provided. In addition, there is a huge 
constraint in the small number of employment services officers where the ratio of 
officers to job-seekers is about 1:1,000 (MLSW, 2017). This reflects budget 
constraints since the ALMPs are mostly supported by international donors. These 
constraints may help to explain the finding in chapter 5, that whether or not 
participants held an individual employment/training plan had no impact on the 
probability of being employed. Given that the training at the VTC and counselling of 
the participants by the employment counsellors at the Employment Offices, are a 
crucial design element of ALMPs, a policy recommendation in this case would be to 
improve the level and quality of the employment services and VTCs allocate more 
time to participants and dedicate more effort to formulating employment/training 
plans. In addition, the employment/training plans should be upgraded to include not 
only a pre- but also post-training skill assessment of all the participants through a 
system of profiling each participants‘ strengths and identifying their employment 
opportunities in the labour market.  
According to the MLSW (2017), there is lack of effective monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms to ensure that the full cycle of active measure is completed and that 
these policies provided by VTCs are of the quality required by the labour market. 
The findings from this thesis suggest that a considerable number of participants did 
not have a employment/training plan or the certificate of completion of the active 
measures and they stayed a longer or a shorter period in the training than anticipated. 
These findings question the effectiveness of the current active measures in Kosovo. 
Hence, the policy recommendation in this case would be to improve the existing 
system of monitoring and evaluating the implementation and effectiveness of these 
measures in promoting employment.  
A possible drawback in the implementation process of ALMPs, is the lack of 
assessment of the needs of the labour market. Because of the unavailability of data 
about the labour demand, there is a challenge in providing well-designed training 
and other active measures in those professions required by the labour market. This is 
particularly challenging since there is insufficient cooperation between VTC, 
enterprises and the social partners (MLSW, 2017). In this case, the policy agenda 
should focus on increasing this cooperation at the regional level in order to design 
and adapt training and other active measures to region-specific opportunities rather 
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than having a ‗one size fits all‘ approach. This cooperation, however, should be 
coordinated centrally in order to avoid too large divergences between different 
regions.  
As emphasised in chapter 4, an experimental design approach provides the most 
reliable evaluation of the active measures. In Kosovo, there is lack of systematic 
evaluation of ALMPs which would shed light on the impact of these policies in 
improving employment prospects of the various groups of unemployed. The policy 
recommendation in this case is that in order to conduct an experimental design 
evaluation, measures to ensure the collection of data about the beneficiaries and the 
control group should be incorporated into the design and implementation stages of 
any ALMP.  
7.5 Limitations and Future Work  
There are certain limitations in the research undertaken which could not be addressed 
in this thesis due to data unavailability.  
A general limitation of the empirical analysis conducted in this thesis is 
straightforward. Given the problems experienced with the data in the empirical 
investigations, when designing ALMPs it is crucial to simultaneously design 
appropriate evaluation strategies and the data collection methods. With regard to the 
data at the national level, as discussed in chapter 3, the matching efficiency would 
have been captured better if more frequent data about ALMPs were available, such 
as monthly or quarterly data as pointed out in section 7.2. Currently only annual data 
is available for analysis. Additionally, the data necessary for this approach was 
restricted in terms of the time span (the data is available only for period 2010-2015) 
and country coverage (11 transition economies and 3 Western economies). Using the 
available data with the approach discussed in section 3.3.3, restricted the sample to 
only 49 observations. Due to the small sample for the matching function, it was also 
not possible to estimate the effectiveness of different ALMPs. Given that the current 
unemployment rate is partly determined by the previous unemployment rates, then 
ideally a dynamic panel analysis is required. However, due to a small sample size, 
dynamic panel estimators could not be used. . The second empirical approach to 
analysing the effectiveness of ALMPs did utilise a dynamic panel model, however it 
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was not possible to divide the samples and estimate the effectiveness of ALMPs for 
the two sets of countries (transition and non-transition European economies).  
The collection of the individual level data for the control group should be conducted 
at the same time as for those of the treatment group. This enables obtaining the 
necessary and relevant information for both groups, hence allowing for a more 
comprehensive comparison between participants and non-participants. Most 
importantly, this would avoid the potential measurement error issues such as those 
experienced in the empirical investigation presented in chapter 6. The main 
limitation of the individual level analysis is that it lacked an appropriate control 
group. Obtaining the data on the control group from the same source would have 
increased the number of factors to match the treatment and controls individuals 
hence improving the reliability of the estimated treatment effects. As argued in 
chapters 4 and 6, an evaluation analysis should ideally utilise a dataset with as much 
pre-treatment information as possible about the employment of both treated and 
control individuals. This information may have helped capture unobserved 
characteristics such as individuals‘ motivation, willingness to remain attached to the 
labour market, search intensity, interpersonal skills and employers‘ preference 
towards certain workers. The quality of variables such as employment history and 
the missing information about the incidence of nepotism in the selection process and 
on the probability of finding employment might have also influenced accuracy of the 
estimated results. A variable measuring the individuals‘ pre-treatment employment 
history was constructed from different questions asked of the treatment and control 
groups, hence imposing measurement errors in the analysis of chapter 6. 
Additionally, the inability to account for ALMP participation of the individuals in 
the control group due to the limitation of the data, increased the possibility of bias in 
the estimated results.  
The evaluation of the treatment effects of the policies would have been more 
thorough if investigated both through cross-sectional analysis and over time. Apart 
from the data being collected at single point in time, the first approach used for 
investigation at the individual level was a multinomial probit model which did not 
address the selection bias issue. Additionally, after attempting to address the 
selection bias issue when using the IPWRA estimator, the sample for certain 
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outcome models was reduced which created an imbalance between different 
treatment groups. This might have distorted the estimated results for this outcome 
model when analysing the relative effectiveness of the individual programmes. Also, 
the treatment group dataset provided no information about the quality or the content 
of the training and internships and the unavailability of such data restricted the 
interpretation of the estimated results. Another limitation of the data is that the 
participants were not surveyed at a fixed time after completing their treatment.  
It is important to note that whilst ALMPs might increase both future employment 
prospects and lifetime earnings, their provision is costly. Hence, to be able to fully 
assess whether active measures have been worthwhile from the social perspective 
additional expenditure and earnings data should be collected and made available to 
researchers. There is currently no systematic data available about the costs of and 
monetary benefits to the participants, employers, government and society as a whole 
in Kosovo.  
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Appendix 2 – Chapter 2  
Appendix A2.1 Snower’s (1994) model of multiple equilibria in 
the labour market  
Based on the theoretical model of Snower (1994), multiple equilibria can result in a 
‗low-skill, bad-job equilibrium‘ and a ‗high-skill, good-job equilibrium‘. Snower 
argues that labour market can fall into a ‗low-skill, bad-job trap‘ which entails a 
preponderance of jobs that are associated with low wages, low productivity and little 
opportunity to acquire training or enhance human capital. In this context, firms do 
not provide a lot of skilled vacancies because there is not enough skilled labour and 
these vacancies would be difficult to fill. Snower refers to this as the ‗vacancy 
supply externality‘. Similarly, workers are not incentivised to acquire skills since 
there are few skilled vacancies and as such the skills would be likely to remain 
under-compensated. This is regarded as the ‗training supply externality‘. If firms 
provide skilled vacancies it raises the workers‘ returns to education and training, 
however firms do not pay for the workers‘ education. By the same argument, 
workers who acquire training and education increase firms‘ returns to opening 
vacancies for skilled jobs. Snower argues these two externalities reinforce one 
another and can induce an insufficient level of training.  
Snower assumes that there is fixed number of workers who either are ‗unskilled‘ and 
have a marginal product of     and can work only at the ‗bad jobs‘ or are ‗skilled‘ 
who have a marginal product of    which is higher than   . All workers live for two 
periods; during the first period every worker makes the decision to acquire the 
necessary education or training and to become skilled. Those who decide not to 
acquire education start working in the first period while those that start the education 
or training are able to provide work only in the second period. The barriers to entry 
which gives workers and employers a market power in the wage setting process 
make the market for ‗good jobs‘ imperfectly competitive, while the market for ‗bad 
jobs‘ remains perfectly competitive. In the market of unskilled workers, on account 
to perfect competition, the real wage is equal to the marginal product of the unskilled 
workers:  
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Assuming that this wage is above the reservation wage of the unskilled workers, 
there is no unemployment. The real wage of the skilled workers    is determined by 
a Nash bargain between the employer and the high skilled workers. The skilled 
worker receives the wage    while the employer receives the return of      . In 
case of disagreement, the high skilled worker will receive    while the vacancy of 
the employer will remain unfilled. The bargaining problem is to maximise the Nash 
product (      
            
    with respect to   , where the μ is the bargaining 
power of the skilled worker relative to employer. The wage that solves this problem 
is: 
                                                                                                                     
With regard to the education/training decision, workers are assumed to be 
heterogenous in terms of their ability to acquire education. The marginal skilled 
worker‘s cost of education increases with the aggregate number of the educated 
workers,      
 , where the   and ϵ are positive constants. After the worker acquires 
education, his/her probability of having a high skilled job is ρ and having a wage 
    while the probability of having a low skilled job is (1- ρ) and having a bad job 
wage   . Thus the marginal skilled worker‘s net return from acquiring education is 
                        
 . The marginal worker in the equilibrium is 
indifferent whether to acquire education or remaining unskilled is        
                 
      where    is the income of unskilled worker during 
the two periods. This equation is equivalent to  
                        
                                                                                       
The matching process is given by the following expression:  
                                                                                                                              
Where    is the number of aggregate matches,    is the number of skilled job 
seekers,    is the aggregate number of skilled vacancies and the constant   < 1 
because workers have imperfect information about the availability of skilled 
vacancies. Consequently, the probability of finding a good job is:  
309 
 
   
  
  
       [
  
  
  ]                                                                                                      
Substituting the wage equation in 2.15 and 2.16 along with equation 2.18 into the 
marginal condition 2.15, will give the training function:  
             
  
  
           
                                                                 
                      
                                                                           
This training function is shown by the TF curve in Figure 2.5.  
The model assumes that firms face free entry in the sector so the aggregate number 
of skilled vacancies may be determined by a zero-profit constraint. Each firm has a 
fixed cost of    while beyond that, firms are assumed to be heterogenous in terms of 
the costs of supplying vacancies. So the marginal firm‘s total cost of supplying 
vacancies rises with the aggregate number of vacancies supplied. The vacancy 
induced part of the total costs is      
  where    and 𝛿 are positive constants and 
𝛿>1; thus the average cost of marginal firm is               
   . 
Because each firm has the same average return from creating a skilled vacancy, 
         , where   is the firm‘s probability of finding a skilled worker, so the 
zero profit condition of supplying vacancies is: 
           
  
  
        
                                                                                           
The probability that a firm will find a skilled worker is:  
   
  
  
       [
  
  
   ]                                                                                                    
By substituting 2.22 into 2.21, the skilled vacancy function is obtained:  
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This is depicted by the vacancy function VF in Figure 2.5. Equation 2.24 represents 
the horizontal vacancy function lying beneath the     line in Figure 2.5, while the 
equation 2.23 represents the vacancy function lying above the    line which is 
concave.   
Equilibria lie at the intersections of the training function and the vacancy function. 
Rising marginal cost of training makes the lower portion of the training function 
convex (equation 2.19), while the rising marginal costs of vacancies makes the 
vacancy function concave (equation 2.23). Thus there exist at least two equilibria. 
The low skilled equilibrium lies at the upward sloping portion of TF curve and 
horizontal VF function at point   . The good job equilibrium is either at the 
intersection of the upward sloping portion of the VF curve and vertical portion of TF 
curve at point   
  (the intersection of VF1 and TF in Figure 2.5), or at the 
intersection of the upper horizontal portion of the VF curve and the upward sloping 
portion of the TF curve at point   
  (the intersection of VF2 and TF in Figure 2.5).  
Figure 2.5 Multiple equilibria – the low-skill, bad-job trap and the high-skill, good 
job equilibrium 
 
Source: Snower (1994) 
At the bad-job equilibrium, few workers acquire education since firms supply few 
skilled vacancies and similarly firms supply less skilled vacancies because there are 
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not enough skilled workers who can fill these vacancies. Thus, skilled workers 
employment is   
  and because labour force is constant at L, the unskilled 
employment is   
      
 . Firms offer plenty of skilled vacancies at the good-job 
equilibrium since many workers acquire education.  
Snower‘s model can be used to explain the different incidence of skilled employment 
opportunities in different countries and the emergence of multiple equilibria. 
Technological progress increased the demand for skilled workers in Western 
economies while increased international trade increased the demand for unskilled 
workers in Central and Eastern Europe. In this context, due to low demand for 
skilled labour in transition economies there is little incentive for labour to acquire 
skills through education and training because they will likely be under-compensated. 
In the same vein, because there are only a small proportion of skilled workers in 
transition economies, firms do not have sufficient incentives to open vacancies for 
high-skilled labour. As discussed in section 2.3, in transition countries highly-skilled 
labour is largely missing and these economies are not considered knowledge-based 
economies.  
Appendix A2.2 Youth Unemployment  
One of the aims of this thesis was to evaluate the effectiveness of ALMPs that are 
targeted specifically at youth unemployment. As Chapter 1 documented, youth 
unemployment rates are considerably high, reaching double-digit figures in most of 
the European transition economies. This section examines the causes of these high 
youth unemployment rates in European transition economies. 
A common feature for every country with available statistics is that the youth 
unemployment rate is higher than the adult unemployment rate (O‘Higgins, 2001). 
The gap between the youth and adult unemployment rates is typically wider in 
developing and transition countries compared to industrialised countries. In addition, 
it is observed that an increase in the adult unemployment rate is usually associated 
with a proportionate increase (Gaude, 1997) or more than proportionate increase in 
youth unemployment (O‘Higgins, 2001). Thus, one of the objectives of this section 
is to discuss the causes of the disproportionate increase in youth unemployment rate 
compared to adult unemployment rate.  
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Economic growth is a precondition for improved employment opportunities for 
labour market entrants, though in recent years it was observed that many 
industrialised and developing economies have experienced jobless growth 
(O‘Higgins, 2015). Despite relatively high economic growth in European transition 
economies in the last decade, youth unemployment remains high and it poses a 
continuing challenge to policymakers (Kovtun et al., 2014). The low youth 
employment rates in most ETEs may cause the human capital of the unemployed 
young people to rapidly depreciate, hence making it more difficult for them to find 
‗good‘ jobs in the future. Further, it will increase the dependence of young people on 
the social security system which in turn will diminish the countries‘ growth 
potential. As observed in section 2.2.2, this may lead to a ‗hysteresis‘ effect on 
overall unemployment and consequently the natural rate of unemployment will tend 
to increase.  
The following sub-sections will identify what are the causes of youth unemployment 
in European transition economies with particular reference to youth unemployment 
in Kosovo. Section 2.2.1 analyses how aggregate demand impacts disproportionately 
on the youth unemployment rate and particularly analysing the peculiarities during 
the transitional restructuring. Section 2.2.2 will further discuss the causes of the 
extended school-to-work transition, particularly focusing on the relevance of 
education and the evidence of skill mismatch in transition economies.  
2.2.1 Youth Labour Force Size and the Fluctuation in Aggregate Demand  
Previous research suggests that there are a number of factors that contribute to 
persistently high youth unemployment levels, where some are specifically related to 
young people while others reflect the overall situation in the ETEs. One of the 
arguments underlying the cause of the youth unemployment is the demographic 
composition, particularly the size of youth cohort in the labour market (O‘Higgins, 
2001; Zimmermann et al., 2013). A high growth of the young population means that 
the job creation should also increase in order to absorb the new entrants in the labour 
market so that youth unemployment does not rise. According to some studies, youth 
population growth can explain to some extent the high youth unemployment in 
Romania, Moldova, Kosovo and FYR Macedonia (Kolev and Saget, 2005, 
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Mojsoska-Blazevski, 2016). However, in the long run employment tends to grow at 
the same rate as the labour supply (Mojsoska-Blazevski, 2016).   
Zimmermann et al. (2013) argues that even though the size of the labour force is an 
important determinant of the level of youth unemployment, labour demand and 
overall employment opportunities are a more important factor. Youth unemployment 
is affected by economic growth in a similar way as that of adults, but it is much more 
sensitive to fluctuations in the business cycle (O‘Higgins, 2001). Young workers are 
less likely to be employed because they have less experience. Also, the argument 
behind the disproportionate impact on youth unemployment is that young workers 
tend to quit jobs more than adults for several reasons. Firstly, young workers have 
fewer job-specific skills and therefore are less likely to suffer a wage loss when 
moving between jobs. Secondly, young workers are more likely to quit trying to find 
a better match with their skills and aspirations. Thirdly, the opportunity cost of 
young people not being employed is lower than that of adults since they are less 
skilled, tend to have lower wages and are less likely to ‗need‘ a job to support their 
families (O‘Higgins, 2001). A contributing factor to this issue is that young people 
are more likely to be employed in temporary jobs or disproportionately working in 
the more cyclical-sensitive industries than adults (O‘Higgins, 2015).   
Since young people are disproportionately low-skilled and generally have acquired 
less training investment by firms, it is less costly to dismiss them rather than older 
employees. Furthermore, the employment protection legislation usually does not 
cover young people since such legislation usually requires a qualifying period or a 
certain level of experience which increases with tenure (O‘Higgins, 2001; Kovtun et 
al., 2014). Moreover, during recession periods firms will primarily freeze the 
recruitments of new employees and afterwards they start layoffs typically on a ‗last-
in/first-out‘ (LIFO) basis. In cases of hiring freezes and layoffs, young people are 
more likely to be hit harder.  
O‘Higgins (2001) argues that in Central and Eastern Europe, as a consequence of the 
transition from central to market economy, youth unemployment has increased at a 
higher rate compared to industrialised countries. The outflow from the 
unemployment has been much lower compared to the flow of new entrants into the 
unemployment pool. The structural adjustments in the 1990s had a huge impact in 
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the downsizing of employment in the public sector while the new job-openings have 
been insufficient to compensate the loss of jobs during the transition period. The 
extent of restructuring in transition economies has caused the large-scale job 
reallocation which affected youth unemployment. Countries that have had a slow 
restructuring may have temporarily preserved the jobs of senior workers at the 
expense of the young workers (Kolev and Saget, 2005; O‘Higgins, 2015). This made 
it harder for young people to find employment, causing the disproportionate high 
youth unemployment rate. The development of the private sector was expected to 
reduce youth unemployment; however, no clear relation is evident between the job-
creation in the private sector and youth unemployment. Kolev and Saget (2005) 
suggest that this is because the private sector is mostly comprised of former public 
enterprises which have been restructured to private enterprises as opposed to newly 
established private enterprises. It is the growth of service sectors, such as retail trade, 
hotels and restaurants and information technology that has created opportunities for 
young people. 
The macroeconomic and fiscal policies that were introduced in Kosovo, such as the 
promotion of private sector development through offering low tax rates, 
liberalisation of trade, reduction of public employment and public subsidies and 
transfers, have not been fully successful in opening new job opportunities and 
reducing unemployment. Insufficient foreign and domestic investment and 
decreasing external income transfers together with rapid de-industrialisation have 
dampened aggregate demand and slowed down economic growth. Additionally, the 
predominance of micro-enterprises with low productivity and competitiveness seem 
to have been one of the main causes of the large trade deficits which in turn affect 
employment. 
As recorded above, transition economies with high unemployment and poverty have 
developed large scale informal employment. For instance, in Kosovo young people 
mostly transit from school and unemployment to low paid jobs in the informal 
economy (Corbanese and Rosas, 2007). The causes of young people engaging in 
informal employment vary across countries but the main reason is that they cannot 
find jobs in the formal sector (Corbanese and Rosas, 2007; Shehu and Nilsson, 2014; 
Mojsoska-Blazevski, 2016).  
315 
 
As discussed in section 2.3, labour protection legislation is very limited in Kosovo 
and inadequately enforced. Corbanese and Rosas (2007) attribute the predominance 
of informal employment of youths in Kosovo to the low enforcement of employment 
regulation. Despite the lowest mandatory social security contributions in the South-
East Europe (5% of the gross wage paid by each: employer and employee), the 
survey of Corbanese and Rosas found that 73% of enterprises in Kosovo responded 
that they preferred informal employment because of the avoidance of the cost of 
paying social security contributions for their workers. It is the limited capacity of 
public administration to ensure the enforcement of labour legislation that leads to 
high informal employment among young people. In other European transition 
economies, young people are typically not eligible to claim unemployment benefits 
because they lack employment experience, this provides another incentive for the 
young unemployed to take informal jobs (Marjanovic, 2016, Djuric, 2016).  
2.2.2 School to work transition and the contribution of education  
The school to work transition is characterised by different status episodes that can 
consist of: vocational education, higher education, military service, temporary jobs 
etc. with the final objective of becoming fully integrated into the formal labour 
market. These status episodes can be viewed as optimal job-search episodes where 
young people move in and out of the labour market before they get settled in a 
particular job that offers them a career or before they go back to full-time education. 
Some of the young workers enter the labour market through temporary jobs and 
afterwards move to more stable jobs while other young workers move to 
unemployment and inactivity. The most common risk faced by young workers is the 
mismatch of the level of education acquired and the level of skills required in the 
labour market. As the first chapter emphasised, the unemployment rate for more 
educated and skilled young people is lower than that of low-skilled youths. General 
education and training thus are one of the major factors determining the shape of 
school to work transition (Dietrich, 2012).   
European transition economies show different patterns of school to work transition 
which in addition are heavily influenced by the educational policies and the 
education system. Zimmermann et al. (2013) suggests that when the formal 
education cannot translate into jobs the educational mismatch can cause youth 
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unemployment and underemployment. General education (non-vocational primary 
and secondary school) aims to improve the cognitive skills required for successful 
integration into the formal labour market and it is usually observed that those who 
have completed high-quality general education have higher earnings compared to 
those who attended education of a lower quality. However, as opposed to individuals 
with vocational education, those who complete general secondary education have a 
higher risk of being weakly attached to the labour market because they are not 
specialised in a specific occupation (Zimmermann et al., 2013) and do not gain 
practical experience. Well-designed and targeted vocational education, on the other 
hand, can increase employment opportunities for youths. It aims to promote the 
direct entry of youths into the labour market and its success depends on the 
alignment of the skills acquired in school to skills required in the labour market.  
Skill mismatches are an important factor contributing to youth unemployment and 
inactivity in European transition economies. According to the School to Work 
transition reports conducted by International Labour Organisation, the mismatch 
between the skills and labour demand is quite large in European transition economies 
(Corbanese and Rosas, 2007; Matsumoto and Elder, 2010; Shehu and Nielson, 2014; 
Djuric, 2016; Mojsoska-Blazevski, 2016; Marjanovic, 2016). This skill mismatch 
may prolong the school-to-work transition. In Serbia and FYR Macedonia, the over-
education is more common than under-education (Marjanovic, 2016; Mojsoska-
Blazevski, 2016). Since newly created jobs were mostly in lower skilled occupations, 
this made the overqualified young individuals to take the available jobs in the labour 
market. Consequently, they earn less than what they could have otherwise and their 
potential is not fully utilised. 
The skill mismatch is a particularly important determinant of the slow school-to-
work transition in Kosovo. The skill mismatch seems to have been a consequence of 
the education system from the 1990‘s. In Kosovo during this decade the access to 
education was limited and education was mostly informally obtained while 
vocational education was acquired mostly on the job (Corbanese and Rosas, 2007). 
In spite of significant improvement since after the conflict in Kosovo, the 
educational system still suffers from high drop-out rates and is poorly financed 
which triggers low educational outcomes. These gaps are predominantly evident for 
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vocational education and trainings. According to Corbanese and Rosas (2007), 
vocational education in Kosovo does not attract students despite the fact that 
enterprises seem to require workers with vocational skills. Another important reason 
for young people in Kosovo not having completed the transition to work (e.g. are 
inactive) is that they do not believe that they can find employment. For young 
women in Kosovo not having completed the transition to work, a reason might be 
their household-related responsibilities and childcare. A possible explanation for this 
is that social services and childcare facilities are largely unavailable in Kosovo. The 
low inactivity of young women in Kosovo is also related to gender stereotypical 
factors which are engraved even in younger generation that some occupations are not 
unsuitable for women (Corbanese and Rosas, 2007).   
As Chapter 1 identified, the percentage of NEETs (not in education, employment or 
training) can be as high as 35 percent of youths in Kosovo, 31 percent in FYR 
Macedonia and 28 percent in Montenegro (Mojsoska-Blazevski, 2016; Djuric, 2016).  
NEETs neither contribute to the economic production nor are they investing in their 
human capital through education and training. The concept of idleness or 
disconnected youth, closely related to the NEET, is related to the idea that young 
people do not have a strong network to support them in the labour market. 
Arulampalam (2001) also considers that there is a strong relationship between the 
initial experience of unemployment amongst young people and their future labour 
market success. The mechanisms behind this relationship can be explained through 
three different processes: deteriorating working skills and loss of experience; 
negative signalling effects to labour market and potential future earnings; and loss of 
social networks. 
Studies provide evidence that the longer the unemployment spells in early working 
life, the larger the skill deterioration and the ‗scarring‘ effect will prevail in the 
future labour market status and at the level of earnings (Ball and Mankiw, 2002; 
Luijkx and Wolbers, 2009; Dietrich, 2012). The shock that leads to unemployment 
leaves a permanent scar through diminishing human capital and signalling of low 
productivity to the labour market. This makes the unemployed less attractive to 
employers and by attaching the social stigma of long-term unemployment leading to 
a higher natural rate of unemployment. Studies found evidence that the early youth 
unemployment has high negative effect on employment prospects while the effect on 
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earnings is slightly lower (Arulampalam, 2001; Gartell, 2009). When evaluating the 
scaring effects one should take into consideration the labour market condition at that 
period. Experiencing unemployment when overall unemployment is low, signals low 
productivity and loss of future earnings compared to being unemployed in periods 
when the aggregate unemployment is high.  
The social capital and social network consist of both formal and informal job-related 
networks which can impact or facilitate reemployment success (McKee-Ryanet al., 
2005). Fugate et al. (2004) argue that social capital and ‗knowing-whom‘ 
competencies increases the employability perspective of the young unemployed and 
young people entering the labour market for the first time do not always have the 
right social network to get a job and the longer the young individual is unemployed it 
is more likely that social capital will be less utilised and developed.                                                                     
Experiencing unemployment as a youth and social exclusion from the labour market 
may also influence mental health of the young unemployed, as various studies show 
(Fernandes and Gabe, 2009; Bell and Blanchflower, 2009). Unemployment spells 
when young can create permanent scars many years later through affecting 
happiness, job satisfaction and wellbeing (Bell and Blanchflower, 2009). Alvaro and 
Garrido (2003) show that the main cause of diminishing well-being of young 
unemployed are financial issues and lack of social inclusion.  
In conclusion, youth unemployment rates in transition economies remain very high 
despite the relatively high economic growth in recent years. Youth unemployment 
rates were disproportionally impacted by the transition process compared to adult 
unemployment rates, mainly because during the restructuring process enterprises 
preserved the employment of existing workers at the expense of new ones, while the 
private sector was unable to create jobs at the rate required to match the inflow of 
entrants to the labour market. Additionally, the low enforcement of labour protection 
legislation and inadequate labour market policies have contributed to the emergence 
of significant informal employment. The transition of youths from school to formal 
work is fraught with difficulties, whilst the low quality of education  in ETEs and 
large mismatch of skills have extended this transition.  
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Appendix 3 – Chapter 3  
Table A3.1.1 Correlation Matrix  
 
             | lnUEflow AL~plag1 ln~Tlag1 lnVaca~1 lnEUflow lnIUflow   lnLFor ShLongUn ShYoun~n ShWome~n PLMPE~g1 Inform~1 GDPgro~h LabFre~1 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    lnUEflow |   1.0000 
 ALMPExplag1 |   0.5578   1.0000 
lnUnemplST~1 |   0.6620  -0.0327   1.0000 
lnVacancie~1 |   0.7412   0.5262   0.2685   1.0000 
    lnEUflow |   0.9731   0.5489   0.6032   0.7317   1.0000 
    lnIUflow |   0.9044   0.4883   0.4424   0.7333   0.9082   1.0000 
      lnLFor |   0.8914   0.2887   0.6974   0.8160   0.8637   0.8612   1.0000 
    ShLongUn |  -0.4215  -0.6585   0.2847  -0.6392  -0.4326  -0.5502  -0.3451   1.0000 
   ShYoungUn |   0.4855   0.6752  -0.0971   0.7084   0.4632   0.5936   0.4624  -0.8000   1.0000 
   ShWomenUn |   0.1894   0.2511  -0.0789   0.1182   0.2215   0.0836  -0.0190  -0.0584  -0.0752   1.0000 
 PLMPExplag1 |   0.3551   0.5176  -0.0139   0.3279   0.4263   0.3733   0.1886  -0.1629   0.2404   0.3060   1.0000 
Informalit~1 |  -0.4673  -0.6293   0.0649  -0.6920  -0.4492  -0.4454  -0.4126   0.4953  -0.5986  -0.5166  -0.4857   1.0000 
   GDPgrowth |  -0.2329  -0.1000  -0.0330  -0.3603  -0.3184  -0.2640  -0.2809   0.1344  -0.1485  -0.2556  -0.1979   0.2597   1.0000 
LabFreeInd~1 |   0.2900  -0.2478   0.5815   0.1270   0.2529   0.1524   0.3751   0.2688  -0.3702   0.0084  -0.2578   0.1091   0.0091   1.0000 
EcoFreeInd~1 |   0.1215   0.4106  -0.1820   0.3788   0.0777   0.0537   0.0390  -0.4151   0.3359   0.2354   0.3193  -0.5060   0.2569   0.0175 
 EduTertiary |  -0.2340   0.3976  -0.6349  -0.0165  -0.2109  -0.2014  -0.4254  -0.4649   0.2274   0.0156   0.1862  -0.0767   0.2767  -0.4317 
EduSecondary |  -0.0982  -0.4907   0.4662  -0.3514  -0.1507  -0.2910  -0.0207   0.6526  -0.5679   0.2063  -0.4664   0.2068  -0.0436   0.4865 
  PopDensity |   0.5054   0.2531   0.2712   0.4855   0.5741   0.5031   0.4871  -0.0486   0.1222   0.3642   0.7950  -0.5142  -0.2946   0.1065 
 
             | EcoFre~1 EduTer~y EduSec~y PopDen~y 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
EcoFreeInd~1 |   1.0000 
 EduTertiary |   0.5224   1.0000 
EduSecondary |  -0.3821  -0.7356   1.0000 
  PopDensity |   0.2886  -0.1212  -0.2356   1.0000 
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Table A3.1.2 Variance Inflation Factor  
 
 All Variables  
 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
      lnLFor |    117.79    0.008490 
EduSecondary |     51.71    0.019337 
lnVacancie~1 |     43.20    0.023146 
    lnEUflow |     42.26    0.023665 
    lnIUflow |     41.86    0.023892 
lnUnemplST~1 |     39.51    0.025307 
  PopDensity |     25.33    0.039472 
 EduTertiary |     21.57    0.046367 
    ShLongUn |     18.86    0.053015 
Informalit~1 |     16.11    0.062064 
   ShYoungUn |     13.71    0.072933 
 PLMPExplag1 |     10.09    0.099082 
 ALMPExplag1 |      9.25    0.108091 
EcoFreeInd~1 |      8.28    0.120725 
   ShWomenUn |      7.40    0.135165 
LabFreeInd~1 |      4.83    0.206904 
   GDPgrowth |      2.64    0.378943 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |     27.91 
 
 
 
Without Shares  
 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
      lnLFor |     63.12    0.015843 
    lnEUflow |     31.99    0.031261 
lnVacancie~1 |     29.61    0.033776 
    lnIUflow |     29.22    0.034221 
EduSecondary |     22.15    0.045140 
lnUnemplST~1 |     18.02    0.055492 
  PopDensity |     13.01    0.076883 
Informalit~1 |     12.85    0.077819 
 EduTertiary |     12.34    0.081053 
 ALMPExplag1 |      8.32    0.120192 
 PLMPExplag1 |      8.29    0.120686 
EcoFreeInd~1 |      4.28    0.233718 
LabFreeInd~1 |      2.66    0.376102 
   GDPgrowth |      2.54    0.394042 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |     18.46 
 
Without EduSecondary  
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
      lnLFor |     62.83    0.015916 
lnVacancie~1 |     23.43    0.042673 
    lnEUflow |     21.59    0.046312 
    lnIUflow |     21.43    0.046670 
lnUnemplST~1 |     16.44    0.060833 
  PopDensity |      9.53    0.104898 
 PLMPExplag1 |      8.17    0.122350 
 ALMPExplag1 |      6.45    0.155083 
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 EduTertiary |      5.94    0.168420 
Informalit~1 |      5.51    0.181638 
EcoFreeInd~1 |      3.98    0.251149 
   GDPgrowth |      2.37    0.422810 
LabFreeInd~1 |      2.23    0.449058 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |     14.61 
 
 
Without EcoFreeIndlag1 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
      lnLFor |     56.66    0.017649 
    lnIUflow |     20.37    0.049101 
    lnEUflow |     19.80    0.050512 
lnVacancie~1 |     19.53    0.051207 
lnUnemplST~1 |     14.52    0.068868 
  PopDensity |      8.94    0.111806 
 PLMPExplag1 |      8.09    0.123612 
 ALMPExplag1 |      6.44    0.155202 
 EduTertiary |      5.08    0.196992 
Informalit~1 |      5.00    0.200001 
   GDPgrowth |      2.10    0.476909 
LabFreeInd~1 |      2.04    0.489056 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |     14.05 
 
Table A3.2.1 Model 1- Random effects estimated results 
 
xtreg lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow lnLFor 
ShLongUn ShYoungUn ShWomenUn PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth LabFreeIndlag1 
EduTertiary PopDensity PopDen2 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15, re 
note: Y11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: Y15 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =         49 
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         14 
 
R-sq:                                           Obs per group: 
     within  = 0.6205                                         min =          1 
     between = 0.9976                                         avg =        3.5 
     overall = 0.9891                                         max =          4 
 
                                                Wald chi2(19)     =    2623.44 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    ALMPExplag1 |   .2103095   .1628138     1.29   0.196    -.1087997    .5294187 
 lnUnemplSTlag1 |   .3639824   .0901802     4.04   0.000     .1872324    .5407323 
lnVacancieslag1 |   .0662571   .0730406     0.91   0.364       -.0769    .2094141 
       lnEUflow |   .3318623   .1077998     3.08   0.002     .1205786    .5431461 
       lnIUflow |   .3332963   .1058643     3.15   0.002     .1258059    .5407866 
         lnLFor |  -.1438179   .2124609    -0.68   0.498    -.5602336    .2725977 
       ShLongUn |   -.002468   .0034364    -0.72   0.473    -.0092032    .0042672 
      ShYoungUn |  -.0030278   .0098497    -0.31   0.759    -.0223328    .0162772 
322 
 
      ShWomenUn |   .0062877   .0118253     0.53   0.595    -.0168895    .0294649 
    PLMPExplag1 |  -.0638675   .1466339    -0.44   0.663    -.3512647    .2235297 
  Informalityl1 |  -.0121141   .0065005    -1.86   0.062    -.0248548    .0006265 
      GDPgrowth |   -.003859   .0127516    -0.30   0.762    -.0288517    .0211337 
 LabFreeIndlag1 |  -.0005993   .0029596    -0.20   0.840    -.0063999    .0052014 
    EduTertiary |    .011437   .0080847     1.41   0.157    -.0044087    .0272827 
     PopDensity |   .0004987   .0027374     0.18   0.855    -.0048664    .0058639 
        PopDen2 |  -1.45e-06   4.60e-06    -0.32   0.752    -.0000105    7.56e-06 
            Y11 |          0  (omitted) 
            Y12 |   .0123046   .0578129     0.21   0.831    -.1010066    .1256158 
            Y13 |  -.0003466   .0489755    -0.01   0.994    -.0963368    .0956436 
            Y14 |  -.0251891   .0455727    -0.55   0.580    -.1145098    .0641317 
            Y15 |          0  (omitted) 
          _cons |   .5270129   1.493766     0.35   0.724    -2.400715    3.454741 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        sigma_u |          0 
        sigma_e |  .07176607 
            rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table A3.2.2 Model 1- Fixed effects estimated results 
 
. xtreg lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow 
lnLFor ShLongUn ShYoungUn ShWomenUn PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth 
LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity PopDen2 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15, fe 
note: Y11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: Y15 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =         49 
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         14 
 
R-sq:                                           Obs per group: 
     within  = 0.8535                                         min =          1 
     between = 0.5840                                         avg =        3.5 
     overall = 0.5876                                         max =          4 
 
                                                F(19,16)          =       4.90 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9936                        Prob > F          =     0.0012 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    ALMPExplag1 |   .3688273   .2250573     1.64   0.121    -.1082728    .8459275 
 lnUnemplSTlag1 |   .2268562   .2461955     0.92   0.371    -.2950549    .7487672 
lnVacancieslag1 |  -.1122832   .1952238    -0.58   0.573    -.5261393    .3015729 
       lnEUflow |   .0969108   .1218783     0.80   0.438    -.1614596    .3552813 
       lnIUflow |   .4306739   .1351354     3.19   0.006     .1441996    .7171481 
         lnLFor |   1.442781   2.521462     0.57   0.575    -3.902479    6.788042 
       ShLongUn |   .0151545   .0077504     1.96   0.068    -.0012755    .0315845 
      ShYoungUn |   .0087283   .0140387     0.62   0.543    -.0210325    .0384891 
      ShWomenUn |   .0046092    .014068     0.33   0.747    -.0252137    .0344321 
    PLMPExplag1 |   .0673884   .2638013     0.26   0.802    -.4918453    .6266221 
  Informalityl1 |  -.1676947   .2030228    -0.83   0.421    -.5980838    .2626945 
      GDPgrowth |  -.0164374   .0170993    -0.96   0.351    -.0526864    .0198116 
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 LabFreeIndlag1 |   .0129254   .0048447     2.67   0.017     .0026552    .0231957 
    EduTertiary |   .0134148   .0287974     0.47   0.648    -.0476328    .0744625 
     PopDensity |   .0333606   .0651036     0.51   0.615    -.1046529    .1713741 
        PopDen2 |  -.0000235   .0000711    -0.33   0.745    -.0001742    .0001272 
            Y11 |          0  (omitted) 
            Y12 |   .2114057   .2666313     0.79   0.439    -.3538273    .7766388 
            Y13 |   .1427422   .2090091     0.68   0.504    -.3003373    .5858217 
            Y14 |   .0671069    .122732     0.55   0.592    -.1930732     .327287 
            Y15 |          0  (omitted) 
          _cons |  -19.69832   35.06323    -0.56   0.582    -94.02904    54.63241 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        sigma_u |  4.0123355 
        sigma_e |  .07176607 
            rho |  .99968018   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
F test that all u_i=0: F(13, 16) = 2.84                      Prob > F = 0.0255 
 
Table A3.2.3 Model 1- Fixed versus Random effects 
 
. hausman fixed random, sigmamore 
 
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (13) does not equal the number 
of coefficients being tested (19); be sure this is what you 
        expect, or there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the output 
of your estimators for anything unexpected and possibly 
        consider scaling your variables so that the coefficients are on a similar 
scale. 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |     fixed        random       Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 ALMPExplag1 |    .3688273     .2103095        .1585179        .2565864 
lnUnemplST~1 |    .2268562     .3639824       -.1371262        .3199591 
lnVacancie~1 |   -.1122832     .0662571       -.1785403        .2532791 
    lnEUflow |    .0969108     .3318623       -.2349515        .1243428 
    lnIUflow |    .4306739     .3332963        .0973776        .1486159 
      lnLFor |    1.442781    -.1438179        1.586599        3.397962 
    ShLongUn |    .0151545     -.002468        .0176226        .0098846 
   ShYoungUn |    .0087283    -.0030278        .0117561        .0161958 
   ShWomenUn |    .0046092     .0062877       -.0016785        .0148656 
 PLMPExplag1 |    .0673884    -.0638675        .1312559        .3246149 
Informalit~1 |   -.1676947    -.0121141       -.1555805         .274054 
   GDPgrowth |   -.0164374     -.003859       -.0125785        .0192476 
LabFreeInd~1 |    .0129254    -.0005993        .0135247        .0058337 
 EduTertiary |    .0134148      .011437        .0019778        .0380338 
  PopDensity |    .0333606     .0004987        .0328619        .0878634 
     PopDen2 |   -.0000235    -1.45e-06       -.0000221        .0000959 
         Y12 |    .2114057     .0123046        .1991011         .355346 
         Y13 |    .1427422    -.0003466        .1430888        .2779319 
         Y14 |    .0671069    -.0251891         .092296        .1593291 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
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    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                 chi2(13) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       20.22 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0898 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
 
Table A3.2.4 Model 1- Diagnostic tests 
 
. xttest3 
 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
 
chi2 (14)  =     139.46 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
 
 
. xtserial lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow 
lnLFor ShLongUn ShYoungUn ShWomenUn PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth 
LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity PopDen2 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,      10) =      1.392 
           Prob > F =      0.2653 
 
 
. pantest2 lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow 
lnLFor ShLongUn ShYoungUn ShWomenUn PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth 
LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity PopDen2 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 
 
 
Test for serial correlation in residuals 
Null hypothesis is either that rho=0 if residuals are AR(1) 
or that lamda=0 if residuals are MA(1) 
Following tests only approximate for unbalanced panels 
LM= .26778097 
which is asy. distributed as chisq(1) under null, so: 
Probability of value greater than LM is .60482422 
LM5= .51747557 
which is asy. distributed as N(0,1) under null, so: 
Probability of value greater than abs(LM5) is .30241211 
 
 
Test for significance of fixed effects 
F= 2.8362991 
Probability>F= .02553437 
 
 
Test for normality of residuals 
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                    Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality 
                                                          ------ joint ------ 
    Variable |        Obs  Pr(Skewness)  Pr(Kurtosis) adj chi2(2)   Prob>chi2 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    __00000B |         49     0.2923        0.9317        1.16         0.5585 
 
Table A3.3.1 Model 2 - Random effects estimated results 
 
. xtreg lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow 
lnLFor PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity 
PopDen2 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15, re 
note: Y11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: Y15 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =         49 
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         14 
 
R-sq:                                           Obs per group: 
     within  = 0.6312                                         min =          1 
     between = 0.9971                                         avg =        3.5 
     overall = 0.9887                                         max =          4 
 
                                                Wald chi2(16)     =    2803.39 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    ALMPExplag1 |   .2090653   .1473779     1.42   0.156      -.07979    .4979206 
 lnUnemplSTlag1 |   .3574434   .0668219     5.35   0.000     .2264749    .4884119 
lnVacancieslag1 |   .0790493   .0595936     1.33   0.185    -.0377519    .1958506 
       lnEUflow |   .3632491   .0992787     3.66   0.000     .1686664    .5578318 
       lnIUflow |   .3667876   .0847777     4.33   0.000     .2006265    .5329488 
         lnLFor |  -.2094547   .1292363    -1.62   0.105    -.4627532    .0438437 
    PLMPExplag1 |  -.1249271   .1156449    -1.08   0.280    -.3515869    .1017327 
  Informalityl1 |  -.0134375   .0046894    -2.87   0.004    -.0226284   -.0042465 
      GDPgrowth |  -.0053599   .0121389    -0.44   0.659    -.0291517    .0184318 
 LabFreeIndlag1 |  -.0001254   .0016943    -0.07   0.941    -.0034461    .0031953 
    EduTertiary |   .0154241   .0058656     2.63   0.009     .0039277    .0269206 
     PopDensity |   .0016755   .0012723     1.32   0.188    -.0008181    .0041691 
        PopDen2 |  -3.46e-06   2.16e-06    -1.60   0.110    -7.70e-06    7.83e-07 
            Y11 |          0  (omitted) 
            Y12 |     .02382   .0513156     0.46   0.643    -.0767567    .1243966 
            Y13 |  -.0084442    .042042    -0.20   0.841    -.0908451    .0739566 
            Y14 |  -.0306881    .041683    -0.74   0.462    -.1123853    .0510091 
            Y15 |          0  (omitted) 
          _cons |   .7382203   .6429947     1.15   0.251     -.522026    1.998467 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        sigma_u |          0 
        sigma_e |  .07381611 
            rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table A3.3.2 Model 2- Fixed effects estimated results  
 
. xtreg lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow 
lnLFor PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity 
PopDen2 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15, fe 
note: Y11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: Y15 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =         49 
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of groups  =         14 
 
R-sq:                                           Obs per group: 
     within  = 0.8159                                         min =          1 
     between = 0.3374                                         avg =        3.5 
     overall = 0.3443                                         max =          4 
 
                                                F(16,19)          =       5.26 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9938                        Prob > F          =     0.0004 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    ALMPExplag1 |   .2690424    .217477     1.24   0.231    -.1861421     .724227 
 lnUnemplSTlag1 |   .4761076   .1919659     2.48   0.023     .0743184    .8778967 
lnVacancieslag1 |   -.159109   .1904059    -0.84   0.414     -.557633    .2394151 
       lnEUflow |    .055846   .1134434     0.49   0.628    -.1815938    .2932857 
       lnIUflow |   .4352632    .136523     3.19   0.005     .1495172    .7210091 
         lnLFor |  -.2635231   2.425759    -0.11   0.915    -5.340695    4.813649 
    PLMPExplag1 |  -.0401567   .2615544    -0.15   0.880    -.5875963    .5072829 
  Informalityl1 |  -.1038271   .1932142    -0.54   0.597     -.508229    .3005748 
      GDPgrowth |  -.0123861   .0171245    -0.72   0.478    -.0482281    .0234559 
 LabFreeIndlag1 |    .012366   .0048525     2.55   0.020     .0022097    .0225223 
    EduTertiary |   .0175104   .0282197     0.62   0.542    -.0415542    .0765749 
     PopDensity |   .0788168   .0615362     1.28   0.216    -.0499798    .2076135 
        PopDen2 |  -.0000757   .0000664    -1.14   0.269    -.0002146    .0000633 
            Y11 |          0  (omitted) 
            Y12 |   .1239867   .2518366     0.49   0.628    -.4031134    .6510869 
            Y13 |   .1184844   .2047234     0.58   0.570    -.3100066    .5469753 
            Y14 |   .0543626     .12139     0.45   0.659    -.1997096    .3084348 
            Y15 |          0  (omitted) 
          _cons |  -.1809657   34.31742    -0.01   0.996    -72.00816    71.64623 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        sigma_u |   5.041739 
        sigma_e |  .07381611 
            rho |  .99978569   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
F test that all u_i=0: F(13, 19) = 2.51                      Prob > F = 0.0337 
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Table A3.3.3 Model 2 - Fixed effects versus Random effects 
 
. hausman fixed random, sigmamore 
 
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (13) does not equal the number 
of coefficients being tested (16); be sure this is what you 
        expect, or there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the output 
of your estimators for anything unexpected and possibly 
        consider scaling your variables so that the coefficients are on a similar 
scale. 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |     fixed        random       Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 ALMPExplag1 |    .2690424     .2090653        .0599771        .2335095 
lnUnemplST~1 |    .4761076     .3574434        .1186642        .2343985 
lnVacancie~1 |    -.159109     .0790493       -.2381583        .2342964 
    lnEUflow |     .055846     .3632491       -.3074031        .1043584 
    lnIUflow |    .4352632     .3667876        .0684755        .1511958 
      lnLFor |   -.2635231    -.2094547       -.0540683         3.07725 
 PLMPExplag1 |   -.0401567    -.1249271        .0847704         .311307 
Informalit~1 |   -.1038271    -.0134375       -.0903897        .2452773 
   GDPgrowth |   -.0123861    -.0053599       -.0070262        .0180388 
LabFreeInd~1 |     .012366    -.0001254        .0124914        .0059236 
 EduTertiary |    .0175104     .0154241        .0020862        .0353469 
  PopDensity |    .0788168     .0016755        .0771413        .0781215 
     PopDen2 |   -.0000757    -3.46e-06       -.0000722        .0000843 
         Y12 |    .1239867       .02382        .1001667          .31561 
         Y13 |    .1184844    -.0084442        .1269286        .2565128 
         Y14 |    .0543626    -.0306881        .0850507        .1483843 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                 chi2(13) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       20.21 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0900 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
Table A3.3.4 Model 2- Diagnostic tests 
 
. xttest3 
 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
 
chi2 (14)  =    2.0e+26 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000   -  presence of heteroscedasticity  
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. xtserial lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow 
lnLFor PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth LabFreeIndlag1 Ed 
> uTertiary PopDensity PopDen2 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,      10) =      0.615 
           Prob > F =      0.4509    - no serial correlation  
 
 
 
. pantest2 lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow 
lnLFor PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth LabFreeIndlag1 Ed 
> uTertiary PopDensity PopDen2 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 
 
 
Test for serial correlation in residuals 
Null hypothesis is either that rho=0 if residuals are AR(1) 
or that lamda=0 if residuals are MA(1) 
Following tests only approximate for unbalanced panels 
LM= .14305331 
which is asy. distributed as chisq(1) under null, so: 
Probability of value greater than LM is .70526428 
LM5= .37822389 
which is asy. distributed as N(0,1) under null, so: 
Probability of value greater than abs(LM5) is .35263214 
 
 
Test for significance of fixed effects 
F= 2.5067412 
Probability>F= .03365295 
 
 
Test for normality of residuals 
 
                    Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality 
                                                          ------ joint ------ 
    Variable |        Obs  Pr(Skewness)  Pr(Kurtosis) adj chi2(2)   Prob>chi2 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    __00000B |         49     0.3764        0.7780        0.89         0.6393   - 
there is normality in the residuals  
 
Table A3.4.1 Model 1 - Fixed effects Driscoll Kraay standard 
errors 
. xtscc lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow 
lnLFor ShLongUn ShYoungUn ShWomenUn PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth 
LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity PopDen2 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        49 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        14 
Group variable (i): CountryID                    F( 21,     3)     =      3.31 
maximum lag: 1                                   Prob > F          =    0.1767 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.8535 
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                |             Drisc/Kraay 
       lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    ALMPExplag1 |   .3688273   .1176355     3.14   0.052    -.0055414    .7431961 
 lnUnemplSTlag1 |   .2268562   .1354863     1.67   0.193    -.2043218    .6580341 
lnVacancieslag1 |  -.1122832   .1432888    -0.78   0.490    -.5682921    .3437257 
       lnEUflow |   .0969108   .1009649     0.96   0.408    -.2244045    .4182262 
       lnIUflow |   .4306739   .1890671     2.28   0.107    -.1710221     1.03237 
         lnLFor |   1.442781   1.026804     1.41   0.255    -1.824968     4.71053 
       ShLongUn |   .0151545   .0077352     1.96   0.145    -.0094623    .0397714 
      ShYoungUn |   .0087283   .0073409     1.19   0.320    -.0146339    .0320904 
      ShWomenUn |   .0046092   .0008516     5.41   0.012     .0018991    .0073193 
    PLMPExplag1 |   .0673884   .1566408     0.43   0.696    -.4311124    .5658893 
  Informalityl1 |  -.1676947   .1454643    -1.15   0.333     -.630627    .2952376 
      GDPgrowth |  -.0164374   .0119613    -1.37   0.263    -.0545035    .0216286 
 LabFreeIndlag1 |   .0129254   .0026244     4.93   0.016     .0045734    .0212774 
    EduTertiary |   .0134148   .0128297     1.05   0.373    -.0274151    .0542448 
     PopDensity |   .0333606   .0361021     0.92   0.424    -.0815324    .1482536 
        PopDen2 |  -.0000235   .0000385    -0.61   0.584    -.0001461     .000099 
            Y11 |          0  (omitted) 
            Y12 |  -19.48691   17.04874    -1.14   0.336    -73.74362     34.7698 
            Y13 |  -19.55557   17.03529    -1.15   0.334    -73.76946    34.65831 
            Y14 |  -19.63121   16.98838    -1.16   0.332    -73.69582     34.4334 
            Y15 |  -19.69832   16.92031    -1.16   0.329    -73.54629    34.14966 
          _cons |          0  (omitted) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table A3.4.2 Model 2 - Fixed effects Driscoll Kraay standard 
errors 
 
. xtscc lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow 
lnLFor PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity 
PopDen2 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        49 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        14 
Group variable (i): CountryID                    F( 18,     3)     =      1.33 
maximum lag: 1                                   Prob > F          =    0.4644 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.8159 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                |             Drisc/Kraay 
       lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    ALMPExplag1 |   .2690424   .0867664     3.10   0.053    -.0070869    .5451717 
 lnUnemplSTlag1 |   .4761076   .0784168     6.07   0.009     .2265503    .7256648 
lnVacancieslag1 |   -.159109   .1562102    -1.02   0.383    -.6562396    .3380217 
       lnEUflow |    .055846   .1081853     0.52   0.641    -.2884479    .4001399 
       lnIUflow |   .4352632   .1391011     3.13   0.052    -.0074187    .8779451 
         lnLFor |  -.2635231   .9905391    -0.27   0.807    -3.415861    2.888814 
    PLMPExplag1 |  -.0401567   .1484008    -0.27   0.804    -.5124342    .4321208 
  Informalityl1 |  -.1038271   .1343679    -0.77   0.496    -.5314456    .3237914 
      GDPgrowth |  -.0123861   .0090679    -1.37   0.265    -.0412443     .016472 
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 LabFreeIndlag1 |    .012366   .0026824     4.61   0.019     .0038292    .0209027 
    EduTertiary |   .0175104   .0073643     2.38   0.098    -.0059262     .040947 
     PopDensity |   .0788168   .0193167     4.08   0.027     .0173424    .1402913 
        PopDen2 |  -.0000757   .0000108    -6.99   0.006    -.0001101   -.0000412 
            Y11 |          0  (omitted) 
            Y12 |  -.0569791   15.46727    -0.00   0.997    -49.28075    49.16679 
            Y13 |  -.0624814     15.471    -0.00   0.997    -49.29811    49.17314 
            Y14 |  -.1266032   15.47161    -0.01   0.994    -49.36416    49.11095 
            Y15 |  -.1809658    15.4614    -0.01   0.991    -49.38603     49.0241 
          _cons |          0  (omitted) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table A3.4.3 Model 3 - Fixed effects Vector Decomposition 
 
. xtfevd lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow 
lnLFor ShYoungUn ShLongUn ShWomenUn PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth 
LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity PopDen2 Transition TransAlmp Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 
Y15 , invariant (ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow 
lnLFor ShYoungUn ShLongUn  Informalityl1 LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity 
Transition TransAlmp Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 ) 
note: Y11 dropped because of collinearity 
note: Y12 dropped because of collinearity 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =       14           number of obs       =       49 
mean squared error         = .0012914           F( 23, 14)          = 69.61665 
root mean squared error    = .0359362           Prob > F            = 9.57e-11 
Residual Sum of Squares    = .0632792           R-squared           = .9974593 
Total Sum of Squares       = 24.90641           adj. R-squared      = .9912891 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 24.84313 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                |                fevd 
       lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ShWomenUn |  -.0058359   .0116968    -0.50   0.626    -.0309231    .0192513 
    PLMPExplag1 |   .1403465   .2084367     0.67   0.512    -.3067057    .5873987 
      GDPgrowth |  -.0175212   .0140616    -1.25   0.233    -.0476804    .0126379 
        PopDen2 |  -8.37e-06   .0000178    -0.47   0.645    -.0000465    .0000298 
    ALMPExplag1 |  -.0158621    .257772    -0.06   0.952    -.5687281     .537004 
 lnUnemplSTlag1 |   .4191055   .1659405     2.53   0.024     .0631986    .7750124 
lnVacancieslag1 |   .0098564   .1213886     0.08   0.936    -.2504962     .270209 
       lnEUflow |   .2988957    .177792     1.68   0.115    -.0824303    .6802218 
       lnIUflow |   .3525121   .1474683     2.39   0.031     .0362242    .6688001 
         lnLFor |   -.232976   .3304523    -0.71   0.492    -.9417256    .4757736 
      ShYoungUn |   .0163243    .017277     0.94   0.361    -.0207312    .0533797 
       ShLongUn |  -.0051206   .0055562    -0.92   0.372    -.0170374    .0067963 
  Informalityl1 |  -.0150511   .0187811    -0.80   0.436    -.0553326    .0252303 
 LabFreeIndlag1 |   .0051965   .0066247     0.78   0.446    -.0090122    .0194051 
    EduTertiary |   .0231657   .0133591     1.73   0.105    -.0054868    .0518182 
     PopDensity |   .0041234   .0102543     0.40   0.694    -.0178698    .0261167 
     Transition |   .0253691   .8496806     0.03   0.977    -1.797015    1.847753 
      TransAlmp |   .2156918     .27136     0.79   0.440    -.3663175    .7977011 
            Y13 |  -.0317285   .0464383    -0.68   0.506    -.1313287    .0678717 
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            Y14 |  -.0340524   .0509123    -0.67   0.514    -.1432484    .0751435 
            Y15 |    .021637   .0590033     0.37   0.719    -.1049126    .1481865 
            eta |   .9999999          .        .       .            .           . 
          _cons |   1.229792   2.636751     0.47   0.648    -4.425476     6.88506 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table A3.4.4 Model 4 – Fixed effects Vector Decomposition 
 
. xtfevd lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow 
lnLFor PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity 
PopDen2 Transition TransAlmp Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 , invariant (ALMPExplag1 
lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow lnLFor Informalityl1 
LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity Transition TransAlmp Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 ) 
note: Y11 dropped because of collinearity 
note: Y12 dropped because of collinearity 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =       17           number of obs       =       49 
mean squared error         = .0018075           F( 20, 17)          = 22.45638 
root mean squared error    = .0425151           Prob > F            = 1.88e-08 
Residual Sum of Squares    = .0885691           R-squared           = .9964439 
Total Sum of Squares       = 24.90641           adj. R-squared      = .9899593 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 24.81784 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                |                fevd 
       lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    PLMPExplag1 |   .0350401   .5739618     0.06   0.952    -1.175913    1.245994 
      GDPgrowth |  -.0108214   .0259919    -0.42   0.682    -.0656594    .0440166 
        PopDen2 |  -.0000545   .0000332    -1.64   0.119    -.0001245    .0000155 
    ALMPExplag1 |   -.438968   .3977543    -1.10   0.285    -1.278156    .4002202 
 lnUnemplSTlag1 |    .741545   .3209103     2.31   0.034     .0644834    1.418607 
lnVacancieslag1 |  -.1352387   .2291942    -0.59   0.563    -.6187962    .3483187 
       lnEUflow |  -.0837976   .3860516    -0.22   0.831    -.8982952       .7307 
       lnIUflow |   .7539002   .3600563     2.09   0.052    -.0057521    1.513553 
         lnLFor |  -.6835512   .6375332    -1.07   0.299    -2.028629    .6615262 
  Informalityl1 |   .0231103   .0362731     0.64   0.533    -.0534192    .0996399 
 LabFreeIndlag1 |   .0120507   .0087954     1.37   0.188     -.006506    .0306075 
    EduTertiary |   .0613646   .0232273     2.64   0.017     .0123593    .1103699 
     PopDensity |   .0284794   .0192276     1.48   0.157    -.0120873    .0690461 
     Transition |   -2.35014    1.93987    -1.21   0.242    -6.442908    1.742627 
      TransAlmp |  -.5686798   .4616829    -1.23   0.235    -1.542746    .4053859 
            Y13 |   .0076052   .0695641     0.11   0.914    -.1391621    .1543726 
            Y14 |  -.0414401   .0850589    -0.49   0.632    -.2208986    .1380184 
            Y15 |  -.1038633   .1160867    -0.89   0.383    -.3487847    .1410581 
            eta |   .9999999          .        .       .            .           . 
          _cons |    3.47707   4.922688     0.71   0.490    -6.908894    13.86303 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table A3.4.5 Models 1 and 2 Fixed Effects Driscoll Kraay 
including variable ALMPExp2lag1 
 
. xtscc lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 ALMPExp2lag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow 
lnIUflow lnLFor ShLongUn ShYoungUn ShWomenUn PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth 
LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity PopDen2 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        49 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        14 
Group variable (i): CountryID                    F( 22,     3)     =      3.94 
maximum lag: 1                                   Prob > F          =    0.1420 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.8585 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                |             Drisc/Kraay 
       lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    ALMPExplag1 |   .7873498   .3370624     2.34   0.102    -.2853333    1.860033 
   ALMPExp2lag1 |  -.4487401   .4584658    -0.98   0.400    -1.907783    1.010303 
 lnUnemplSTlag1 |   .2384307   .1863354     1.28   0.291    -.3545718    .8314332 
lnVacancieslag1 |   .0134431   .2487156     0.05   0.960    -.7780809    .8049672 
       lnEUflow |   .0953937    .102901     0.93   0.422    -.2320833    .4228707 
       lnIUflow |   .4695351   .1593043     2.95   0.060    -.0374424    .9765126 
         lnLFor |   1.973188   1.059726     1.86   0.160    -1.399333    5.345709 
       ShLongUn |   .0151473   .0079844     1.90   0.154    -.0102626    .0405572 
      ShYoungUn |   .0122288   .0095327     1.28   0.290    -.0181085     .042566 
      ShWomenUn |   .0032965   .0015315     2.15   0.120    -.0015773    .0081703 
    PLMPExplag1 |   .0656843   .1094917     0.60   0.591    -.2827671    .4141357 
  Informalityl1 |    -.11949   .1260839    -0.95   0.413    -.5207452    .2817653 
      GDPgrowth |  -.0179593   .0124625    -1.44   0.245    -.0576204    .0217019 
 LabFreeIndlag1 |   .0122958   .0027511     4.47   0.021     .0035406     .021051 
    EduTertiary |   .0193682   .0116445     1.66   0.195    -.0176899    .0564263 
     PopDensity |   .0510252   .0496425     1.03   0.380    -.1069595    .2090099 
        PopDen2 |  -.0000449   .0000522    -0.86   0.453    -.0002111    .0001213 
            Y11 |          0  (omitted) 
            Y12 |  -31.71955   20.36695    -1.56   0.217    -96.53628    33.09717 
            Y13 |  -31.79522    20.3563    -1.56   0.216    -96.57807    32.98762 
            Y14 |   -31.8416    20.3106    -1.57   0.215    -96.47899     32.7958 
            Y15 |  -31.88043   20.25141    -1.57   0.214    -96.32945     32.5686 
          _cons |          0  (omitted) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
. xtscc lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 ALMPExp2lag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow 
lnIUflow lnLFor PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary 
PopDensity PopDen2 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        49 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        14 
Group variable (i): CountryID                    F( 19,     3)     =      2.61 
maximum lag: 1                                   Prob > F          =    0.2338 
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                                                 within R-squared  =    0.8194 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                |             Drisc/Kraay 
       lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    ALMPExplag1 |   .6077271   .3899977     1.56   0.217    -.6334197    1.848874 
   ALMPExp2lag1 |  -.3537821   .4206666    -0.84   0.462    -1.692531    .9849667 
 lnUnemplSTlag1 |   .4692318   .0901878     5.20   0.014     .1822139    .7562497 
lnVacancieslag1 |   -.058317   .2611418    -0.22   0.838    -.8893867    .7727527 
       lnEUflow |   .0562167   .1079838     0.52   0.639     -.287436    .3998695 
       lnIUflow |   .4680013   .1033823     4.53   0.020     .1389926      .79701 
         lnLFor |   .1189252   .8712911     0.14   0.900    -2.653912    2.891762 
    PLMPExplag1 |  -.0333812   .1280158    -0.26   0.811    -.4407847    .3740223 
  Informalityl1 |    -.05488   .0877199    -0.63   0.576    -.3340439    .2242839 
      GDPgrowth |  -.0129878    .011126    -1.17   0.327    -.0483957      .02242 
 LabFreeIndlag1 |   .0119602    .002625     4.56   0.020     .0036063    .0203141 
    EduTertiary |   .0208572   .0047789     4.36   0.022     .0056487    .0360656 
     PopDensity |   .0906636   .0365489     2.48   0.089    -.0256512    .2069784 
        PopDen2 |  -.0000913   .0000313    -2.92   0.062    -.0001909    8.28e-06 
            Y11 |          0  (omitted) 
            Y12 |   -9.05307   16.37816    -0.55   0.619    -61.17567    43.06953 
            Y13 |  -9.056876   16.40471    -0.55   0.619      -61.264    43.15025 
            Y14 |  -9.096417   16.42043    -0.55   0.618    -61.35354    43.16071 
            Y15 |  -9.126938   16.43499    -0.56   0.617    -61.43041    43.17654 
          _cons |          0  (omitted) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table A3.4.6  Models 3 and 4 Fixed Effects Vector 
Decomposition including variable ALMPExp2lag1 
 
. xtfevd lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 ALMPExp2lag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow 
lnIUflow lnLFor ShYoungUn ShLongUn ShWomenUn PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth 
LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity PopDen2 Transition TransAlmp Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 
Y15 , invariant (ALMPExplag1 ALMPExp2lag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow 
lnIUflow lnLFor ShYoungUn ShLongUn  Informalityl1 LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary 
PopDensity Transition TransAlmp Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 ) 
note: Y11 dropped because of collinearity 
note: Y12 dropped because of collinearity 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =       13           number of obs       =       49 
mean squared error         = .0010851           F( 24, 13)          = 38.26931 
root mean squared error    = .0329414           Prob > F            = 1.68e-08 
Residual Sum of Squares    = .0531717           R-squared           = .9978651 
Total Sum of Squares       = 24.90641           adj. R-squared      = .9921174 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 24.85324 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                |                fevd 
       lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ShWomenUn |  -.0108913   .0131917    -0.83   0.424    -.0393903    .0176077 
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    PLMPExplag1 |   .1540743   .3486001     0.44   0.666    -.5990305    .9071791 
      GDPgrowth |  -.0207964   .0197345    -1.05   0.311    -.0634302    .0218375 
        PopDen2 |  -.0000472   .0000404    -1.17   0.264    -.0001346    .0000402 
    ALMPExplag1 |   1.790506   .9396866     1.91   0.079    -.2395636    3.820575 
   ALMPExp2lag1 |  -2.127342   1.241152    -1.71   0.110    -4.808688     .554005 
 lnUnemplSTlag1 |   .9426165   .4341394     2.17   0.049     .0047153    1.880518 
lnVacancieslag1 |   -.037702   .1758484    -0.21   0.834    -.4175994    .3421954 
       lnEUflow |  -.0928856   .3347186    -0.28   0.786    -.8160011    .6302298 
       lnIUflow |   .6879981   .3395405     2.03   0.064    -.0455345    1.421531 
         lnLFor |  -1.084635   .8691929    -1.25   0.234    -2.962412     .793142 
      ShYoungUn |   .0571737   .0396419     1.44   0.173    -.0284675     .142815 
       ShLongUn |  -.0173056   .0113277    -1.53   0.151    -.0417775    .0071664 
  Informalityl1 |   .0189463   .0410171     0.46   0.652    -.0696658    .1075584 
 LabFreeIndlag1 |   .0201829   .0149671     1.35   0.201    -.0121515    .0525172 
    EduTertiary |   .0500081   .0250329     2.00   0.067    -.0040722    .1040884 
     PopDensity |   .0256487   .0231261     1.11   0.287    -.0243123    .0756097 
     Transition |  -.9791195   1.581596    -0.62   0.547     -4.39595    2.437711 
      TransAlmp |  -.7150214   .6183255    -1.16   0.268    -2.050833    .6207896 
            Y13 |   .0200127   .0644501     0.31   0.761    -.1192234    .1592487 
            Y14 |    .085404   .0995331     0.86   0.406    -.1296242    .3004322 
            Y15 |   .1089978   .1024187     1.06   0.307    -.1122643    .3302599 
            eta |   .9999999          .        .       .            .           . 
          _cons |   5.340617   5.482036     0.97   0.348    -6.502601    17.18384 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
. xtfevd lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 ALMPExp2lag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow 
lnIUflow lnLFor PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth LabFr 
> eeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity PopDen2 Transition TransAlmp Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 
Y15 , invariant (ALMPExplag1 ALMPExp2lag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnV 
> acancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow lnLFor  Informalityl1 LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary 
PopDensity Transition TransAlmp Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15) 
note: Y11 dropped because of collinearity 
note: Y12 dropped because of collinearity 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =       16           number of obs       =       49 
mean squared error         = .0017237           F( 21, 16)          = 19.53196 
root mean squared error    = .0415175           Prob > F            = 1.10e-07 
Residual Sum of Squares    = .0844616           R-squared           = .9966088 
Total Sum of Squares       = 24.90641           adj. R-squared      = .9898265 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 24.82195 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                |                fevd 
       lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    PLMPExplag1 |   .0509783   .7971499     0.06   0.950    -1.638904    1.740861 
      GDPgrowth |  -.0115687   .0298803    -0.39   0.704     -.074912    .0517746 
        PopDen2 |  -.0000756   .0000489    -1.55   0.142    -.0001792    .0000281 
    ALMPExplag1 |   1.347909    .902694     1.49   0.155    -.5657164    3.261535 
   ALMPExp2lag1 |  -1.772241   1.074527    -1.65   0.119    -4.050137    .5056553 
 lnUnemplSTlag1 |    1.01864   .5241696     1.94   0.070    -.0925502     2.12983 
lnVacancieslag1 |  -.0726656   .2938228    -0.25   0.808    -.6955422     .550211 
       lnEUflow |  -.2974786   .5234511    -0.57   0.578    -1.407145    .8121881 
       lnIUflow |    1.04201   .5664403     1.84   0.084    -.1587902    2.242809 
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         lnLFor |  -1.146352   1.055432    -1.09   0.294    -3.383768    1.091063 
  Informalityl1 |   .0412155   .0531294     0.78   0.449    -.0714138    .1538448 
 LabFreeIndlag1 |   .0160274   .0120378     1.33   0.202    -.0094915    .0415463 
    EduTertiary |   .0777053    .030306     2.56   0.021     .0134595    .1419511 
     PopDensity |   .0392475   .0280018     1.40   0.180    -.0201137    .0986087 
     Transition |  -2.911803   2.682918    -1.09   0.294    -8.599335    2.775729 
      TransAlmp |  -1.811259   .8934914    -2.03   0.060    -3.705376    .0828586 
            Y13 |   .0566402   .0849011     0.67   0.514    -.1233421    .2366225 
            Y14 |   .0363491   .1080994     0.34   0.741    -.1928114    .2655095 
            Y15 |  -.1149681   .1441653    -0.80   0.437    -.4205849    .1906488 
            eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
          _cons |   4.172804    6.86928     0.61   0.552    -10.38942    18.73503 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table A3.5 Returns to Scale 
 
Model 1  
 
. xtscc lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow 
lnLFor ShLongUn ShYoungUn ShWomenUn PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth 
LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity PopDen2 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15, fe 
 
 
. lincom lnUnemplSTlag1+ lnVacancieslag1+ lnEUflow+ lnIUflow 
 
 ( 1)  lnUnemplSTlag1 + lnVacancieslag1 + lnEUflow + lnIUflow = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .6421577   .1653083     3.88   0.030     .1160728    1.168242 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Model 2  
 
. xtscc lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow 
lnLFor PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity 
PopDen2 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15, fe 
 
 
. lincom lnUnemplSTlag1+ lnVacancieslag1+ lnEUflow+ lnIUflow 
 
 ( 1)  lnUnemplSTlag1 + lnVacancieslag1 + lnEUflow + lnIUflow = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .8081077   .1892566     4.27   0.024     .2058087    1.410407 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Model 3  
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. xtfevd lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow 
lnLFor ShYoungUn ShLongUn ShWomenUn PLMPExplag1 Informality 
> l1 GDPgrowth LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity PopDen2 Transition TransAlmp 
Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 , invariant (ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag 
> 1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow lnLFor ShYoungUn ShLongUn  Informalityl1 
LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity Transition TransAlmp Y1 
> 1 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 ) 
 
 
 
. lincom lnUnemplSTlag1+ lnVacancieslag1+ lnEUflow+ lnIUflow 
 
 ( 1)  lnUnemplSTlag1 + lnVacancieslag1 + lnEUflow + lnIUflow = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |    1.08037   .2345406     4.61   0.000     .5773303    1.583409 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Model 4 
 
. xtfevd lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow 
lnLFor PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth LabFreeIndlag1 Edu 
> Tertiary PopDensity PopDen2 Transition TransAlmp Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 , invariant 
(ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIU 
> flow lnLFor Informalityl1 LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity Transition 
TransAlmp Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15) 
 
 
. lincom lnUnemplSTlag1+ lnVacancieslag1+ lnEUflow+ lnIUflow 
 
 ( 1)  lnUnemplSTlag1 + lnVacancieslag1 + lnEUflow + lnIUflow = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   1.276409   .4374473     2.92   0.010     .3534757    2.199342 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Model 5  
 
. . xtscc lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow 
lnLFor ShLongUn ShYoungUn ShWomenUn PLMPExplag1 Informalityl 
> 1 GDPgrowth LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity PopDen2 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 if 
Transition==1, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        37 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        11 
Group variable (i): CountryID                    F( 21,     3)     =     59.51 
maximum lag: 1                                   Prob > F          =    0.0031 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.9254 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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                |             Drisc/Kraay 
       lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    ALMPExplag1 |   .4413269   .1936163     2.28   0.107    -.1748465      1.0575 
 lnUnemplSTlag1 |   .6316515   .2171559     2.91   0.062    -.0594354    1.322738 
lnVacancieslag1 |  -.0457022   .0839903    -0.54   0.624    -.3129967    .2215924 
       lnEUflow |   .2216063   .1051707     2.11   0.126    -.1130937    .5563064 
       lnIUflow |   .5030952   .2157519     2.33   0.102    -.1835237    1.189714 
         lnLFor |   1.156418   2.108172     0.55   0.622    -5.552726    7.865561 
       ShLongUn |   .0202351   .0053119     3.81   0.032     .0033303    .0371399 
      ShYoungUn |  -.0200766   .0212113    -0.95   0.414    -.0875803    .0474271 
      ShWomenUn |  -.0110116   .0041788    -2.64   0.078    -.0243103     .002287 
    PLMPExplag1 |  -.2921545    .250742    -1.17   0.328    -1.090128    .5058186 
  Informalityl1 |   -.214972   .1116682    -1.93   0.150    -.5703501     .140406 
      GDPgrowth |  -.0578897   .0195133    -2.97   0.059    -.1199896    .0042102 
 LabFreeIndlag1 |   .0187806   .0033658     5.58   0.011     .0080692    .0294919 
    EduTertiary |   .0375509   .0254929     1.47   0.237    -.0435788    .1186806 
     PopDensity |  -.1337318   .0933328    -1.43   0.247    -.4307584    .1632947 
        PopDen2 |    .001215   .0004007     3.03   0.056    -.0000601    .0024902 
            Y11 |          0  (omitted) 
            Y12 |          0  (omitted) 
            Y13 |  -.2366143   .0568152    -4.16   0.025    -.4174256   -.0558031 
            Y14 |  -.3754613   .0958131    -3.92   0.030    -.6803812   -.0705413 
            Y15 |  -.4766822   .1275645    -3.74   0.033    -.8826495   -.0707149 
          _cons |  -16.40543   28.79176    -0.57   0.609    -108.0336    75.22279 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
. lincom lnUnemplSTlag1+ lnVacancieslag1+ lnEUflow+ lnIUflow 
 
 ( 1)  lnUnemplSTlag1 + lnVacancieslag1 + lnEUflow + lnIUflow = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   1.310651    .161662     8.11   0.004     .7961702    1.825132 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
 
Model 6  
 
 
. . xtscc lnUEflow ALMPExplag1 lnUnemplSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow 
lnLFor PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth LabFreeIndlag1 Ed 
> uTertiary PopDensity PopDen2 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 if Transition==1, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        37 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        11 
Group variable (i): CountryID                    F( 18,     3)     =      6.53 
maximum lag: 1                                   Prob > F          =    0.0737 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.8681 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                |             Drisc/Kraay 
       lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    ALMPExplag1 |   .4089648   .1481309     2.76   0.070     -.062454    .8803836 
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 lnUnemplSTlag1 |   .7502171   .2230092     3.36   0.044     .0405024    1.459932 
lnVacancieslag1 |  -.1898325    .155245    -1.22   0.309    -.6838913    .3042263 
       lnEUflow |   .0612245   .1426543     0.43   0.697    -.3927653    .5152143 
       lnIUflow |   .5197556   .2080855     2.50   0.088    -.1424655    1.181977 
         lnLFor |  -.0883273     2.3955    -0.04   0.973    -7.711877    7.535222 
    PLMPExplag1 |  -.2753001   .2961312    -0.93   0.421    -1.217722    .6671215 
  Informalityl1 |  -.1025874   .2097123    -0.49   0.658    -.7699857    .5648108 
      GDPgrowth |  -.0330377   .0227174    -1.45   0.242    -.1053345    .0392591 
 LabFreeIndlag1 |   .0140652   .0037735     3.73   0.034     .0020562    .0260742 
    EduTertiary |   .0229731   .0073098     3.14   0.052    -.0002899    .0462361 
     PopDensity |  -.1748834   .1880417    -0.93   0.421    -.7733159    .4235492 
        PopDen2 |   .0017678   .0011113     1.59   0.210    -.0017689    .0053046 
            Y11 |          0  (omitted) 
            Y12 |          0  (omitted) 
            Y13 |  -.0835755   .0728666    -1.15   0.335    -.3154697    .1483186 
            Y14 |  -.1475639   .1397648    -1.06   0.369     -.592358    .2972302 
            Y15 |  -.1934651   .2285959    -0.85   0.460    -.9209592     .534029 
          _cons |   .1085458   33.86719     0.00   0.998     -107.672     107.889 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
. lincom lnUnemplSTlag1+ lnVacancieslag1+ lnEUflow+ lnIUflow 
 
 ( 1)  lnUnemplSTlag1 + lnVacancieslag1 + lnEUflow + lnIUflow = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   1.141365   .2996006     3.81   0.032     .1879018    2.094827 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table A3.6 Correlation Matrix 
 
. corr UnemPActPop ALMPExp_01 TrainSh EmpIncSh SupportSh DirectJobSh PLMPExp_01 Informality GDPgrowth LabFreeIndex EduTertiary 
PopDensity 
(obs=245) 
 
             | UnemPA~p ALMPE~01  TrainSh EmpIncSh Suppor~h Direct~h PLMPE~01 Inform~y GDPgro~h LabFre~x 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 UnemPActPop |   1.0000 
  ALMPExp_01 |  -0.0785   1.0000 
     TrainSh |  -0.0278   0.1433   1.0000 
    EmpIncSh |  -0.0820  -0.2723  -0.4638   1.0000 
   SupportSh |  -0.1881   0.3607  -0.3214  -0.1882   1.0000 
 DirectJobSh |   0.1519  -0.1663  -0.3246  -0.2443  -0.3720   1.0000 
  PLMPExp_01 |   0.2432   0.6942   0.2855  -0.1971   0.1353  -0.2407   1.0000 
 Informality |   0.2855  -0.5581  -0.1752   0.1941  -0.3381   0.2988  -0.5061   1.0000 
   GDPgrowth |  -0.2017  -0.1459  -0.1259   0.0427  -0.0073   0.0865  -0.3134   0.1207   1.0000 
LabFreeIndex |  -0.1567   0.1721  -0.2259  -0.1067   0.2731   0.1793  -0.0166  -0.0530   0.0467   1.0000 
 EduTertiary |   0.0409   0.2838   0.1172   0.0103   0.0473  -0.1063   0.3594  -0.1895  -0.1070  -0.0138 
  PopDensity |  -0.2462   0.1985  -0.2311   0.0886   0.5014  -0.2623   0.3074  -0.4321  -0.0702   0.0655 
 
             | EduTer~y PopDen~y 
-------------+------------------ 
 EduTertiary |   1.0000 
  PopDensity |   0.0733   1.0000 
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Table A3.6.1 VIF diagnostics  
 
. reg UnemPActPop ALMPExp_01 TrainSh EmpIncSh SupportSh DirectJobSh PLMPExp_01 
Informality GDPgrowth LabFreeIndex EduTertiary PopDensity 
 
      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       245 
-------------+----------------------------------   F(11, 233)      =     22.32 
       Model |  1968.44168        11  178.949243   Prob > F        =    0.0000 
    Residual |  1868.29009       233  8.01841239   R-squared       =    0.5131 
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.4901 
       Total |  3836.73176       244  15.7243105   Root MSE        =    2.8317 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 UnemPActPop |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ALMPExp_01 |  -4.593658    1.09539    -4.19   0.000    -6.751793   -2.435523 
     TrainSh |  -.1601032   .0251768    -6.36   0.000    -.2097064      -.1105 
    EmpIncSh |  -.1451453   .0260649    -5.57   0.000    -.1964983   -.0937923 
   SupportSh |  -.1077022    .029418    -3.66   0.000    -.1656615   -.0497429 
 DirectJobSh |  -.1089322   .0270249    -4.03   0.000    -.1621767   -.0556878 
  PLMPExp_01 |   4.242314   .4482715     9.46   0.000      3.35913    5.125497 
 Informality |   .1785261   .0341833     5.22   0.000     .1111783    .2458739 
   GDPgrowth |  -.1114642   .0483535    -2.31   0.022      -.20673   -.0161983 
LabFreeIndex |  -.0250062   .0138429    -1.81   0.072    -.0522794     .002267 
 EduTertiary |   .0091814   .0248632     0.37   0.712    -.0398041    .0581668 
  PopDensity |  -.0114019   .0023862    -4.78   0.000    -.0161031   -.0067006 
       _cons |   19.21647   2.457935     7.82   0.000     14.37385    24.05909 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
     TrainSh |      9.94    0.100554 
   SupportSh |      9.42    0.106180 
 DirectJobSh |      8.47    0.118106 
    EmpIncSh |      7.97    0.125412 
  PLMPExp_01 |      2.98    0.335200 
  ALMPExp_01 |      2.94    0.340154 
  PopDensity |      1.94    0.516439 
 Informality |      1.87    0.534752 
LabFreeIndex |      1.25    0.797896 
 EduTertiary |      1.22    0.820811 
   GDPgrowth |      1.13    0.884683 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      4.47 
 
  
341 
 
Table A3.7.1 Dynamic Panel Difference GMM estimation, 2004-
2016 (dep. variable UnemRate)  
 
xtabond2 UnemPActPop l.UnemPActPop ALMPExp_01 ALMPEx2 PLMPExp_01 Informality GDPgrowth 
LabFreeIndex EduTertiary PopDensity Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 Y16 , gmm 
(l.UnemPActPop, lag(3 4) coll) gmm(ALMPExp_01, lag(2 4) coll) gmm(ALMPEx2, lag(2 4) 
coll) gmm(PLMPExp_01, coll lag (3 4)) iv (Informalityl1 GDPgrowth  LabFreeIndlag1 
EduTertiary PopDensity Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 Y16) nolevel orthog 
small two robust 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, 
perm. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step difference GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of obs      =       211 
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =        28 
Number of instruments = 23                      Obs per group: min =         2 
F(21, 28)     =    300.67                                      avg =      7.54 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
 UnemPActPop |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 UnemPActPop | 
         L1. |   .8029835   .0897542     8.95   0.000     .6191303    .9868368 
             | 
  ALMPExp_01 |  -1.766425   4.304943    -0.41   0.685     -10.5847    7.051851 
     ALMPEx2 |   .6537321   1.843726     0.35   0.726     -3.12297    4.430434 
  PLMPExp_01 |   1.506833     1.0193     1.48   0.150    -.5811085    3.594774 
 Informality |  -.2839615   .7307676    -0.39   0.701    -1.780871    1.212948 
   GDPgrowth |  -.3197609   .0537135    -5.95   0.000     -.429788   -.2097338 
LabFreeIndex |  -.0544686   .0260127    -2.09   0.045    -.1077532    -.001184 
 EduTertiary |  -.0695874   .0640921    -1.09   0.287    -.2008742    .0616994 
  PopDensity |   .0306049   .0297469     1.03   0.312    -.0303289    .0915388 
          Y5 |          0  (omitted) 
          Y6 |          0  (omitted) 
          Y7 |          0  (omitted) 
          Y8 |  -.3625466   .5431668    -0.67   0.510    -1.475173    .7500801 
          Y9 |  -1.198688   .8866481    -1.35   0.187    -3.014905    .6175279 
         Y10 |   -1.01152   .6609107    -1.53   0.137    -2.365334    .3422942 
         Y11 |   .3692955   1.088361     0.34   0.737     -1.86011    2.598701 
         Y12 |  -.6940559   1.205192    -0.58   0.569    -3.162779    1.774667 
         Y13 |  -.7969428   1.376565    -0.58   0.567    -3.616709    2.022823 
         Y14 |  -.7710867   1.754208    -0.44   0.664    -4.364418    2.822245 
         Y15 |  -.8559475   1.777762    -0.48   0.634    -4.497529    2.785634 
         Y16 |          0  (omitted) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
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  Standard 
    FOD.(Informalityl1 GDPgrowth LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity Y5 Y6 
    Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 Y16) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(3/4).PLMPExp_01 collapsed 
    L(2/4).ALMPEx2 collapsed 
    L(2/4).ALMPExp_01 collapsed 
    L(3/4).L.UnemPActPop collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.67  Pr > z =  0.008 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.40  Pr > z =  0.163 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   1.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.404 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   2.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.310 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  gmm(L.UnemPActPop, collapse lag(3 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   1.06  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.527 
  gmm(PLMPExp_01, collapse lag(3 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   1.82  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.770 
 
 
Table A3.7.2 Dynamic Panel Difference GMM estimation, 2004-
2016 (dep. variable UnemRate) including variables TrainSh, 
EmpIncSh, SupportSh, DirectJobSh and StartupSh 
 
. xtabond2 UnemPActPop l.UnemPActPop ALMPExp_01 ALMPEx2 TrainSh EmpIncSh SupportSh 
DirectJobSh PLMPExp_01 Informality GDPgrowth LabFreeIndex EduTertiary PopDensity Y5 Y6 
Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 Y16 , gmm (l.UnemPActPop, lag(2 2) coll) 
gmm(ALMPExp_01, lag(1 4) coll) gmm(ALMPEx2, lag(1 4) coll) gmm(PLMPExp_01, coll lag (2 
2)) iv (TrainSh EmpIncSh SupportSh DirectJobSh Informalityl1 GDPgrowth  LabFreeIndlag1 
EduTertiary PopDensity Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 Y16) nolevel orthog 
small two robust 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, 
perm. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimat 
> ion. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step difference GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: CountryID                       Number of obs      =       194 
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =        27 
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Number of instruments = 27                      Obs per group: min =         2 
F(25, 27)     =   1230.04                                      avg =      7.19 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
 UnemPActPop |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 UnemPActPop | 
         L1. |   .8108625   .1251556     6.48   0.000     .5540643    1.067661 
             | 
  ALMPExp_01 |  -2.653723   5.008279    -0.53   0.601    -12.92986    7.622417 
     ALMPEx2 |   1.866048   1.944381     0.96   0.346    -2.123493    5.855588 
     TrainSh |  -.0062418   .0294469    -0.21   0.834    -.0666618    .0541782 
    EmpIncSh |   .0005877   .0285775     0.02   0.984    -.0580485    .0592239 
   SupportSh |   .0227252   .0252127     0.90   0.375    -.0290069    .0744573 
 DirectJobSh |   .0030111   .0377527     0.08   0.937     -.074451    .0804732 
  PLMPExp_01 |   1.219703    1.10226     1.11   0.278    -1.041948    3.481354 
 Informality |  -.0840336   .6553656    -0.13   0.899    -1.428733    1.260666 
   GDPgrowth |  -.3404664   .0448648    -7.59   0.000    -.4325215   -.2484114 
LabFreeIndex |  -.0243384   .0219517    -1.11   0.277    -.0693796    .0207027 
 EduTertiary |  -.0090602    .057657    -0.16   0.876    -.1273625    .1092421 
  PopDensity |   .0428234   .0324361     1.32   0.198      -.02373    .1093769 
          Y5 |          0  (omitted) 
          Y6 |          0  (omitted) 
          Y7 |   .2404947   .4075819     0.59   0.560    -.5957942    1.076784 
          Y8 |          0  (omitted) 
          Y9 |  -.7772027   .4228337    -1.84   0.077    -1.644786    .0903804 
         Y10 |  -.6702403   .4682324    -1.43   0.164    -1.630974    .2904933 
         Y11 |   .9418979    .636306     1.48   0.150    -.3636942     2.24749 
         Y12 |  -.3329215   .8490945    -0.39   0.698     -2.07512    1.409277 
         Y13 |  -.5248557   .9922158    -0.53   0.601    -2.560714    1.511003 
         Y14 |  -.5370858   1.386175    -0.39   0.701    -3.381282    2.307111 
         Y15 |    -.74371    1.40572    -0.53   0.601     -3.62801    2.140589 
         Y16 |          0  (omitted) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for orthogonal deviations equation 
  Standard 
    FOD.(TrainSh EmpIncSh SupportSh DirectJobSh Informalityl1 GDPgrowth 
    LabFreeIndlag1 EduTertiary PopDensity Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 
    Y15 Y16) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.PLMPExp_01 collapsed 
    L(1/4).ALMPEx2 collapsed 
    L(1/4).ALMPExp_01 collapsed 
    L2.L.UnemPActPop collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.42  Pr > z =  0.016 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.33  Pr > z =  0.182 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   1.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.553 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   1.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.371 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
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Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  gmm(L.UnemPActPop, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.176 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.700 
  gmm(PLMPExp_01, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.165 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.823 
Table A3.8.1 Instrumental Variable Approach for the Matching 
Function specification; Instrument: ALMPExplag1 
 
. xtivreg2 lnUEflow  lnUnemploymentSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow lnLFor 
ShLongUn ShYoungUn ShWomenUn PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth EcoFreeIndex 
EduTertiary Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15  (ALMPExp ALMPExp2= ALMPExplag1 ALMPExp2lag1), fe 
endog (ALMPExp) 
Warning - singleton groups detected.  1 observation(s) not used. 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:       Y11 Y15 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        13                    Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =       3.7 
                                                               max =         4 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:  Y11 Y15 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
-------------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only 
                                                      Number of obs =       48 
                                                      F( 18,    17) =     0.43 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.9595 
Total (centered) SS     =  .5623271776                Centered R2   =  -0.8691 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  .5623271776                Uncentered R2 =  -0.8691 
Residual SS             =  1.051048527                Root MSE      =    .1733 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
            lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
             ALMPExp |   36.62942   72.82149     0.50   0.615    -106.0981    179.3569 
            ALMPExp2 |  -3320.165   6842.135    -0.49   0.627     -16730.5    10090.17 
lnUnemploymentSTlag1 |  -1.430722   2.454789    -0.58   0.560     -6.24202    3.380576 
     lnVacancieslag1 |  -.1072928   .4610507    -0.23   0.816    -1.010936    .7963499 
            lnEUflow |   .4057029   .5990795     0.68   0.498    -.7684714    1.579877 
            lnIUflow |  -.6549891    1.50119    -0.44   0.663    -3.597267    2.287289 
              lnLFor |    8.62242   10.28435     0.84   0.402    -11.53453    28.77937 
            ShLongUn |   .0194153   .0223759     0.87   0.386    -.0244406    .0632713 
           ShYoungUn |  -.0921094   .1561642    -0.59   0.555    -.3981857    .2139669 
           ShWomenUn |   .0158908   .0369706     0.43   0.667    -.0565703    .0883518 
         PLMPExplag1 |   1.931171   3.148014     0.61   0.540    -4.238824    8.101165 
       Informalityl1 |   -1.14282   1.954934    -0.58   0.559     -4.97442     2.68878 
           GDPgrowth |   .0753888   .1683375     0.45   0.654    -.2545467    .4053243 
        EcoFreeIndex |  -.0869994   .0717081    -1.21   0.225    -.2275448    .0535459 
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         EduTertiary |  -.1144043   .1691777    -0.68   0.499    -.4459865    .2171779 
                 Y11 |          0  (omitted) 
                 Y12 |   1.318679   2.456291     0.54   0.591    -3.495564    6.132922 
                 Y13 |   1.179178   2.336734     0.50   0.614    -3.400737    5.759092 
                 Y14 |   .5659593   1.168634     0.48   0.628    -1.724521     2.85644 
                 Y15 |          0  (omitted) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):           0.500 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.4797 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                0.123 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size              7.03 
                                         15% maximal IV size              4.58 
                                         20% maximal IV size              3.95 
                                         25% maximal IV size              3.63 
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005).  Reproduced by permission. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           0.000 
                                                 (equation exactly identified) 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                               5.436 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0197 
Regressors tested:    ALMPExp 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:         ALMPExp ALMPExp2 
Included instruments: lnUnemploymentSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow 
                      lnLFor ShLongUn ShYoungUn ShWomenUn PLMPExplag1 
                      Informalityl1 GDPgrowth EcoFreeIndex EduTertiary Y12 Y13 
                      Y14 
Excluded instruments: ALMPExplag1 ALMPExp2lag1 
Dropped collinear:    Y11 Y15 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table A3.8.2 Instrumental Variable Approach for the Matching 
Function specification; Instrument: CompGov 
. xtivreg2 lnUEflow  lnUnemploymentSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow lnLFor 
ShLongUn ShYoungUn ShWomenUn PLMPExplag1 Informalityl1 GDPgrowth EcoFreeIndex 
EduTertiary Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15  (ALMPExp = CompGov), fe endog (ALMPExp) 
Warning - singleton groups detected.  1 observation(s) not used. 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:       Y11 Y15 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        13                    Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =       3.5 
                                                               max =         4 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:  Y11 Y15 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
-------------------- 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only 
                                                      Number of obs =       46 
                                                      F( 17,    16) =     3.67 
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                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0063 
Total (centered) SS     =  .4604319025                Centered R2   =   0.7765 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  .4604319025                Uncentered R2 =   0.7765 
Residual SS             =  .1029111646                Root MSE      =   .05584 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
            lnUEflow |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
             ALMPExp |    .991117   .8501442     1.17   0.244     -.675135    2.657369 
lnUnemploymentSTlag1 |  -.3590063   .3386942    -1.06   0.289    -1.022835    .3048222 
     lnVacancieslag1 |  -.2441166   .1568904    -1.56   0.120    -.5516161    .0633829 
            lnEUflow |   .1834128   .1022803     1.79   0.073    -.0170529    .3838786 
            lnIUflow |   .0173152   .2206178     0.08   0.937    -.4150877    .4497181 
              lnLFor |   .7252567   2.595003     0.28   0.780    -4.360855    5.811368 
            ShLongUn |   .0087909   .0058639     1.50   0.134    -.0027022     .020284 
           ShYoungUn |  -.0152553   .0246109    -0.62   0.535    -.0634919    .0329812 
           ShWomenUn |   .0104089   .0131803     0.79   0.430    -.0154241    .0362418 
         PLMPExplag1 |   .6516695   .3576061     1.82   0.068    -.0492256    1.352565 
       Informalityl1 |  -.2330759   .1833585    -1.27   0.204    -.5924519    .1263001 
           GDPgrowth |   .0257738   .0173248     1.49   0.137    -.0081822    .0597299 
        EcoFreeIndex |  -.0183485   .0338955    -0.54   0.588    -.0847825    .0480854 
         EduTertiary |   .0132404   .0382611     0.35   0.729    -.0617499    .0882306 
                 Y11 |          0  (omitted) 
                 Y12 |   .3228151   .2315507     1.39   0.163    -.1310158    .7766461 
                 Y13 |   .3386977   .1958829     1.73   0.084    -.0452257    .7226212 
                 Y14 |   .1605702   .1060527     1.51   0.130    -.0472893    .3684298 
                 Y15 |          0  (omitted) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):           2.606 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.1065 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                1.372 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size             16.38 
                                         15% maximal IV size              8.96 
                                         20% maximal IV size              6.66 
                                         25% maximal IV size              5.53 
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005).  Reproduced by permission. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           0.000 
                                                 (equation exactly identified) 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                               1.822 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.1770 
Regressors tested:    ALMPExp 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:         ALMPExp 
Included instruments: lnUnemploymentSTlag1 lnVacancieslag1 lnEUflow lnIUflow 
                      lnLFor ShLongUn ShYoungUn ShWomenUn PLMPExplag1 
                      Informalityl1 GDPgrowth EcoFreeIndex EduTertiary Y12 Y13 
                      Y14 
Excluded instruments: CompGov 
Dropped collinear:    Y11 Y15 
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Appendix 4.1 – Chapter 4 - Matching methods 
There are different matching estimators using a weighting scheme which determines the 
weights when comparing the two groups (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). The closer the 
matched control to the treated individual in terms of propensity score value, the higher 
the quality of the matching. However, choosing parameters that maximise the quality 
may induce lower variability, as the number of matched individuals from the control 
group will be reduced. Therefore, matching methods are subject to a trade-off between 
bias and variance which is crucial when using small samples (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008). In addition, issues with low common support tend to distort the performance of 
the algorithms and hence should be accounted for (Busso et al., 2014).   
There is a large group of methods used for balancing of covariates or propensity scores 
(Heckman et al. 1999; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Figure 4.1 offers an overview of the 
methods used. The most commonly applied matching algorithms and trade-offs faced 
when using different algorithms are presented and explained below.  
Figure 4.1 Different Matching Algorithms 
 
Source: Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008 
The Nearest Neighbour matching algorithm is commonly used in the evaluations of 
the effectiveness of ALMPs (Bonin and Rinne, 2014). The criteria to form match sets of 
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propensity scores based on this algorithm is to assign the closest propensity score of the 
un-treated subject to that of a treated one. There are two primary methods to form the 
matches with this algorithm: the nearest neighbour matching without replacement and 
the nearest neighbour matching with replacement (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). 
Nearest neighbour without replacement – also called ‗greedy matching‘ - assigns a 
weight to the nearest control observations and zero to all the others. This method does 
not impose any common support condition because it dedicates one control observation 
    to match at most one treated observation   . In the case where multiple 
untreated have equally close proximity to the treated propensity scores, the propensity 
score is selected randomly. An important note to this method is that there is no 
restriction on the approximate distance between the propensity scores (Austin, 2011). 
Thus, there is a risk that in the case when there are a limited number of control units, the 
matched control and treated units will not be similar in terms of propensity scores and 
there will not be quality matched pairs. Nearest neighbour matching with replacement is 
used in particular to minimize the distance between the matched control and treatment 
units, since it allows the comparison unit to be matched more than once. This is likely to 
be beneficial since it reduces bias by ensuring that each treated observation is matched 
to the closest available control, however, it may reduce efficiency since the total sample 
of matched controls contains a smaller number of controls than the full sample (Deheija 
and Wahba, 2002; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Ming and Rosenbaum (2000) found 
evidence of reduction in bias when varying number of control subjects was used in 
matching. Another method that can be used to match treated and untreated individuals is 
‗oversampling‘ matching. When using ‗oversampling‘ matching, one should decide on a 
random number of partners to be matched based on distance or weights, where one 
treated can be matched with more than one control. At the same time,  it may also assign 
different weights when matching the propensity scores. The difference of this method to 
matching with replacement is that the former dedicates a number of neighbours to be 
matched while in the later replacement may or may not happen depending on the 
number of the control propensity scores within the allowed distance or weights. 
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) suggest ‗oversampling‘ with more than one nearest 
neighbour using distance-based weights rather than uniform weights to aggregate the 
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observations mitigates the trade-off between bias and variance (Schmidl, 2014). 
However, since oversampling matching selects ad-hoc a number of neighbours and as 
such is not protected from outlier values, this method is outperformed by most other 
methods. 
If the propensity scores are far from each other, nearest neighbour matching is not an 
appropriate choice since it will not form quality matches. This issue could be overcome 
by imposing a maximum distance to allow creating matching pairs. Caliper and Radius 
matching uses all the control units within a radius (caliper) for a maximum threshold 
allowed and rules out matches beyond that particular threshold (Austin, 2011). When 
using Caliper matching, for a given treated subject, one can identify a set of untreated 
subjects whose propensity score lie within the caliper; the closest propensity score from 
this restricted set will be chosen for matching with treated. If within the caliper there is 
no untreated subject, the treated propensity score will not be matched and consequently 
will be excluded from the matched sample (Austin, 2011). The advantage of this type of 
matching is that it allows good matching within the caliper when good control units are 
available and vice versa (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). According to Dehejia and Wahba, 
Radius matching may be a more appropriate choice than Caliper.  This method allows 
forming more than one matching pair within the specified caliper if there are available 
quality matches. When using caliper matching there is no consensus agreed among 
researchers as to what constitutes an optimal distance. A wide range of caliper widths 
have been used in the ALMP evaluations. After examining the reduction in bias, 
Cochran and Rubin (1973) suggest that choosing a caliper of 0.2 of the standard 
deviation of the logarithm of the propensity score, will remove 98% of the bias. 
The idea behind Stratification/Interval Matching is to separate the common support 
into different strata (intervals) and treatment effects are calculated through simple 
averaging within each strata (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Todd, 2006). This variant of 
matching is also referred in the literature as blocking and sub-classification (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1983). To implement this method one should make a choice of the number 
of intervals and how wide they should be (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Todd, 2010). 
Partitioning propensity scores into five intervals will often remove 95% of the bias 
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(Imbens, 2004). Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) suggest that propensity scores need to be 
balanced within the intervals meaning that mean values of the propensity scores of both 
groups are not statistically different from each other. If they are not balanced then the 
interval is too large and need to be partitioned again.  
The matching methods discussed above use one or more untreated subjects to construct 
the counterfactuals for a treated subject. In contrast, the Kernel and Local-Linear 
methods compare each treated unit to a weighted average of the outcomes of all control 
units. Control units with closer propensity scores to the treated unit being matched are 
given a higher weight. Since this method uses more information to create matching, it 
increases the efficiency, while the drawback of this method is that it includes 
information from poor matches. Kernel matching can use different weighting schemes: 
weighted average (kernel matching) or weighted regression on an intercept and a linear 
term of the propensity score (local linear matching). Gausian and Epanechnikov are 
kernel methods mostly used. Epanechnikov, similar to caliper method, drops matches 
that are out of pre-assigned distance. This method is more likely to be performed when 
there is a risk in using distant matches. However, Gaussian is recommended since it uses 
more information therefore produces higher efficiency. In comparison to nearest 
neighbour method, kernel produces much less bias, since kernel weights reduce the 
variability of the estimator (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2009). A disadvantage of the 
kernel method is that it produces bias at the ends of the distribution of propensity scores; 
in this case the Local Linear matching method would be more suitable. Local linear 
matching is different from kernel matching since it includes a linear term which is 
helpful when the observations in the control group are asymmetrically distributed 
around the participants‘ observations. This asymmetry is more likely to be present at the 
boundary points.  
When implementing a social experiment to assess the effectiveness of ALMPs, the 
propensity scores are known and can be directly used as weights to obtain balance 
between two groups. This is known as Weighting on Propensity Score and is mostly 
used in experimental settings (Imbens, 2004).  
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The propensity score can be used to construct matched pairs by also applying 
Mahalanobis metric matching (Stuart, 2010). Mahalanobis metric matching can also 
impose a specified caliper to form matching pairs. This method defines distance 
between the treated and untreated observations within a caliper and uses the estimated 
propensity scores and also the set of ‗key variables‘ to create matching pairs (Stuart, 
2010). The set of key variables used may be the pre-treatment measures which affect the 
outcome. This form of matching has been regarded as being very efficient in balancing 
the covariates between the two groups and is superior to the Nearest Neighbour 
matching (Feng et al., 2006; Stuart, 2010). This method works quite well when fewer 
than 8 covariates are used for matching but it does not perform well when there is no 
normal distribution among the covariates (Rubin, 1974). 
When selecting among the matching algorithms one should consider the trade-off 
between bias and efficiency. In general, if there is sufficient data on control and treated 
units and there is considerable overlapping between the control and treated groups all 
these matching methods will yield similar results. In contrast, if there are only a handful 
of comparison units that can be good matches to the treated units choosing only the 
nearest match in terms of propensity scores will minimize the bias but it will ignore a 
great deal of information providing less efficient results. When assessing cross-
programme effectiveness the number of potential matches is typically low and as 
consequence only a small share of the treatment group might be in the common support 
(Stephan and Pahnke, 2008). In such cases when using nearest neighbour matching 
without replacement the evaluator is likely to end up with only a few observations. 
Matching methods are not mutually exclusive; these methods may be combined in order 
to produce more quality matches (such as combining Nearest Neighbour with Caliper 
method or with Stratification). The existing literature is inconclusive regarding the most 
preferred matching method, however Kernel and Mahalanobis matching methods seem 
to be more appropriate in case of small samples since these methods utilise more 
information provided in the sample.   
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Appendix 5 – Chapter 5  
Table A5.1 Hausman test 
. *Multinomial Logit – omitting category 2   
 
. . mlogit LABSTATE OJT IS Amduration AM2009 AM2010 Cert Emplan Age Agesq Male Disability 
Minority Socialassist Twounempl Remittance Primaryeduc Secondaryeduc  Undur6 Undur12 Undur24 FER 
GJAK GJIL MIT PEJ PRZ 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -664.9741   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -548.43968   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -537.0644   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -536.72965   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -536.72674   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -536.72673   
 
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =        751 
                                                  LR chi2(52)     =     256.49 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -536.72673                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1929 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     LABSTATE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
0             |  (base outcome) 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1             | 
          OJT |   .4597266   .2917661     1.58   0.115    -.1121243    1.031578 
           IS |   .5103823   .3244463     1.57   0.116    -.1255208    1.146285 
   Amduration |  -.0157657   .0857393    -0.18   0.854    -.1838117    .1522802 
       AM2009 |  -.1949788   .2744215    -0.71   0.477    -.7328351    .3428774 
       AM2010 |   -.798991   .2663633    -3.00   0.003    -1.321053   -.2769286 
         Cert |   .5498937   .2305077     2.39   0.017      .098107     1.00168 
       Emplan |   .1473124   .2264484     0.65   0.515    -.2965184    .5911432 
          Age |   .2222954   .1660162     1.34   0.181    -.1030903    .5476811 
        Agesq |  -.0027416   .0027363    -1.00   0.316    -.0081047    .0026216 
         Male |   .3659762   .1978192     1.85   0.064    -.0217422    .7536946 
   Disability |  -1.655212   1.072373    -1.54   0.123    -3.757024    .4466009 
     Minority |   -.984669   .4876099    -2.02   0.043    -1.940367   -.0289712 
 Socialassist |  -.8496233   .4073139    -2.09   0.037    -1.647944   -.0513028 
    Twounempl |  -.5390388   .2219733    -2.43   0.015    -.9740986   -.1039791 
   Remittance |  -.3516946   .3625584    -0.97   0.332    -1.062296    .3589069 
  Primaryeduc |  -.8467976   .3175506    -2.67   0.008    -1.469185   -.2244098 
Secondaryeduc |  -.9813312   .2373486    -4.13   0.000    -1.446526   -.5161365 
       Undur6 |   1.349181   .3500525     3.85   0.000     .6630904    2.035271 
      Undur12 |    .154713   .2794858     0.55   0.580     -.393069    .7024951 
      Undur24 |   .5172292   .3306467     1.56   0.118    -.1308265    1.165285 
          FER |  -.4050338   .3644336    -1.11   0.266     -1.11931    .3092429 
         GJAK |  -.7839924   .3797028    -2.06   0.039    -1.528196   -.0397886 
         GJIL |  -.4159494   .3232929    -1.29   0.198    -1.049592    .2176932 
          MIT |  -2.342225   .4656797    -5.03   0.000     -3.25494   -1.429509 
          PEJ |  -.4183847   .3846836    -1.09   0.277    -1.172351    .3355813 
          PRZ |  -1.106432   .3789633    -2.92   0.004    -1.849186   -.3636774 
        _cons |  -3.967431   2.591582    -1.53   0.126    -9.046839    1.111976 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
2             | 
          OJT |   1.094729   .4269262     2.56   0.010     .2579689    1.931489 
           IS |   .6127019   .4870321     1.26   0.208    -.3418635    1.567267 
   Amduration |   .3606224   .1306877     2.76   0.006     .1044792    .6167655 
       AM2009 |  -.4541542   .4223747    -1.08   0.282    -1.281993     .373685 
       AM2010 |  -.5149485   .3829009    -1.34   0.179     -1.26542    .2355233 
         Cert |  -.7380894   .3129407    -2.36   0.018    -1.351442   -.1247369 
       Emplan |   .1968594   .3419847     0.58   0.565    -.4734183     .867137 
          Age |   .5827392   .2770131     2.10   0.035     .0398035    1.125675 
        Agesq |  -.0092678    .004771    -1.94   0.052    -.0186188    .0000833 
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         Male |   1.484491   .3247421     4.57   0.000     .8480082    2.120974 
   Disability |  -1.035347   1.171001    -0.88   0.377    -3.330466    1.259772 
     Minority |  -1.815683    .680237    -2.67   0.008    -3.148923   -.4824432 
 Socialassist |  -.2684868   .5620885    -0.48   0.633     -1.37016    .8331864 
    Twounempl |   .0634986    .323416     0.20   0.844    -.5703851    .6973823 
   Remittance |   .1541961   .4972226     0.31   0.756    -.8203422    1.128734 
  Primaryeduc |   1.369059   .4970307     2.75   0.006     .3948968    2.343221 
Secondaryeduc |   1.781445    .416228     4.28   0.000     .9656527    2.597236 
       Undur6 |   1.556241   .4434997     3.51   0.000     .6869977    2.425485 
      Undur12 |     .00767   .3978933     0.02   0.985    -.7721866    .7875266 
      Undur24 |   .8443963   .4618276     1.83   0.067    -.0607692    1.749562 
          FER |  -1.318202   .5346858    -2.47   0.014    -2.366167   -.2702375 
         GJAK |  -1.306474   .5584836    -2.34   0.019    -2.401082   -.2118661 
         GJIL |  -1.115373     .44656    -2.50   0.013    -1.990614   -.2401313 
          MIT |  -1.369892   .4806071    -2.85   0.004    -2.311865   -.4279195 
          PEJ |  -2.172006   .8320165    -2.61   0.009    -3.802728   -.5412833 
          PRZ |  -1.313306   .5031249    -2.61   0.009    -2.299413   -.3271996 
        _cons |  -13.32806   4.182931    -3.19   0.001    -21.52646   -5.129668 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. . estimates store allcats 
 
. . hausman . allcats, alleqs constant 
the two models need to be different 
r(198); 
 
. . mlogit LABSTATE OJT IS Amduration AM2009 AM2010 Cert Emplan Age Agesq Male Disability 
Minority Socialassist Twounempl Remittance Pri 
> maryeduc Secondaryeduc  Undur6 Undur12 Undur24 FER GJAK GJIL MIT PEJ PRZ if LABSTATE!= 2 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -414.52635   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -338.34147   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -334.54489   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -334.5016   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -334.50134   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -334.50134   
 
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =        673 
                                                  LR chi2(26)     =     160.05 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -334.50134                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1931 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     LABSTATE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
0             |  (base outcome) 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1             | 
          OJT |   .4633314   .2965452     1.56   0.118    -.1178864    1.044549 
           IS |   .5249883   .3303649     1.59   0.112    -.1225149    1.172492 
   Amduration |   .0052355   .0866417     0.06   0.952     -.164579    .1750501 
       AM2009 |  -.2820691   .2796365    -1.01   0.313    -.8301466    .2660083 
       AM2010 |  -.9072117   .2721565    -3.33   0.001    -1.440629   -.3737948 
         Cert |   .5838014   .2349768     2.48   0.013     .1232553    1.044347 
       Emplan |    .124732   .2283894     0.55   0.585    -.3229031     .572367 
          Age |   .2050731   .1619691     1.27   0.205    -.1123805    .5225266 
        Agesq |  -.0024886   .0026613    -0.94   0.350    -.0077046    .0027274 
         Male |   .3134485   .2007348     1.56   0.118    -.0799844    .7068815 
   Disability |  -1.612346   1.078726    -1.49   0.135     -3.72661    .5019185 
     Minority |  -.9469323   .4892818    -1.94   0.053    -1.905907    .0120425 
 Socialassist |   -.898881   .4156091    -2.16   0.031     -1.71346   -.0843021 
    Twounempl |  -.6054384    .224338    -2.70   0.007    -1.045133   -.1657441 
   Remittance |  -.4004109   .3676038    -1.09   0.276    -1.120901    .3200793 
  Primaryeduc |  -.8586244   .3197078    -2.69   0.007     -1.48524   -.2320087 
Secondaryeduc |  -.9550832   .2385986    -4.00   0.000    -1.422728   -.4874385 
       Undur6 |    1.58059   .3678728     4.30   0.000     .8595724    2.301607 
      Undur12 |    .158366   .2853416     0.56   0.579    -.4008932    .7176252 
      Undur24 |    .548747   .3366296     1.63   0.103    -.1110348    1.208529 
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          FER |  -.4355245   .3732842    -1.17   0.243    -1.167148     .296099 
         GJAK |  -.7534865   .3874847    -1.94   0.052    -1.512943    .0059696 
         GJIL |  -.4272716   .3303703    -1.29   0.196    -1.074785    .2202422 
          MIT |   -2.37131    .477567    -4.97   0.000    -3.307324   -1.435296 
          PEJ |  -.4358382   .3913001    -1.11   0.265    -1.202772    .3310959 
          PRZ |  -1.176137   .3919322    -3.00   0.003     -1.94431    -.407964 
        _cons |  -3.669244   2.539658    -1.44   0.149    -8.646883    1.308394 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. . hausman . allcats, alleqs constant 
 
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (26) does not equal the number of coefficients 
being tested (27); be sure this is what 
        you expect, or there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the output of your 
estimators for anything unexpected and 
        possibly consider scaling your variables so that the coefficients are on a similar 
scale. 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |       .         allcats       Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         OJT |    .4633314     .4597266        .0036048        .0530246 
          IS |    .5249883     .5103823         .014606        .0622536 
  Amduration |    .0052355    -.0157657        .0210013        .0124719 
      AM2009 |   -.2820691    -.1949788       -.0870903        .0537531 
      AM2010 |   -.9072117     -.798991       -.1082206        .0558548 
        Cert |    .5838014     .5498937        .0339076        .0456106 
      Emplan |     .124732     .1473124       -.0225804        .0297126 
         Age |    .2050731     .2222954       -.0172223               . 
       Agesq |   -.0024886    -.0027416         .000253               . 
        Male |    .3134485     .3659762       -.0525277        .0340886 
  Disability |   -1.612346    -1.655212        .0428659        .1169019 
    Minority |   -.9469323     -.984669        .0377367        .0404147 
Socialassist |    -.898881    -.8496233       -.0492577        .0826217 
   Twounempl |   -.6054384    -.5390388       -.0663996        .0324864 
  Remittance |   -.4004109    -.3516946       -.0487163        .0606952 
 Primaryeduc |   -.8586244    -.8467976       -.0118268        .0370762 
Secondarye~c |   -.9550832    -.9813312         .026248        .0243918 
      Undur6 |     1.58059     1.349181        .2314092        .1131091 
     Undur12 |     .158366      .154713         .003653        .0575111 
     Undur24 |     .548747     .5172292        .0315178         .063184 
         FER |   -.4355245    -.4050338       -.0304907        .0808038 
        GJAK |   -.7534865    -.7839924        .0305059        .0772672 
        GJIL |   -.4272716    -.4159494       -.0113222        .0680161 
         MIT |    -2.37131    -2.342225        -.029085        .1058897 
         PEJ |   -.4358382    -.4183847       -.0174535         .071654 
         PRZ |   -1.176137    -1.106432       -.0697053        .0999886 
       _cons |   -3.669244    -3.967431        .2981869               . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                          b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from mlogit 
           B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from mlogit 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                 chi2(26) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =        3.26 
                Prob>chi2 =      1.0000 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
 
 
. *Multinomial Logit – omitting category 1  
 
. . mlogit LABSTATE OJT IS Amduration AM2009 AM2010 Cert Emplan Age Agesq Male Disability 
Minority Socialassist Twounempl Remittance Pri 
> maryeduc Secondaryeduc  Undur6 Undur12 Undur24 FER GJAK GJIL MIT PEJ PRZ, baseoutcome (1) 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =  -664.9741   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -548.43968   
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Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -537.0644   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -536.72965   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -536.72674   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -536.72673   
 
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =        751 
                                                  LR chi2(52)     =     256.49 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -536.72673                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1929 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     LABSTATE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
0             | 
          OJT |  -.4597266   .2917661    -1.58   0.115    -1.031578    .1121243 
           IS |  -.5103823   .3244463    -1.57   0.116    -1.146285    .1255208 
   Amduration |   .0157657   .0857393     0.18   0.854    -.1522802    .1838117 
       AM2009 |   .1949788   .2744215     0.71   0.477    -.3428774    .7328351 
       AM2010 |    .798991   .2663633     3.00   0.003     .2769286    1.321053 
         Cert |  -.5498937   .2305077    -2.39   0.017     -1.00168    -.098107 
       Emplan |  -.1473124   .2264484    -0.65   0.515    -.5911432    .2965184 
          Age |  -.2222954   .1660162    -1.34   0.181    -.5476811    .1030903 
        Agesq |   .0027416   .0027363     1.00   0.316    -.0026216    .0081047 
         Male |  -.3659762   .1978192    -1.85   0.064    -.7536946    .0217422 
   Disability |   1.655212   1.072373     1.54   0.123    -.4466009    3.757024 
     Minority |    .984669   .4876099     2.02   0.043     .0289712    1.940367 
 Socialassist |   .8496233   .4073139     2.09   0.037     .0513028    1.647944 
    Twounempl |   .5390388   .2219733     2.43   0.015     .1039791    .9740986 
   Remittance |   .3516946   .3625584     0.97   0.332    -.3589069    1.062296 
  Primaryeduc |   .8467976   .3175506     2.67   0.008     .2244098    1.469185 
Secondaryeduc |   .9813312   .2373486     4.13   0.000     .5161365    1.446526 
       Undur6 |  -1.349181   .3500525    -3.85   0.000    -2.035271   -.6630904 
      Undur12 |   -.154713   .2794858    -0.55   0.580    -.7024951     .393069 
      Undur24 |  -.5172292   .3306467    -1.56   0.118    -1.165285    .1308265 
          FER |   .4050338   .3644336     1.11   0.266    -.3092429     1.11931 
         GJAK |   .7839924   .3797028     2.06   0.039     .0397886    1.528196 
         GJIL |   .4159494   .3232929     1.29   0.198    -.2176932    1.049592 
          MIT |   2.342225   .4656797     5.03   0.000     1.429509     3.25494 
          PEJ |   .4183847   .3846836     1.09   0.277    -.3355813    1.172351 
          PRZ |   1.106432   .3789633     2.92   0.004     .3636774    1.849186 
        _cons |   3.967431   2.591582     1.53   0.126    -1.111976    9.046839 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1             |  (base outcome) 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
2             | 
          OJT |   .6350022   .4737188     1.34   0.180    -.2934697    1.563474 
           IS |   .1023196   .5373253     0.19   0.849    -.9508186    1.155458 
   Amduration |   .3763881   .1422335     2.65   0.008     .0976156    .6551606 
       AM2009 |  -.2591754   .4471344    -0.58   0.562    -1.135543    .6171919 
       AM2010 |   .2840425   .4115321     0.69   0.490    -.5225457    1.090631 
         Cert |  -1.287983   .3504318    -3.68   0.000    -1.974817   -.6011495 
       Emplan |    .049547   .3733776     0.13   0.894    -.6822597    .7813536 
          Age |   .3604439   .3031939     1.19   0.235    -.2338053     .954693 
        Agesq |  -.0065262    .005187    -1.26   0.208    -.0166926    .0036402 
         Male |   1.118515   .3516377     3.18   0.001     .4293177    1.807712 
   Disability |   .6198646   1.534446     0.40   0.686    -2.387594    3.627323 
     Minority |  -.8310143   .7896506    -1.05   0.293    -2.378701    .7166725 
 Socialassist |   .5811364   .6298056     0.92   0.356    -.6532599    1.815533 
    Twounempl |   .6025374   .3517561     1.71   0.087    -.0868918    1.291967 
   Remittance |   .5058907   .5526644     0.92   0.360    -.5773116    1.589093 
  Primaryeduc |   2.215857   .5389817     4.11   0.000     1.159472    3.272241 
Secondaryeduc |   2.762776   .4408597     6.27   0.000     1.898707    3.626845 
       Undur6 |   .2070604   .4709984     0.44   0.660    -.7160796      1.1302 
      Undur12 |   -.147043   .4417662    -0.33   0.739    -1.012889    .7188029 
      Undur24 |   .3271671   .5066823     0.65   0.518    -.6659119    1.320246 
          FER |  -.9131686   .5838935    -1.56   0.118    -2.057579    .2312417 
         GJAK |  -.5224815   .5932143    -0.88   0.378     -1.68516    .6401972 
         GJIL |  -.6994234   .4863514    -1.44   0.150    -1.652655    .2538077 
          MIT |   .9723326   .5965839     1.63   0.103    -.1969504    2.141616 
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          PEJ |  -1.753621   .8552865    -2.05   0.040    -3.429952   -.0772902 
          PRZ |  -.2068746   .5484497    -0.38   0.706    -1.281816    .8680671 
        _cons |   -9.36063   4.602088    -2.03   0.042    -18.38056   -.3407034 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. . estimates store allcats 
 
. . hausman . allcats, alleqs constant 
the two models need to be different 
r(198); 
 
. . mlogit LABSTATE OJT IS Amduration AM2009 AM2010 Cert Emplan Age Agesq Male Disability 
Minority Socialassist Twounempl Remittance Pri 
> maryeduc Secondaryeduc  Undur6 Undur12 Undur24 FER GJAK GJIL MIT PEJ PRZ if  LABSTATE != 1 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -223.76921   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -183.59836   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -175.51166   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -175.21807   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -175.21531   
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -175.21531   
 
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =        545 
                                                  LR chi2(26)     =      97.11 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -175.21531                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2170 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     LABSTATE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
0             |  (base outcome) 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
2             | 
          OJT |   1.076963   .4425022     2.43   0.015     .2096751    1.944252 
           IS |   .6694552   .5034822     1.33   0.184    -.3173519    1.656262 
   Amduration |   .3335893   .1397581     2.39   0.017     .0596684    .6075102 
       AM2009 |  -.4188908   .4399431    -0.95   0.341    -1.281163    .4433818 
       AM2010 |  -.4637839    .402037    -1.15   0.249    -1.251762    .3241941 
         Cert |  -.8007494   .3226123    -2.48   0.013    -1.433058    -.168441 
       Emplan |   .3778588   .3615245     1.05   0.296    -.3307161    1.086434 
          Age |   .5331342   .2741219     1.94   0.052    -.0041348    1.070403 
        Agesq |  -.0083947   .0046633    -1.80   0.072    -.0175346    .0007453 
         Male |   1.548984   .3291945     4.71   0.000     .9037741    2.194193 
   Disability |  -1.044292   1.170088    -0.89   0.372    -3.337623    1.249038 
     Minority |  -1.751292   .6888179    -2.54   0.011     -3.10135   -.4012341 
 Socialassist |  -.3053427   .5708567    -0.53   0.593    -1.424201    .8135158 
    Twounempl |   .0695731   .3417902     0.20   0.839    -.6003233    .7394696 
   Remittance |   .1092955   .5150997     0.21   0.832    -.9002813    1.118872 
  Primaryeduc |   1.400195   .5264263     2.66   0.008     .3684186    2.431972 
Secondaryeduc |     1.7761   .4347528     4.09   0.000     .9240006      2.6282 
       Undur6 |   1.543768   .4577152     3.37   0.001     .6466623    2.440873 
      Undur12 |  -.1805326   .4018381    -0.45   0.653    -.9681208    .6070556 
      Undur24 |   .7411883    .476862     1.55   0.120    -.1934439    1.675821 
          FER |  -1.310509     .55292    -2.37   0.018    -2.394213   -.2268062 
         GJAK |  -1.141076   .5754469    -1.98   0.047    -2.268931   -.0132207 
         GJIL |   -1.14778   .4668586    -2.46   0.014    -2.062806   -.2327536 
          MIT |  -1.354635   .4882264    -2.77   0.006    -2.311541   -.3977289 
          PEJ |  -1.944116   .8670739    -2.24   0.025     -3.64355   -.2446828 
          PRZ |  -1.172205   .5171251    -2.27   0.023    -2.185752   -.1586588 
        _cons |  -12.71889     4.2037    -3.03   0.002    -20.95799   -4.479784 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. . hausman . allcats, alleqs constant 
 
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (26) does not equal the number of coefficients 
being tested (27); be sure this is what 
        you expect, or there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the output of your 
estimators for anything unexpected and 
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        possibly consider scaling your variables so that the coefficients are on a similar 
scale. 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |       .         allcats       Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         OJT |    1.076963     .6350022        .4419612               . 
          IS |    .6694552     .1023196        .5671357               . 
  Amduration |    .3335893     .3763881       -.0427988               . 
      AM2009 |   -.4188908    -.2591754       -.1597154               . 
      AM2010 |   -.4637839     .2840425       -.7478264               . 
        Cert |   -.8007494    -1.287983        .4872337               . 
      Emplan |    .3778588      .049547        .3283119               . 
         Age |    .5331342     .3604439        .1726903               . 
       Agesq |   -.0083947    -.0065262       -.0018685               . 
        Male |    1.548984     1.118515        .4304687               . 
  Disability |   -1.044292     .6198646       -1.664157               . 
    Minority |   -1.751292    -.8310143        -.920278               . 
Socialassist |   -.3053427     .5811364       -.8864792               . 
   Twounempl |    .0695731     .6025374       -.5329643               . 
  Remittance |    .1092955     .5058907       -.3965952               . 
 Primaryeduc |    1.400195     2.215857       -.8156615               . 
Secondarye~c |      1.7761     2.762776       -.9866754               . 
      Undur6 |    1.543768     .2070604        1.336707               . 
     Undur12 |   -.1805326     -.147043       -.0334896               . 
     Undur24 |    .7411883     .3271671        .4140213               . 
         FER |   -1.310509    -.9131686       -.3973409               . 
        GJAK |   -1.141076    -.5224815       -.6185944               . 
        GJIL |    -1.14778    -.6994234       -.4483562               . 
         MIT |   -1.354635     .9723326       -2.326968               . 
         PEJ |   -1.944116    -1.753621       -.1904955        .1424858 
         PRZ |   -1.172205    -.2068746       -.9653306               . 
       _cons |   -12.71889     -9.36063       -3.358255               . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                          b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from mlogit 
           B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from mlogit 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                 chi2(26) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =      210.06 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
 
 
 
Table A5.2 Multinomial probit model and marginal effects of the 
final model using dependent variable LABSTATE 
 
. . mprobit LABSTATE OJT IS Amduration AM2008 AM2009 Cert Emplan Age Agesq Male Disability 
Minority Socialassist Twounempl Remittance Primaryeduc Secondaryeduc Undur6 Undur12 Undur24 FER 
GJAK GJIL MIT PEJ PRZ 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood =   -539.105   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -537.12037   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -537.0904   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -537.09039   
 
Multinomial probit regression                     Number of obs   =        751 
                                                  Wald chi2(52)   =     199.55 
Log likelihood = -537.09039                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     LABSTATE |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
0             |  (base outcome) 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1             | 
          OJT |   .3917622   .2289026     1.71   0.087    -.0568786    .8404031 
           IS |   .4314454   .2565022     1.68   0.093    -.0712896    .9341805 
   Amduration |  -.0124474    .069435    -0.18   0.858    -.1485375    .1236426 
       AM2008 |   .6600419   .2131802     3.10   0.002     .2422164    1.077867 
       AM2009 |   .4675774   .1854235     2.52   0.012      .104154    .8310009 
         Cert |   .4040996   .1815747     2.23   0.026     .0482197    .7599795 
       Emplan |   .1274878   .1813859     0.70   0.482    -.2280219    .4829976 
          Age |   .1790627   .1349573     1.33   0.185    -.0854488    .4435742 
        Agesq |  -.0022631   .0022426    -1.01   0.313    -.0066585    .0021323 
         Male |   .3230189   .1586846     2.04   0.042     .0120028     .634035 
   Disability |  -1.291635   .7512435    -1.72   0.086    -2.764045    .1807747 
     Minority |  -.8267022   .3653888    -2.26   0.024    -1.542851   -.1105534 
 Socialassist |  -.7721515   .3222473    -2.40   0.017    -1.403745   -.1405585 
    Twounempl |  -.4591886   .1767584    -2.60   0.009    -.8056287   -.1127486 
   Remittance |  -.3074324    .292005    -1.05   0.292    -.8797518    .2648869 
  Primaryeduc |  -.6990088   .2527711    -2.77   0.006    -1.194431   -.2035866 
Secondaryeduc |   -.738497   .1903087    -3.88   0.000    -1.111495   -.3654989 
       Undur6 |   1.126386   .2785105     4.04   0.000     .5805155    1.672257 
      Undur12 |   .1098213    .226483     0.48   0.628    -.3340772    .5537197 
      Undur24 |   .4295659   .2675983     1.61   0.108    -.0949171     .954049 
          FER |  -.3732822   .2917459    -1.28   0.201    -.9450937    .1985292 
         GJAK |  -.6890372   .3077592    -2.24   0.025    -1.292234   -.0858402 
         GJIL |  -.3700658   .2572416    -1.44   0.150    -.8742501    .1341185 
          MIT |  -1.869331   .3462665    -5.40   0.000    -2.548001   -1.190661 
          PEJ |  -.3674074   .3133319    -1.17   0.241    -.9815266    .2467119 
          PRZ |  -.9669882   .3032506    -3.19   0.001    -1.561348   -.3726279 
        _cons |  -3.768876   2.063958    -1.83   0.068    -7.814159    .2764075 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
2             | 
          OJT |   .7628254   .2940522     2.59   0.009     .1864937    1.339157 
           IS |    .393991   .3379471     1.17   0.244    -.2683732    1.056355 
   Amduration |   .2493871    .094475     2.64   0.008     .0642196    .4345547 
       AM2008 |   .4168909   .2778403     1.50   0.133     -.127666    .9614478 
       AM2009 |   .1063493   .2388008     0.45   0.656    -.3616918    .5743904 
         Cert |  -.4473866   .2213226    -2.02   0.043    -.8811708   -.0136023 
       Emplan |    .199591   .2430901     0.82   0.412    -.2768568    .6760388 
          Age |     .44342   .1962733     2.26   0.024     .0587313    .8281087 
        Agesq |  -.0069977   .0033605    -2.08   0.037    -.0135841   -.0004113 
         Male |   1.024555   .2181042     4.70   0.000     .5970781    1.452031 
   Disability |  -.8918562   .8712783    -1.02   0.306     -2.59953    .8158178 
     Minority |  -1.311852   .4630656    -2.83   0.005    -2.219444   -.4042604 
 Socialassist |  -.2101106   .3907467    -0.54   0.591      -.97596    .5557388 
    Twounempl |   .0007493   .2322625     0.00   0.997    -.4544767    .4559754 
   Remittance |   .1009049   .3524518     0.29   0.775     -.589888    .7916977 
  Primaryeduc |   .8146505   .3421494     2.38   0.017     .1440499    1.485251 
Secondaryeduc |   1.105831   .2796901     3.95   0.000      .557648    1.654013 
       Undur6 |   1.238188   .3177207     3.90   0.000     .6154667    1.860909 
      Undur12 |  -.0119304   .2861954    -0.04   0.967    -.5728632    .5490023 
      Undur24 |   .5867474   .3358453     1.75   0.081    -.0714972    1.244992 
          FER |  -.9169577   .3771587    -2.43   0.015    -1.656175   -.1777402 
         GJAK |  -.8569173   .3981051    -2.15   0.031    -1.637189   -.0766457 
         GJIL |  -.7457064   .3195222    -2.33   0.020    -1.371958   -.1194545 
          MIT |  -1.066837   .3567498    -2.99   0.003    -1.766053   -.3676198 
          PEJ |   -1.39678   .5241895    -2.66   0.008    -2.424173   -.3693875 
          PRZ |  -.9335005   .3651058    -2.56   0.011    -1.649095   -.2179062 
        _cons |  -10.29498   2.947795    -3.49   0.000    -16.07256   -4.517413 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. . margins, dydx(*) predict(pr outcome(0)) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        751 
Model VCE    : OIM 
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Expression   : Pr(LABSTATE==0), predict(pr outcome(0)) 
dy/dx w.r.t. : OJT IS Amduration AM2008 AM2009 Cert Emplan Age Agesq Male Disability Minority 
Socialassist Twounempl Remittance 
               Primaryeduc Secondaryeduc Undur6 Undur12 Undur24 FER GJAK GJIL MIT PEJ PRZ 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |            Delta-method 
              |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          OJT |  -.1209935    .047696    -2.54   0.011    -.2144759    -.027511 
           IS |  -.0999437   .0541527    -1.85   0.065     -.206081    .0061937 
   Amduration |  -.0165842   .0149075    -1.11   0.266    -.0458023    .0126338 
       AM2008 |  -.1390221   .0449949    -3.09   0.002    -.2272105   -.0508338 
       AM2009 |  -.0843751   .0388958    -2.17   0.030    -.1606095   -.0081408 
         Cert |  -.0326569   .0378044    -0.86   0.388    -.1067522    .0414383 
       Emplan |  -.0357418   .0387676    -0.92   0.357    -.1117249    .0402413 
          Age |  -.0623768   .0288951    -2.16   0.031    -.1190101   -.0057435 
        Agesq |   .0008924   .0004848     1.84   0.066    -.0000579    .0018427 
         Male |  -.1292964   .0330837    -3.91   0.000    -.1941393   -.0644535 
   Disability |   .2777296   .1468617     1.89   0.059     -.010114    .5655732 
     Minority |   .2330832   .0744048     3.13   0.002     .0872525    .3789139 
 Socialassist |   .1419107    .066246     2.14   0.032      .012071    .2717505 
    Twounempl |   .0750079   .0375356     2.00   0.046     .0014395    .1485763 
   Remittance |   .0427227   .0608123     0.70   0.482    -.0764672    .1619126 
  Primaryeduc |   .0534463   .0536921     1.00   0.320    -.0517883     .158681 
Secondaryeduc |   .0381623   .0410567     0.93   0.353    -.0423074    .1186319 
       Undur6 |   -.276573   .0564184    -4.90   0.000    -.3871511   -.1659949 
      Undur12 |  -.0170618   .0473619    -0.36   0.719    -.1098894    .0757657 
      Undur24 |  -.1140274   .0562307    -2.03   0.043    -.2242375   -.0038173 
          FER |   .1294799   .0616056     2.10   0.036     .0087352    .2502246 
         GJAK |    .176614   .0653298     2.70   0.007       .04857    .3046579 
         GJIL |   .1161686   .0542014     2.14   0.032     .0099358    .2224014 
          MIT |   .3852297    .065498     5.88   0.000      .256856    .5136035 
          PEJ |   .1643426   .0716926     2.29   0.022     .0238278    .3048575 
          PRZ |   .2277684   .0624652     3.65   0.000     .1053389     .350198 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. margins, dydx(*) predict(pr outcome(1)) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        751 
Model VCE    : OIM 
 
Expression   : Pr(LABSTATE==1), predict(pr outcome(1)) 
dy/dx w.r.t. : OJT IS Amduration AM2008 AM2009 Cert Emplan Age Agesq Male Disability Minority 
Socialassist Twounempl Remittance 
               Primaryeduc Secondaryeduc Undur6 Undur12 Undur24 FER GJAK GJIL MIT PEJ PRZ 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |            Delta-method 
              |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          OJT |   .0502385   .0438837     1.14   0.252    -.0357719    .1362488 
           IS |   .0719219   .0493342     1.46   0.145    -.0247714    .1686152 
   Amduration |  -.0117748   .0132898    -0.89   0.376    -.0378223    .0142727 
       AM2008 |   .1169424   .0400223     2.92   0.003     .0385002    .1953846 
       AM2009 |   .0898725    .035366     2.54   0.011     .0205564    .1591886 
         Cert |   .0977328   .0343696     2.84   0.004     .0303696     .165096 
       Emplan |   .0181584    .034936     0.52   0.603     -.050315    .0866317 
          Age |   .0194377   .0261911     0.74   0.458    -.0318959    .0707712 
        Agesq |  -.0001938   .0004368    -0.44   0.657    -.0010499    .0006622 
         Male |   .0267077    .030117     0.89   0.375    -.0323205    .0857359 
   Disability |  -.2260158   .1485043    -1.52   0.128    -.5170789    .0650472 
     Minority |  -.1170944   .0705121    -1.66   0.097    -.2552957    .0211068 
 Socialassist |  -.1471314   .0614546    -2.39   0.017    -.2675802   -.0266827 
    Twounempl |  -.0921731   .0333756    -2.76   0.006     -.157588   -.0267581 
   Remittance |  -.0654459   .0560129    -1.17   0.243    -.1752291    .0443373 
  Primaryeduc |   -.170574   .0473014    -3.61   0.000    -.2632829    -.077865 
Secondaryeduc |  -.1893296   .0343317    -5.51   0.000    -.2566186   -.1220407 
       Undur6 |   .1799721   .0508242     3.54   0.000     .0803585    .2795858 
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      Undur12 |   .0224816   .0438406     0.51   0.608    -.0634444    .1084076 
      Undur24 |   .0643744   .0510487     1.26   0.207    -.0356793    .1644281 
          FER |  -.0407965   .0556763    -0.73   0.464    -.1499201    .0683271 
         GJAK |  -.1063924   .0580531    -1.83   0.067    -.2201743    .0073895 
         GJIL |  -.0465214   .0488351    -0.95   0.341    -.1422365    .0491937 
          MIT |  -.3354327   .0638271    -5.26   0.000    -.4605315   -.2103338 
          PEJ |  -.0217687   .0602588    -0.36   0.718    -.1398739    .0963364 
          PRZ |  -.1593199   .0566606    -2.81   0.005    -.2703726   -.0482671 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. . margins, dydx(*) predict(pr outcome(2)) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        751 
Model VCE    : OIM 
 
Expression   : Pr(LABSTATE==2), predict(pr outcome(2)) 
dy/dx w.r.t. : OJT IS Amduration AM2008 AM2009 Cert Emplan Age Agesq Male Disability Minority 
Socialassist Twounempl Remittance 
               Primaryeduc Secondaryeduc Undur6 Undur12 Undur24 FER GJAK GJIL MIT PEJ PRZ 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |            Delta-method 
              |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          OJT |    .070755   .0315136     2.25   0.025     .0089896    .1325204 
           IS |   .0280217    .036328     0.77   0.440    -.0431799    .0992234 
   Amduration |    .028359   .0100862     2.81   0.005     .0085904    .0481276 
       AM2008 |   .0220797   .0293189     0.75   0.451    -.0353842    .0795436 
       AM2009 |  -.0054974   .0255026    -0.22   0.829    -.0554816    .0444869 
         Cert |  -.0650759   .0234657    -2.77   0.006    -.1110679   -.0190839 
       Emplan |   .0175834   .0260968     0.67   0.500    -.0335653    .0687322 
          Age |   .0429391   .0212665     2.02   0.043     .0012576    .0846206 
        Agesq |  -.0006986    .000365    -1.91   0.056     -.001414    .0000169 
         Male |   .1025887    .023258     4.41   0.000     .0570038    .1481736 
   Disability |  -.0517138   .0967032    -0.53   0.593    -.2412486     .137821 
     Minority |  -.1159888   .0499839    -2.32   0.020    -.2139555    -.018022 
 Socialassist |   .0052207   .0417256     0.13   0.900      -.07656    .0870013 
    Twounempl |   .0171652   .0246564     0.70   0.486    -.0311605    .0654908 
   Remittance |   .0227232   .0376575     0.60   0.546    -.0510842    .0965306 
  Primaryeduc |   .1171276    .036235     3.23   0.001     .0461083     .188147 
Secondaryeduc |   .1511674   .0291913     5.18   0.000     .0939534    .2083813 
       Undur6 |   .0966009   .0320659     3.01   0.003     .0337529    .1594488 
      Undur12 |  -.0054198   .0308658    -0.18   0.861    -.0659156    .0550761 
      Undur24 |    .049653   .0357437     1.39   0.165    -.0204035    .1197095 
          FER |  -.0886834   .0401473    -2.21   0.027    -.1673706   -.0099961 
         GJAK |  -.0702216   .0419906    -1.67   0.094    -.1525217    .0120785 
         GJIL |  -.0696472   .0337756    -2.06   0.039    -.1358462   -.0034482 
          MIT |  -.0497971   .0365503    -1.36   0.173    -.1214344    .0218403 
          PEJ |  -.1425739   .0565762    -2.52   0.012    -.2534612   -.0316866 
          PRZ |  -.0684486   .0381302    -1.80   0.073    -.1431824    .0062852 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table A5.3 Estimated results from Inverse probability weighting – 
Regression Adjustment - EMP Outcome Model 
  
**EMP Outcome Model  
* including all variables  
 
. . teffects ipwra (EMP Amduration AM2008 AM2009 Cert Emplan Age Agesq Male Disability Minority 
Socialassist Twounempl Remittance Primaryeduc Secondaryeduc Undur6 Undur12 Undur24 FER GJAK GJIL 
MIT PEJ PRZ, logit) (AMTYPE Amduration AM2008 AM2009 Cert Emplan Age Agesq Male Disability 
Minority Socialassist Twounempl Remittance Primaryeduc Secondaryeduc Jobsearchbt Undur6 Undur12 
Undur24 FER GJAK GJIL MIT PEJ PRZ Vtcmncp), atet aequ 
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Iteration 0:   EE criterion =   .0028074   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  .00084465   
Iteration 2:   EE criterion =  .00032005   
Iteration 3:   EE criterion =  .00004341   
Iteration 4:   EE criterion =  4.304e-06   
Iteration 5:   EE criterion =  3.276e-07   
Iteration 6:   EE criterion =  1.832e-08   
Iteration 7:   EE criterion =  1.932e-09   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs      =       775 
Estimator      : IPW regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: (multinomial) logit 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
          EMP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
       AMTYPE | 
    (2 vs 1)  |  -.0439966   .0411158    -1.07   0.285    -.1245821    .0365889 
    (3 vs 1)  |  -.2306781   .0472774    -4.88   0.000    -.3233401   -.1380162 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
       AMTYPE | 
           1  |   .4207408   .0305375    13.78   0.000     .3608884    .4805932 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1          | 
   Amduration |  -.0627644   .1303158    -0.48   0.630    -.3181786    .1926498 
       AM2008 |   .5885721    .438524     1.34   0.180    -.2709191    1.448063 
       AM2009 |   .3764315   .3755101     1.00   0.316    -.3595549    1.112418 
         Cert |   -.108387   .3388105    -0.32   0.749    -.7724433    .5556693 
       Emplan |  -.0460054   .3620198    -0.13   0.899    -.7555512    .6635403 
          Age |   .5386367   .2722076     1.98   0.048     .0051196    1.072154 
        Agesq |  -.0083705   .0045713    -1.83   0.067    -.0173301     .000589 
         Male |   1.160854   .2903829     4.00   0.000     .5917135    1.729994 
   Disability |  -2.515615     1.1588    -2.17   0.030    -4.786822   -.2444086 
     Minority |   -2.76118   .7085929    -3.90   0.000    -4.149996   -1.372363 
 Socialassist |   .3444823   .5696708     0.60   0.545     -.772052    1.461016 
    Twounempl |   -.271202   .3384137    -0.80   0.423    -.9344806    .3920767 
   Remittance |  -.3015599   .5125612    -0.59   0.556    -1.306161    .7030416 
  Primaryeduc |  -.9373679   .4560413    -2.06   0.040    -1.831192   -.0435434 
Secondaryeduc |  -.3071879   .3476105    -0.88   0.377     -.988492    .3741162 
       Undur6 |   1.554599   .5943598     2.62   0.009     .3896753    2.719523 
      Undur12 |  -.5105077   .4606861    -1.11   0.268    -1.413436    .3924205 
      Undur24 |   .4740173   .5287411     0.90   0.370    -.5622963    1.510331 
          FER |  -.3391754   .5876229    -0.58   0.564    -1.490895    .8125443 
         GJAK |  -.1144167     .63751    -0.18   0.858    -1.363913     1.13508 
         GJIL |  -.2202198   .5427857    -0.41   0.685     -1.28406    .8436207 
          MIT |  -2.111176   .7391942    -2.86   0.004     -3.55997   -.6623822 
          PEJ |   .9000074   .6956095     1.29   0.196    -.4633622    2.263377 
          PRZ |   .4902991   .6264216     0.78   0.434    -.7374646    1.718063 
        _cons |  -8.341024   4.000653    -2.08   0.037    -16.18216   -.4998876 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME2          | 
   Amduration |  -.0528849   .1626507    -0.33   0.745    -.3716744    .2659046 
       AM2008 |   .9601598   .4628436     2.07   0.038      .053003    1.867317 
       AM2009 |   .8849673   .4409396     2.01   0.045     .0207417    1.749193 
         Cert |   .6859635   .3750789     1.83   0.067    -.0491775    1.421105 
       Emplan |  -.0964195   .3765648    -0.26   0.798    -.8344729    .6416339 
          Age |   .3300517   .4286507     0.77   0.441    -.5100883    1.170192 
        Agesq |  -.0052958   .0073758    -0.72   0.473    -.0197521    .0091604 
         Male |   .8151041   .3640748     2.24   0.025     .1015307    1.528678 
   Disability |  -8.219612   .9235115    -8.90   0.000    -10.02966   -6.409563 
     Minority |  -1.210774   .8045656    -1.50   0.132    -2.787693    .3661458 
 Socialassist |  -.5206427   .6292882    -0.83   0.408    -1.754025    .7127395 
    Twounempl |  -.2773804   .4233309    -0.66   0.512    -1.107094     .552333 
   Remittance |  -.2559838   .6344453    -0.40   0.687    -1.499474    .9875062 
  Primaryeduc |   .4713746   .5492713     0.86   0.391    -.6051775    1.547927 
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Secondaryeduc |  -.6405328   .3792625    -1.69   0.091    -1.383874    .1028081 
       Undur6 |   2.138261   .6996729     3.06   0.002     .7669272    3.509595 
      Undur12 |   .4738089   .4918827     0.96   0.335    -.4902635    1.437881 
      Undur24 |   .9988515   .8858621     1.13   0.260    -.7374064    2.735109 
          FER |  -1.110155    .635524    -1.75   0.081    -2.355759    .1354489 
         GJAK |  -2.365871   .7502384    -3.15   0.002    -3.836311   -.8954304 
         GJIL |  -1.156276   .6167073    -1.87   0.061       -2.365    .0524484 
          MIT |  -2.413818   .6655569    -3.63   0.000    -3.718286   -1.109351 
          PEJ |  -1.901809   .8040223    -2.37   0.018    -3.477664   -.3259546 
          PRZ |  -1.549686   .7409136    -2.09   0.036     -3.00185   -.0975217 
        _cons |  -4.855077   5.951074    -0.82   0.415    -16.51897    6.808813 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME3          | 
   Amduration |   .5901876   .3973585     1.49   0.137    -.1886207    1.368996 
       AM2008 |   .5749502   .8729531     0.66   0.510    -1.136006    2.285907 
       AM2009 |   -1.90357    .889983    -2.14   0.032    -3.647905   -.1592353 
         Cert |   .3093716   .7776974     0.40   0.691    -1.214887     1.83363 
       Emplan |   .7193027    .769889     0.93   0.350     -.789652    2.228257 
          Age |  -.5588032    .502037    -1.11   0.266    -1.542778    .4251712 
        Agesq |   .0099583   .0075848     1.31   0.189    -.0049077    .0248242 
         Male |   1.130225   .6832662     1.65   0.098    -.2089524    2.469402 
   Disability |   6.942585   2.835869     2.45   0.014     1.384385    12.50079 
     Minority |    2.02076   1.828067     1.11   0.269    -1.562186    5.603707 
 Socialassist |  -8.274242   2.516683    -3.29   0.001    -13.20685   -3.341633 
    Twounempl |  -3.340542   .8764125    -3.81   0.000    -5.058279   -1.622805 
   Remittance |  -1.170883   1.041103    -1.12   0.261    -3.211409    .8696421 
  Primaryeduc |  -4.003694   2.009059    -1.99   0.046    -7.941377   -.0660114 
Secondaryeduc |   2.135157   .9667549     2.21   0.027     .2403519    4.029961 
       Undur6 |   3.132367   1.831742     1.71   0.087    -.4577812    6.722514 
      Undur12 |   2.496569   1.263554     1.98   0.048     .0200484     4.97309 
      Undur24 |   6.385734   2.338571     2.73   0.006     1.802219    10.96925 
          FER |   .4291426   1.595427     0.27   0.788    -2.697837    3.556122 
         GJAK |  -4.655251   1.853636    -2.51   0.012    -8.288312   -1.022191 
         GJIL |  -.3609159   .9061367    -0.40   0.690    -2.136911    1.415079 
          MIT |  -16.34204   3.567898    -4.58   0.000      -23.335   -9.349093 
          PEJ |  -6.566865   2.281503    -2.88   0.004    -11.03853   -2.095202 
          PRZ |  -2.476982   1.424689    -1.74   0.082    -5.269321    .3153575 
        _cons |   4.050914   7.508062     0.54   0.590    -10.66462    18.76644 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME2          | 
   Amduration |   .2329991   .0838307     2.78   0.005     .0686938    .3973043 
       AM2008 |   1.234078   .2462185     5.01   0.000     .7514989    1.716658 
       AM2009 |   .1470328   .2220062     0.66   0.508    -.2880914     .582157 
         Cert |   .0172119   .2252752     0.08   0.939    -.4243194    .4587432 
       Emplan |   .2091462   .2196086     0.95   0.341    -.2212787    .6395712 
          Age |   .1598413   .1340997     1.19   0.233    -.1029892    .4226719 
        Agesq |  -.0030997   .0021689    -1.43   0.153    -.0073507    .0011513 
         Male |  -.0440999   .1899546    -0.23   0.816    -.4164041    .3282043 
   Disability |  -.3981354   .6460456    -0.62   0.538    -1.664361    .8680907 
     Minority |  -.0685822   .3791509    -0.18   0.856    -.8117043    .6745398 
 Socialassist |   .6226882   .3631565     1.71   0.086    -.0890855    1.334462 
    Twounempl |   .4005677   .2140876     1.87   0.061    -.0190363    .8201716 
   Remittance |   .2351421   .3290873     0.71   0.475    -.4098572    .8801413 
  Primaryeduc |  -.1364308   .3109532    -0.44   0.661    -.7458878    .4730262 
Secondaryeduc |   .1207818   .2360897     0.51   0.609    -.3419456    .5835092 
  Jobsearchbt |   .4425851   .2522755     1.75   0.079    -.0518658     .937036 
       Undur6 |  -1.274316   .3646765    -3.49   0.000    -1.989069   -.5595632 
      Undur12 |  -.5470632   .2724658    -2.01   0.045    -1.081086   -.0130402 
      Undur24 |  -.8556659   .3146513    -2.72   0.007    -1.472371   -.2389607 
          FER |   1.068962   .3774749     2.83   0.005     .3291246    1.808799 
         GJAK |   1.051089   .3935209     2.67   0.008     .2798026    1.822376 
         GJIL |   .6588806   .3462634     1.90   0.057    -.0197832    1.337544 
          MIT |   1.110043   .3813545     2.91   0.004     .3626017    1.857484 
          PEJ |   1.046338   .3992684     2.62   0.009     .2637862     1.82889 
          PRZ |   .5137491   .4041379     1.27   0.204    -.2783467    1.305845 
      Vtcmncp |   -.781792   .1891974    -4.13   0.000    -1.152612   -.4109718 
        _cons |  -4.833665   2.122526    -2.28   0.023     -8.99374   -.6735905 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME3          | 
363 
 
   Amduration |   .0699453   .1026532     0.68   0.496    -.1312512    .2711419 
       AM2008 |   .3738966   .3009637     1.24   0.214    -.2159814    .9637746 
       AM2009 |  -.7006541   .2928764    -2.39   0.017    -1.274681   -.1266269 
         Cert |  -.3147974   .2505141    -1.26   0.209     -.805796    .1762011 
       Emplan |   .7616696   .2905456     2.62   0.009     .1922107    1.331128 
          Age |   .1582482   .1943625     0.81   0.416    -.2226953    .5391917 
        Agesq |  -.0023262   .0032816    -0.71   0.478    -.0087581    .0041056 
         Male |  -.1965395    .224941    -0.87   0.382    -.6374157    .2443368 
   Disability |   .2362288   .7070531     0.33   0.738     -1.14957    1.622027 
     Minority |  -.0211426   .4437801    -0.05   0.962    -.8909357    .8486504 
 Socialassist |  -.1434028   .4926486    -0.29   0.771    -1.108976    .8221706 
    Twounempl |   .7158547   .2658317     2.69   0.007     .1948341    1.236875 
   Remittance |   .1740182   .4339583     0.40   0.688    -.6765244    1.024561 
  Primaryeduc |   .3734437   .3727712     1.00   0.316    -.3571744    1.104062 
Secondaryeduc |   .5329797   .2998281     1.78   0.075    -.0546725    1.120632 
  Jobsearchbt |   .8118546   .3396121     2.39   0.017     .1462271    1.477482 
       Undur6 |  -.0187538   .4246984    -0.04   0.965    -.8511474    .8136397 
      Undur12 |   .3849114   .3013072     1.28   0.201    -.2056397    .9754626 
      Undur24 |   .3669331   .3769147     0.97   0.330    -.3718062    1.105672 
          FER |  -.5393957   .3657813    -1.47   0.140    -1.256314    .1775224 
         GJAK |  -1.576471    .574202    -2.75   0.006    -2.701887   -.4510561 
         GJIL |  -.5222018   .3428936    -1.52   0.128    -1.194261    .1498572 
          MIT |  -1.590113   .5036984    -3.16   0.002    -2.577344   -.6028823 
          PEJ |  -.7224363   .4894672    -1.48   0.140    -1.681774    .2369018 
          PRZ |  -.2941617   .3988018    -0.74   0.461    -1.075799    .4874756 
      Vtcmncp |   .1647272   .2480323     0.66   0.507    -.3214072    .6508616 
        _cons |  -5.180945   2.945028    -1.76   0.079    -10.95309    .5912033 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
*Final Model for EMP; OJT defined as the control group  
 
. teffects ipwra (EMP Age Agesq Male Minority Disability Socialassist Twounempl Remittance 
Secondaryeduc Tertiaryeduc Amduration AM2009 AM2010 Cert Emplan Undur6 Undur12 Undur24  Regunmp, 
logit) (AMTYPE Age Male Minority Disability Socialassist Twounempl Remittance Secondaryeduc 
Tertiaryeduc  AM2008 AM2009 Emplan Jobsearchbt Undur6 Undur12 Undur24 FER GJAK GJIL MIT PEJ PRZ 
Vtcmncp), atet aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  .00013777   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  5.368e-06   
Iteration 2:   EE criterion =  4.777e-07   
Iteration 3:   EE criterion =  1.633e-08   
Iteration 4:   EE criterion =  1.310e-09   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =        775 
Estimator      : IPW regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: (multinomial) logit 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
          EMP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
       AMTYPE | 
    (2 vs 1)  |  -.0548059   .0432557    -1.27   0.205    -.1395855    .0299737 
    (3 vs 1)  |  -.1874647   .0514709    -3.64   0.000    -.2883458   -.0865835 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
       AMTYPE | 
           1  |   .4315867   .0332301    12.99   0.000     .3664569    .4967165 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1          | 
          Age |    .564068   .2197993     2.57   0.010     .1332692    .9948668 
364 
 
        Agesq |   -.008986   .0034663    -2.59   0.010    -.0157799   -.0021921 
         Male |   1.077326   .3052461     3.53   0.000      .479055    1.675598 
     Minority |  -2.131653   .6789061    -3.14   0.002    -3.462285   -.8010217 
   Disability |  -1.759941   1.026867    -1.71   0.087    -3.772563    .2526803 
 Socialassist |  -.4438142   .5832432    -0.76   0.447     -1.58695    .6993215 
    Twounempl |  -.2522157   .3207956    -0.79   0.432    -.8809636    .3765322 
   Remittance |  -.1205627   .4233139    -0.28   0.776    -.9502426    .7091173 
Secondaryeduc |   .5924487   .4915488     1.21   0.228    -.3709693    1.555867 
 Tertiaryeduc |   1.147507   .5019215     2.29   0.022      .163759    2.131255 
   Amduration |   .0008367   .1337267     0.01   0.995    -.2612629    .2629362 
       AM2009 |  -.3331047   .4215384    -0.79   0.429    -1.159305    .4930955 
       AM2010 |  -.5841415   .4209084    -1.39   0.165    -1.409107    .2408239 
         Cert |   -.278692   .3239883    -0.86   0.390    -.9136973    .3563134 
       Emplan |  -.2239667   .3016824    -0.74   0.458    -.8152533    .3673199 
       Undur6 |   .9511897   .4445372     2.14   0.032     .0799127    1.822467 
      Undur12 |  -.5641854   .4364019    -1.29   0.196    -1.419517    .2911467 
      Undur24 |   .4275026   .3972222     1.08   0.282    -.3510386    1.206044 
      Regunmp |   .0193867   .0142039     1.36   0.172    -.0084525    .0472259 
        _cons |  -9.735501   3.580699    -2.72   0.007    -16.75354    -2.71746 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME2          | 
          Age |   .3290636   .4356758     0.76   0.450    -.5248454    1.182973 
        Agesq |  -.0054928   .0075501    -0.73   0.467    -.0202908    .0093052 
         Male |   .7691322   .3391117     2.27   0.023     .1044854    1.433779 
     Minority |  -.9707207   .7340795    -1.32   0.186     -2.40949    .4680486 
   Disability |  -6.461809   .9453664    -6.84   0.000    -8.314693   -4.608925 
 Socialassist |  -.3667602   .5957894    -0.62   0.538    -1.534486    .8009656 
    Twounempl |  -.3107361   .3846959    -0.81   0.419    -1.064726     .443254 
   Remittance |   -.434276   .5704788    -0.76   0.447    -1.552394     .683842 
Secondaryeduc |  -1.169853   .4802645    -2.44   0.015    -2.111154   -.2285517 
 Tertiaryeduc |  -.5243086   .4952637    -1.06   0.290    -1.495008    .4463905 
   Amduration |  -.0431157   .1491718    -0.29   0.773     -.335487    .2492556 
       AM2009 |  -.0183602   .3964591    -0.05   0.963    -.7954058    .7586854 
       AM2010 |  -.9108668   .4256333    -2.14   0.032    -1.745093   -.0766409 
         Cert |   .3899731    .373649     1.04   0.297    -.3423654    1.122312 
       Emplan |  -.0710129    .361261    -0.20   0.844    -.7790715    .6370456 
       Undur6 |   1.548749   .6600847     2.35   0.019     .2550068    2.842491 
      Undur12 |   .4375261   .4840877     0.90   0.366    -.5112684    1.386321 
      Undur24 |   .3784083   .7547346     0.50   0.616    -1.100844    1.857661 
      Regunmp |   -.025802    .017712    -1.46   0.145     -.060517    .0089129 
        _cons |  -3.780572   6.112092    -0.62   0.536    -15.76005    8.198908 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME3          | 
          Age |  -.4753036   .5929791    -0.80   0.423    -1.637521    .6869142 
        Agesq |   .0080286   .0092375     0.87   0.385    -.0100766    .0261338 
         Male |   .8265213   .5732131     1.44   0.149    -.2969558    1.949998 
     Minority |    1.39971   1.839669     0.76   0.447    -2.205975    5.005394 
   Disability |   5.858273   2.261611     2.59   0.010     1.425598    10.29095 
 Socialassist |  -7.628091   2.096519    -3.64   0.000    -11.73719   -3.518989 
    Twounempl |  -3.128161   .7312034    -4.28   0.000    -4.561294   -1.695029 
   Remittance |  -2.850865   1.431468    -1.99   0.046    -5.656491   -.0452389 
Secondaryeduc |   5.124749   1.620706     3.16   0.002     1.948223    8.301276 
 Tertiaryeduc |   4.752533   1.642633     2.89   0.004     1.533032    7.972034 
   Amduration |  -.0737341   .2859281    -0.26   0.797    -.6341429    .4866747 
       AM2009 |  -2.241873   .9776115    -2.29   0.022    -4.157956   -.3257894 
       AM2010 |  -1.046779   .9059241    -1.16   0.248    -2.822358    .7287996 
         Cert |  -.8625012   .7444766    -1.16   0.247    -2.321648    .5966461 
       Emplan |   1.379132   .6936569     1.99   0.047      .019589    2.738674 
       Undur6 |   1.738822   .8813282     1.97   0.049     .0114503    3.466193 
      Undur12 |   2.007601    .815216     2.46   0.014     .4098071    3.605395 
365 
 
      Undur24 |   2.161926    1.23921     1.74   0.081    -.2668821    4.590733 
      Regunmp |  -.1055114   .0412353    -2.56   0.011    -.1863311   -.0246917 
        _cons |   5.449672   9.669776     0.56   0.573    -13.50274    24.40208 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME2          | 
          Age |  -.0230224   .0211147    -1.09   0.276    -.0644065    .0183617 
         Male |  -.0461145   .1867698    -0.25   0.805    -.4121766    .3199477 
     Minority |   .0272558   .3661039     0.07   0.941    -.6902948    .7448063 
   Disability |   -.428773   .6256488    -0.69   0.493    -1.655022     .797476 
 Socialassist |   .5597349   .3544127     1.58   0.114    -.1349013    1.254371 
    Twounempl |   .3931691   .2118415     1.86   0.063    -.0220327    .8083709 
   Remittance |   .2418132   .3253031     0.74   0.457    -.3957692    .8793956 
Secondaryeduc |   .2617961   .2758849     0.95   0.343    -.2789283    .8025206 
 Tertiaryeduc |   .4270143   .2938807     1.45   0.146    -.1489814     1.00301 
       AM2008 |   1.110861   .2385366     4.66   0.000     .6433375    1.578384 
       AM2009 |    .032839    .215568     0.15   0.879    -.3896665    .4553446 
       Emplan |    .273116   .2148994     1.27   0.204     -.148079    .6943111 
  Jobsearchbt |   .4865343   .2493387     1.95   0.051    -.0021607    .9752293 
       Undur6 |  -1.229632   .3484286    -3.53   0.000     -1.91254   -.5467245 
      Undur12 |  -.5288263   .2760252    -1.92   0.055    -1.069826    .0121731 
      Undur24 |  -.9240161   .3143914    -2.94   0.003    -1.540212   -.3078202 
          FER |   .9365803   .3632649     2.58   0.010     .2245943    1.648566 
         GJAK |   1.063305   .3793692     2.80   0.005     .3197549    1.806855 
         GJIL |   .6252092   .3420067     1.83   0.068    -.0451115     1.29553 
          MIT |   1.049897   .3716283     2.83   0.005     .3215184    1.778275 
          PEJ |   1.096769   .3985844     2.75   0.006     .3155582     1.87798 
          PRZ |   .5635947   .4008738     1.41   0.160    -.2221034    1.349293 
      Vtcmncp |  -.7920202    .185652    -4.27   0.000    -1.155891   -.4281488 
        _cons |   -1.53445   .7677026    -2.00   0.046     -3.03912   -.0297811 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME3          | 
          Age |   .0095294   .0240766     0.40   0.692    -.0376599    .0567188 
         Male |  -.1728018   .2247162    -0.77   0.442    -.6132373    .2676338 
     Minority |    .073275   .4223298     0.17   0.862    -.7544762    .9010261 
   Disability |    .117096   .7091327     0.17   0.869    -1.272779    1.506971 
 Socialassist |  -.1774981    .491178    -0.36   0.718    -1.140189    .7851931 
    Twounempl |   .7069163   .2685615     2.63   0.008     .1805455    1.233287 
   Remittance |   .1390156   .4267626     0.33   0.745    -.6974236    .9754549 
Secondaryeduc |   .1273452   .3300205     0.39   0.700    -.5194832    .7741735 
 Tertiaryeduc |  -.3026011    .336995    -0.90   0.369    -.9630991     .357897 
       AM2008 |   .3318749   .2876811     1.15   0.249    -.2319697    .8957195 
       AM2009 |  -.7350617   .2848813    -2.58   0.010    -1.293419   -.1767046 
       Emplan |   .7865257   .2914136     2.70   0.007     .2153655    1.357686 
  Jobsearchbt |   .8000072   .3485275     2.30   0.022     .1169059    1.483109 
       Undur6 |   .0009203   .4247558     0.00   0.998    -.8315858    .8334265 
      Undur12 |   .3828117   .3023662     1.27   0.205    -.2098152    .9754386 
      Undur24 |   .3530662   .3738044     0.94   0.345    -.3795768    1.085709 
          FER |  -.5227817   .3621072    -1.44   0.149    -1.232499    .1869355 
         GJAK |  -1.695781   .5737932    -2.96   0.003    -2.820394   -.5711666 
         GJIL |  -.5104089   .3389441    -1.51   0.132    -1.174727    .1539094 
          MIT |  -1.689925   .5029444    -3.36   0.001    -2.675678   -.7041722 
          PEJ |  -.7374181   .4909741    -1.50   0.133     -1.69971    .2248734 
          PRZ |    -.31525   .3929581    -0.80   0.422    -1.085434    .4549338 
      Vtcmncp |   .1120576   .2431995     0.46   0.645    -.3646046    .5887199 
        _cons |  -2.431239   .8687185    -2.80   0.005    -4.133896   -.7285821 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. tebalance sum 
 
  Covariate balance summary 
366 
 
                                                 Observations       
                               Treatment           Raw     Weighted 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                            1bn.AMTYPE =           434        266.8 
                            2.AMTYPE   =           215        260.1 
                            3.AMTYPE   =           126        248.0 
                            Total      =           775        775.0 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw    Weighted           Raw   Weighted 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  2.AMTYPE        | 
              Age |  -.0678291   -.0018754      .5369847   .7090128 
             Male |  -.0132747    .0471284      1.004152   .9966165 
         Minority |   .0458827    .0136406      1.159304   1.042683 
       Disability |  -.0459175    .0263776      .7408577   1.220008 
     Socialassist |   .1072386   -.0373641        1.3155   .9218237 
        Twounempl |   .1581292   -.0316135      1.054328   .9960882 
       Remittance |   .0267562    .0027943      1.080152   1.007737 
    Secondaryeduc |   .0124827     .074304      1.006664   1.030859 
     Tertiaryeduc |    .026563   -.0285668      1.011413   .9920741 
           AM2008 |   .4176771    -.101535      1.737583   .9358358 
           AM2009 |  -.1748149   -.0001514      .8442664    .999914 
           Emplan |   .1672003   -.0670688      .8822599   1.072764 
      Jobsearchbt |   .1248105    .0480782        .82352   .9215799 
           Undur6 |  -.1918028    .0203489      .5470082   1.084407 
          Undur12 |  -.1510318    .0265457      .7264488    1.06986 
          Undur24 |   -.150218    .0830826      .6250328    1.40823 
              FER |   .0967362    .0293226      1.224914   1.058445 
             GJAK |  -.0026116    .0914655      .9972103   1.219827 
             GJIL |   .0048082   -.0458883      1.009151   .9408615 
              MIT |   .1844576   -.0184909      1.439318   .9711882 
              PEJ |   .0259385    .0134178      1.072776   1.035376 
              PRZ |  -.1775181   -.0363147      .6685847   .9094665 
          Vtcmncp |  -.3764772    -.041915      1.056687   .9920788 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  3.AMTYPE        | 
              Age |   .0024615    -.014137      .6569841   .5916758 
             Male |  -.1212737    .2389363      1.008882   .9384594 
         Minority |   .0299832    .0966511      1.107869   1.311958 
       Disability |   .0383374    .0867318      1.251365   1.805588 
     Socialassist |   -.106935    .1485006       .714682   1.309968 
        Twounempl |    .400877    .0624914      1.037655   1.002314 
       Remittance |  -.0675719   -.0308559      .8155747   .9168337 
    Secondaryeduc |   .0804742    .2297438      1.028082    1.05904 
     Tertiaryeduc |   -.108869   -.2023614      .9544092   .9109877 
           AM2008 |   .1543468   -.0266902      1.310053   .9851328 
           AM2009 |  -.3846312   -.2308287      .6168735   .6979702 
           Emplan |   .4312289    .1184841      .6277311   .8578052 
      Jobsearchbt |    .365399    .1723042      .4722596   .7162723 
           Undur6 |  -.1288816   -.0108593      .6907432    .956348 
          Undur12 |   .0082529   -.0786436        1.0208   .7999073 
          Undur24 |   .0314918     .179775      1.090249   1.950019 
              FER |   .0540492   -.1419401      1.130358   .7206681 
             GJAK |  -.3820654     .038094      .3009627   1.091374 
             GJIL |   .0623979    .1986769      1.092133   1.221178 
              MIT |  -.2623877   -.1867469      .4324768     .70229 
              PEJ |  -.1302014    .1379881      .6699214   1.371341 
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              PRZ |   -.016284   -.0371711      .9746405   .9075171 
          Vtcmncp |  -.0482927   -.1599332      1.028956   .9515728 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
*Final Model for EMP; IS defined as the control group  
 
 
.  . teffects ipwra (EMP Age Agesq Male Minority Disability Socialassist Twounempl Remittance 
Secondaryeduc Tertiaryeduc Amduration AM2009 AM2010 Cert Emplan Undur6 Undur12 Undur24  Regunmp, 
logit) (AMTYPE Age Male Minority Disability Socialassist Twounempl Remittance Secondaryeduc 
Tertiaryeduc  AM2008 AM2009 Emplan Jobsearchbt Undur6 Undur12 Undur24 FER GJAK GJIL MIT PEJ PRZ 
Vtcmncp), control(2) atet aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  .00048362   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =   .0000189   
Iteration 2:   EE criterion =  2.219e-06   
Iteration 3:   EE criterion =  1.265e-07   
Iteration 4:   EE criterion =  1.139e-08   
Iteration 5:   EE criterion =  7.640e-10   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =        775 
Estimator      : IPW regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: (multinomial) logit 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
          EMP |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
       AMTYPE | 
    (1 vs 2)  |   .0132943   .0493514     0.27   0.788    -.0834326    .1100213 
    (3 vs 2)  |  -.1615823   .0557652    -2.90   0.004    -.2708801   -.0522845 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
       AMTYPE | 
           2  |   .4221895   .0450768     9.37   0.000     .3338406    .5105385 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1          | 
          Age |   .3555378   .1599303     2.22   0.026     .0420802    .6689954 
        Agesq |  -.0047716   .0025722    -1.86   0.064     -.009813    .0002698 
         Male |   .6272575   .2151691     2.92   0.004     .2055339    1.048981 
     Minority |  -1.062448   .4922263    -2.16   0.031    -2.027193   -.0977018 
   Disability |  -.7002416   .7995441    -0.88   0.381    -2.267319    .8668361 
 Socialassist |  -.9621916   .4325418    -2.22   0.026    -1.809958   -.1144252 
    Twounempl |  -.3550106    .250606    -1.42   0.157    -.8461894    .1361681 
   Remittance |  -.5315613   .3776834    -1.41   0.159    -1.271807    .2086845 
Secondaryeduc |    .408088    .339943     1.20   0.230     -.258188    1.074364 
 Tertiaryeduc |   .9511209   .3610006     2.63   0.008     .2435726    1.658669 
   Amduration |   .0677976   .0920094     0.74   0.461    -.1125375    .2481327 
       AM2009 |  -.3039122    .329441    -0.92   0.356    -.9496046    .3417802 
       AM2010 |  -.5634386   .3193848    -1.76   0.078    -1.189421    .0625441 
         Cert |  -.2398386   .2622122    -0.91   0.360    -.7537651     .274088 
       Emplan |   .2390566   .2359918     1.01   0.311    -.2234789    .7015921 
       Undur6 |   .8193721   .3540247     2.31   0.021     .1254965    1.513248 
      Undur12 |   -.446396   .3288358    -1.36   0.175    -1.090902    .1981103 
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      Undur24 |   .0048597   .3442055     0.01   0.989    -.6697706      .67949 
      Regunmp |   .0218089   .0111575     1.95   0.051    -.0000594    .0436772 
        _cons |  -7.357804   2.542043    -2.89   0.004    -12.34012   -2.375492 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME2          | 
          Age |   .7615354   .5099778     1.49   0.135    -.2380027    1.761073 
        Agesq |   -.012766   .0090131    -1.42   0.157    -.0304312    .0048993 
         Male |   1.195647   .3915337     3.05   0.002     .4282555    1.963039 
     Minority |  -.3391327   1.140973    -0.30   0.766    -2.575399    1.897134 
   Disability |  -8.153542   1.426372    -5.72   0.000    -10.94918   -5.357904 
 Socialassist |  -1.020312   .7201723    -1.42   0.157    -2.431823    .3912001 
    Twounempl |  -.2178595   .4368585    -0.50   0.618    -1.074086    .6383674 
   Remittance |   -.741187   .6449859    -1.15   0.250    -2.005336    .5229622 
Secondaryeduc |  -1.452402    .538278    -2.70   0.007    -2.507408   -.3973969 
 Tertiaryeduc |  -.7624754   .5641786    -1.35   0.177    -1.868245    .3432943 
   Amduration |  -.2353584    .165339    -1.42   0.155    -.5594168       .0887 
       AM2009 |   -.204226   .4171904    -0.49   0.624    -1.021904    .6134522 
       AM2010 |  -.7458789   .4596267    -1.62   0.105    -1.646731    .1549729 
         Cert |   .6266007   .4030011     1.55   0.120    -.1632669    1.416468 
       Emplan |   .1962163   .4219629     0.47   0.642    -.6308157    1.023248 
       Undur6 |   .8622146   .5673309     1.52   0.129    -.2497336    1.974163 
      Undur12 |   .3543984   .6307943     0.56   0.574    -.8819357    1.590733 
      Undur24 |   .7979761   .9120326     0.87   0.382     -.989575    2.585527 
      Regunmp |  -.0245198    .019497    -1.26   0.209    -.0627332    .0136936 
        _cons |  -9.521713   7.069237    -1.35   0.178    -23.37716    4.333738 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME3          | 
          Age |  -.2186589   .4498074    -0.49   0.627    -1.100265    .6629474 
        Agesq |    .003462   .0066684     0.52   0.604    -.0096079    .0165318 
         Male |   .8357335   .5236569     1.60   0.110    -.1906152    1.862082 
     Minority |  -1.243846   1.726844    -0.72   0.471    -4.628398    2.140707 
   Disability |   2.494899   1.027847     2.43   0.015     .4803557    4.509443 
 Socialassist |  -3.900294   1.487789    -2.62   0.009    -6.816306   -.9842812 
    Twounempl |   -2.28188    .558867    -4.08   0.000    -3.377239   -1.186521 
   Remittance |  -2.468048   1.132103    -2.18   0.029     -4.68693   -.2491661 
Secondaryeduc |   2.067616   1.046027     1.98   0.048     .0174413    4.117791 
 Tertiaryeduc |   2.663065   .9968961     2.67   0.008     .7091844    4.616945 
   Amduration |  -.2908568     .24037    -1.21   0.226    -.7619732    .1802597 
       AM2009 |  -1.434142   .8174757    -1.75   0.079    -3.036365    .1680809 
       AM2010 |  -.2140462   .7878155    -0.27   0.786    -1.758136    1.330044 
         Cert |  -.0363909   .5660568    -0.06   0.949    -1.145842     1.07306 
       Emplan |   .9753456   .5803867     1.68   0.093    -.1621913    2.112883 
       Undur6 |   .7258337   .8339626     0.87   0.384     -.908703     2.36037 
      Undur12 |   1.722254   .6675755     2.58   0.010       .41383    3.030678 
      Undur24 |   2.228145   .8650997     2.58   0.010     .5325807    3.923709 
      Regunmp |  -.1207516   .0359788    -3.36   0.001    -.1912688   -.0502345 
        _cons |   4.703475   7.113951     0.66   0.509    -9.239613    18.64656 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1          | 
          Age |   .0230224   .0211147     1.09   0.276    -.0183617    .0644065 
         Male |   .0461145   .1867698     0.25   0.805    -.3199477    .4121766 
     Minority |  -.0272558   .3661039    -0.07   0.941    -.7448063    .6902948 
   Disability |    .428773   .6256488     0.69   0.493     -.797476    1.655022 
 Socialassist |  -.5597349   .3544127    -1.58   0.114    -1.254371    .1349013 
    Twounempl |  -.3931691   .2118415    -1.86   0.063    -.8083709    .0220327 
   Remittance |  -.2418132   .3253031    -0.74   0.457    -.8793956    .3957692 
Secondaryeduc |  -.2617961   .2758849    -0.95   0.343    -.8025206    .2789283 
 Tertiaryeduc |  -.4270143   .2938807    -1.45   0.146     -1.00301    .1489814 
       AM2008 |  -1.110861   .2385366    -4.66   0.000    -1.578384   -.6433375 
       AM2009 |   -.032839    .215568    -0.15   0.879    -.4553446    .3896665 
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       Emplan |   -.273116   .2148994    -1.27   0.204    -.6943111     .148079 
  Jobsearchbt |  -.4865343   .2493387    -1.95   0.051    -.9752293    .0021607 
       Undur6 |   1.229632   .3484286     3.53   0.000     .5467245     1.91254 
      Undur12 |   .5288263   .2760252     1.92   0.055    -.0121731    1.069826 
      Undur24 |   .9240161   .3143914     2.94   0.003     .3078202    1.540212 
          FER |  -.9365803   .3632649    -2.58   0.010    -1.648566   -.2245943 
         GJAK |  -1.063305   .3793692    -2.80   0.005    -1.806855   -.3197549 
         GJIL |  -.6252092   .3420067    -1.83   0.068     -1.29553    .0451115 
          MIT |  -1.049897   .3716283    -2.83   0.005    -1.778275   -.3215184 
          PEJ |  -1.096769   .3985844    -2.75   0.006     -1.87798   -.3155582 
          PRZ |  -.5635947   .4008738    -1.41   0.160    -1.349293    .2221034 
      Vtcmncp |   .7920202    .185652     4.27   0.000     .4281488    1.155891 
        _cons |    1.53445   .7677026     2.00   0.046     .0297811     3.03912 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME3          | 
          Age |   .0325518   .0280539     1.16   0.246    -.0224327    .0875364 
         Male |  -.1266873   .2503674    -0.51   0.613    -.6173984    .3640239 
     Minority |   .0460192   .4873019     0.09   0.925    -.9090749    1.001113 
   Disability |    .545869    .835418     0.65   0.513     -1.09152    2.183258 
 Socialassist |   -.737233   .5527755    -1.33   0.182    -1.820653    .3461872 
    Twounempl |   .3137472   .2951957     1.06   0.288    -.2648257    .8923202 
   Remittance |  -.1027976   .4828955    -0.21   0.831    -1.049255    .8436602 
Secondaryeduc |  -.1344509   .3767758    -0.36   0.721     -.872918    .6040161 
 Tertiaryeduc |  -.7296153   .3913419    -1.86   0.062    -1.496631    .0374008 
       AM2008 |  -.7789858   .2998533    -2.60   0.009    -1.366688   -.1912841 
       AM2009 |  -.7679007   .3201505    -2.40   0.016    -1.395384   -.1404173 
       Emplan |   .5134096   .3270476     1.57   0.116    -.1275919    1.154411 
  Jobsearchbt |   .3134729    .391893     0.80   0.424    -.4546233    1.081569 
       Undur6 |   1.230552    .504891     2.44   0.015     .2409843    2.220121 
      Undur12 |   .9116381    .368618     2.47   0.013       .18916    1.634116 
      Undur24 |   1.277082   .4312697     2.96   0.003     .4318091    2.122355 
          FER |  -1.459362   .4286079    -3.40   0.001    -2.299418    -.619306 
         GJAK |  -2.759085   .6454695    -4.27   0.000    -4.024183   -1.493988 
         GJIL |  -1.135618   .3996894    -2.84   0.004    -1.918995   -.3522413 
          MIT |  -2.739822   .5609588    -4.88   0.000    -3.839281   -1.640363 
          PEJ |  -1.834187   .5650037    -3.25   0.001    -2.941574   -.7268004 
          PRZ |  -.8788447   .4791612    -1.83   0.067    -1.817983     .060294 
      Vtcmncp |   .9040778   .2660051     3.40   0.001     .3827174    1.425438 
        _cons |  -.8967887   1.020752    -0.88   0.380    -2.897426    1.103849 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. tebalance sum 
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                 Observations       
                               Treatment           Raw     Weighted 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                            1bn.AMTYPE =           434        275.4 
                            2.AMTYPE   =           215        261.1 
                            3.AMTYPE   =           126        238.5 
                            Total      =           775        775.0 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw    Weighted           Raw   Weighted 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  1.AMTYPE        | 
              Age |   .0678291       .0602       1.86225   1.972814 
             Male |   .0132747    .0213407      .9958648   .9971013 
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         Minority |  -.0458827    .0125859      .8625864   1.043287 
       Disability |   .0459175    .0229909      1.349787    1.15563 
     Socialassist |  -.1072386    -.032924      .7601673   .9138627 
        Twounempl |  -.1581292   -.0648614      .9484715   .9731745 
       Remittance |  -.0267562   -.0247555       .925796   .9328523 
    Secondaryeduc |  -.0124827    .0487914      .9933797   1.019859 
     Tertiaryeduc |   -.026563   -.0226891      .9887159   .9920579 
           AM2008 |  -.4176771   -.0601096       .575512   .8931296 
           AM2009 |   .1748149    -.082829       1.18446   .9452037 
           Emplan |  -.1672003   -.0682123      1.133453   1.045229 
      Jobsearchbt |  -.1248105    .0984191        1.2143   .8850456 
           Undur6 |   .1918028    .0501703      1.828126   1.142705 
          Undur12 |   .1510318    .0542696      1.376559   1.109925 
          Undur24 |    .150218    .1550883      1.599916   1.633426 
              FER |  -.0967362    .0543424       .816384   1.139787 
             GJAK |   .0026116    .1312138      1.002798    1.34387 
             GJIL |  -.0048082   -.1472809      .9909323    .837401 
              MIT |  -.1844576   -.0426374      .6947735   .9084236 
              PEJ |  -.0259385    .0194836      .9321606   1.054722 
              PRZ |   .1775181   -.0109066      1.495697   .9795942 
          Vtcmncp |   .3764772    .0531773      .9463541   .9752052 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  3.AMTYPE        | 
              Age |   .0798579    .1174111      1.223469   1.531705 
             Male |  -.1079032    .0738068       1.00471   .9871909 
         Minority |  -.0158672    .1235349      .9556325   1.451093 
       Disability |   .0836776    .0690918      1.689075   1.500922 
     Socialassist |  -.2128018    .0337177      .5432779   1.090079 
        Twounempl |   .2389379    .0331421      .9841861   1.010847 
       Remittance |  -.0941555   -.0512798      .7550558   .8628922 
    Secondaryeduc |    .067946    .1495471      1.021276   1.046757 
     Tertiaryeduc |  -.1354217   -.1531382      .9436395   .9296092 
           AM2008 |  -.2614834    .0788847      .7539509   1.137736 
           AM2009 |  -.2082087   -.2109584      .7306621   .8405048 
           Emplan |   .2610492    .1011247      .7115037   .9183888 
      Jobsearchbt |   .2414269    .3092292      .5734647   .6154978 
           Undur6 |    .063799    .0326308      1.262766   1.092897 
          Undur12 |   .1590057    .0046304      1.405192   1.009778 
          Undur24 |   .1809766     .203182      1.744307   1.848489 
              FER |  -.0426173    .0097031      .9228061    1.02515 
             GJAK |  -.3792364   -.0181466      .3018047   .9540108 
             GJIL |   .0575603    .0209381       1.08223   1.021163 
              MIT |  -.4401124   -.1468737      .3004735   .6912175 
              PEJ |  -.1557422   -.0848431      .6244744   .7702631 
              PRZ |    .161032    .0353862      1.457767   1.065677 
          Vtcmncp |   .3262228   -.0574194      .9737566   1.020832 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table A5.4 Estimated results from Inverse probability weighting – 
Regression Adjustment - ACTSRCAT Outcome Model 
  
**ACTSRCAT Outcome Model  
* including all variables  
 
 
. teffects ipwra (ACTSRCAT Age Agesq Male Minority Disability Secondaryeduc Tertiaryeduc 
Socialassist Amduration AM2008 AM2009 Emplan Undur6 Undur12 Undur24 Regunemp, logit) (AMTYPE Age 
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Male Minority Disability Socialassist Twounempl Remittance Secondaryeduc Tertiaryeduc AM2008 
AM2009 Emplan Jobsearchbt Undur6 Undur12 Undur24 FER GJAK GJIL MIT PEJ PRZ Vtcmncp), control(1) 
atet aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  .01638724   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  .01006662   
Iteration 2:   EE criterion =  .00847948   
Iteration 3:   EE criterion =  .00062315   
Iteration 4:   EE criterion =  .00003246   
Iteration 5:   EE criterion =  1.686e-06   
Iteration 6:   EE criterion =  1.300e-07   
Iteration 7:   EE criterion =  3.741e-09   
Iteration 8:   EE criterion =  9.645e-10   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =        385 
Estimator      : IPW regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: (multinomial) logit 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     ACTSRCAT |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
       AMTYPE | 
    (2 vs 1)  |   .1921274   .0642331     2.99   0.003     .0662329     .318022 
    (3 vs 1)  |   .1054037   .0689658     1.53   0.126    -.0297668    .2405741 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
       AMTYPE | 
           1  |   .6474952   .0541566    11.96   0.000     .5413502    .7536402 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1          | 
          Age |   .7855234   .3305322     2.38   0.017     .1376921    1.433355 
        Agesq |  -.0131236   .0053049    -2.47   0.013    -.0235211   -.0027262 
         Male |   .9209845   .4581127     2.01   0.044        .0231    1.818869 
     Minority |   1.178178   1.126998     1.05   0.296    -1.030698    3.387053 
   Disability |   1.958913   1.358724     1.44   0.149    -.7041378    4.621963 
Secondaryeduc |  -.3781189   .7702736    -0.49   0.624    -1.887827     1.13159 
 Tertiaryeduc |   .6546435   .8086952     0.81   0.418    -.9303699    2.239657 
 Socialassist |  -.1283874   .9438567    -0.14   0.892    -1.978313    1.721538 
   Amduration |   .1745178    .247074     0.71   0.480    -.3097383    .6587739 
       AM2008 |   .5782775   .7065633     0.82   0.413    -.8065611    1.963116 
       AM2009 |   .4253178    .509013     0.84   0.403    -.5723294    1.422965 
       Emplan |   .3363128   .6293192     0.53   0.593    -.8971301    1.569756 
       Undur6 |   .1944928   .8136496     0.24   0.811    -1.400231    1.789217 
      Undur12 |   .9896838   .7311165     1.35   0.176    -.4432782    2.422646 
      Undur24 |   .6338765   .9148453     0.69   0.488    -1.159187     2.42694 
     Regunemp |   .0346191    .030677     1.13   0.259    -.0255066    .0947449 
        _cons |  -13.64592   5.354346    -2.55   0.011    -24.14025   -3.151598 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME2          | 
          Age |   -1.26435   .8890177    -1.42   0.155    -3.006792     .478093 
        Agesq |    .018973   .0142685     1.33   0.184    -.0089928    .0469388 
         Male |   -.348881   .7102232    -0.49   0.623    -1.740893    1.043131 
     Minority |   .0989111   1.165032     0.08   0.932    -2.184509    2.382331 
   Disability |  -2.907915   1.289745    -2.25   0.024    -5.435768   -.3800618 
Secondaryeduc |   .2816064   .9344415     0.30   0.763    -1.549865    2.113078 
 Tertiaryeduc |   1.101218    1.27291     0.87   0.387     -1.39364    3.596076 
 Socialassist |   .3290989   .8126935     0.40   0.686    -1.263751    1.921949 
   Amduration |    .990741   .3812899     2.60   0.009     .2434266    1.738055 
372 
 
       AM2008 |   -.609777   .9201519    -0.66   0.508    -2.413242    1.193688 
       AM2009 |  -1.042218   .9379028    -1.11   0.266    -2.880474    .7960374 
       Emplan |  -1.988228   .8890076    -2.24   0.025    -3.730651   -.2458048 
       Undur6 |  -4.996561   1.422994    -3.51   0.000    -7.785578   -2.207544 
      Undur12 |  -1.976822   1.254593    -1.58   0.115     -4.43578    .4821365 
      Undur24 |   -2.16246   1.197947    -1.81   0.071    -4.510393    .1854734 
     Regunemp |  -.0283003   .0470194    -0.60   0.547    -.1204566    .0638559 
        _cons |   21.76476   12.78821     1.70   0.089    -3.299671    46.82919 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME3          | 
          Age |   .6639564   1.250694     0.53   0.596     -1.78736    3.115272 
        Agesq |   -.013077   .0181811    -0.72   0.472    -.0487113    .0225574 
         Male |   4.649181   1.594984     2.91   0.004      1.52307    7.775291 
     Minority |   15.48883   3.550417     4.36   0.000     8.530138    22.44752 
   Disability |   -6.84905   1.993739    -3.44   0.001    -10.75671   -2.941393 
Secondaryeduc |   1.228815   1.286932     0.95   0.340    -1.293525    3.751156 
 Tertiaryeduc |   4.209563   2.888558     1.46   0.145    -1.451908    9.871033 
 Socialassist |  -6.913187   2.858857    -2.42   0.016    -12.51644    -1.30993 
   Amduration |  -.9779994   .8239995    -1.19   0.235    -2.593009    .6370099 
       AM2008 |  -1.517675   1.648279    -0.92   0.357    -4.748242    1.712892 
       AM2009 |   3.081588   1.790679     1.72   0.085     -.428078    6.591254 
       Emplan |  -1.465409   1.705103    -0.86   0.390     -4.80735    1.876531 
       Undur6 |  -4.689655   1.513316    -3.10   0.002    -7.655699   -1.723611 
      Undur12 |  -3.201606   1.299426    -2.46   0.014    -5.748434   -.6547785 
      Undur24 |  -6.210585   1.942114    -3.20   0.001    -10.01706   -2.404112 
     Regunemp |   .2244805   .0981028     2.29   0.022     .0322026    .4167584 
        _cons |   -9.28485   21.76238    -0.43   0.670    -51.93833    33.36863 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME2          | 
          Age |  -.0107182   .0301458    -0.36   0.722    -.0698028    .0483665 
         Male |  -.0145628   .2928872    -0.05   0.960    -.5886112    .5594856 
     Minority |   .5183788   .4725444     1.10   0.273    -.4077912    1.444549 
   Disability |    -.24759   .7675267    -0.32   0.747    -1.751915    1.256735 
 Socialassist |   .6917754   .5241023     1.32   0.187    -.3354461    1.718997 
    Twounempl |   .4810493   .3228976     1.49   0.136    -.1518184    1.113917 
   Remittance |   .5892035   .4846377     1.22   0.224     -.360669    1.539076 
Secondaryeduc |   .7108797   .3644914     1.95   0.051    -.0035105     1.42527 
 Tertiaryeduc |   .5889222   .4149555     1.42   0.156    -.2243757     1.40222 
       AM2008 |   1.198901   .3747809     3.20   0.001     .4643434    1.933458 
       AM2009 |  -.2354281   .3479118    -0.68   0.499    -.9173226    .4464664 
       Emplan |   .4894523   .3400249     1.44   0.150    -.1769844    1.155889 
  Jobsearchbt |   .9085695   .3747099     2.42   0.015     .1741516    1.642987 
       Undur6 |  -1.203228   .6725296    -1.79   0.074    -2.521361    .1149062 
      Undur12 |  -.7441301    .422225    -1.76   0.078    -1.571676    .0834157 
      Undur24 |  -1.227016   .4865824    -2.52   0.012      -2.1807   -.2733315 
          FER |   1.351682   .5873415     2.30   0.021     .2005142    2.502851 
         GJAK |   1.490546   .6188091     2.41   0.016      .277703     2.70339 
         GJIL |   .0833482   .6307585     0.13   0.895    -1.152916    1.319612 
          MIT |   .8992903   .5857786     1.54   0.125    -.2488146    2.047395 
          PEJ |   2.379415   .7201428     3.30   0.001     .9679614    3.790869 
          PRZ |   .5260253   .6516298     0.81   0.420    -.7511456    1.803196 
      Vtcmncp |   -1.22444   .2836089    -4.32   0.000    -1.780303   -.6685763 
        _cons |  -2.502794   1.177249    -2.13   0.034    -4.810159   -.1954287 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME3          | 
          Age |   .0055744   .0327451     0.17   0.865    -.0586049    .0697537 
         Male |   .3828976   .3331292     1.15   0.250    -.2700237    1.035819 
     Minority |  -.0209445   .5453514    -0.04   0.969    -1.089814    1.047925 
   Disability |  -.6334026   .9198573    -0.69   0.491     -2.43629    1.169485 
 Socialassist |    .362595   .6041698     0.60   0.548    -.8215561    1.546746 
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    Twounempl |   1.395816   .4146874     3.37   0.001     .5830436    2.208588 
   Remittance |   .3777435   .6364503     0.59   0.553    -.8696762    1.625163 
Secondaryeduc |   .1742506    .433992     0.40   0.688    -.6763581    1.024859 
 Tertiaryeduc |  -.1356057   .4379488    -0.31   0.757    -.9939696    .7227581 
       AM2008 |   .5498323   .4880917     1.13   0.260    -.4068099    1.506475 
       AM2009 |   -.421889   .3781891    -1.12   0.265    -1.163126    .3193479 
       Emplan |   1.395946   .4112312     3.39   0.001     .5899479    2.201944 
  Jobsearchbt |   .8051559   .4278951     1.88   0.060     -.033503    1.643815 
       Undur6 |  -.0305311   .6315204    -0.05   0.961    -1.268288    1.207226 
      Undur12 |  -.4555178   .4327111    -1.05   0.292    -1.303616    .3925805 
      Undur24 |  -.5648889   .5551786    -1.02   0.309    -1.653019    .5232411 
          FER |   -.380537   .5503666    -0.69   0.489    -1.459236    .6981616 
         GJAK |  -1.356918   .6936049    -1.96   0.050    -2.716359    .0025224 
         GJIL |  -.9156303   .5531677    -1.66   0.098    -1.999819    .1685584 
          MIT |  -2.150158    .647901    -3.32   0.001     -3.42002    -.880295 
          PEJ |   .8573721   .7078696     1.21   0.226    -.5300269    2.244771 
          PRZ |   .2243124   .6074618     0.37   0.712    -.9662909    1.414916 
      Vtcmncp |  -.0192191   .3203944    -0.06   0.952    -.6471806    .6087423 
        _cons |  -2.938529   1.270639    -2.31   0.021    -5.428934   -.4481228 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. tebalance sum 
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                 Observations       
                               Treatment           Raw     Weighted 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                            1bn.AMTYPE =           198        127.6 
                            2.AMTYPE   =           106        135.2 
                            3.AMTYPE   =            81        122.3 
                            Total      =           385        385.0 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw    Weighted           Raw   Weighted 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  2.AMTYPE        | 
              Age |   .0469178   -.1176441      .6697239   .4930499 
             Male |   .0228163    .0666434      1.006693    1.00914 
         Minority |    .130576    .0284658       1.39318   1.065543 
       Disability |  -.0400379    .0192032      .8099595   1.119374 
     Socialassist |   .1173884   -.1151869      1.254727   .8416362 
        Twounempl |   .1586626    .0441835      1.055684   1.008288 
       Remittance |   .0734337    .0220473      1.220114    1.05637 
    Secondaryeduc |   .1169856    .0733064      1.004898   .9966409 
     Tertiaryeduc |  -.0120731   -.0169054      .9935561   .9845396 
           AM2008 |   .4462825   -.1384233      2.024386    .900612 
           AM2009 |  -.2650759   -.1286476      .7418974   .8425819 
           Emplan |   .2459716   -.1422474      .8399412    1.18709 
      Jobsearchbt |   .2145967     .171024      .7404639   .7752592 
           Undur6 |  -.1825743    .0183309      .4910266   1.095554 
          Undur12 |  -.2528701   -.0101925      .6357149   .9765382 
          Undur24 |  -.1586015    .1033995      .6272406   1.513257 
              FER |   .2020129    .1698698       1.49761   1.382373 
             GJAK |   .0496555     .062013       1.10144   1.123216 
             GJIL |  -.2071617   -.0277422      .7217675   .9481301 
              MIT |   .1468002   -.2045398      1.211077   .8445723 
              PEJ |   .1918449     .187964      1.977895    1.93371 
              PRZ |  -.2406805     .018363      .5451572   1.061895 
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          Vtcmncp |  -.5956623   -.0501914      .9392673   .9665852 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  3.AMTYPE        | 
              Age |   .0610288   -.1824096      .5611763   .2705367 
             Male |  -.0504876    .1871295      .9986175    1.00447 
         Minority |  -.0157253    .0395087       .962368    1.09212 
       Disability |  -.0622575    .0405248       .711348   1.260678 
     Socialassist |  -.1586101   -.0429769      .6753459   .9426918 
        Twounempl |   .4780627   -.0294926       1.00627   .9923483 
       Remittance |  -.0609651    .2677074       .836034   1.700987 
    Secondaryeduc |  -.0011195    .1472895      1.007248   .9836359 
     Tertiaryeduc |   .0230942   -.1275994      1.027585   .8767174 
           AM2008 |   .1280804    -.224049      1.322035   .8261523 
           AM2009 |   -.330247   -.2959073      .6696204   .6227825 
           Emplan |   .4933111     .064386      .6060147   .9075907 
      Jobsearchbt |   .4226874    .3922785      .4689016   .4719845 
           Undur6 |  -.0250875     .062998      .9302026   1.346306 
          Undur12 |  -.1115962   -.0377317      .8471476   .9153915 
          Undur24 |  -.1275203    .2756192      .6995739   2.532545 
              FER |   .0589499   -.0194497      1.151546   .9566218 
             GJAK |  -.3435652   -.0827095      .3678549   .8354458 
             GJIL |  -.0240006    .2737024      .9762657    1.47047 
              MIT |   -.376092   -.3607303      .4285997   .6929506 
              PEJ |   .1648216      .35033      1.833082   2.875119 
              PRZ |   .0896691    .0754917      1.182391   1.264106 
          Vtcmncp |  -.1227302   -.0575387      1.051715   .9621428 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
*ACTSRCAT 
 
 
. . teffects ipwra (ACTSRCAT Age Agesq Male Minority Disability Secondaryeduc Tertiaryeduc 
Socialassist Amduration AM2008 AM2009 Emplan Undur6 Undur12 Undur24 Regunemp, logit) (AMTYPE Age 
Male Minority Disability Socialassist Twounempl Remittance Secondaryeduc Tertiaryeduc AM2008 
AM2009 Emplan Jobsearchbt Undur6 Undur12 Undur24 FER GJAK GJIL MIT PEJ PRZ Vtcmncp), control(2) 
atet aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  .01592071   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  .01166808   
Iteration 2:   EE criterion =  .00093145   
Iteration 3:   EE criterion =   .0001571   
Iteration 4:   EE criterion =  9.368e-06   
Iteration 5:   EE criterion =  7.510e-06   
Iteration 6:   EE criterion =  2.879e-06   
Iteration 7:   EE criterion =  1.587e-07   
Iteration 8:   EE criterion =  3.983e-09   
Iteration 9:   EE criterion =  2.411e-09   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =        385 
Estimator      : IPW regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: (multinomial) logit 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     ACTSRCAT |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
       AMTYPE | 
    (1 vs 2)  |  -.1920193   .0415693    -4.62   0.000    -.2734936    -.110545 
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    (3 vs 2)  |  -.0886878   .0388308    -2.28   0.022    -.1647947   -.0125809 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
       AMTYPE | 
           2  |   .8637365   .0262012    32.97   0.000     .8123832    .9150898 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1          | 
          Age |   .5278033   .2427499     2.17   0.030     .0520223    1.003584 
        Agesq |  -.0094776   .0040586    -2.34   0.020    -.0174323   -.0015228 
         Male |   .2355423   .3310657     0.71   0.477    -.4133345    .8844191 
     Minority |   1.606358   .8089989     1.99   0.047     .0207498    3.191967 
   Disability |   1.510059   1.182681     1.28   0.202    -.8079539    3.828072 
Secondaryeduc |  -.3784887   .4564943    -0.83   0.407    -1.273201    .5162238 
 Tertiaryeduc |   .0547136   .5274265     0.10   0.917    -.9790233    1.088451 
 Socialassist |  -.3859264   .5939675    -0.65   0.516    -1.550081    .7782284 
   Amduration |   .2676195   .1799104     1.49   0.137    -.0849984    .6202373 
       AM2008 |   .5012953   .5872473     0.85   0.393    -.6496882    1.652279 
       AM2009 |   .1660366   .3802438     0.44   0.662    -.5792275    .9113006 
       Emplan |  -1.026109   .4005349    -2.56   0.010    -1.811143   -.2410748 
       Undur6 |  -.1188785   .5967711    -0.20   0.842    -1.288528    1.050771 
      Undur12 |   .7633018   .4251614     1.80   0.073    -.0699993    1.596603 
      Undur24 |   .9534763   .6155676     1.55   0.121    -.2530142    2.159967 
     Regunemp |  -.0151766   .0201283    -0.75   0.451    -.0546275    .0242742 
        _cons |  -6.647015   3.730022    -1.78   0.075    -13.95772    .6636939 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME2          | 
          Age |  -1.702706    1.20255    -1.42   0.157     -4.05966    .6542483 
        Agesq |   .0239457   .0189859     1.26   0.207    -.0132659    .0611573 
         Male |   .2616281   1.127252     0.23   0.816    -1.947745    2.471001 
     Minority |   .5560734   1.336804     0.42   0.677    -2.064015    3.176161 
   Disability |  -6.450657   3.181505    -2.03   0.043    -12.68629   -.2150218 
Secondaryeduc |  -.4575954   1.079094    -0.42   0.672    -2.572581     1.65739 
 Tertiaryeduc |  -.0416049   1.848478    -0.02   0.982    -3.664555    3.581345 
 Socialassist |  -.5028637   .9755297    -0.52   0.606    -2.414867    1.409139 
   Amduration |   1.039097   .5992965     1.73   0.083     -.135503    2.213696 
       AM2008 |  -.2919937   1.836497    -0.16   0.874    -3.891462    3.307474 
       AM2009 |  -1.299163   .9690926    -1.34   0.180    -3.198549    .6002239 
       Emplan |  -2.900869   1.030958    -2.81   0.005     -4.92151   -.8802284 
       Undur6 |  -4.684602   1.547021    -3.03   0.002    -7.716707   -1.652496 
      Undur12 |  -.0854218   1.014419    -0.08   0.933    -2.073647    1.902803 
      Undur24 |  -1.278675   1.358028    -0.94   0.346     -3.94036    1.383011 
     Regunemp |  -.1399308   .0716475    -1.95   0.051    -.2803574    .0004957 
        _cons |   34.86274   18.03677     1.93   0.053    -.4886715    70.21416 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME3          | 
          Age |  -.9192463   1.382563    -0.66   0.506     -3.62902    1.790527 
        Agesq |   .0090623   .0189473     0.48   0.632    -.0280738    .0461984 
         Male |   6.747202   2.432296     2.77   0.006     1.979988    11.51442 
     Minority |   25.01594   7.829698     3.20   0.001     9.670016    40.36187 
   Disability |  -6.284884   2.104192    -2.99   0.003    -10.40902   -2.160744 
Secondaryeduc |   3.426887   1.953232     1.75   0.079    -.4013775    7.255151 
 Tertiaryeduc |   10.50046   6.058336     1.73   0.083    -1.373658    22.37458 
 Socialassist |  -17.17769   6.184165    -2.78   0.005    -29.29843   -5.056948 
   Amduration |  -2.962514   1.642176    -1.80   0.071     -6.18112    .2560918 
       AM2008 |  -1.354023   1.339307    -1.01   0.312    -3.979016    1.270971 
       AM2009 |   6.973179   3.339297     2.09   0.037     .4282767    13.51808 
       Emplan |   2.308827   2.702151     0.85   0.393    -2.987291    7.604945 
       Undur6 |  -6.769747   1.777209    -3.81   0.000    -10.25301   -3.286481 
      Undur12 |  -1.536215   1.280427    -1.20   0.230    -4.045806    .9733759 
      Undur24 |  -5.365509    1.51606    -3.54   0.000    -8.336932   -2.394086 
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     Regunemp |   .2624056   .0846091     3.10   0.002     .0965747    .4282365 
        _cons |   18.63529   24.66947     0.76   0.450    -29.71599    66.98657 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1          | 
          Age |   .0107182   .0301458     0.36   0.722    -.0483665    .0698028 
         Male |   .0145628   .2928872     0.05   0.960    -.5594856    .5886112 
     Minority |  -.5183788   .4725444    -1.10   0.273    -1.444549    .4077912 
   Disability |     .24759   .7675267     0.32   0.747    -1.256735    1.751915 
 Socialassist |  -.6917754   .5241023    -1.32   0.187    -1.718997    .3354461 
    Twounempl |  -.4810493   .3228976    -1.49   0.136    -1.113917    .1518184 
   Remittance |  -.5892035   .4846377    -1.22   0.224    -1.539076     .360669 
Secondaryeduc |  -.7108797   .3644914    -1.95   0.051     -1.42527    .0035105 
 Tertiaryeduc |  -.5889222   .4149555    -1.42   0.156     -1.40222    .2243757 
       AM2008 |  -1.198901   .3747809    -3.20   0.001    -1.933458   -.4643434 
       AM2009 |   .2354281   .3479118     0.68   0.499    -.4464664    .9173226 
       Emplan |  -.4894523   .3400249    -1.44   0.150    -1.155889    .1769844 
  Jobsearchbt |  -.9085695   .3747099    -2.42   0.015    -1.642987   -.1741516 
       Undur6 |   1.203228   .6725296     1.79   0.074    -.1149062    2.521361 
      Undur12 |   .7441301    .422225     1.76   0.078    -.0834157    1.571676 
      Undur24 |   1.227016   .4865824     2.52   0.012     .2733315      2.1807 
          FER |  -1.351682   .5873415    -2.30   0.021    -2.502851   -.2005142 
         GJAK |  -1.490546   .6188091    -2.41   0.016     -2.70339    -.277703 
         GJIL |  -.0833482   .6307585    -0.13   0.895    -1.319612    1.152916 
          MIT |  -.8992903   .5857786    -1.54   0.125    -2.047395    .2488146 
          PEJ |  -2.379415   .7201428    -3.30   0.001    -3.790869   -.9679614 
          PRZ |  -.5260253   .6516298    -0.81   0.420    -1.803196    .7511456 
      Vtcmncp |    1.22444   .2836089     4.32   0.000     .6685763    1.780303 
        _cons |   2.502794   1.177249     2.13   0.034     .1954287    4.810159 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME3          | 
          Age |   .0162926   .0337335     0.48   0.629    -.0498239     .082409 
         Male |   .3974604   .3645366     1.09   0.276    -.3170182    1.111939 
     Minority |  -.5393232   .5906892    -0.91   0.361    -1.697053    .6184063 
   Disability |  -.3858126   1.025519    -0.38   0.707    -2.395792    1.624167 
 Socialassist |  -.3291805   .7089888    -0.46   0.642    -1.718773    1.060412 
    Twounempl |   .9147666   .4367696     2.09   0.036     .0587139    1.770819 
   Remittance |    -.21146   .7135111    -0.30   0.767    -1.609916    1.186996 
Secondaryeduc |   -.536629   .5047437    -1.06   0.288    -1.525908    .4526504 
 Tertiaryeduc |   -.724528    .530147    -1.37   0.172    -1.763597    .3145411 
       AM2008 |  -.6490683   .4572438    -1.42   0.156     -1.54525    .2471132 
       AM2009 |  -.1864609   .4249025    -0.44   0.661    -1.019255    .6463327 
       Emplan |   .9064938   .4528083     2.00   0.045     .0190059    1.793982 
  Jobsearchbt |  -.1034135    .492785    -0.21   0.834    -1.069254    .8624274 
       Undur6 |   1.172696   .7958985     1.47   0.141    -.3872359    2.732629 
      Undur12 |   .2886123   .5063369     0.57   0.569    -.7037898    1.281014 
      Undur24 |   .6621266   .6453526     1.03   0.305    -.6027413    1.926995 
          FER |  -1.732219   .6391062    -2.71   0.007    -2.984845   -.4795944 
         GJAK |  -2.847465    .765895    -3.72   0.000    -4.348591   -1.346338 
         GJIL |  -.9989786   .6655394    -1.50   0.133    -2.303412    .3054547 
          MIT |  -3.049448   .7306176    -4.17   0.000    -4.481432   -1.617464 
          PEJ |  -1.522043   .8180163    -1.86   0.063    -3.125326    .0812393 
          PRZ |  -.3017129   .7408984    -0.41   0.684    -1.753847    1.150421 
      Vtcmncp |    1.20522   .3576987     3.37   0.001      .504144    1.906297 
        _cons |  -.4357348   1.456346    -0.30   0.765    -3.290121    2.418651 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. tebalance sum 
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                 Observations       
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                               Treatment           Raw     Weighted 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                            1bn.AMTYPE =           198        124.4 
                            2.AMTYPE   =           106        144.3 
                            3.AMTYPE   =            81        116.3 
                            Total      =           385        385.0 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw    Weighted           Raw   Weighted 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  1.AMTYPE        | 
              Age |  -.0469178    .0537635      1.493153   2.890789 
             Male |  -.0228163    .3116836      .9933519   1.148539 
         Minority |   -.130576    .0996957      .7177825   1.377608 
       Disability |   .0400379    .0330115       1.23463   1.193099 
     Socialassist |  -.1173884   -.3086257      .7969861   .6155944 
        Twounempl |  -.1586626    .1758147      .9472535   1.126547 
       Remittance |  -.0734337    .0633585      .8195957   1.215718 
    Secondaryeduc |  -.1169856   -.1314029      .9951257   1.002496 
     Tertiaryeduc |   .0120731   -.0468204      1.006486   .9629164 
           AM2008 |  -.4462825     .036214      .4939769   1.095858 
           AM2009 |   .2650759   -.4535307      1.347895   .8649161 
           Emplan |  -.2459716    .1151906       1.19056   .9629924 
      Jobsearchbt |  -.2145967    .3496678      1.350505     .78525 
           Undur6 |   .1825743   -.0179602      2.036549   .9481264 
          Undur12 |   .2528701   -.1441152      1.573032   .8451491 
          Undur24 |   .1586015    .2235563      1.594285   2.067697 
              FER |  -.2020129    .2470047      .6677305   2.226414 
             GJAK |  -.0496555     .221716      .9079023   1.735648 
             GJIL |   .2071617   -.5190951      1.385488   .7162455 
              MIT |  -.1468002   -.1184387      .8257112   .8568192 
              PEJ |  -.1918449    .0514234      .5055881   1.275628 
              PRZ |   .2406805    .2663825      1.834333   2.015142 
          Vtcmncp |   .5956623   -.1516683       1.06466   1.103908 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  3.AMTYPE        | 
              Age |   .0140858    .1455162      .8379218    1.22289 
             Male |  -.0732274    .2065342      .9919786   1.122496 
         Minority |  -.1459679    .2283169      .6907709   1.909743 
       Disability |  -.0223603    .0274183      .8782512   1.160196 
     Socialassist |  -.2746511   -.3120877      .5382414   .6113503 
        Twounempl |   .3131423    .0541008      .9531932   1.046551 
       Remittance |  -.1339151     .213049      .6852098   1.761333 
    Secondaryeduc |  -.1178929    .0022497      1.002338   1.001353 
     Tertiaryeduc |   .0351215   -.2022647      1.034249   .8144936 
           AM2008 |  -.3175752    .2175756      .6530546   1.581343 
           AM2009 |  -.0647055    -.392656      .9025781    .903673 
           Emplan |   .2424322    .1927289      .7214966   .9242017 
      Jobsearchbt |   .2083997      .64816      .6332538   .5030829 
           Undur6 |   .1577672   -.0738311      1.894404   .7891293 
          Undur12 |   .1410316     -.24876       1.33259   .7201211 
          Undur24 |    .031316    .2266712       1.11532   2.085542 
              FER |   -.143024    .1592348      .7689223   1.756056 
             GJAK |  -.3908774   -.0825605      .3339763   .7561397 
             GJIL |   .1827122   -.1405034      1.352604   .9670858 
              MIT |  -.5215216   -.2598305      .3538996   .6715809 
              PEJ |  -.0274744   -.0463111      .9267843   .7786548 
              PRZ |   .3284055    .1797991      2.168899   1.671262 
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          Vtcmncp |   .4632873   -.1564898      1.119718   1.107055 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table A5.5 Estimated results from Inverse probability weighting – 
Regression Adjustment - CONTRACT Outcome Model 
 
**CONTRACT Outcome Model  
*Final IPWRA model for CONTRACT; OJT is defined as the control group  
 
. . teffects ipwra (CONTRACT Age Agesq Male Minority Secondaryeduc Tertiaryeduc Amduration 
AM2008 AM2009 Cert Regunemp, logit) (AMTYPE Age Male Minority Twounempl Remittance Socialassist 
Secondaryeduc Tertiaryedu AM2008 AM2009 Emplan Jobsearchbt Undur6 Undur12 Undur24 FER GJAK GJIL 
MIT PEJ PRZ Vtcmncp), control(1) atet aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =   .0015559   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  .00013411   
Iteration 2:   EE criterion =  .00001898   
Iteration 3:   EE criterion =  1.140e-06   
Iteration 4:   EE criterion =  1.222e-07  (not concave) 
Iteration 5:   EE criterion =  1.039e-07   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =        284 
Estimator      : IPW regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: (multinomial) logit 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     CONTRACT |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
       AMTYPE | 
    (2 vs 1)  |   .0594402   .0603879     0.98   0.325    -.0589178    .1777983 
    (3 vs 1)  |   .1893358   .0706651     2.68   0.007     .0508347     .327837 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
       AMTYPE | 
           1  |   .7168694   .0513943    13.95   0.000     .6161384    .8176004 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1          | 
          Age |  -1.570828   1.195468    -1.31   0.189    -3.913903    .7722462 
        Agesq |   .0291066   .0215583     1.35   0.177    -.0131469    .0713601 
         Male |  -2.246234   .8922786    -2.52   0.012    -3.995067   -.4973997 
     Minority |  -.2418361   1.292622    -0.19   0.852    -2.775329    2.291657 
Secondaryeduc |  -1.328795   .8430968    -1.58   0.115    -2.981234    .3236446 
 Tertiaryeduc |   2.063662   .7855583     2.63   0.009     .5239959    3.603328 
   Amduration |  -.3312716    .278012    -1.19   0.233     -.876165    .2136218 
       AM2008 |   1.376503   .8159476     1.69   0.092    -.2227244    2.975731 
       AM2009 |   .1662639   .5757278     0.29   0.773     -.962142     1.29467 
         Cert |   1.524838   .6779907     2.25   0.025     .1960009    2.853675 
     Regunemp |   .0387214   .0285997     1.35   0.176     -.017333    .0947758 
        _cons |   21.74803   16.82114     1.29   0.196    -11.22079    54.71685 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME2          | 
          Age |  -.2658279   1.089792    -0.24   0.807    -2.401781    1.870125 
        Agesq |   .0008018   .0198097     0.04   0.968    -.0380245     .039628 
         Male |  -1.276675   .9490504    -1.35   0.179     -3.13678    .5834293 
     Minority |  -.0970382   1.366984    -0.07   0.943    -2.776278    2.582202 
Secondaryeduc |  -1.884402   .9329271    -2.02   0.043    -3.712906   -.0558988 
 Tertiaryeduc |    1.29451   1.130685     1.14   0.252    -.9215908    3.510611 
   Amduration |  -.3054533   .3348809    -0.91   0.362    -.9618077    .3509012 
       AM2008 |   .3508733   .8814225     0.40   0.691    -1.376683     2.07843 
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       AM2009 |   1.743472   .9377163     1.86   0.063    -.0944181    3.581362 
         Cert |  -.4357196   .8257698    -0.53   0.598    -2.054199     1.18276 
     Regunemp |  -.0526567   .0361213    -1.46   0.145    -.1234533    .0181398 
        _cons |    11.8787   15.01367     0.79   0.429    -17.54756    41.30495 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME3          | 
          Age |   .4321133   1.877156     0.23   0.818    -3.247045    4.111272 
        Agesq |   -.012179   .0310651    -0.39   0.695    -.0730654    .0487074 
         Male |   1.261803   1.818907     0.69   0.488    -2.303188    4.826795 
     Minority |   .6319239   2.992577     0.21   0.833    -5.233419    6.497266 
Secondaryeduc |   -1.25577   2.622665    -0.48   0.632    -6.396099    3.884559 
 Tertiaryeduc |   2.917971   2.352839     1.24   0.215    -1.693509    7.529452 
   Amduration |  -.5168567   .7711814    -0.67   0.503    -2.028345    .9946311 
       AM2008 |   6.806376   1.997931     3.41   0.001     2.890504    10.72225 
       AM2009 |   6.871649   1.503253     4.57   0.000     3.925328    9.817969 
         Cert |   1.348271   1.598652     0.84   0.399    -1.785029    4.481572 
     Regunemp |  -.0432261   .1461427    -0.30   0.767    -.3296604    .2432083 
        _cons |  -.4308561    26.6373    -0.02   0.987    -52.63901     51.7773 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME2          | 
          Age |  -.0321092   .0417511    -0.77   0.442    -.1139398    .0497215 
         Male |  -.0555829    .345719    -0.16   0.872    -.7331797    .6220139 
     Minority |  -.2253931   .7113321    -0.32   0.751    -1.619578    1.168792 
    Twounempl |   .3327355   .3640496     0.91   0.361    -.3807886     1.04626 
   Remittance |   .3154091    .585174     0.54   0.590    -.8315108    1.462329 
 Socialassist |   .1349841   .6048854     0.22   0.823     -1.05057    1.320538 
Secondaryeduc |    -.76215   .5109524    -1.49   0.136    -1.763598    .2392983 
 Tertiaryeduc |  -.4896404   .5133815    -0.95   0.340     -1.49585    .5165687 
       AM2008 |   1.490915   .4018534     3.71   0.000     .7032967    2.278533 
       AM2009 |   .5394315   .3739309     1.44   0.149    -.1934596    1.272323 
       Emplan |   .2139617    .388943     0.55   0.582    -.5483525    .9762759 
  Jobsearchbt |   .3669636   .4561027     0.80   0.421    -.5269813    1.260908 
       Undur6 |  -1.178853   .4847572    -2.43   0.015     -2.12896   -.2287465 
      Undur12 |  -.3330404   .4500222    -0.74   0.459    -1.215068    .5489868 
      Undur24 |  -.9803232   .5865138    -1.67   0.095    -2.129869    .1692226 
          FER |   .9047341    .587994     1.54   0.124     -.247713    2.057181 
         GJAK |   .5578453   .6605465     0.84   0.398    -.7368022    1.852493 
         GJIL |   .6900692   .5125764     1.35   0.178    -.3145622    1.694701 
          MIT |   1.286926   .6385944     2.02   0.044      .035304    2.538548 
          PEJ |   .1052606   .6556827     0.16   0.872    -1.179854    1.390375 
          PRZ |  -.1027597   .6497056    -0.16   0.874    -1.376159     1.17064 
      Vtcmncp |  -.7542088   .3478689    -2.17   0.030    -1.436019   -.0723983 
        _cons |  -.3773053   1.339358    -0.28   0.778      -3.0024    2.247789 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME3          | 
          Age |   .0190426   .0600367     0.32   0.751    -.0986271    .1367123 
         Male |  -.6835441   .4488813    -1.52   0.128    -1.563335    .1962471 
     Minority |   .0452239   1.077308     0.04   0.967    -2.066261    2.156709 
    Twounempl |  -.1540059   .4753825    -0.32   0.746    -1.085738    .7777266 
   Remittance |   .9346604   .8024783     1.16   0.244    -.6381682    2.507489 
 Socialassist |  -12.42394   .6835657   -18.18   0.000     -13.7637   -11.08417 
Secondaryeduc |   .2733795   .7331014     0.37   0.709    -1.163473    1.710232 
 Tertiaryeduc |  -.4544521   .8008147    -0.57   0.570     -2.02402    1.115116 
       AM2008 |   .2484433   .5110058     0.49   0.627    -.7531097    1.249996 
       AM2009 |  -1.136448    .618007    -1.84   0.066     -2.34772     .074823 
       Emplan |   .9537092   .6181927     1.54   0.123    -.2579263    2.165345 
  Jobsearchbt |   1.696085    .933726     1.82   0.069    -.1339838    3.526155 
       Undur6 |  -.3548364   .7780781    -0.46   0.648    -1.879841    1.170169 
      Undur12 |   .6772807   .5729837     1.18   0.237    -.4457467    1.800308 
      Undur24 |   1.238775   .6874923     1.80   0.072    -.1086847    2.586236 
          FER |    .155961    .609641     0.26   0.798    -1.038913    1.350835 
         GJAK |  -2.582432   1.159891    -2.23   0.026    -4.855776   -.3090877 
         GJIL |  -.0767641   .6261877    -0.12   0.902    -1.304069    1.150541 
          MIT |  -11.99773   .7019423   -17.09   0.000    -13.37352   -10.62195 
          PEJ |  -2.406719   1.274765    -1.89   0.059    -4.905211    .0917737 
          PRZ |  -1.235042    .753814    -1.64   0.101    -2.712491    .2424058 
      Vtcmncp |    .406721   .5838408     0.70   0.486    -.7375859    1.551028 
        _cons |  -3.463821   1.944484    -1.78   0.075    -7.274939    .3472978 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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. tebalance sum 
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                 Observations       
                               Treatment           Raw     Weighted 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                            1bn.AMTYPE =           171        120.4 
                            2.AMTYPE   =            76        114.5 
                            3.AMTYPE   =            37         49.1 
                            Total      =           284        284.0 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw    Weighted           Raw   Weighted 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  2.AMTYPE        | 
              Age |  -.0594412     .070625      .7816163   .9266607 
             Male |   .0360304    -.039862      .9890909   1.024291 
         Minority |   .0559252    .1127639      1.345663   1.913613 
        Twounempl |   .2359867   -.1249337      1.107521   .9963255 
       Remittance |   .0152592    .0026797      1.052692   1.008075 
     Socialassist |   .1030645    .0286481      1.399602   1.087794 
    Secondaryeduc |  -.0582697    .0079244       .969076   1.006315 
     Tertiaryeduc |  -.0757699    -.030478      1.013264   1.001367 
           AM2008 |   .4950311   -.0704007      1.599483   .9792844 
           AM2009 |  -.1147192    .0076706      .9265127   1.007144 
           Emplan |   .1067222   -.0571073      .9244431   1.059437 
      Jobsearchbt |   .0314618   -.0379047      .9511413   1.077511 
           Undur6 |  -.2021795    .0339182      .6558865   1.095538 
          Undur12 |  -.0365508    .1134711      .9378858   1.296097 
          Undur24 |  -.1594276    .0790126      .6269044   1.360027 
              FER |   .1198741    .0009534      1.357258   1.002521 
             GJAK |  -.1515404    .0560614      .7567446   1.139317 
             GJIL |   .2130829   -.0757362      1.379446   .9232308 
              MIT |   .2636853    .1488059      2.071875   1.424037 
              PEJ |  -.1668189   -.0320652      .6748767   .9162914 
              PRZ |   -.214791    -.104038      .6152098   .7673325 
          Vtcmncp |  -.3324751    .0341398      1.086712   1.005236 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  3.AMTYPE        | 
              Age |  -.0495102    .0189432      .6867129   .6148146 
             Male |  -.2563443    .1161219      1.077045   .9257834 
         Minority |  -.0132737    .0356315      .9465972   1.274061 
        Twounempl |   .2875319   -.2817954      1.129528   .9591612 
       Remittance |  -.0236874   -.1544714      .9513167   .5950157 
     Socialassist |  -.3697241   -.4263498             0          0 
    Secondaryeduc |   .1540443    .1531235      1.092842   1.106302 
     Tertiaryeduc |  -.1562826   -.1507679      1.020951   .9985018 
           AM2008 |   .1356457   -.3659149       1.23645   .8073939 
           AM2009 |  -.5289898   -.0254639      .5204012   .9889955 
           Emplan |   .5736149    .1573697        .43955    .825431 
      Jobsearchbt |   .4908913     .422618      .1907906   .2212138 
           Undur6 |  -.2831584     .002422      .5262603   1.019133 
          Undur12 |   .0819851    .0836183      1.178783   1.232708 
          Undur24 |   .2842129     .615492      1.753201   4.329271 
              FER |   .2045328   -.1030863      1.636824    .786326 
             GJAK |  -.5336367   -.0252988      .1766357   .9496481 
             GJIL |   .1966349     .130581      1.373559   1.125183 
              MIT |  -.3697241   -.4595307             0          0 
              PEJ |  -.4314507   -.1634096      .2152536   .5988853 
              PRZ |  -.2525193    .0169182      .5559643   1.051621 
          Vtcmncp |   .1380455    .1895535      .9236101   1.009127 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
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*Final IPWRA model for CONTRACT; IS is defined as the control group  
 
 . teffects ipwra (CONTRACT Age Agesq Male Minority Secondaryeduc Tertiaryeduc Amduration AM2008 
AM2009 Cert Regunemp, logit) (AMTYPE Age Male Minority Twounempl Remittance Socialassist 
Secondaryeduc Tertiaryedu AM2008 AM2009 Emplan Jobsearchbt Undur6 Undur12 Undur24 FER GJAK GJIL 
MIT PEJ PRZ Vtcmncp), control(2) atet aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  .00586947   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  .00058801   
Iteration 2:   EE criterion =  9.171e-06   
Iteration 3:   EE criterion =  2.949e-06   
Iteration 4:   EE criterion =  6.657e-07  (not concave) 
Iteration 5:   EE criterion =  6.640e-07   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =        284 
Estimator      : IPW regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: (multinomial) logit 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     CONTRACT |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
       AMTYPE | 
    (1 vs 2)  |  -.1035414   .0521981    -1.98   0.047    -.2058477   -.0012351 
    (3 vs 2)  |   .0727087   .0616882     1.18   0.239     -.048198    .1936153 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
       AMTYPE | 
           2  |   .7994478   .0426138    18.76   0.000     .7159263    .8829693 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1          | 
          Age |  -1.248272   .9997846    -1.25   0.212    -3.207814    .7112699 
        Agesq |   .0229369   .0183953     1.25   0.212    -.0131173    .0589911 
         Male |  -1.327431   .5262206    -2.52   0.012    -2.358804   -.2960574 
     Minority |   1.250961   1.300732     0.96   0.336    -1.298426    3.800349 
Secondaryeduc |  -.3041944   .6170931    -0.49   0.622    -1.513675    .9052858 
 Tertiaryeduc |   2.420622   .7478692     3.24   0.001     .9548248    3.886418 
   Amduration |  -.2839854   .1898289    -1.50   0.135    -.6560431    .0880724 
       AM2008 |  -.1717216   .6047537    -0.28   0.776    -1.357017    1.013574 
       AM2009 |  -.3598976   .4598987    -0.78   0.434    -1.261282    .5414873 
         Cert |   1.377256   .4834783     2.85   0.004     .4296564    2.324857 
     Regunemp |    .059871   .0219963     2.72   0.006      .016759     .102983 
        _cons |   16.08565   13.49414     1.19   0.233    -10.36237    42.53367 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME2          | 
          Age |   .1068924   1.039525     0.10   0.918    -1.930539    2.144324 
        Agesq |  -.0046417   .0186729    -0.25   0.804    -.0412399    .0319565 
         Male |    -1.2793   1.013344    -1.26   0.207    -3.265417    .7068181 
     Minority |   .0138729   2.309163     0.01   0.995    -4.512003    4.539749 
Secondaryeduc |  -3.385988   1.087702    -3.11   0.002    -5.517843   -1.254132 
 Tertiaryeduc |   .1527821    1.22911     0.12   0.901    -2.256229    2.561793 
   Amduration |  -.3476181   .3840903    -0.91   0.365    -1.100421    .4051851 
       AM2008 |    .477221   1.331504     0.36   0.720    -2.132478     3.08692 
       AM2009 |   2.368121   1.041274     2.27   0.023     .3272616     4.40898 
         Cert |  -.3440903    .802113    -0.43   0.668    -1.916203    1.228022 
     Regunemp |  -.0603549   .0352103    -1.71   0.087    -.1293659     .008656 
        _cons |   7.520743   14.83491     0.51   0.612    -21.55515    36.59664 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME3          | 
          Age |   .2124117   1.708186     0.12   0.901    -3.135571    3.560394 
        Agesq |  -.0081298   .0276568    -0.29   0.769    -.0623362    .0460766 
         Male |  -.2812231   1.569249    -0.18   0.858    -3.356895    2.794449 
     Minority |  -.3809191   3.131774    -0.12   0.903    -6.519083    5.757245 
Secondaryeduc |   1.162634   2.340185     0.50   0.619    -3.424045    5.749313 
 Tertiaryeduc |   3.682896   1.910331     1.93   0.054    -.0612844    7.427077 
   Amduration |  -.9890902   .6484963    -1.53   0.127     -2.26012    .2819392 
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       AM2008 |   6.007305   2.046504     2.94   0.003      1.99623    10.01838 
       AM2009 |   6.126339   1.403316     4.37   0.000      3.37589    8.876789 
         Cert |   1.291372   1.770329     0.73   0.466    -2.178409    4.761154 
     Regunemp |   .0963573   .1224774     0.79   0.431    -.1436939    .3364086 
        _cons |   .0175405   24.44519     0.00   0.999    -47.89415    47.92923 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1          | 
          Age |   .0321092   .0417511     0.77   0.442    -.0497215    .1139398 
         Male |   .0555829    .345719     0.16   0.872    -.6220139    .7331797 
     Minority |   .2253931   .7113313     0.32   0.751    -1.168791    1.619577 
    Twounempl |  -.3327359   .3640496    -0.91   0.361     -1.04626    .3807882 
   Remittance |  -.3154093   .5851742    -0.54   0.590     -1.46233    .8315111 
 Socialassist |  -.1349841   .6048851    -0.22   0.823    -1.320537    1.050569 
Secondaryeduc |   .7621496   .5109523     1.49   0.136    -.2392985    1.763598 
 Tertiaryeduc |   .4896407   .5133814     0.95   0.340    -.5165684     1.49585 
       AM2008 |  -1.490915   .4018534    -3.71   0.000    -2.278533   -.7032967 
       AM2009 |  -.5394314   .3739309    -1.44   0.149    -1.272323    .1934597 
       Emplan |  -.2139618    .388943    -0.55   0.582     -.976276    .5483524 
  Jobsearchbt |  -.3669635   .4561028    -0.80   0.421    -1.260909    .5269815 
       Undur6 |   1.178853   .4847569     2.43   0.015     .2287465    2.128959 
      Undur12 |   .3330405   .4500221     0.74   0.459    -.5489866    1.215068 
      Undur24 |   .9803252   .5865146     1.67   0.095    -.1692223    2.129873 
          FER |  -.9047361   .5879935    -1.54   0.124    -2.057182      .24771 
         GJAK |  -.5578452   .6605465    -0.84   0.398    -1.852493    .7368021 
         GJIL |  -.6900689   .5125764    -1.35   0.178      -1.6947    .3145623 
          MIT |  -1.286926   .6385946    -2.02   0.044    -2.538548   -.0353035 
          PEJ |  -.1052594   .6556831    -0.16   0.872    -1.390375    1.179856 
          PRZ |   .1027597   .6497055     0.16   0.874     -1.17064    1.376159 
      Vtcmncp |   .7542088   .3478689     2.17   0.030     .0723983    1.436019 
        _cons |   .3773053   1.339358     0.28   0.778    -2.247789      3.0024 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME3          | 
          Age |   .0511517   .0678593     0.75   0.451    -.0818501    .1841536 
         Male |  -.6279613   .5006648    -1.25   0.210    -1.609246    .3533236 
     Minority |   .2706169   1.151258     0.24   0.814    -1.985808    2.527042 
    Twounempl |  -.4867426   .5214663    -0.93   0.351    -1.508798    .5353125 
   Remittance |    .619251   .8905398     0.70   0.487    -1.126175    2.364677 
 Socialassist |   -15.3879   .6950939   -22.14   0.000    -16.75026   -14.02554 
Secondaryeduc |   1.035528   .7944133     1.30   0.192    -.5214931     2.59255 
 Tertiaryeduc |   .0351891   .8603897     0.04   0.967    -1.651144    1.721522 
       AM2008 |  -1.242472     .56669    -2.19   0.028    -2.353164   -.1317796 
       AM2009 |   -1.67588   .6760086    -2.48   0.013    -3.000832   -.3509274 
       Emplan |   .7397474   .6622417     1.12   0.264    -.5582224    2.037717 
  Jobsearchbt |   1.329122   .9804046     1.36   0.175    -.5924358     3.25068 
       Undur6 |   .8240139   .8448844     0.98   0.329    -.8319292    2.479957 
      Undur12 |   1.010321    .664597     1.52   0.128    -.2922648    2.312907 
      Undur24 |   2.219102   .7590951     2.92   0.003     .7313033    3.706901 
          FER |  -.7487797   .7237458    -1.03   0.301    -2.167295    .6697359 
         GJAK |  -3.140277   1.285695    -2.44   0.015    -5.660193     -.62036 
         GJIL |  -.7668321   .6650865    -1.15   0.249    -2.070378    .5367134 
          MIT |  -12.92957   .8044269   -16.07   0.000    -14.50622   -11.35293 
          PEJ |  -2.511956   1.319023    -1.90   0.057    -5.097194    .0732819 
          PRZ |  -1.132283   .8778469    -1.29   0.197    -2.852831    .5882655 
      Vtcmncp |    1.16093   .5977694     1.94   0.052    -.0106767    2.332536 
        _cons |  -3.086515   2.163127    -1.43   0.154    -7.326167    1.153136 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. tebalance sum 
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                 Observations       
                               Treatment           Raw     Weighted 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                            1bn.AMTYPE =           171        106.4 
                            2.AMTYPE   =            76         98.1 
                            3.AMTYPE   =            37         79.5 
                            Total      =           284        284.0 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
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  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw    Weighted           Raw   Weighted 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  1.AMTYPE        | 
              Age |   .0594412    .0340956        1.2794   1.277449 
             Male |  -.0360304   -.0995189      1.011029   1.058372 
         Minority |  -.0559252    .1048286      .7431283   2.061955 
        Twounempl |  -.2359867   -.0991135      .9029173   .9465268 
       Remittance |  -.0152592   -.0041699      .9499452   .9871157 
     Socialassist |  -.1030645     .002227      .7144887   1.007187 
    Secondaryeduc |   .0582697    .0092989      1.031911   1.004889 
     Tertiaryeduc |   .0757699     .023615        .98691   .9961463 
           AM2008 |  -.4950311   -.0576343      .6252021   .9154157 
           AM2009 |   .1147192   -.0985306      1.079316   .9516876 
           Emplan |  -.1067222   -.0247015      1.081732   1.016888 
      Jobsearchbt |  -.0314618    .0549605      1.051368   .9113584 
           Undur6 |   .2021795    .0194067      1.524654   1.033696 
          Undur12 |   .0365508    .0611573      1.066228   1.129668 
          Undur24 |   .1594276    .0758768      1.595139   1.226066 
              FER |  -.1198741     .029855      .7367796   1.089455 
             GJAK |   .1515404    .0999352       1.32145   1.194703 
             GJIL |  -.2130829   -.0351566      .7249289   .9391437 
              MIT |  -.2636853    .0330902      .4826546   1.129897 
              PEJ |   .1668189    .0450042      1.481752   1.098568 
              PRZ |    .214791   -.0839615      1.625462   .8678166 
          Vtcmncp |   .3324751     .250539       .920207   .9244295 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  3.AMTYPE        | 
              Age |   .0124118   -.1545446      .8785806   .7581899 
             Male |  -.2923724   -.1056007      1.088924    1.06483 
         Minority |  -.0688049   -.0878776      .7034432    .386044 
        Twounempl |    .051484   -.3560358       1.01987   .7437724 
       Remittance |  -.0388174   -.2170771      .9036987   .4333304 
     Socialassist |  -.4474694   -.3672328             0          0 
    Secondaryeduc |   .2121379    .0314612      1.127716    1.02112 
     Tertiaryeduc |  -.0803936    .0679031      1.007587   .9906179 
           AM2008 |  -.3534865   -.2273836      .7730311   .6618851 
           AM2009 |  -.4098836   -.2697245      .5616773   .8338597 
           Emplan |   .4625227   -.2048462      .4754755   1.113508 
      Jobsearchbt |   .4601577    .5609997      .2005912      .1463 
           Undur6 |  -.0824566     .203515      .8023649   1.347573 
          Undur12 |   .1181524    .1763607      1.256851   1.375989 
          Undur24 |   .4374878    .4020809      2.796599   2.232682 
              FER |   .0855782   -.1569431      1.205979   .5664245 
             GJAK |  -.3912531   -.2717778      .2334152   .4835543 
             GJIL |  -.0155176    .0235399      .9957326   1.042411 
              MIT |  -.5779343   -.3440102             0          0 
              PEJ |  -.2752961   -.0622915      .3189525   .8658297 
              PRZ |  -.0388174    .4194878      .9036987   1.503117 
          Vtcmncp |   .4737685    -.056139      .8499124   1.002388 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
    
Appendix 6 – Chapter 6  
Table 6.1 Outcome variable: employed – Model 1 
Table A6.1.1 PSM  
. teffects psmatch (employed) (bintreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc  emp2011 emphist hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani 
mitrovica peja prizren ), atet vce(robust) 
 
384 
 
Treatment-effects estimation                   Number of obs      =      7,753 
Estimator      : propensity-score matching     Matches: requested =          1 
Outcome model  : matching                                     min =          1 
Treatment model: logit                                        max =          9 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              AI Robust 
    employed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET         | 
bintreatment | 
   (1 vs 0)  |   .0730028   .0253384     2.88   0.004     .0233404    .1226652 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
*** Balancing diagnostics  
 
. tebalance sum 
note: refitting the model using the generate() option 
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                   Raw      Matched 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                          Number of obs =        7,753        1,694 
                          Treated obs   =          847          847 
                          Control obs   =        6,906          847 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw     Matched           Raw    Matched 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
              age |  -.6060234    -.076445      .3243216   .9326923 
            agesq |  -.6665971   -.0780366      .2800718   .9368594 
             male |  -.4618398    .0472512      1.323737   .9960958 
         minority |   .0377737     .099327       1.14086   1.450887 
     socialassist |   .3709548    .1608743       7.49496   1.734988 
    secondaryeduc |  -.4394493      .07248      1.036461   1.031882 
     tertiaryeduc |   .5968176    -.085886      1.880529   .9758825 
          emp2011 |  -.5101395    .0226697      .9074829   1.017066 
          emphist |  -.0797406   -.0575831      1.032292   1.021107 
           hhsize |   -.453916   -.0571991      .3536742   .9977826 
        hhsizegen |  -.5622479    .0271119      .5529141   1.068583 
          ferizaj |   .0111471   -.0416516      1.026757    .913981 
          gjakova |   .0257213    .1493787       1.06098   1.471432 
          gjilani |   .4442438   -.0704341      2.838404   .9122407 
        mitrovica |   .1091392    .0652934      1.308213   1.165055 
             peja |  -.0639643   -.0607731      .8656221    .870611 
         prizreni |  -.0658709    .0598134      .8802186   1.141693 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table A6.1.2 IPW  
 
*** Binary treatment model  
 
. teffects ipw (employed) (bintreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc  emp2011 emphist hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani 
mitrovica peja prizren ), atet vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  1.527e-16   
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Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  3.351e-30   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : inverse-probability weights 
Outcome model  : weighted mean 
Treatment model: logit 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |               Robust 
      employed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET           | 
  bintreatment | 
     (1 vs 0)  |   .0786837   .0206062     3.82   0.000     .0382962    .1190711 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean         | 
  bintreatment | 
            0  |   .3309976   .0196182    16.87   0.000     .2925465    .3694486 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1           | 
           age |   1.451319    .152215     9.53   0.000     1.152983    1.749655 
         agesq |  -.0282003   .0028461    -9.91   0.000    -.0337786   -.0226221 
          male |  -.9374553   .2214396    -4.23   0.000    -1.371469   -.5034416 
      minority |  -.0999522   .1994632    -0.50   0.616    -.4908928    .2909885 
  socialassist |   2.932207   .2344679    12.51   0.000     2.472658    3.391755 
 secondaryeduc |  -.3021237   .1255887    -2.41   0.016    -.5482729   -.0559744 
  tertiaryeduc |   .8970667   .1349911     6.65   0.000     .6324891    1.161644 
       emp2011 |  -2.518161   .1463909   -17.20   0.000    -2.805082   -2.231241 
       emphist |   2.190087   .1425687    15.36   0.000     1.910658    2.469517 
        hhsize |  -.1693141    .024119    -7.02   0.000    -.2165865   -.1220417 
     hhsizegen |   .0336501   .0320513     1.05   0.294    -.0291693    .0964696 
       ferizaj |   .9545303   .1645074     5.80   0.000     .6321016    1.276959 
       gjakova |   .9650004   .1586301     6.08   0.000      .654091     1.27591 
       gjilani |   1.903647   .1596132    11.93   0.000     1.590811    2.216483 
     mitrovica |   1.237659   .1651726     7.49   0.000     .9139271    1.561392 
          peja |   .5909044   .1643426     3.60   0.000     .2687989    .9130099 
      prizreni |   .8850921   .1538299     5.75   0.000      .583591    1.186593 
         _cons |  -19.57279   2.002432    -9.77   0.000    -23.49748   -15.64809 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
*** Multinomial probit treatment model  
 
 
. teffects ipw (employed) (multitreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc  emp2011 employment0811 hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova 
gjilani mitrovica peja prizren ), atet vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  3.811e-17   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  3.182e-26   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : inverse-probability weights 
Outcome model  : weighted mean 
Treatment model: (multinomial) logit 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |               Robust 
      employed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET           | 
multitreatment | 
     (1 vs 0)  |   .1024067     .02652     3.86   0.000     .0504284    .1543849 
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     (2 vs 0)  |   .0937236     .03319     2.82   0.005     .0286723    .1587749 
     (3 vs 0)  |  -.0666286    .042343    -1.57   0.116    -.1496192    .0163621 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean         | 
multitreatment | 
            0  |   .3444019   .0241336    14.27   0.000     .2971009    .3917028 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1           | 
           age |   1.413724   .1781519     7.94   0.000     1.064552    1.762895 
         agesq |  -.0276842    .003336    -8.30   0.000    -.0342226   -.0211457 
          male |   -.717694   .2689107    -2.67   0.008    -1.244749   -.1906388 
      minority |  -.1919382   .2398957    -0.80   0.424    -.6621252    .2782488 
  socialassist |   2.882324   .2669839    10.80   0.000     2.359045    3.405602 
 secondaryeduc |  -.3460953   .1535257    -2.25   0.024    -.6470002   -.0451904 
  tertiaryeduc |   .9204818   .1595055     5.77   0.000     .6078568    1.233107 
       emp2011 |  -2.447462   .1698918   -14.41   0.000    -2.780443    -2.11448 
       emphist |   2.151887   .1626965    13.23   0.000     1.833008    2.470766 
        hhsize |  -.1398375   .0290449    -4.81   0.000    -.1967645   -.0829104 
     hhsizegen |    .001012    .038801     0.03   0.979    -.0750366    .0770607 
       ferizaj |   .9347286   .2068503     4.52   0.000     .5293095    1.340148 
       gjakova |   1.153686    .195793     5.89   0.000     .7699389    1.537433 
       gjilani |   1.999726   .1949397    10.26   0.000     1.617651    2.381801 
     mitrovica |   1.353333    .203549     6.65   0.000     .9543842    1.752282 
          peja |   .6318902   .2083549     3.03   0.002     .2235222    1.040258 
      prizreni |   1.126131   .1917063     5.87   0.000     .7503936    1.501869 
         _cons |  -19.81157   2.347503    -8.44   0.000    -24.41259   -15.21055 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME2           | 
           age |   1.346897   .2628578     5.12   0.000      .831705    1.862089 
         agesq |  -.0259819   .0049166    -5.28   0.000    -.0356183   -.0163455 
          male |  -.7979321   .3745817    -2.13   0.033    -1.532099   -.0637655 
      minority |   .0446592   .3027216     0.15   0.883    -.5486643    .6379826 
  socialassist |   3.195568   .3042002    10.50   0.000     2.599346    3.791789 
 secondaryeduc |  -.0119571   .2216409    -0.05   0.957    -.4463652     .422451 
  tertiaryeduc |   1.202353   .2365829     5.08   0.000     .7386587    1.666047 
       emp2011 |  -2.432426    .226858   -10.72   0.000    -2.877059   -1.987792 
       emphist |   1.909995   .2100973     9.09   0.000     1.498212    2.321778 
        hhsize |  -.1776654   .0366943    -4.84   0.000     -.249585   -.1057459 
     hhsizegen |   .0266939    .056103     0.48   0.634    -.0832659    .1366538 
       ferizaj |   1.682184   .3010803     5.59   0.000     1.092078    2.272291 
       gjakova |   1.638374   .3010562     5.44   0.000     1.048315    2.228434 
       gjilani |   2.377816   .2959141     8.04   0.000     1.797835    2.957797 
     mitrovica |   1.999283   .2964681     6.74   0.000     1.418217     2.58035 
          peja |   1.407159   .2923936     4.81   0.000     .8340779     1.98024 
      prizreni |   1.208193    .317206     3.81   0.000      .586481    1.829906 
         _cons |  -20.36672   3.454223    -5.90   0.000    -27.13687   -13.59656 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME3           | 
           age |   1.845249   .3940853     4.68   0.000     1.072856    2.617642 
         agesq |  -.0354639   .0073317    -4.84   0.000    -.0498338    -.021094 
          male |  -2.077053   .4621661    -4.49   0.000    -2.982882   -1.171224 
      minority |  -.0372633   .3519049    -0.11   0.916    -.7269842    .6524576 
  socialassist |   2.460318   .4081779     6.03   0.000     1.660304    3.260332 
 secondaryeduc |  -.6603757   .2685839    -2.46   0.014     -1.18679   -.1339609 
  tertiaryeduc |   .2656454   .2724921     0.97   0.330    -.2684293    .7997201 
       emp2011 |  -2.816691   .2412737   -11.67   0.000    -3.289579   -2.343803 
emphist |   2.751174   .2544869    10.81   0.000     2.252389    3.249959 
        hhsize |  -.2744273   .0558694    -4.91   0.000    -.3839293   -.1649252 
     hhsizegen |   .1802097    .069577     2.59   0.010     .0438413    .3165781 
       ferizaj |   .2731118   .3064866     0.89   0.373     -.327591    .8738146 
       gjakova |  -.6912424   .4154098    -1.66   0.096    -1.505431    .1229458 
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       gjilani |   1.306612   .2641516     4.95   0.000     .7888841    1.824339 
     mitrovica |  -.2686435   .4071526    -0.66   0.509    -1.066648     .529361 
          peja |  -.6522711   .4023617    -1.62   0.105    -1.440885    .1363434 
      prizreni |  -.0450278   .3066457    -0.15   0.883    -.6460424    .5559868 
         _cons |  -24.98753   5.233495    -4.77   0.000    -35.24499   -14.73007 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
*** Balancing diagnostics  
 
. tebalance sum 
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                 Observations       
                               Treatment           Raw     Weighted 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                          0bn.multitr~t =        6,906      1,937.6 
                          1.multitrea~t =          470      1,962.2 
                          2.multitrea~t =          241      1,951.5 
                          3.multitrea~t =          136      1,901.7 
                          Total         =        7,753      7,753.0 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw    Weighted           Raw   Weighted 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  1.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.6269269   -.0768009      .3221864   .9668094 
            agesq |  -.6869872   -.0765679      .2738164    .982205 
             male |  -.4450008    .0386108      1.321906   .9952384 
         minority |   .0052393    .0184935      1.021027   1.069807 
     socialassist |   .3428648    .1603264      6.827683   1.808988 
    secondaryeduc |  -.4696964    .0583174       1.02591   1.028303 
     tertiaryeduc |   .6244724   -.0756302      1.899256   .9818704 
          emp2011 |  -.4831847    .0041387      .9244103   1.002763 
          emphist |  -.0721193   -.0236421      1.030833   1.008142 
           hhsize |  -.4328879   -.0341622      .3461522   .8928136 
        hhsizegen |  -.5568747    .0215153      .5330855    .969723 
          ferizaj |  -.0306483   -.0071066      .9316378   .9828628 
          gjakova |   .0687207    .0569443       1.16296   1.129645 
          gjilani |   .4292703   -.0708377      2.780606   .9090178 
        mitrovica |   .1178972    .0379924      1.334737   1.088544 
             peja |  -.0830119   -.0207665      .8265375   .9500848 
         prizreni |  -.0032518    .0522388      .9960333   1.106533 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  2.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.5756687   -.0624487      .3526933   .9005252 
            agesq |  -.6322685    -.066895      .3161966   .9323647 
             male |  -.4294723    .0508539      1.321162   .9931169 
         minority |    .078628    .0138854       1.30295   1.052258 
     socialassist |   .4499272    .1834829      9.517168   1.939953 
    secondaryeduc |  -.4066554    .0711956      1.050123   1.033665 
     tertiaryeduc |   .6102409   -.0949887      1.895007   .9754653 
          emp2011 |   -.573383    .0311655      .8684703   1.020092 
          emphist |   -.218392   -.0325065      1.059018   1.010917 
           hhsize |  -.4703471    -.071082      .3897204   1.011424 
        hhsizegen |  -.5477794    .0211668      .5800314   1.048448 
          ferizaj |   .0779458   -.0344939      1.185588   .9173304 
          gjakova |   .0702349    .0726757      1.168982    1.16558 
          gjilani |   .4113551   -.0365455      2.713313   .9537108 
        mitrovica |   .2067901    .0480908      1.594995   1.112192 
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             peja |   .0507065    -.000676      1.112635   .9983651 
         prizreni |  -.1745717    .0021834      .6845422   1.004453 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  3.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.5874766   -.0012217      .2839457   .9544984 
            agesq |  -.6574538   -.0041206      .2399639   1.031749 
             male |  -.5770215    .1282286      1.335005   .9729907 
         minority |   .0709291   -.0401744       1.27692   .8542379 
     socialassist |   .3115719     .173463       6.14469   1.882948 
    secondaryeduc |  -.3928189    .1159143      1.057358   1.049694 
     tertiaryeduc |   .4754033   -.1376762      1.788427   .9588983 
          emp2011 |  -.4921984    -.047144      .9235891   .9663668 
          emphist |   .1462006    .0421045      .9189746   .9828377 
           hhsize |  -.4971539   -.0499302      .3182613   .8294375 
        hhsizegen |   -.605161    .0967708      .5796272    .981256 
          ferizaj |   .0290471   -.0238964      1.074949    .942605 
          gjakova |  -.2503322    .0713566      .4612281   1.162584 
          gjilani |   .5480294   -.0699444      3.261717   .9102099 
        mitrovica |  -.1407073      .01267      .6399687   1.029453 
             peja |  -.2319707    .0030906      .5307899   1.007473 
         prizreni |  -.1079457    .0048408      .8079007    1.00989 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Table A6.1.3 RA  
*** Binary treatment model  
 
. teffects ra (employed age agesq male minority socialassist secondaryeduc 
tertiaryeduc emp2011 emphist hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja 
prizreni, logit) (bintreatment), atet vce(robust)aequ  
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  1.286e-23   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  1.666e-33   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: none 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     employed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
 bintreatment | 
    (1 vs 0)  |    .069562   .0170429     4.08   0.000     .0361586    .1029655 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
 bintreatment | 
           0  |   .3401192   .0162374    20.95   0.000     .3082946    .3719438 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0          | 
          age |   .1808925   .1380061     1.31   0.190    -.0895945    .4513794 
        agesq |  -.0018676   .0023268    -0.80   0.422    -.0064281    .0026929 
         male |   .4311122    .327872     1.31   0.189    -.2115051    1.073729 
     minority |   .0855887   .3472056     0.25   0.805    -.5949217    .7660992 
 socialassist |   1.182815   .5900737     2.00   0.045     .0262914    2.339338 
secondaryeduc |   .5530994   .1964932     2.81   0.005     .1679798    .9382189 
 tertiaryeduc |    .994315   .2897802     3.43   0.001     .4263562    1.562274 
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      emp2011 |   6.753188   .3304302    20.44   0.000     6.105557     7.40082 
      emphist |   .9124589   .3502011     2.61   0.009     .2260774     1.59884 
       hhsize |   .0549228   .0278171     1.97   0.048     .0004023    .1094433 
    hhsizegen |  -.0610614   .0342143    -1.78   0.074    -.1281201    .0059973 
      ferizaj |   -.808614    .295916    -2.73   0.006    -1.388599   -.2286292 
      gjakova |  -.5492257   .2154132    -2.55   0.011    -.9714278   -.1270235 
      gjilani |  -.3347647   .3226504    -1.04   0.299    -.9671478    .2976185 
    mitrovica |   .0805916   .2882117     0.28   0.780     -.484293    .6454763 
         peja |  -.9308065   .2856165    -3.26   0.001    -1.490604   -.3710085 
     prizreni |  -.3631649   .2625625    -1.38   0.167     -.877778    .1514482 
        _cons |  -8.326984   1.991491    -4.18   0.000    -12.23023   -4.423734 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1          | 
          age |   .4888125   .2598077     1.88   0.060    -.0204011    .9980262 
        agesq |  -.0080254   .0047377    -1.69   0.090    -.0173111    .0012602 
         male |   -.218195   .4571157    -0.48   0.633    -1.114125    .6777353 
     minority |  -.5892953   .3331128    -1.77   0.077    -1.242184    .0635938 
 socialassist |  -.5339743   .3671626    -1.45   0.146      -1.2536    .1856511 
secondaryeduc |  -.1018293   .2585159    -0.39   0.694    -.6085113    .4048526 
 tertiaryeduc |   .6767813   .2629518     2.57   0.010     .1614052    1.192157 
      emp2011 |   2.140557   .2229235     9.60   0.000     1.703635    2.577479 
      emphist |   .7164347   .2483117     2.89   0.004     .2297527    1.203117 
       hhsize |  -.0863489   .0585863    -1.47   0.141     -.201176    .0284782 
    hhsizegen |    .114222   .0708649     1.61   0.107    -.0246706    .2531145 
      ferizaj |  -.6452049   .3473382    -1.86   0.063    -1.325975    .0355654 
      gjakova |  -.3286613   .2936638    -1.12   0.263    -.9042318    .2469092 
      gjilani |  -.2569687    .270016    -0.95   0.341    -.7861903    .2722528 
    mitrovica |  -.9280101   .3656768    -2.54   0.011    -1.644723   -.2112967 
         peja |   .8872465   .3282573     2.70   0.007      .243874    1.530619 
     prizreni |   -.473688   .3364302    -1.41   0.159    -1.133079    .1857032 
        _cons |  -8.443024   3.542638    -2.38   0.017    -15.38647   -1.499582 
 
 
 
*** Multinomial probit treatment model  
 
. teffects ra (employed age agesq male minority socialassist secondaryeduc 
tertiaryeduc emp2011 emphist hhsize hhsiz 
> egen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja prizreni, logit) (multitreatment), atet 
vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  1.253e-22   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  6.712e-34   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: none 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |               Robust 
      employed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET           | 
multitreatment | 
     (1 vs 0)  |   .0953583   .0240248     3.97   0.000     .0482706     .142446 
     (2 vs 0)  |   .0869834   .0302539     2.88   0.004     .0276869    .1462798 
     (3 vs 0)  |  -.0430681   .0393597    -1.09   0.274    -.1202116    .0340754 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean         | 
multitreatment | 
            0  |   .3514502   .0213164    16.49   0.000     .3096708    .3932297 
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---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0           | 
           age |   .1808925   .1380061     1.31   0.190    -.0895945    .4513794 
         agesq |  -.0018676   .0023268    -0.80   0.422    -.0064281    .0026929 
          male |   .4311122    .327872     1.31   0.189    -.2115051    1.073729 
      minority |   .0855887   .3472056     0.25   0.805    -.5949217    .7660992 
  socialassist |   1.182815   .5900737     2.00   0.045     .0262914    2.339338 
 secondaryeduc |   .5530994   .1964932     2.81   0.005     .1679798    .9382189 
  tertiaryeduc |    .994315   .2897802     3.43   0.001     .4263562    1.562274 
       emp2011 |   6.753188   .3304302    20.44   0.000     6.105557     7.40082 
       emphist |   .9124589   .3502011     2.61   0.009     .2260774     1.59884 
        hhsize |   .0549228   .0278171     1.97   0.048     .0004023    .1094433 
     hhsizegen |  -.0610614   .0342143    -1.78   0.074    -.1281201    .0059973 
       ferizaj |   -.808614    .295916    -2.73   0.006    -1.388599   -.2286292 
       gjakova |  -.5492257   .2154132    -2.55   0.011    -.9714278   -.1270235 
       gjilani |  -.3347647   .3226504    -1.04   0.299    -.9671478    .2976185 
     mitrovica |   .0805916   .2882117     0.28   0.780     -.484293    .6454763 
          peja |  -.9308065   .2856165    -3.26   0.001    -1.490604   -.3710085 
      prizreni |  -.3631649   .2625625    -1.38   0.167     -.877778    .1514482 
         _cons |  -8.326984   1.991491    -4.18   0.000    -12.23023   -4.423734 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1           | 
           age |   .8781218   .3576114     2.46   0.014     .1772162    1.579027 
         agesq |  -.0148516   .0065542    -2.27   0.023    -.0276976   -.0020056 
          male |  -.7646896   .6402417    -1.19   0.232     -2.01954     .490161 
      minority |  -.5772255   .4981694    -1.16   0.247     -1.55362    .3991685 
  socialassist |  -.6689897   .5311511    -1.26   0.208    -1.710027    .3720472 
 secondaryeduc |   .0939106   .3546871     0.26   0.791    -.6012634    .7890845 
  tertiaryeduc |   .8924367   .3606946     2.47   0.013     .1854883    1.599385 
       emp2011 |   1.867267   .2972801     6.28   0.000     1.284609    2.449925 
       emphist |   .6932728   .3336896     2.08   0.038     .0392533    1.347292 
        hhsize |  -.0873919   .0774409    -1.13   0.259    -.2391732    .0643895 
     hhsizegen |   .1837764   .0988439     1.86   0.063    -.0099541    .3775069 
       ferizaj |   -.870921   .4984884    -1.75   0.081     -1.84794    .1060982 
       gjakova |  -.2300903   .3889685    -0.59   0.554    -.9924545    .5322738 
       gjilani |  -.4720055   .3950961    -1.19   0.232     -1.24638    .3023687 
     mitrovica |  -.9234312   .4893246    -1.89   0.059     -1.88249    .0356273 
          peja |   1.246366   .4892611     2.55   0.011      .287432      2.2053 
      prizreni |  -.5611171   .4199471    -1.34   0.181    -1.384198    .2619641 
         _cons |  -13.68027   4.878485    -2.80   0.005    -23.24192   -4.118611 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME2           | 
           age |   .2174579    .427506     0.51   0.611    -.6204384    1.055354 
         agesq |  -.0044487   .0073458    -0.61   0.545    -.0188461    .0099488 
          male |   .4865273   .8504345     0.57   0.567    -1.180294    2.153348 
      minority |   -.983394   .7627025    -1.29   0.197    -2.478263    .5114754 
  socialassist |  -.4155856   .5695115    -0.73   0.466    -1.531808    .7006364 
 secondaryeduc |  -1.308013   .5301429    -2.47   0.014    -2.347074   -.2689517 
  tertiaryeduc |  -.2254472   .4920602    -0.46   0.647    -1.189867     .738973 
       emp2011 |   2.000179   .4502903     4.44   0.000     1.117626    2.882731 
       emphist |   1.605919   .5258016     3.05   0.002     .5753672    2.636472 
        hhsize |   -.096349   .1089791    -0.88   0.377    -.3099441    .1172461 
     hhsizegen |   .0956543    .126824     0.75   0.451    -.1529161    .3442247 
       ferizaj |  -1.228609   .8022271    -1.53   0.126    -2.800946    .3437268 
       gjakova |  -1.676685   .7325251    -2.29   0.022    -3.112407   -.2409617 
       gjilani |  -1.129984   .6617085    -1.71   0.088    -2.426909    .1669405 
     mitrovica |  -1.769147   .7465952    -2.37   0.018    -3.232447   -.3058474 
          peja |  -.2260909   .6836617    -0.33   0.741    -1.566043    1.113861 
      prizreni |  -1.172745   .8476881    -1.38   0.167    -2.834183    .4886937 
         _cons |  -2.780253   6.173858    -0.45   0.652    -14.88079    9.320286 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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OME3           | 
           age |    -.41594   1.002928    -0.41   0.678    -2.381643    1.549763 
         agesq |   .0094703   .0188905     0.50   0.616    -.0275545     .046495 
          male |   -1.69968   1.881086    -0.90   0.366    -5.386541    1.987181 
      minority |  -1.724112   1.659226    -1.04   0.299    -4.976136    1.527912 
  socialassist |  -1.148109   4.292848    -0.27   0.789    -9.561937    7.265719 
 secondaryeduc |   1.258236   .7785581     1.62   0.106      -.26771    2.784181 
  tertiaryeduc |   1.209672   .8380442     1.44   0.149    -.4328642    2.852209 
       emp2011 |   4.459772   1.196606     3.73   0.000     2.114468    6.805076 
       emphist |   .3789327    .853587     0.44   0.657    -1.294067    2.051932 
        hhsize |  -.3260869    .197547    -1.65   0.099     -.713272    .0610981 
     hhsizegen |   .1646882   .3036852     0.54   0.588    -.4305238    .7599002 
       ferizaj |  -.4170348   .7885456    -0.53   0.597    -1.962556    1.128486 
       gjakova |   1.072785   1.132719     0.95   0.344    -1.147303    3.292873 
       gjilani |   .7914437   .8721782     0.91   0.364    -.9179942    2.500882 
     mitrovica |  -2.863647    1.05063    -2.73   0.006    -4.922843   -.8044508 
          peja |   -1.54128   1.252629    -1.23   0.219    -3.996389     .913828 
      prizreni |   .5834345   1.667557     0.35   0.726    -2.684916    3.851785 
         _cons |   2.417672   13.06953     0.18   0.853    -23.19814    28.03348 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Table A6.1.4 IPWRA  
*** Binary treatment model  
 
. teffects ipwra (employed age agesq male minority socialassist secondaryeduc 
tertiaryeduc emp2011 emphist  hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja 
prizreni, logit) (bintreatment age agesq male minority socialassist secondaryeduc 
tertiaryeduc  emp2011 emphist hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja 
prizren ), atet vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  1.527e-16   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  2.390e-30   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : IPW regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: logit 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |               Robust 
      employed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET           | 
  bintreatment | 
     (1 vs 0)  |   .0724515   .0177001     4.09   0.000       .03776    .1071431 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean         | 
  bintreatment | 
            0  |   .3372297   .0167379    20.15   0.000     .3044241    .3700353 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0           | 
           age |  -.7118113   .4517788    -1.58   0.115    -1.597281    .1736588 
         agesq |   .0130895   .0084505     1.55   0.121    -.0034731    .0296522 
          male |   .6283904   .6700931     0.94   0.348     -.684968    1.941749 
      minority |    .141273     .56156     0.25   0.801    -.9593644     1.24191 
  socialassist |   .9968692    .807604     1.23   0.217    -.5860055    2.579744 
 secondaryeduc |  -.0889005     .73791    -0.12   0.904    -1.535178    1.357377 
  tertiaryeduc |  -.0284332   .9497138    -0.03   0.976    -1.889838    1.832972 
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       emp2011 |    6.83069   .4426385    15.43   0.000     5.963134    7.698245 
       emphist |   1.589349   .6860297     2.32   0.021     .2447557    2.933943 
        hhsize |   .1676132   .0749671     2.24   0.025     .0206803     .314546 
     hhsizegen |  -.0873391   .0878019    -0.99   0.320    -.2594276    .0847494 
       ferizaj |   .5130356   1.072509     0.48   0.632    -1.589044    2.615115 
       gjakova |   -.333446    .468361    -0.71   0.477    -1.251417    .5845247 
       gjilani |  -.0707092   .4651375    -0.15   0.879    -.9823619    .8409435 
     mitrovica |   .8006694   .5094594     1.57   0.116    -.1978526    1.799191 
          peja |   .9435543   1.043219     0.90   0.366    -1.101118    2.988226 
      prizreni |  -.3613945   .4945576    -0.73   0.465     -1.33071    .6079205 
         _cons |   3.422022   5.345466     0.64   0.522      -7.0549    13.89894 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1           | 
           age |   .4888125   .2598077     1.88   0.060    -.0204011    .9980262 
         agesq |  -.0080254   .0047377    -1.69   0.090    -.0173111    .0012602 
          male |   -.218195   .4571157    -0.48   0.633    -1.114125    .6777353 
      minority |  -.5892953   .3331128    -1.77   0.077    -1.242184    .0635938 
  socialassist |  -.5339743   .3671626    -1.45   0.146      -1.2536    .1856511 
 secondaryeduc |  -.1018293   .2585159    -0.39   0.694    -.6085113    .4048526 
  tertiaryeduc |   .6767813   .2629518     2.57   0.010     .1614052    1.192157 
       emp2011 |   2.140557   .2229235     9.60   0.000     1.703635    2.577479 
       emphist |   .7164347   .2483117     2.89   0.004     .2297527    1.203117 
        hhsize |  -.0863489   .0585863    -1.47   0.141     -.201176    .0284782 
     hhsizegen |    .114222   .0708649     1.61   0.107    -.0246706    .2531145 
       ferizaj |  -.6452049   .3473382    -1.86   0.063    -1.325975    .0355654 
       gjakova |  -.3286613   .2936638    -1.12   0.263    -.9042318    .2469092 
       gjilani |  -.2569687    .270016    -0.95   0.341    -.7861903    .2722528 
     mitrovica |  -.9280101   .3656768    -2.54   0.011    -1.644723   -.2112967 
          peja |   .8872465   .3282573     2.70   0.007      .243874    1.530619 
      prizreni |   -.473688   .3364302    -1.41   0.159    -1.133079    .1857032 
         _cons |  -8.443024   3.542638    -2.38   0.017    -15.38647   -1.499582 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1           | 
           age |   1.451319    .152215     9.53   0.000     1.152983    1.749655 
         agesq |  -.0282003   .0028461    -9.91   0.000    -.0337786   -.0226221 
          male |  -.9374553   .2214396    -4.23   0.000    -1.371469   -.5034416 
      minority |  -.0999522   .1994632    -0.50   0.616    -.4908928    .2909885 
  socialassist |   2.932207   .2344679    12.51   0.000     2.472658    3.391755 
 secondaryeduc |  -.3021237   .1255887    -2.41   0.016    -.5482729   -.0559744 
  tertiaryeduc |   .8970667   .1349911     6.65   0.000     .6324891    1.161644 
       emp2011 |  -2.518161   .1463909   -17.20   0.000    -2.805082   -2.231241 
       emphist |   2.190087   .1425687    15.36   0.000     1.910658    2.469517 
        hhsize |  -.1693141    .024119    -7.02   0.000    -.2165865   -.1220417 
     hhsizegen |   .0336501   .0320513     1.05   0.294    -.0291693    .0964696 
       ferizaj |   .9545303   .1645074     5.80   0.000     .6321016    1.276959 
       gjakova |   .9650004   .1586301     6.08   0.000      .654091     1.27591 
       gjilani |   1.903647   .1596132    11.93   0.000     1.590811    2.216483 
     mitrovica |   1.237659   .1651726     7.49   0.000     .9139271    1.561392 
          peja |   .5909044   .1643426     3.60   0.000     .2687989    .9130099 
      prizreni |   .8850921   .1538299     5.75   0.000      .583591    1.186593 
         _cons |  -19.57279   2.002432    -9.77   0.000    -23.49748   -15.64809 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
*** Multinomial probit treatment model 
 
. teffects ipwra (employed age agesq male minority socialassist secondaryeduc 
tertiaryeduc emp2011 emphist  hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja 
prizreni, logit) (multitreatment age agesq  male minority socialassist secondaryeduc 
tertiaryeduc  emp2011 emphist hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja 
prizren ), atet vce(robust)  aequations 
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Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  3.811e-17   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  1.731e-26   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : IPW regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: (multinomial) logit 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |               Robust 
      employed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET           | 
multitreatment | 
     (1 vs 0)  |   .0991218   .0244461     4.05   0.000     .0512083    .1470353 
     (2 vs 0)  |   .0879362   .0305271     2.88   0.004     .0281042    .1477681 
     (3 vs 0)  |   -.053061   .0409642    -1.30   0.195    -.1333494    .0272274 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean         | 
multitreatment | 
            0  |   .3476867   .0215506    16.13   0.000     .3054483    .3899251 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0           | 
           age |  -.6677465   .4478029    -1.49   0.136    -1.545424    .2099309 
         agesq |   .0124019   .0083481     1.49   0.137    -.0039602    .0287639 
          male |   .4794327   .6788999     0.71   0.480    -.8511866    1.810052 
      minority |   .1307871   .5747539     0.23   0.820    -.9957098    1.257284 
  socialassist |   1.023982   .7943787     1.29   0.197    -.5329718    2.580936 
 secondaryeduc |   .0726845   .6986675     0.10   0.917    -1.296679    1.442048 
  tertiaryeduc |    .125271   .9093575     0.14   0.890    -1.657037    1.907579 
       emp2011 |   6.804093   .4501296    15.12   0.000     5.921855    7.686331 
       emphist |    1.65305   .6776125     2.44   0.015     .3249537    2.981146 
        hhsize |   .1455636   .0756676     1.92   0.054    -.0027423    .2938694 
     hhsizegen |  -.0671963   .0902719    -0.74   0.457    -.2441261    .1097334 
       ferizaj |   .5367144   1.138176     0.47   0.637    -1.694069    2.767498 
       gjakova |  -.2804227    .460167    -0.61   0.542    -1.182333    .6214879 
       gjilani |  -.1633164   .4570627    -0.36   0.721    -1.059143    .7325099 
     mitrovica |   .8001392    .510842     1.57   0.117    -.2010928    1.801371 
          peja |   1.021226   1.011514     1.01   0.313    -.9613059    3.003757 
      prizreni |  -.3738089   .5051459    -0.74   0.459    -1.363877    .6162589 
         _cons |   2.733365   5.340782     0.51   0.609    -7.734375     13.2011 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1           | 
           age |   .8781218   .3576114     2.46   0.014     .1772162    1.579027 
         agesq |  -.0148516   .0065542    -2.27   0.023    -.0276976   -.0020056 
          male |  -.7646896   .6402417    -1.19   0.232     -2.01954     .490161 
      minority |  -.5772255   .4981694    -1.16   0.247     -1.55362    .3991685 
  socialassist |  -.6689897   .5311511    -1.26   0.208    -1.710027    .3720472 
 secondaryeduc |   .0939106   .3546871     0.26   0.791    -.6012634    .7890845 
  tertiaryeduc |   .8924367   .3606946     2.47   0.013     .1854883    1.599385 
       emp2011 |   1.867267   .2972801     6.28   0.000     1.284609    2.449925 
       emphist |   .6932728   .3336896     2.08   0.038     .0392533    1.347292 
        hhsize |  -.0873919   .0774409    -1.13   0.259    -.2391732    .0643895 
     hhsizegen |   .1837764   .0988439     1.86   0.063    -.0099541    .3775069 
       ferizaj |   -.870921   .4984884    -1.75   0.081     -1.84794    .1060982 
       gjakova |  -.2300903   .3889685    -0.59   0.554    -.9924545    .5322738 
       gjilani |  -.4720055   .3950961    -1.19   0.232     -1.24638    .3023687 
     mitrovica |  -.9234312   .4893246    -1.89   0.059     -1.88249    .0356273 
          peja |   1.246366   .4892611     2.55   0.011      .287432      2.2053 
      prizreni |  -.5611171   .4199471    -1.34   0.181    -1.384198    .2619641 
         _cons |  -13.68027   4.878485    -2.80   0.005    -23.24192   -4.118611 
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---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME2           | 
           age |    .136024   .4809697     0.28   0.777    -.8066594    1.078707 
         agesq |  -.0027331   .0085085    -0.32   0.748    -.0194096    .0139433 
          male |   .7981886   .8943002     0.89   0.372    -.9546075    2.550985 
      minority |   -.974543   .8667033    -1.12   0.261     -2.67325    .7241643 
  socialassist |  -.4927547   .5228051    -0.94   0.346    -1.517434    .5319244 
 secondaryeduc |  -1.501587    .557957    -2.69   0.007    -2.595162   -.4080114 
  tertiaryeduc |  -.3254069   .5345709    -0.61   0.543    -1.373146    .7223328 
       emp2011 |   1.968352   .4713379     4.18   0.000     1.044546    2.892157 
       emphist |   1.588437   .5209449     3.05   0.002      .567404    2.609471 
        hhsize |  -.0870363   .1094399    -0.80   0.426    -.3015345    .1274619 
     hhsizegen |   .0764527    .128024     0.60   0.550    -.1744697    .3273751 
       ferizaj |  -1.078196   .7796379    -1.38   0.167    -2.606259    .4498659 
       gjakova |  -1.598505   .7513452    -2.13   0.033    -3.071114   -.1258952 
       gjilani |  -.9448311   .6686614    -1.41   0.158    -2.255383     .365721 
     mitrovica |  -1.660417   .7641433    -2.17   0.030     -3.15811   -.1627235 
          peja |  -.1053805   .6918786    -0.15   0.879    -1.461438    1.250677 
      prizreni |  -1.175091    .830445    -1.42   0.157    -2.802734     .452551 
         _cons |  -1.976327   6.689965    -0.30   0.768    -15.08842    11.13576 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME3           | 
           age |  -.1638573   .9690795    -0.17   0.866    -2.063218    1.735504 
         agesq |    .006548   .0180793     0.36   0.717    -.0288869    .0419828 
          male |  -1.365352   2.186413    -0.62   0.532    -5.650641    2.919938 
      minority |  -2.448472   1.288977    -1.90   0.057    -4.974821    .0778771 
  socialassist |  -3.010292   4.312833    -0.70   0.485    -11.46329    5.442706 
 secondaryeduc |   1.675777   .8040307     2.08   0.037     .0999058    3.251648 
  tertiaryeduc |   1.332617   .8585433     1.55   0.121    -.3500971    3.015331 
       emp2011 |   3.970016   1.210366     3.28   0.001     1.597744    6.342289 
       emphist |   1.156213   .7996599     1.45   0.148    -.4110919    2.723517 
        hhsize |  -.4893157   .2561319    -1.91   0.056    -.9913249    .0126935 
     hhsizegen |   .0879398   .3519665     0.25   0.803    -.6019018    .7777814 
       ferizaj |  -.2868893   .9552357    -0.30   0.764    -2.159117    1.585338 
       gjakova |   1.115135   1.109826     1.00   0.315    -1.060084    3.290354 
       gjilani |   1.001144   .8825521     1.13   0.257    -.7286266    2.730914 
     mitrovica |  -3.356343   1.073165    -3.13   0.002    -5.459708   -1.252977 
          peja |  -1.058001   1.095014    -0.97   0.334    -3.204189    1.088186 
      prizreni |   .0768549   1.877923     0.04   0.967    -3.603806    3.757516 
         _cons |   -1.70247   12.64516    -0.13   0.893    -26.48653    23.08159 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1           | 
           age |   1.413724   .1781519     7.94   0.000     1.064552    1.762895 
         agesq |  -.0276842    .003336    -8.30   0.000    -.0342226   -.0211457 
          male |   -.717694   .2689107    -2.67   0.008    -1.244749   -.1906388 
      minority |  -.1919382   .2398957    -0.80   0.424    -.6621252    .2782488 
  socialassist |   2.882324   .2669839    10.80   0.000     2.359045    3.405602 
 secondaryeduc |  -.3460953   .1535257    -2.25   0.024    -.6470002   -.0451904 
  tertiaryeduc |   .9204818   .1595055     5.77   0.000     .6078568    1.233107 
       emp2011 |  -2.447462   .1698918   -14.41   0.000    -2.780443    -2.11448 
       emphist |   2.151887   .1626965    13.23   0.000     1.833008    2.470766 
        hhsize |  -.1398375   .0290449    -4.81   0.000    -.1967645   -.0829104 
     hhsizegen |    .001012    .038801     0.03   0.979    -.0750366    .0770607 
       ferizaj |   .9347286   .2068503     4.52   0.000     .5293095    1.340148 
       gjakova |   1.153686    .195793     5.89   0.000     .7699389    1.537433 
       gjilani |   1.999726   .1949397    10.26   0.000     1.617651    2.381801 
     mitrovica |   1.353333    .203549     6.65   0.000     .9543842    1.752282 
          peja |   .6318902   .2083549     3.03   0.002     .2235222    1.040258 
      prizreni |   1.126131   .1917063     5.87   0.000     .7503936    1.501869 
         _cons |  -19.81157   2.347503    -8.44   0.000    -24.41259   -15.21055 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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TME2           | 
           age |   1.346897   .2628578     5.12   0.000      .831705    1.862089 
         agesq |  -.0259819   .0049166    -5.28   0.000    -.0356183   -.0163455 
          male |  -.7979321   .3745817    -2.13   0.033    -1.532099   -.0637655 
      minority |   .0446592   .3027216     0.15   0.883    -.5486643    .6379826 
  socialassist |   3.195568   .3042002    10.50   0.000     2.599346    3.791789 
 secondaryeduc |  -.0119571   .2216409    -0.05   0.957    -.4463652     .422451 
  tertiaryeduc |   1.202353   .2365829     5.08   0.000     .7386587    1.666047 
       emp2011 |  -2.432426    .226858   -10.72   0.000    -2.877059   -1.987792 
       emphist |   1.909995   .2100973     9.09   0.000     1.498212    2.321778 
        hhsize |  -.1776654   .0366943    -4.84   0.000     -.249585   -.1057459 
     hhsizegen |   .0266939    .056103     0.48   0.634    -.0832659    .1366538 
       ferizaj |   1.682184   .3010803     5.59   0.000     1.092078    2.272291 
       gjakova |   1.638374   .3010562     5.44   0.000     1.048315    2.228434 
       gjilani |   2.377816   .2959141     8.04   0.000     1.797835    2.957797 
     mitrovica |   1.999283   .2964681     6.74   0.000     1.418217     2.58035 
          peja |   1.407159   .2923936     4.81   0.000     .8340779     1.98024 
      prizreni |   1.208193    .317206     3.81   0.000      .586481    1.829906 
         _cons |  -20.36672   3.454223    -5.90   0.000    -27.13687   -13.59656 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME3           | 
           age |   1.845249   .3940853     4.68   0.000     1.072856    2.617642 
         agesq |  -.0354639   .0073317    -4.84   0.000    -.0498338    -.021094 
          male |  -2.077053   .4621661    -4.49   0.000    -2.982882   -1.171224 
      minority |  -.0372633   .3519049    -0.11   0.916    -.7269842    .6524576 
  socialassist |   2.460318   .4081779     6.03   0.000     1.660304    3.260332 
 secondaryeduc |  -.6603757   .2685839    -2.46   0.014     -1.18679   -.1339609 
  tertiaryeduc |   .2656454   .2724921     0.97   0.330    -.2684293    .7997201 
       emp2011 |  -2.816691   .2412737   -11.67   0.000    -3.289579   -2.343803 
       emphist |   2.751174   .2544869    10.81   0.000     2.252389    3.249959 
        hhsize |  -.2744273   .0558694    -4.91   0.000    -.3839293   -.1649252 
     hhsizegen |   .1802097    .069577     2.59   0.010     .0438413    .3165781 
       ferizaj |   .2731118   .3064866     0.89   0.373     -.327591    .8738146 
       gjakova |  -.6912424   .4154098    -1.66   0.096    -1.505431    .1229458 
       gjilani |   1.306612   .2641516     4.95   0.000     .7888841    1.824339 
     mitrovica |  -.2686435   .4071526    -0.66   0.509    -1.066648     .529361 
          peja |  -.6522711   .4023617    -1.62   0.105    -1.440885    .1363434 
      prizreni |  -.0450278   .3066457    -0.15   0.883    -.6460424    .5559868 
         _cons |  -24.98753   5.233495    -4.77   0.000    -35.24499   -14.73007 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 6.2 Outcome Variable: employed – Model 2, excluding 
emphist 
Table A6.2.1 PSM  
. teffects psmatch (employed) (bintreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc emp2011 hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica 
peja prizren ) if insampm==1, atet vce(robust) 
 
Treatment-effects estimation                   Number of obs      =      7,753 
Estimator      : propensity-score matching     Matches: requested =          1 
Outcome model  : matching                                     min =          1 
Treatment model: logit                                        max =          9 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              AI Robust 
    employed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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ATET         | 
bintreatment | 
   (1 vs 0)  |   .0670012   .0246546     2.72   0.007     .0186791    .1153233 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
*** Balancing diagnostics  
 
. tebalance sum 
note: refitting the model using the generate() option 
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                   Raw      Matched 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                          Number of obs =        7,753        1,694 
                          Treated obs   =          847          847 
                          Control obs   =        6,906          847 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw     Matched           Raw    Matched 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
              age |  -.6060234   -.0272963      .3243216   .9542477 
            agesq |  -.6665971    -.029148      .2800718   .9545983 
             male |  -.4618398    .0378049      1.323737   .9965182 
         minority |   .0377737    .1103094       1.14086   1.521516 
     socialassist |   .3709548    .1106018       7.49496    1.42536 
    secondaryeduc |  -.4394493    .0578811      1.036461   1.024474 
     tertiaryeduc |   .5968176   -.0953859      1.880529   .9741495 
          emp2011 |  -.5101395   -.0125136      .9074829   .9911969 
           hhsize |   -.453916   -.0180904      .3536742   .8421255 
        hhsizegen |  -.5622479    .0253108      .5529141   .9879471 
          ferizaj |   .0111471    .0741576      1.026757    1.19752 
          gjakova |   .0257213    .0141508       1.06098   1.032134 
          gjilani |   .4442438    -.005757      2.838404   .9919855 
        mitrovica |   .1091392   -.0576464      1.308213   .8876912 
             peja |  -.0639643   -.0880067      .8656221   .8224986 
         prizreni |  -.0658709    .0206687      .8802186   1.044971 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table A6.2.2 IPW  
*** Binary treatment model  
 
. teffects ipw (employed) (bintreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc  emp2011 hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica 
peja prizren ) if insampm==1, atet vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  1.061e-23   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  8.893e-32   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : inverse-probability weights 
Outcome model  : weighted mean 
Treatment model: logit 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     employed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
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 bintreatment | 
    (1 vs 0)  |   .0793523   .0177834     4.46   0.000     .0444975    .1142071 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
 bintreatment | 
           0  |   .3303289   .0169624    19.47   0.000     .2970832    .3635746 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1          | 
          age |   1.529679   .1520654    10.06   0.000     1.231637    1.827722 
        agesq |  -.0293802   .0028491   -10.31   0.000    -.0349643   -.0237961 
         male |  -.8143384   .2115076    -3.85   0.000    -1.228886    -.399791 
     minority |   -.117641   .1887696    -0.62   0.533    -.4876227    .2523406 
 socialassist |   2.898167   .2258356    12.83   0.000     2.455537    3.340797 
secondaryeduc |  -.2218473   .1213679    -1.83   0.068    -.4597239    .0160294 
 tertiaryeduc |    .967574   .1272537     7.60   0.000     .7181613    1.216987 
      emp2011 |   -.815216   .0962615    -8.47   0.000    -1.003885   -.6265469 
       hhsize |  -.1566946    .023219    -6.75   0.000    -.2022031   -.1111862 
    hhsizegen |   .0261437   .0305012     0.86   0.391    -.0336375    .0859249 
      ferizaj |   .8376426   .1531923     5.47   0.000     .5373912    1.137894 
      gjakova |   .8286225    .153645     5.39   0.000     .5274839    1.129761 
      gjilani |   1.826747   .1465489    12.47   0.000     1.539517    2.113978 
    mitrovica |   1.021507   .1600413     6.38   0.000     .7078318    1.335182 
         peja |   .2845783   .1530052     1.86   0.063    -.0153063     .584463 
     prizreni |   .9107659   .1476721     6.17   0.000     .6213338    1.200198 
        _cons |  -20.44219   2.004136   -10.20   0.000    -24.37022   -16.51416 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
*** Balancing diagnostics  
 
. tebalance sum  
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                   Raw     Weighted 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                          Number of obs =        7,753      7,753.0 
                          Treated obs   =          847      3,937.0 
                          Control obs   =        6,906      3,816.0 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw    Weighted           Raw   Weighted 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
              age |  -.6060234   -.0399176      .3243216   .9571953 
            agesq |  -.6665971     -.04135      .2800718   .9836777 
             male |  -.4618398    .0048963      1.323737   .9993789 
         minority |   .0377737    .0018411       1.14086    1.00612 
     socialassist |   .3709548    .1339313       7.49496   1.555801 
    secondaryeduc |  -.4394493    .0123786      1.036461   1.004586 
     tertiaryeduc |   .5968176   -.0299941      1.880529   .9898049 
          emp2011 |  -.5101395   -.0027371      .9074829   .9980306 
           hhsize |   -.453916   -.0149439      .3536742   .9519562 
        hhsizegen |  -.5622479   -.0079745      .5529141   .9926433 
          ferizaj |   .0111471    .0203222      1.026757   1.047771 
          gjakova |   .0257213    -.020305       1.06098   .9571171 
          gjilani |   .4442438    .0212731      2.838404    1.03105 
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        mitrovica |   .1091392   -.0231879      1.308213   .9516492 
             peja |  -.0639643   -.0058137      .8656221   .9860955 
         prizreni |  -.0658709    .0076986      .8802186   1.016287 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
*** Multinomial treatment model 
 
 
. teffects ipw (employed) (multitreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc emp2011 hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica 
peja prizren ) if insampm==1, atet vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  1.415e-25   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  1.365e-30   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : inverse-probability weights 
Outcome model  : weighted mean 
Treatment model: (multinomial) logit 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |               Robust 
      employed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET           | 
multitreatment | 
     (1 vs 0)  |   .1048446   .0243483     4.31   0.000     .0571229    .1525664 
     (2 vs 0)  |   .0886774   .0314554     2.82   0.005      .027026    .1503289 
     (3 vs 0)  |  -.0619315   .0412751    -1.50   0.133    -.1428292    .0189661 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean         | 
multitreatment | 
            0  |   .3419639   .0219641    15.57   0.000     .2989149    .3850128 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1           | 
           age |   1.488677   .1806225     8.24   0.000     1.134663     1.84269 
         agesq |  -.0288241   .0033858    -8.51   0.000    -.0354602    -.022188 
          male |  -.5852999   .2593222    -2.26   0.024    -1.093562   -.0770378 
      minority |  -.2005106   .2352003    -0.85   0.394    -.6614948    .2604736 
  socialassist |   2.858397   .2596356    11.01   0.000      2.34952    3.367273 
 secondaryeduc |  -.2658465   .1522796    -1.75   0.081     -.564309    .0326161 
  tertiaryeduc |   .9955244    .155405     6.41   0.000     .6909361    1.300113 
       emp2011 |  -.7686188   .1200859    -6.40   0.000    -1.003983   -.5332547 
        hhsize |  -.1273163   .0280696    -4.54   0.000    -.1823317   -.0723008 
     hhsizegen |  -.0075608     .03714    -0.20   0.839    -.0803539    .0652323 
       ferizaj |   .8305248   .2003134     4.15   0.000     .4379177    1.223132 
       gjakova |   1.036952   .1953685     5.31   0.000     .6540371    1.419868 
       gjilani |   1.927927    .186489    10.34   0.000     1.562415    2.293438 
     mitrovica |    1.15678   .2026307     5.71   0.000      .759631    1.553929 
          peja |   .3477453   .2019948     1.72   0.085    -.0481572    .7436478 
      prizreni |   1.157398   .1882848     6.15   0.000     .7883668     1.52643 
         _cons |    -20.647   2.384039    -8.66   0.000    -25.31963   -15.97437 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME2           | 
           age |   1.398609   .2665012     5.25   0.000     .8762767    1.920942 
         agesq |  -.0267274   .0049928    -5.35   0.000    -.0365131   -.0169417 
          male |  -.7163576   .3709546    -1.93   0.053    -1.443415       .0107 
      minority |   .0143413   .2935359     0.05   0.961    -.5609785    .5896612 
  socialassist |   3.159174   .2977953    10.61   0.000     2.575506    3.742842 
 secondaryeduc |   .0464099   .2216867     0.21   0.834     -.388088    .4809078 
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  tertiaryeduc |   1.264522   .2337751     5.41   0.000     .8063315    1.722713 
       emp2011 |  -.8877192   .1677239    -5.29   0.000    -1.216452   -.5589864 
        hhsize |  -.1671686   .0365646    -4.57   0.000    -.2388339   -.0955034 
     hhsizegen |   .0217715   .0555829     0.39   0.695    -.0871689    .1307119 
       ferizaj |   1.579255   .2946838     5.36   0.000     1.001686    2.156825 
       gjakova |   1.529028   .2976047     5.14   0.000     .9457336    2.112323 
       gjilani |   2.320191    .289253     8.02   0.000     1.753265    2.887116 
     mitrovica |   1.828277   .2904867     6.29   0.000     1.258933     2.39762 
          peja |   1.163869   .2864361     4.06   0.000     .6024641    1.725273 
      prizreni |   1.235643   .3145016     3.93   0.000     .6192306    1.852054 
         _cons |  -20.92444   3.506563    -5.97   0.000    -27.79718    -14.0517 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME3           | 
           age |   1.979701   .4019656     4.93   0.000     1.191863    2.767539 
         agesq |  -.0374467    .007472    -5.01   0.000    -.0520915    -.022802 
          male |  -1.824051   .4473795    -4.08   0.000    -2.700898    -.947203 
      minority |  -.0890958   .3342492    -0.27   0.790    -.7442123    .5660206 
  socialassist |    2.49236    .394361     6.32   0.000     1.719427    3.265294 
 secondaryeduc |  -.4864627   .2748068    -1.77   0.077    -1.025074    .0521488 
  tertiaryeduc |    .393309    .273296     1.44   0.150    -.1423414    .9289594 
       emp2011 |  -.8624769   .2057616    -4.19   0.000    -1.265762   -.4591917 
        hhsize |  -.2534561   .0544834    -4.65   0.000    -.3602417   -.1466705 
     hhsizegen |   .1634357   .0677831     2.41   0.016     .0305832    .2962882 
       ferizaj |    .148274   .2914652     0.51   0.611    -.4229873    .7195353 
       gjakova |  -.8398084   .4075449    -2.06   0.039    -1.638582    -.041035 
       gjilani |   1.220565   .2435454     5.01   0.000     .7432244    1.697905 
     mitrovica |  -.5330993   .3927957    -1.36   0.175    -1.302965    .2367662 
          peja |  -1.063046   .3837402    -2.77   0.006    -1.815163    -.310929 
      prizreni |   .0140902   .3109107     0.05   0.964    -.5952835     .623464 
         _cons |  -26.63742   5.360814    -4.97   0.000    -37.14442   -16.13042 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
*** Balancing diagnostics  
 
. tebalance sum 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                 Observations       
                               Treatment           Raw     Weighted 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                          0bn.multitr~t =        6,906      1,901.9 
                          1.multitrea~t =          470      1,959.0 
                          2.multitrea~t =          241      1,951.1 
                          3.multitrea~t =          136      1,940.9 
                          Total         =        7,753      7,753.0 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw    Weighted           Raw   Weighted 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  1.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.6269269   -.0389111      .3221864   .9565371 
            agesq |  -.6869872   -.0404997      .2738164   .9746485 
             male |  -.4450008    .0051839      1.321906   .9991708 
         minority |   .0052393    .0013714      1.021027     1.0049 
     socialassist |   .3428648     .124423      6.827683   1.548222 
    secondaryeduc |  -.4696964    .0094012       1.02591   1.004009 
     tertiaryeduc |   .6244724   -.0264873      1.899256   .9922846 
          emp2011 |  -.4831847    -.004493      .9244103   .9970294 
           hhsize |  -.4328879   -.0170643      .3461522   .8874219 
        hhsizegen |  -.5568747   -.0079624      .5330855   .9636638 
          ferizaj |  -.0306483    .0180038      .9316378   1.045925 
          gjakova |   .0687207   -.0175528       1.16296   .9657325 
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          gjilani |   .4292703    .0205999      2.780606   1.031008 
        mitrovica |   .1178972   -.0261339      1.334737   .9467408 
             peja |  -.0830119   -.0036363      .8265375   .9909039 
         prizreni |  -.0032518    .0084815      .9960333   1.015833 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  2.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.5756687   -.0302419      .3526933   .8810271 
            agesq |  -.6322685   -.0371779      .3161966   .9099084 
             male |  -.4294723    .0230807      1.321162   .9959539 
         minority |    .078628    .0018004       1.30295   1.006441 
     socialassist |   .4499272    .1460166      9.517168    1.65164 
    secondaryeduc |  -.4066554    .0066291      1.050123   1.002842 
     tertiaryeduc |   .6102409   -.0348289      1.895007     .98958 
          emp2011 |   -.573383    .0112631      .8684703   1.007236 
           hhsize |  -.4703471   -.0625769      .3897204   .9827943 
        hhsizegen |  -.5477794    -.008632      .5800314   1.026098 
          ferizaj |   .0779458   -.0040152      1.185588   .9897935 
          gjakova |   .0702349   -.0061039      1.168982   .9880772 
          gjilani |   .4113551    .0474671      2.713313    1.07084 
        mitrovica |   .2067901   -.0223583      1.594995   .9544265 
             peja |   .0507065    .0238161      1.112635    1.05981 
         prizreni |  -.1745717    -.035644      .6845422   .9332364 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  3.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.5874766   -.0296457      .2839457   1.005488 
            agesq |  -.6574538   -.0280253      .2399639   1.067238 
             male |  -.5770215    .1272245      1.335005   .9649316 
         minority |   .0709291   -.0288807       1.27692   .8984358 
     socialassist |   .3115719    .1221867       6.14469   1.537644 
    secondaryeduc |  -.3928189    .0399179      1.057358   1.015899 
     tertiaryeduc |   .4754033    -.106945      1.788427   .9607291 
          emp2011 |  -.4921984   -.0572278      .9235891   .9597447 
           hhsize |  -.4971539   -.0202623      .3182613   .8647128 
        hhsizegen |   -.605161    .1097637      .5796272   1.020864 
          ferizaj |   .0290471    .0216465      1.074949    1.05527 
          gjakova |  -.2503322    .0075024      .4612281   1.014623 
          gjilani |   .5480294    .0069959      3.261717   1.010569 
        mitrovica |  -.1407073   -.0923244      .6399687   .8130044 
             peja |  -.2319707    .0323926      .5307899    1.08149 
         prizreni |  -.1079457     .017153      .8079007   1.032017 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table A6.2.3 RA  
*** Binary treatment model  
 
. teffects ra (employed age agesq male minority socialassist secondaryeduc 
tertiaryeduc emp2011 hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja prizreni, 
logit) (bintreatment) if insampm==1, atet vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  7.882e-24   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  1.455e-33   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: none 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
401 
 
     employed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
 bintreatment | 
    (1 vs 0)  |   .0754428   .0165533     4.56   0.000     .0429989    .1078867 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
 bintreatment | 
           0  |   .3342384   .0157554    21.21   0.000     .3033585    .3651183 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0          | 
          age |   .1739483   .1384529     1.26   0.209    -.0974144    .4453109 
        agesq |  -.0016824   .0023459    -0.72   0.473    -.0062803    .0029154 
         male |   .4312049   .3242473     1.33   0.184    -.2043081    1.066718 
     minority |   .0725496    .341229     0.21   0.832     -.596247    .7413461 
 socialassist |   1.101173   .5870512     1.88   0.061    -.0494262    2.251772 
secondaryeduc |    .565752   .1956808     2.89   0.004     .1822246    .9492794 
 tertiaryeduc |   1.002006   .2889504     3.47   0.001     .4356737    1.568339 
      emp2011 |   7.507091   .1921049    39.08   0.000     7.130573     7.88361 
       hhsize |   .0548388   .0272224     2.01   0.044     .0014839    .1081937 
    hhsizegen |  -.0604394   .0338882    -1.78   0.075    -.1268591    .0059804 
      ferizaj |  -.8505879   .2939916    -2.89   0.004    -1.426801   -.2743749 
      gjakova |  -.5909916   .2156204    -2.74   0.006      -1.0136   -.1683834 
      gjilani |  -.3466467   .3338538    -1.04   0.299    -1.000988    .3076948 
    mitrovica |   .0003534   .2824008     0.00   0.999     -.553142    .5538488 
         peja |  -.9984065   .2782186    -3.59   0.000    -1.543705   -.4531081 
     prizreni |  -.3955839   .2642355    -1.50   0.134     -.913476    .1223081 
        _cons |  -8.104945   1.983933    -4.09   0.000    -11.99338   -4.216507 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1          | 
          age |   .5014897    .270826     1.85   0.064    -.0293195    1.032299 
        agesq |  -.0081754   .0049658    -1.65   0.100    -.0179082    .0015575 
         male |  -.1344847   .4492491    -0.30   0.765    -1.014997    .7460273 
     minority |  -.5419511   .3303748    -1.64   0.101    -1.189474    .1055715 
 socialassist |  -.4340609    .368882    -1.18   0.239    -1.157056    .2889345 
secondaryeduc |  -.0305491   .2538747    -0.12   0.904    -.5281342    .4670361 
 tertiaryeduc |   .6810658   .2561136     2.66   0.008     .1790924    1.183039 
      emp2011 |   2.520389   .1906286    13.22   0.000     2.146764    2.894014 
       hhsize |  -.0771316   .0577986    -1.33   0.182    -.1904148    .0361515 
    hhsizegen |   .1069022   .0701897     1.52   0.128    -.0306671    .2444716 
      ferizaj |  -.6781667   .3489586    -1.94   0.052    -1.362113    .0057796 
      gjakova |  -.2724553   .2991633    -0.91   0.362    -.8588047    .3138941 
      gjilani |  -.3299047   .2685538    -1.23   0.219    -.8562605    .1964511 
    mitrovica |  -.9772652   .3645494    -2.68   0.007    -1.691769   -.2627615 
         peja |   .6604484   .3134478     2.11   0.035     .0461019    1.274795 
     prizreni |  -.3979773   .3296818    -1.21   0.227    -1.044142    .2481871 
        _cons |  -8.453706   3.674403    -2.30   0.021     -15.6554   -1.252007 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
*** Multinomial probit probit treatment model  
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. teffects ra (employed age agesq male minority socialassist secondaryeduc 
tertiaryeduc emp2011 hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja prizreni, 
logit) (multitreatment) if insampm==1, atet vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  1.196e-22   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  1.463e-33   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: none 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |               Robust 
      employed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET           | 
multitreatment | 
     (1 vs 0)  |   .1013386   .0237429     4.27   0.000     .0548033    .1478739 
     (2 vs 0)  |   .0811349   .0297426     2.73   0.006     .0228404    .1394294 
     (3 vs 0)  |  -.0345264   .0370209    -0.93   0.351     -.107086    .0380332 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean         | 
multitreatment | 
            0  |   .3454699   .0210372    16.42   0.000     .3042378     .386702 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0           | 
           age |   .1739483   .1384529     1.26   0.209    -.0974144    .4453109 
         agesq |  -.0016824   .0023459    -0.72   0.473    -.0062803    .0029154 
          male |   .4312049   .3242473     1.33   0.184    -.2043081    1.066718 
      minority |   .0725496    .341229     0.21   0.832     -.596247    .7413461 
  socialassist |   1.101173   .5870512     1.88   0.061    -.0494262    2.251772 
 secondaryeduc |    .565752   .1956808     2.89   0.004     .1822246    .9492794 
  tertiaryeduc |   1.002006   .2889504     3.47   0.001     .4356737    1.568339 
       emp2011 |   7.507091   .1921049    39.08   0.000     7.130573     7.88361 
        hhsize |   .0548388   .0272224     2.01   0.044     .0014839    .1081937 
     hhsizegen |  -.0604394   .0338882    -1.78   0.075    -.1268591    .0059804 
       ferizaj |  -.8505879   .2939916    -2.89   0.004    -1.426801   -.2743749 
       gjakova |  -.5909916   .2156204    -2.74   0.006      -1.0136   -.1683834 
       gjilani |  -.3466467   .3338538    -1.04   0.299    -1.000988    .3076948 
     mitrovica |   .0003534   .2824008     0.00   0.999     -.553142    .5538488 
          peja |  -.9984065   .2782186    -3.59   0.000    -1.543705   -.4531081 
      prizreni |  -.3955839   .2642355    -1.50   0.134     -.913476    .1223081 
         _cons |  -8.104945   1.983933    -4.09   0.000    -11.99338   -4.216507 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1           | 
           age |   .9045607   .3653916     2.48   0.013     .1884064    1.620715 
         agesq |  -.0152479   .0067114    -2.27   0.023    -.0284021   -.0020938 
          male |  -.5726078   .6330777    -0.90   0.366    -1.813417    .6682017 
      minority |    -.50035   .5095082    -0.98   0.326    -1.498968    .4982676 
  socialassist |  -.5613401    .547356    -1.03   0.305    -1.634138    .5114579 
 secondaryeduc |    .151391   .3519244     0.43   0.667    -.5383681    .8411501 
  tertiaryeduc |   .9169005   .3540227     2.59   0.010     .2230288    1.610772 
       emp2011 |   2.222583   .2565311     8.66   0.000     1.719791    2.725375 
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        hhsize |  -.0710066    .076656    -0.93   0.354    -.2212496    .0792364 
     hhsizegen |   .1610572   .0988294     1.63   0.103     -.032645    .3547593 
       ferizaj |  -.9482069   .4926257    -1.92   0.054    -1.913736    .0173217 
       gjakova |  -.1875847   .3944766    -0.48   0.634    -.9607446    .5855752 
       gjilani |  -.6400604   .3812018    -1.68   0.093    -1.387202    .1070813 
     mitrovica |  -1.010493   .4877512    -2.07   0.038    -1.966468   -.0545181 
          peja |   .9499454   .4528238     2.10   0.036     .0624271    1.837464 
      prizreni |  -.5466719   .4146967    -1.32   0.187    -1.359463    .2661187 
         _cons |  -13.89721   4.983012    -2.79   0.005    -23.66373   -4.130684 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME2           | 
           age |   .3050504   .4251022     0.72   0.473    -.5281347    1.138235 
         agesq |  -.0055252   .0074743    -0.74   0.460    -.0201746    .0091242 
          male |   .4715506   .8520853     0.55   0.580    -1.198506    2.141607 
      minority |  -.7893973   .6900379    -1.14   0.253    -2.141847     .563052 
  socialassist |  -.2693546   .5309975    -0.51   0.612    -1.310091    .7713813 
 secondaryeduc |  -.8728817   .4568688    -1.91   0.056    -1.768328    .0225647 
  tertiaryeduc |  -.1017518    .460685    -0.22   0.825    -1.004678    .8011741 
       emp2011 |   2.871955   .3951667     7.27   0.000     2.097442    3.646467 
        hhsize |   -.080814   .1143602    -0.71   0.480    -.3049559    .1433279 
     hhsizegen |   .0955063   .1337495     0.71   0.475    -.1666379    .3576505 
       ferizaj |  -1.307936   .8520808    -1.53   0.125    -2.977983    .3621121 
       gjakova |  -1.629053   .7910716    -2.06   0.039    -3.179525   -.0785814 
       gjilani |  -1.105803   .7261535    -1.52   0.128    -2.529038    .3174316 
     mitrovica |   -1.75528   .8068848    -2.18   0.030    -3.336745   -.1738143 
          peja |    -.59098   .7615134    -0.78   0.438    -2.083519    .9015589 
      prizreni |  -1.174985   .8712466    -1.35   0.177    -2.882597    .5326273 
         _cons |  -3.999873   5.960206    -0.67   0.502    -15.68166    7.681916 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME3           | 
           age |  -.4811639   1.006041    -0.48   0.632    -2.452968    1.490641 
         agesq |   .0104985   .0189708     0.55   0.580    -.0266835    .0476806 
          male |  -1.729743   1.863676    -0.93   0.353    -5.382481    1.922995 
      minority |  -1.619945    1.63731    -0.99   0.322    -4.829014    1.589125 
  socialassist |  -1.223795   4.182051    -0.29   0.770    -9.420465    6.972875 
 secondaryeduc |   1.243717   .7898034     1.57   0.115     -.304269    2.791703 
  tertiaryeduc |   1.185714   .8366557     1.42   0.156    -.4541012    2.825529 
       emp2011 |   4.666074   .9318401     5.01   0.000     2.839701    6.492447 
        hhsize |  -.3329732   .1886001    -1.77   0.077    -.7026225    .0366761 
     hhsizegen |   .1765113   .2987702     0.59   0.555    -.4090675    .7620902 
       ferizaj |  -.3879032   .7821124    -0.50   0.620    -1.920815    1.145009 
       gjakova |   1.069933   1.129233     0.95   0.343    -1.143323    3.283189 
       gjilani |   .8194994   .8319558     0.99   0.325    -.8111041    2.450103 
     mitrovica |  -2.852956   1.052288    -2.71   0.007    -4.915404   -.7905091 
          peja |  -1.517402   1.247406    -1.22   0.224    -3.962272    .9274685 
      prizreni |   .7599637   1.538918     0.49   0.621     -2.25626    3.776187 
         _cons |   3.603758   13.04108     0.28   0.782    -21.95629     29.1638 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table A6.2.4 IPWRA  
*** Binary treatment model 
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. teffects ipwra (employed age agesq male minority socialassist secondaryeduc 
tertiaryeduc emp2011 hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja prizreni, 
logit) (bintreatment age agesq male minority socialassist secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc 
emp2011 hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja prizren ) if 
insampm==1, atet vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  1.153e-23   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  8.681e-32   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : IPW regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: logit 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     employed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
 bintreatment | 
    (1 vs 0)  |   .0805836   .0164736     4.89   0.000     .0482959    .1128712 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
 bintreatment | 
           0  |   .3290976   .0157353    20.91   0.000     .2982571    .3599382 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0          | 
          age |  -.2262621   .4341884    -0.52   0.602    -1.077256    .6247315 
        agesq |   .0055272   .0081847     0.68   0.499    -.0105145     .021569 
         male |   .5588442   .6182347     0.90   0.366    -.6528736    1.770562 
     minority |  -.2106421   .4040391    -0.52   0.602    -1.002544    .5812599 
 socialassist |   .8294192   .9685587     0.86   0.392    -1.068921    2.727759 
secondaryeduc |   .6463209   .4631962     1.40   0.163     -.261527    1.554169 
 tertiaryeduc |   .8491812   .5496118     1.55   0.122    -.2280382      1.9264 
      emp2011 |   7.810324   .3298494    23.68   0.000     7.163831    8.456817 
       hhsize |   .0590892   .0715206     0.83   0.409    -.0810886     .199267 
    hhsizegen |  -.0153849   .0808653    -0.19   0.849     -.173878    .1431082 
      ferizaj |  -1.268089   .7435662    -1.71   0.088    -2.725452    .1892736 
      gjakova |  -1.287125   .5570029    -2.31   0.021    -2.378831   -.1954195 
      gjilani |  -.6878748   .4624748    -1.49   0.137    -1.594309    .2185591 
    mitrovica |   -.320406   .4421026    -0.72   0.469    -1.186911    .5460991 
         peja |  -.3413098   .8454592    -0.40   0.686    -1.998379     1.31576 
     prizreni |   -1.05728   .5670165    -1.86   0.062    -2.168612    .0540522 
        _cons |  -2.893375   5.214786    -0.55   0.579    -13.11417    7.327417 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1          | 
          age |   .5014897    .270826     1.85   0.064    -.0293195    1.032299 
        agesq |  -.0081754   .0049658    -1.65   0.100    -.0179082    .0015575 
         male |  -.1344847   .4492491    -0.30   0.765    -1.014997    .7460273 
     minority |  -.5419511   .3303748    -1.64   0.101    -1.189474    .1055715 
 socialassist |  -.4340609    .368882    -1.18   0.239    -1.157056    .2889345 
secondaryeduc |  -.0305491   .2538747    -0.12   0.904    -.5281342    .4670361 
 tertiaryeduc |   .6810658   .2561136     2.66   0.008     .1790924    1.183039 
405 
 
      emp2011 |   2.520389   .1906286    13.22   0.000     2.146764    2.894014 
       hhsize |  -.0771316   .0577986    -1.33   0.182    -.1904148    .0361515 
    hhsizegen |   .1069022   .0701897     1.52   0.128    -.0306671    .2444716 
      ferizaj |  -.6781667   .3489586    -1.94   0.052    -1.362113    .0057796 
      gjakova |  -.2724553   .2991633    -0.91   0.362    -.8588047    .3138941 
      gjilani |  -.3299047   .2685538    -1.23   0.219    -.8562605    .1964511 
    mitrovica |  -.9772652   .3645494    -2.68   0.007    -1.691769   -.2627615 
         peja |   .6604484   .3134478     2.11   0.035     .0461019    1.274795 
     prizreni |  -.3979773   .3296818    -1.21   0.227    -1.044142    .2481871 
        _cons |  -8.453706   3.674403    -2.30   0.021     -15.6554   -1.252007 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1          | 
          age |   1.529679   .1520654    10.06   0.000     1.231637    1.827722 
        agesq |  -.0293802   .0028491   -10.31   0.000    -.0349643   -.0237961 
         male |  -.8143384   .2115076    -3.85   0.000    -1.228886    -.399791 
     minority |   -.117641   .1887696    -0.62   0.533    -.4876227    .2523406 
 socialassist |   2.898167   .2258356    12.83   0.000     2.455537    3.340797 
secondaryeduc |  -.2218473   .1213679    -1.83   0.068    -.4597239    .0160294 
 tertiaryeduc |    .967574   .1272537     7.60   0.000     .7181613    1.216987 
      emp2011 |   -.815216   .0962615    -8.47   0.000    -1.003885   -.6265469 
       hhsize |  -.1566946    .023219    -6.75   0.000    -.2022031   -.1111862 
    hhsizegen |   .0261437   .0305012     0.86   0.391    -.0336375    .0859249 
      ferizaj |   .8376426   .1531923     5.47   0.000     .5373912    1.137894 
      gjakova |   .8286225    .153645     5.39   0.000     .5274839    1.129761 
      gjilani |   1.826747   .1465489    12.47   0.000     1.539517    2.113978 
    mitrovica |   1.021507   .1600413     6.38   0.000     .7078318    1.335182 
         peja |   .2845783   .1530052     1.86   0.063    -.0153063     .584463 
     prizreni |   .9107659   .1476721     6.17   0.000     .6213338    1.200198 
        _cons |  -20.44219   2.004136   -10.20   0.000    -24.37022   -16.51416 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
*** Multinomial probit treatment model  
 
. teffects ipwra (   employed age agesq male minority socialassist secondaryeduc 
tertiaryeduc emp2011 hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja prizreni, 
logit) (multitreatment age agesq male minority socialassist secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc 
emp2011 hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja prizren ) if 
insampm==1, atet vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  6.376e-24   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  1.872e-31   
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : IPW regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: (multinomial) logit 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |               Robust 
      employed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET           | 
multitreatment | 
     (1 vs 0)  |   .1063634   .0236892     4.49   0.000     .0599334    .1527935 
406 
 
     (2 vs 0)  |   .0830785   .0292299     2.84   0.004      .025789     .140368 
     (3 vs 0)  |  -.0442443   .0345548    -1.28   0.200    -.1119704    .0234819 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean         | 
multitreatment | 
            0  |   .3404451   .0210635    16.16   0.000     .2991613    .3817288 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0           | 
           age |  -.2904645   .3972418    -0.73   0.465    -1.069044    .4881151 
         agesq |   .0068103    .007504     0.91   0.364    -.0078974     .021518 
          male |   .4819534   .6193396     0.78   0.436    -.7319299    1.695837 
      minority |  -.2310351   .4025864    -0.57   0.566     -1.02009    .5580197 
  socialassist |    .756079   .9807899     0.77   0.441    -1.166234    2.678392 
 secondaryeduc |    .740045   .4250841     1.74   0.082    -.0931045    1.573195 
  tertiaryeduc |   .9320518   .5306001     1.76   0.079    -.1079053    1.972009 
       emp2011 |   7.877888   .3341251    23.58   0.000     7.223015    8.532762 
        hhsize |   .0565099   .0659018     0.86   0.391    -.0726553    .1856751 
     hhsizegen |  -.0103306   .0776207    -0.13   0.894    -.1624645    .1418033 
       ferizaj |  -1.336282   .7586819    -1.76   0.078    -2.823271     .150707 
       gjakova |  -1.223612   .5595416    -2.19   0.029    -2.320293   -.1269307 
       gjilani |  -.7280765   .4769634    -1.53   0.127    -1.662908    .2067545 
     mitrovica |  -.3177137   .4614019    -0.69   0.491    -1.222045    .5866174 
          peja |  -.2405535   .8501725    -0.28   0.777    -1.906861    1.425754 
      prizreni |  -1.087353   .5825042    -1.87   0.062     -2.22904    .0543347 
         _cons |  -2.168215   4.761691    -0.46   0.649    -11.50096    7.164528 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1           | 
           age |   .9045607   .3653916     2.48   0.013     .1884064    1.620715 
         agesq |  -.0152479   .0067114    -2.27   0.023    -.0284021   -.0020938 
          male |  -.5726078   .6330777    -0.90   0.366    -1.813417    .6682017 
      minority |    -.50035   .5095082    -0.98   0.326    -1.498968    .4982676 
  socialassist |  -.5613401    .547356    -1.03   0.305    -1.634138    .5114579 
 secondaryeduc |    .151391   .3519244     0.43   0.667    -.5383681    .8411501 
  tertiaryeduc |   .9169005   .3540227     2.59   0.010     .2230288    1.610772 
       emp2011 |   2.222583   .2565311     8.66   0.000     1.719791    2.725375 
        hhsize |  -.0710066    .076656    -0.93   0.354    -.2212496    .0792364 
     hhsizegen |   .1610572   .0988294     1.63   0.103     -.032645    .3547593 
       ferizaj |  -.9482069   .4926257    -1.92   0.054    -1.913736    .0173217 
       gjakova |  -.1875847   .3944766    -0.48   0.634    -.9607446    .5855752 
       gjilani |  -.6400604   .3812018    -1.68   0.093    -1.387202    .1070813 
     mitrovica |  -1.010493   .4877512    -2.07   0.038    -1.966468   -.0545181 
          peja |   .9499454   .4528238     2.10   0.036     .0624271    1.837464 
      prizreni |  -.5466719   .4146967    -1.32   0.187    -1.359463    .2661187 
         _cons |  -13.89721   4.983012    -2.79   0.005    -23.66373   -4.130684 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME2           | 
           age |   .2776937   .4982021     0.56   0.577    -.6987645    1.254152 
         agesq |  -.0048634   .0090429    -0.54   0.591    -.0225871    .0128604 
          male |    .826246   .8859974     0.93   0.351     -.910277    2.562769 
      minority |   -.647995   .7979432    -0.81   0.417    -2.211935     .915945 
  socialassist |   -.302681   .5308647    -0.57   0.569    -1.343157    .7377947 
 secondaryeduc |  -.9862897   .4627274    -2.13   0.033    -1.893219   -.0793607 
  tertiaryeduc |  -.2368137   .4777363    -0.50   0.620     -1.17316    .6995321 
407 
 
       emp2011 |   2.856388   .4201064     6.80   0.000     2.032995    3.679782 
        hhsize |  -.0790102   .1118083    -0.71   0.480    -.2981505    .1401301 
     hhsizegen |   .0791055   .1338036     0.59   0.554    -.1831446    .3413557 
       ferizaj |   -1.00536   .8289143    -1.21   0.225    -2.630002    .6192819 
       gjakova |  -1.397607   .7781177    -1.80   0.072    -2.922689    .1274757 
       gjilani |  -.7843113   .7119811    -1.10   0.271    -2.179769     .611146 
     mitrovica |  -1.489404   .7969223    -1.87   0.062    -3.051343    .0725352 
          peja |  -.3405993   .7440961    -0.46   0.647    -1.799001    1.117802 
      prizreni |  -.8852856   .8457887    -1.05   0.295    -2.543001    .7724298 
         _cons |  -4.060629   6.749413    -0.60   0.547    -17.28923    9.167976 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME3           | 
           age |  -.6159187   .9352814    -0.66   0.510    -2.449036    1.217199 
         agesq |   .0143873   .0176043     0.82   0.414    -.0201165    .0488912 
          male |    -1.4357   2.102815    -0.68   0.495    -5.557142    2.685742 
      minority |  -1.650699   1.076011    -1.53   0.125    -3.759642    .4582449 
  socialassist |  -4.203331   4.541444    -0.93   0.355     -13.1044    4.697735 
 secondaryeduc |   1.245403   .7597816     1.64   0.101    -.2437411    2.734548 
  tertiaryeduc |   1.409617   .8831028     1.60   0.110    -.3212325    3.140467 
       emp2011 |   4.501698   1.111401     4.05   0.000     2.323393    6.680003 
        hhsize |  -.4748813   .2199765    -2.16   0.031    -.9060274   -.0437353 
     hhsizegen |    .167488   .3268997     0.51   0.608    -.4732236    .8081997 
       ferizaj |  -.1171851   .9449948    -0.12   0.901    -1.969341    1.734971 
       gjakova |    .680064   1.181365     0.58   0.565    -1.635368    2.995496 
       gjilani |   .7284944    .889441     0.82   0.413    -1.014778    2.471767 
     mitrovica |  -3.240155   1.047393    -3.09   0.002    -5.293006   -1.187303 
          peja |  -1.199277   1.039999    -1.15   0.249    -3.237637    .8390831 
      prizreni |   .5166203   1.970444     0.26   0.793    -3.345379     4.37862 
         _cons |   5.202919   11.74923     0.44   0.658    -17.82514    28.23098 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1           | 
           age |   1.488677   .1806225     8.24   0.000     1.134663     1.84269 
         agesq |  -.0288241   .0033858    -8.51   0.000    -.0354602    -.022188 
          male |  -.5852999   .2593222    -2.26   0.024    -1.093562   -.0770378 
      minority |  -.2005106   .2352003    -0.85   0.394    -.6614948    .2604736 
  socialassist |   2.858397   .2596356    11.01   0.000      2.34952    3.367273 
 secondaryeduc |  -.2658465   .1522796    -1.75   0.081     -.564309    .0326161 
  tertiaryeduc |   .9955244    .155405     6.41   0.000     .6909361    1.300113 
       emp2011 |  -.7686188   .1200859    -6.40   0.000    -1.003983   -.5332547 
        hhsize |  -.1273163   .0280696    -4.54   0.000    -.1823317   -.0723008 
     hhsizegen |  -.0075608     .03714    -0.20   0.839    -.0803539    .0652323 
       ferizaj |   .8305248   .2003134     4.15   0.000     .4379177    1.223132 
       gjakova |   1.036952   .1953685     5.31   0.000     .6540371    1.419868 
       gjilani |   1.927927    .186489    10.34   0.000     1.562415    2.293438 
     mitrovica |    1.15678   .2026307     5.71   0.000      .759631    1.553929 
          peja |   .3477453   .2019948     1.72   0.085    -.0481572    .7436478 
      prizreni |   1.157398   .1882848     6.15   0.000     .7883668     1.52643 
         _cons |    -20.647   2.384039    -8.66   0.000    -25.31963   -15.97437 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME2           | 
           age |   1.398609   .2665012     5.25   0.000     .8762767    1.920942 
         agesq |  -.0267274   .0049928    -5.35   0.000    -.0365131   -.0169417 
          male |  -.7163576   .3709546    -1.93   0.053    -1.443415       .0107 
408 
 
      minority |   .0143413   .2935359     0.05   0.961    -.5609785    .5896612 
  socialassist |   3.159174   .2977953    10.61   0.000     2.575506    3.742842 
 secondaryeduc |   .0464099   .2216867     0.21   0.834     -.388088    .4809078 
  tertiaryeduc |   1.264522   .2337751     5.41   0.000     .8063315    1.722713 
       emp2011 |  -.8877192   .1677239    -5.29   0.000    -1.216452   -.5589864 
        hhsize |  -.1671686   .0365646    -4.57   0.000    -.2388339   -.0955034 
     hhsizegen |   .0217715   .0555829     0.39   0.695    -.0871689    .1307119 
       ferizaj |   1.579255   .2946838     5.36   0.000     1.001686    2.156825 
       gjakova |   1.529028   .2976047     5.14   0.000     .9457336    2.112323 
       gjilani |   2.320191    .289253     8.02   0.000     1.753265    2.887116 
     mitrovica |   1.828277   .2904867     6.29   0.000     1.258933     2.39762 
          peja |   1.163869   .2864361     4.06   0.000     .6024641    1.725273 
      prizreni |   1.235643   .3145016     3.93   0.000     .6192306    1.852054 
         _cons |  -20.92444   3.506563    -5.97   0.000    -27.79718    -14.0517 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME3           | 
           age |   1.979701   .4019656     4.93   0.000     1.191863    2.767539 
         agesq |  -.0374467    .007472    -5.01   0.000    -.0520915    -.022802 
          male |  -1.824051   .4473795    -4.08   0.000    -2.700898    -.947203 
      minority |  -.0890958   .3342492    -0.27   0.790    -.7442123    .5660206 
  socialassist |    2.49236    .394361     6.32   0.000     1.719427    3.265294 
 secondaryeduc |  -.4864627   .2748068    -1.77   0.077    -1.025074    .0521488 
  tertiaryeduc |    .393309    .273296     1.44   0.150    -.1423414    .9289594 
       emp2011 |  -.8624769   .2057616    -4.19   0.000    -1.265762   -.4591917 
        hhsize |  -.2534561   .0544834    -4.65   0.000    -.3602417   -.1466705 
     hhsizegen |   .1634357   .0677831     2.41   0.016     .0305832    .2962882 
       ferizaj |    .148274   .2914652     0.51   0.611    -.4229873    .7195353 
       gjakova |  -.8398084   .4075449    -2.06   0.039    -1.638582    -.041035 
       gjilani |   1.220565   .2435454     5.01   0.000     .7432244    1.697905 
     mitrovica |  -.5330993   .3927957    -1.36   0.175    -1.302965    .2367662 
          peja |  -1.063046   .3837402    -2.77   0.006    -1.815163    -.310929 
      prizreni |   .0140902   .3109107     0.05   0.964    -.5952835     .623464 
         _cons |  -26.63742   5.360814    -4.97   0.000    -37.14442   -16.13042 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 6.3 Outcome Variable: employed – Model 3, excluding 
emphist and emp2011 
Table A6.3.1 PSM  
*** Binary treatment model  
 
  
. teffects psmatch (employed) (bintreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc  hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja 
prizren ) if insampm==1, atet vce(robust) 
 
Treatment-effects estimation                   Number of obs      =      7,753 
Estimator      : propensity-score matching     Matches: requested =          1 
Outcome model  : matching                                     min =          1 
Treatment model: logit                                        max =         16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              AI Robust 
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    employed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET         | 
bintreatment | 
   (1 vs 0)  |  -.1201402   .0274427    -4.38   0.000    -.1739269   -.0663535 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. tebalance sum 
note: refitting the model using the generate() option 
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                   Raw      Matched 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                          Number of obs =        7,753        1,694 
                          Treated obs   =          847          847 
                          Control obs   =        6,906          847 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw     Matched           Raw    Matched 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
              age |  -.6060234   -.0560202      .3243216   1.032325 
            agesq |  -.6665971   -.0516844      .2800718   1.027513 
             male |  -.4618398    .0590598      1.323737   .9958181 
         minority |   .0377737    .0625463       1.14086   1.250156 
     socialassist |   .3709548    .2393765       7.49496   2.528539 
    secondaryeduc |  -.4394493    .0192129      1.036461   1.007279 
     tertiaryeduc |   .5968176   -.1547271      1.880529   .9673542 
           hhsize |   -.453916    .0715541      .3536742   .8875756 
        hhsizegen |  -.5622479    .0385221      .5529141   .9956847 
          ferizaj |   .0111471    .0399729      1.026757   1.098258 
          gjakova |   .0257213    .0431534       1.06098   1.104466 
          gjilani |   .4442438   -.0370242      2.838404   .9511813 
        mitrovica |   .1091392    .0035033      1.308213   1.007722 
             peja |  -.0639643   -.0255434      .8656221   .9414794 
         prizreni |  -.0658709   -.0367838      .8802186   .9287426 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Table A6.3.2 IPW  
. *** Binary treatment model  
 
. teffects ipw (employed) (bintreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc  hhsize hhs 
> izegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja prizren ) if insampm==1, atet 
vce(robust) aequ  
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  1.009e-23   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  3.061e-32   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : inverse-probability weights 
Outcome model  : weighted mean 
Treatment model: logit 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
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     employed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
 bintreatment | 
    (1 vs 0)  |  -.0791602   .0212052    -3.73   0.000    -.1207216   -.0375987 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
 bintreatment | 
           0  |   .4888414   .0142626    34.27   0.000     .4608871    .5167956 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1          | 
          age |   1.489746   .1510649     9.86   0.000     1.193664    1.785828 
        agesq |  -.0290606   .0028341   -10.25   0.000    -.0346153   -.0235059 
         male |  -.9042557    .209688    -4.31   0.000    -1.315237   -.4932748 
     minority |  -.0438336   .1833028    -0.24   0.811    -.4031005    .3154332 
 socialassist |   3.109302   .2212496    14.05   0.000      2.67566    3.542943 
secondaryeduc |  -.3147433    .118473    -2.66   0.008    -.5469462   -.0825404 
 tertiaryeduc |   .8323472   .1235364     6.74   0.000     .5902204    1.074474 
       hhsize |  -.1567485   .0230038    -6.81   0.000    -.2018351    -.111662 
    hhsizegen |   .0265874   .0301634     0.88   0.378    -.0325317    .0857065 
      ferizaj |   .8335969   .1508638     5.53   0.000     .5379093    1.129285 
      gjakova |   .9042148   .1490287     6.07   0.000      .612124    1.196306 
      gjilani |   1.832649   .1431117    12.81   0.000     1.552155    2.113142 
    mitrovica |   1.113014    .158378     7.03   0.000     .8025985    1.423429 
         peja |    .511612   .1512205     3.38   0.001     .2152254    .8079987 
     prizreni |   .8182876   .1460099     5.60   0.000     .5321135    1.104462 
        _cons |  -19.86672   1.987935    -9.99   0.000      -23.763   -15.97044 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
*** Balancing diagnostics  
 
 
. tebalance sum 
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                   Raw     Weighted 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                          Number of obs =        7,753      7,753.0 
                          Treated obs   =          847      3,946.7 
                          Control obs   =        6,906      3,806.3 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw    Weighted           Raw   Weighted 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
              age |  -.6060234   -.0475656      .3243216   .9581938 
            agesq |  -.6665971   -.0487129      .2800718   .9868389 
             male |  -.4618398     .002955      1.323737   .9996149 
         minority |   .0377737     .020367       1.14086    1.07147 
     socialassist |   .3709548    .1592337       7.49496   1.722564 
    secondaryeduc |  -.4394493    .0089127      1.036461   1.003264 
     tertiaryeduc |   .5968176   -.0343847      1.880529   .9884746 
           hhsize |   -.453916   -.0079835      .3536742   .9402526 
        hhsizegen |  -.5622479   -.0072016      .5529141   .9931567 
          ferizaj |   .0111471    .0257461      1.026757   1.061253 
          gjakova |   .0257213   -.0029112       1.06098   .9936182 
          gjilani |   .4442438    .0212012      2.838404    1.03094 
        mitrovica |   .1091392   -.0225392      1.308213   .9529385 
             peja |  -.0639643   -.0171653      .8656221   .9599668 
         prizreni |  -.0658709   -.0128522      .8802186   .9739011 
411 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
*** Multinomial probit treatment model  
 
 
. teffects ipw (   employed) (multitreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc  hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja 
prizren ) if insampm==1, atet vce(robust) aequ  
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  2.160e-25   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  3.282e-31   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : inverse-probability weights 
Outcome model  : weighted mean 
Treatment model: (multinomial) logit 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |               Robust 
      employed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET           | 
multitreatment | 
     (1 vs 0)  |  -.0457259   .0263508    -1.74   0.083    -.0973724    .0059207 
     (2 vs 0)  |   -.076272   .0353308    -2.16   0.031    -.1455191   -.0070249 
     (3 vs 0)  |  -.2228705   .0451723    -4.93   0.000    -.3114067   -.1343343 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean         | 
multitreatment | 
            0  |   .4925344   .0153671    32.05   0.000     .4624154    .5226533 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1           | 
           age |   1.452835   .1796828     8.09   0.000     1.100663    1.805007 
         agesq |  -.0285565   .0033743    -8.46   0.000      -.03517    -.021943 
          male |  -.6717092   .2580573    -2.60   0.009    -1.177492   -.1659261 
      minority |  -.1324891    .231146    -0.57   0.567    -.5855269    .3205486 
  socialassist |   3.067042   .2537005    12.09   0.000     2.569798    3.564286 
 secondaryeduc |  -.3466381   .1509441    -2.30   0.022    -.6424831   -.0507931 
  tertiaryeduc |   .8748281   .1537469     5.69   0.000     .5734897    1.176166 
        hhsize |  -.1274079   .0279889    -4.55   0.000    -.1822651   -.0725507 
     hhsizegen |  -.0067229   .0368747    -0.18   0.855     -.078996    .0655502 
       ferizaj |   .8270523   .1986786     4.16   0.000     .4376494    1.216455 
       gjakova |   1.108157    .191103     5.80   0.000     .7336015    1.482712 
       gjilani |   1.934041    .184201    10.50   0.000     1.573013    2.295068 
     mitrovica |   1.243574   .2015755     6.17   0.000     .8484936    1.638655 
          peja |   .5639601   .2007041     2.81   0.005     .1705872     .957333 
      prizreni |   1.069853   .1865271     5.74   0.000     .7042669     1.43544 
         _cons |  -20.13843   2.367687    -8.51   0.000    -24.77901   -15.49785 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME2           | 
           age |   1.360546   .2673669     5.09   0.000     .8365163    1.884575 
         agesq |  -.0264873   .0050132    -5.28   0.000    -.0363131   -.0166615 
          male |  -.8044124    .369694    -2.18   0.030    -1.528999   -.0798254 
      minority |   .0870677   .2874638     0.30   0.762     -.476351    .6504864 
  socialassist |   3.380726   .2945283    11.48   0.000     2.803462    3.957991 
 secondaryeduc |  -.0570558   .2159371    -0.26   0.792    -.4802847    .3661731 
  tertiaryeduc |   1.108868   .2257367     4.91   0.000     .6664318    1.551303 
        hhsize |  -.1674929   .0365388    -4.58   0.000    -.2391076   -.0958782 
     hhsizegen |   .0219234   .0553486     0.40   0.692    -.0865579    .1304047 
       ferizaj |   1.565415   .2914305     5.37   0.000     .9942216    2.136608 
       gjakova |   1.608339   .2940545     5.47   0.000     1.032002    2.184675 
       gjilani |   2.324789   .2845205     8.17   0.000     1.767139    2.882439 
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     mitrovica |   1.920447   .2892411     6.64   0.000     1.353545    2.487349 
          peja |   1.408167   .2860544     4.92   0.000     .8475103    1.968823 
      prizreni |   1.137828   .3102009     3.67   0.000     .5298456    1.745811 
         _cons |  -20.35176   3.514834    -5.79   0.000     -27.2407   -13.46281 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME3           | 
           age |   1.914787   .3967772     4.83   0.000     1.137118    2.692456 
         agesq |  -.0366737    .007375    -4.97   0.000    -.0511284   -.0222189 
          male |   -1.91522   .4409584    -4.34   0.000    -2.779483   -1.050958 
      minority |   .0075032   .3308248     0.02   0.982    -.6409015     .655908 
  socialassist |   2.702783   .3957607     6.83   0.000     1.927106    3.478459 
 secondaryeduc |  -.6107306   .2664775    -2.29   0.022    -1.133017   -.0884443 
  tertiaryeduc |    .240355   .2659369     0.90   0.366    -.2808719    .7615818 
        hhsize |  -.2508386   .0533032    -4.71   0.000     -.355311   -.1463662 
     hhsizegen |   .1607539    .066522     2.42   0.016     .0303731    .2911347 
       ferizaj |   .1565877   .2890636     0.54   0.588    -.4099665    .7231419 
       gjakova |  -.7563943   .4065169    -1.86   0.063    -1.553153    .0403642 
       gjilani |   1.227501   .2417102     5.08   0.000     .7537573    1.701244 
     mitrovica |  -.4284341   .3908317    -1.10   0.273     -1.19445    .3375821 
          peja |  -.8302177   .3820004    -2.17   0.030    -1.578925   -.0815106 
      prizreni |   -.086036   .3056564    -0.28   0.778    -.6851115    .5130396 
         _cons |  -25.72966   5.288687    -4.87   0.000     -36.0953   -15.36402 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
*** Balancing diagnostics  
 
 
. tebalance sum  
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                 Observations       
                               Treatment           Raw     Weighted 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                          0bn.multitr~t =        6,906      1,896.0 
                          1.multitrea~t =          470      1,960.1 
                          2.multitrea~t =          241      1,948.6 
                          3.multitrea~t =          136      1,948.2 
                          Total         =        7,753      7,753.0 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw    Weighted           Raw   Weighted 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  1.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.6269269   -.0462105      .3221864   .9580967 
            agesq |  -.6869872   -.0474977      .2738164   .9782737 
             male |  -.4450008    .0028551      1.321906   .9995277 
         minority |   .0052393    .0177392      1.021027   1.066792 
     socialassist |   .3428648    .1476677      6.827683    1.70901 
    secondaryeduc |  -.4696964    .0073878       1.02591   1.003128 
     tertiaryeduc |   .6244724   -.0308911      1.899256   .9911459 
           hhsize |  -.4328879   -.0097892      .3461522   .8800767 
        hhsizegen |  -.5568747   -.0071883      .5330855    .965112 
          ferizaj |  -.0306483    .0224416      .9316378   1.057842 
          gjakova |   .0687207   -.0002716       1.16296   .9994342 
          gjilani |   .4292703    .0220984      2.780606   1.033354 
        mitrovica |   .1178972   -.0252817      1.334737   .9483873 
             peja |  -.0830119   -.0134813      .8265375   .9670548 
         prizreni |  -.0032518   -.0128668      .9960333   .9769054 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
413 
 
  2.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.5756687   -.0272215      .3526933    .886999 
            agesq |  -.6322685   -.0338573      .3161966   .9219734 
             male |  -.4294723    .0190387      1.321162   .9966462 
         minority |    .078628     .018009       1.30295   1.067823 
     socialassist |   .4499272    .1682574      9.517168   1.818464 
    secondaryeduc |  -.4066554    .0050543      1.050123   1.002149 
     tertiaryeduc |   .6102409   -.0286358      1.895007   .9918568 
           hhsize |  -.4703471   -.0504451      .3897204    .985924 
        hhsizegen |  -.5477794   -.0074872      .5800314   1.034602 
          ferizaj |   .0779458    .0060072      1.185588   1.015414 
          gjakova |   .0702349    .0057401      1.168982   1.011579 
          gjilani |   .4113551    .0422679      2.713313   1.063398 
        mitrovica |   .2067901   -.0181121      1.594995   .9630094 
             peja |   .0507065    .0136519      1.112635   1.033515 
         prizreni |  -.1745717   -.0439517      .6845422   .9209734 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  3.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.5874766   -.0331906      .2839457   1.004342 
            agesq |  -.6574538   -.0315444      .2399639   1.066691 
             male |  -.5770215    .1266538      1.335005   .9645727 
         minority |   .0709291   -.0126459       1.27692   .9533034 
     socialassist |   .3115719    .1480874       6.14469   1.711224 
    secondaryeduc |  -.3928189    .0507329      1.057358   1.019453 
     tertiaryeduc |   .4754033   -.1121614      1.788427   .9592518 
           hhsize |  -.4971539   -.0105451      .3182613   .8636918 
        hhsizegen |   -.605161    .1136171      .5796272   1.029173 
          ferizaj |   .0290471    .0097819      1.074949   1.025132 
          gjakova |  -.2503322    .0209289      .4612281   1.042249 
          gjilani |   .5480294    .0117647      3.261717   1.017808 
        mitrovica |  -.1407073   -.0966607      .6399687   .8040265 
             peja |  -.2319707    .0250584      .5307899   1.061657 
         prizreni |  -.1079457     .014166      .8079007   1.025317 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 6.3.3 RA  
Table A6.3.4 IPWRA  
.  
. *** Binary treatment model  
.  
. teffects ipwra (employed age agesq male minority socialassist secondaryeduc 
tertiaryeduc hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja prizreni, logit) 
(bintreatment age agesq male minority  socialassist secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc  hhsize 
hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja prizren ) if insampm==1, atet 
vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  5.313e-15   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  2.623e-26   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : IPW regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: logit 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     employed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
414 
 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
 bintreatment | 
    (1 vs 0)  |  -.0567178   .0207371    -2.74   0.006    -.0973618   -.0160737 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
 bintreatment | 
           0  |    .466399   .0139171    33.51   0.000     .4391219    .4936761 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0          | 
          age |   .1523512   .1379542     1.10   0.269    -.1180342    .4227366 
        agesq |   .0003626   .0025336     0.14   0.886    -.0046031    .0053283 
         male |   .5089198   .3131192     1.63   0.104    -.1047826    1.122622 
     minority |  -.8922428   .2565743    -3.48   0.001    -1.395119   -.3893664 
 socialassist |  -2.792914    .577729    -4.83   0.000    -3.925242   -1.660586 
secondaryeduc |   .9020205   .1343009     6.72   0.000     .6387955    1.165246 
 tertiaryeduc |   1.083888   .1528397     7.09   0.000      .784328    1.383448 
       hhsize |  -.0196155   .0394375    -0.50   0.619    -.0969116    .0576806 
    hhsizegen |   .0127255   .0430549     0.30   0.768    -.0716604    .0971115 
      ferizaj |  -.2071083   .1608543    -1.29   0.198    -.5223769    .1081603 
      gjakova |  -.5806185   .1578682    -3.68   0.000    -.8900346   -.2712025 
      gjilani |  -.0105097   .2097396    -0.05   0.960    -.4215917    .4005723 
    mitrovica |  -.5025315   .1711469    -2.94   0.003    -.8379732   -.1670898 
         peja |  -1.146402   .1801384    -6.36   0.000    -1.499466   -.7933368 
     prizreni |   .7430386   .1604076     4.63   0.000     .4286455    1.057432 
        _cons |  -5.012248   1.844008    -2.72   0.007    -8.626437   -1.398059 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1          | 
          age |   .5119307   .2112997     2.42   0.015     .0977909    .9260706 
        agesq |  -.0083758   .0038008    -2.20   0.028    -.0158252   -.0009265 
         male |  -.0227869   .4110149    -0.06   0.956    -.8283613    .7827876 
     minority |  -.8287694   .3539911    -2.34   0.019    -1.522579   -.1349596 
 socialassist |  -.4309245   .2887258    -1.49   0.136    -.9968168    .1349678 
secondaryeduc |   .1135012   .2172495     0.52   0.601       -.3123    .5393024 
 tertiaryeduc |   .6347905   .2199569     2.89   0.004     .2036829    1.065898 
       hhsize |  -.0747009   .0507704    -1.47   0.141    -.1742091    .0248073 
    hhsizegen |   .1097048   .0633041     1.73   0.083    -.0143689    .2337785 
      ferizaj |  -.5178538   .2832156    -1.83   0.067    -1.072946    .0372384 
      gjakova |  -.2611117   .2760369    -0.95   0.344    -.8021341    .2799108 
      gjilani |   -.445238   .2531556    -1.76   0.079    -.9414139    .0509378 
    mitrovica |  -1.161152   .2956017    -3.93   0.000    -1.740521   -.5817837 
         peja |  -.1824993   .2869199    -0.64   0.525    -.7448521    .3798534 
     prizreni |  -.5232536   .2703597    -1.94   0.053    -1.053149    .0066417 
        _cons |  -7.652244   2.936347    -2.61   0.009    -13.40738    -1.89711 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1          | 
          age |   1.489746   .1510649     9.86   0.000     1.193664    1.785828 
        agesq |  -.0290606   .0028341   -10.25   0.000    -.0346153   -.0235059 
         male |  -.9042557    .209688    -4.31   0.000    -1.315237   -.4932748 
     minority |  -.0438336   .1833028    -0.24   0.811    -.4031005    .3154332 
 socialassist |   3.109302   .2212496    14.05   0.000      2.67566    3.542943 
secondaryeduc |  -.3147433    .118473    -2.66   0.008    -.5469462   -.0825404 
 tertiaryeduc |   .8323472   .1235364     6.74   0.000     .5902204    1.074474 
415 
 
       hhsize |  -.1567485   .0230038    -6.81   0.000    -.2018351    -.111662 
    hhsizegen |   .0265874   .0301634     0.88   0.378    -.0325317    .0857065 
      ferizaj |   .8335969   .1508638     5.53   0.000     .5379093    1.129285 
      gjakova |   .9042148   .1490287     6.07   0.000      .612124    1.196306 
      gjilani |   1.832649   .1431117    12.81   0.000     1.552155    2.113142 
    mitrovica |   1.113014    .158378     7.03   0.000     .8025985    1.423429 
         peja |    .511612   .1512205     3.38   0.001     .2152254    .8079987 
     prizreni |   .8182876   .1460099     5.60   0.000     .5321135    1.104462 
        _cons |  -19.86672   1.987935    -9.99   0.000      -23.763   -15.97044 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. *** Multinomial probit treatment model 
 
.  
. teffects ipwra (employed age agesq male minority socialassist secondaryeduc 
tertiaryeduc hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja prizreni, logit) 
(multitreatment age agesq male minority socialassist secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc  
hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja prizren ) if insampm==1, atet 
vce(robust) aequ  
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  2.245e-20   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  1.363e-31   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : IPW regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: (multinomial) logit 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |               Robust 
      employed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET           | 
multitreatment | 
     (1 vs 0)  |  -.0254893   .0259382    -0.98   0.326    -.0763273    .0253486 
     (2 vs 0)  |  -.0602018   .0352423    -1.71   0.088    -.1292755    .0088719 
     (3 vs 0)  |   -.198256   .0415232    -4.77   0.000      -.27964   -.1168721 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean         | 
multitreatment | 
            0  |   .4722978   .0154288    30.61   0.000     .4420579    .5025378 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0           | 
           age |   .1400378   .1380287     1.01   0.310    -.1304935     .410569 
         agesq |   .0005487   .0025438     0.22   0.829    -.0044371    .0055345 
          male |   .5357812   .3044452     1.76   0.078    -.0609205    1.132483 
      minority |  -.8654024   .2600023    -3.33   0.001    -1.374998   -.3558072 
  socialassist |  -2.910951   .5801124    -5.02   0.000     -4.04795   -1.773951 
 secondaryeduc |   .8270565   .1362491     6.07   0.000     .5600132      1.0941 
  tertiaryeduc |   1.017111   .1564595     6.50   0.000     .7104564    1.323766 
        hhsize |  -.0170668   .0361488    -0.47   0.637    -.0879171    .0537835 
     hhsizegen |   .0057499   .0402538     0.14   0.886    -.0731462    .0846459 
       ferizaj |  -.1898509   .1604717    -1.18   0.237    -.5043697    .1246679 
416 
 
       gjakova |  -.5661943   .1590917    -3.56   0.000    -.8780082   -.2543803 
       gjilani |  -.0258231   .2111879    -0.12   0.903    -.4397437    .3880975 
     mitrovica |  -.4916423   .1706602    -2.88   0.004    -.8261301   -.1571545 
          peja |   -1.14343   .1829398    -6.25   0.000    -1.501985   -.7848741 
      prizreni |   .7478287   .1615893     4.63   0.000     .4311195    1.064538 
         _cons |  -4.768192   1.845776    -2.58   0.010    -8.385846   -1.150538 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1           | 
           age |    .771614   .3050696     2.53   0.011     .1736886    1.369539 
         agesq |  -.0129968   .0055079    -2.36   0.018     -.023792   -.0022016 
          male |  -.3697689   .5519637    -0.67   0.503    -1.451598      .71206 
      minority |  -.8981239   .5662227    -1.59   0.113      -2.0079    .2116523 
  socialassist |  -.3497898   .4116745    -0.85   0.396    -1.156657    .4570773 
 secondaryeduc |   .3289861   .3159554     1.04   0.298     -.290275    .9482473 
  tertiaryeduc |   .8978944    .312165     2.88   0.004     .2860622    1.509727 
        hhsize |  -.0543442   .0618897    -0.88   0.380    -.1756457    .0669574 
     hhsizegen |   .1502849    .085277     1.76   0.078    -.0168549    .3174248 
       ferizaj |  -.6979258   .4031789    -1.73   0.083    -1.488142    .0922904 
       gjakova |   -.109384   .3800496    -0.29   0.773    -.8542675    .6354995 
       gjilani |  -.7085552   .3732224    -1.90   0.058    -1.440058    .0229473 
     mitrovica |  -1.233911   .4173416    -2.96   0.003    -2.051885   -.4159363 
          peja |   .2738405   .4217283     0.65   0.516    -.5527318    1.100413 
      prizreni |  -.4016541   .3733499    -1.08   0.282    -1.133406    .3300983 
         _cons |  -11.36656   4.230742    -2.69   0.007    -19.65866    -3.07446 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME2           | 
           age |   .1473416   .4137805     0.36   0.722    -.6636533    .9583364 
         agesq |  -.0022723   .0074223    -0.31   0.759    -.0168197    .0122751 
          male |   .4105205   .8363128     0.49   0.624    -1.228622    2.049663 
      minority |  -.5964027   .6304277    -0.95   0.344    -1.832018    .6392129 
  socialassist |  -.6062209   .5272215    -1.15   0.250    -1.639556    .4271142 
 secondaryeduc |  -.7850725   .4177642    -1.88   0.060    -1.603875    .0337302 
  tertiaryeduc |  -.2420901   .4233125    -0.57   0.567    -1.071767     .587587 
        hhsize |  -.1046332   .1173059    -0.89   0.372    -.3345485    .1252821 
     hhsizegen |   .1158886   .1312362     0.88   0.377    -.1413296    .3731068 
       ferizaj |   -1.05825   .6453475    -1.64   0.101    -2.323108    .2066079 
       gjakova |  -1.244594   .6525026    -1.91   0.056    -2.523475    .0342879 
       gjilani |  -.7773096   .6087851    -1.28   0.202    -1.970507    .4158873 
     mitrovica |  -1.636243   .6496147    -2.52   0.012    -2.909464   -.3630213 
          peja |  -1.349373   .6544219    -2.06   0.039    -2.632016   -.0667294 
      prizreni |  -1.227955   .6352079    -1.93   0.053    -2.472939    .0170299 
         _cons |  -1.113319   5.739615    -0.19   0.846    -12.36276    10.13612 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME3           | 
           age |   .3302282   .5771315     0.57   0.567    -.8009288    1.461385 
         agesq |  -.0025658    .010544    -0.24   0.808    -.0232316    .0181001 
          male |   .0662248   1.498513     0.04   0.965    -2.870806    3.003256 
      minority |  -1.881336   1.351211    -1.39   0.164     -4.52966    .7669889 
  socialassist |  -2.668093   2.013468    -1.33   0.185    -6.614418    1.278231 
 secondaryeduc |   .6582037   .7685032     0.86   0.392     -.848035    2.164442 
  tertiaryeduc |   1.229319   .8633618     1.42   0.154    -.4628395    2.921477 
        hhsize |  -.3201979   .1986378    -1.61   0.107    -.7095207     .069125 
     hhsizegen |   .1016827   .2358462     0.43   0.666    -.3605674    .5639328 
417 
 
       ferizaj |   1.040806   .7905504     1.32   0.188    -.5086447    2.590256 
       gjakova |  -.4668876   1.018065    -0.46   0.647    -2.462259    1.528484 
       gjilani |   .2599474   .6247903     0.42   0.677    -.9646191    1.484514 
     mitrovica |  -1.662454   .8875603    -1.87   0.061     -3.40204     .077132 
          peja |   -1.70144    1.20846    -1.41   0.159    -4.069977    .6670974 
      prizreni |  -.8299097   .8301331    -1.00   0.317    -2.456941    .7971212 
         _cons |  -6.723661   7.853104    -0.86   0.392    -22.11546     8.66814 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1           | 
           age |   1.452835   .1796828     8.09   0.000     1.100663    1.805007 
         agesq |  -.0285565   .0033743    -8.46   0.000      -.03517    -.021943 
          male |  -.6717092   .2580573    -2.60   0.009    -1.177492   -.1659261 
      minority |  -.1324891    .231146    -0.57   0.567    -.5855269    .3205486 
  socialassist |   3.067042   .2537005    12.09   0.000     2.569798    3.564286 
 secondaryeduc |  -.3466381   .1509441    -2.30   0.022    -.6424831   -.0507931 
  tertiaryeduc |   .8748281   .1537469     5.69   0.000     .5734897    1.176166 
        hhsize |  -.1274079   .0279889    -4.55   0.000    -.1822651   -.0725507 
     hhsizegen |  -.0067229   .0368747    -0.18   0.855     -.078996    .0655502 
       ferizaj |   .8270523   .1986786     4.16   0.000     .4376494    1.216455 
       gjakova |   1.108157    .191103     5.80   0.000     .7336015    1.482712 
       gjilani |   1.934041    .184201    10.50   0.000     1.573013    2.295068 
     mitrovica |   1.243574   .2015755     6.17   0.000     .8484936    1.638655 
          peja |   .5639601   .2007041     2.81   0.005     .1705872     .957333 
      prizreni |   1.069853   .1865271     5.74   0.000     .7042669     1.43544 
         _cons |  -20.13843   2.367687    -8.51   0.000    -24.77901   -15.49785 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME2           | 
           age |   1.360546   .2673669     5.09   0.000     .8365163    1.884575 
         agesq |  -.0264873   .0050132    -5.28   0.000    -.0363131   -.0166615 
          male |  -.8044124    .369694    -2.18   0.030    -1.528999   -.0798254 
      minority |   .0870677   .2874638     0.30   0.762     -.476351    .6504864 
  socialassist |   3.380726   .2945283    11.48   0.000     2.803462    3.957991 
 secondaryeduc |  -.0570558   .2159371    -0.26   0.792    -.4802847    .3661731 
  tertiaryeduc |   1.108868   .2257367     4.91   0.000     .6664318    1.551303 
        hhsize |  -.1674929   .0365388    -4.58   0.000    -.2391076   -.0958782 
     hhsizegen |   .0219234   .0553486     0.40   0.692    -.0865579    .1304047 
       ferizaj |   1.565415   .2914305     5.37   0.000     .9942216    2.136608 
       gjakova |   1.608339   .2940545     5.47   0.000     1.032002    2.184675 
       gjilani |   2.324789   .2845205     8.17   0.000     1.767139    2.882439 
     mitrovica |   1.920447   .2892411     6.64   0.000     1.353545    2.487349 
          peja |   1.408167   .2860544     4.92   0.000     .8475103    1.968823 
      prizreni |   1.137828   .3102009     3.67   0.000     .5298456    1.745811 
         _cons |  -20.35176   3.514834    -5.79   0.000     -27.2407   -13.46281 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME3           | 
           age |   1.914787   .3967772     4.83   0.000     1.137118    2.692456 
         agesq |  -.0366737    .007375    -4.97   0.000    -.0511284   -.0222189 
          male |   -1.91522   .4409584    -4.34   0.000    -2.779483   -1.050958 
      minority |   .0075032   .3308248     0.02   0.982    -.6409015     .655908 
  socialassist |   2.702783   .3957607     6.83   0.000     1.927106    3.478459 
 secondaryeduc |  -.6107306   .2664775    -2.29   0.022    -1.133017   -.0884443 
  tertiaryeduc |    .240355   .2659369     0.90   0.366    -.2808719    .7615818 
        hhsize |  -.2508386   .0533032    -4.71   0.000     -.355311   -.1463662 
418 
 
     hhsizegen |   .1607539    .066522     2.42   0.016     .0303731    .2911347 
       ferizaj |   .1565877   .2890636     0.54   0.588    -.4099665    .7231419 
       gjakova |  -.7563943   .4065169    -1.86   0.063    -1.553153    .0403642 
       gjilani |   1.227501   .2417102     5.08   0.000     .7537573    1.701244 
     mitrovica |  -.4284341   .3908317    -1.10   0.273     -1.19445    .3375821 
          peja |  -.8302177   .3820004    -2.17   0.030    -1.578925   -.0815106 
      prizreni |   -.086036   .3056564    -0.28   0.778    -.6851115    .5130396 
         _cons |  -25.72966   5.288687    -4.87   0.000     -36.0953   -15.36402 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 6.4 Outcome Variable: emp1112 – Model 4 
Table A6.4.1 PSM  
. teffects psmatch (empl1112) (bintreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc  hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja 
prizren ) if insampm==1, atet vce(robust) 
 
Treatment-effects estimation                   Number of obs      =      7,753 
Estimator      : propensity-score matching     Matches: requested =          1 
Outcome model  : matching                                     min =          1 
Treatment model: logit                                        max =         16 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              AI Robust 
    empl1112 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET         | 
bintreatment | 
   (1 vs 0)  |  -.0539964   .0274526    -1.97   0.049    -.1078024   -.0001904 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. tebalance sum 
note: refitting the model using the generate() option 
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                   Raw      Matched 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                          Number of obs =        7,753        1,694 
                          Treated obs   =          847          847 
                          Control obs   =        6,906          847 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw     Matched           Raw    Matched 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
              age |  -.6060234   -.0560202      .3243216   1.032325 
            agesq |  -.6665971   -.0516844      .2800718   1.027513 
             male |  -.4618398    .0590598      1.323737   .9958181 
         minority |   .0377737    .0625463       1.14086   1.250156 
     socialassist |   .3709548    .2393765       7.49496   2.528539 
    secondaryeduc |  -.4394493    .0192129      1.036461   1.007279 
     tertiaryeduc |   .5968176   -.1547271      1.880529   .9673542 
           hhsize |   -.453916    .0715541      .3536742   .8875756 
        hhsizegen |  -.5622479    .0385221      .5529141   .9956847 
          ferizaj |   .0111471    .0399729      1.026757   1.098258 
          gjakova |   .0257213    .0431534       1.06098   1.104466 
          gjilani |   .4442438   -.0370242      2.838404   .9511813 
419 
 
        mitrovica |   .1091392    .0035033      1.308213   1.007722 
             peja |  -.0639643   -.0255434      .8656221   .9414794 
         prizreni |  -.0658709   -.0367838      .8802186   .9287426 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table A6.4.2 IPW  
 
***Binary treatment model  
 
. teffects ipw (empl1112) (bintreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc  hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja 
prizren ) if insampm==1, atet vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  1.009e-23   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  3.230e-32   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : inverse-probability weights 
Outcome model  : weighted mean 
Treatment model: logit 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     empl1112 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
 bintreatment | 
    (1 vs 0)  |  -.0180082   .0212248    -0.85   0.396     -.059608    .0235916 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
 bintreatment | 
           0  |   .5067921   .0142967    35.45   0.000     .4787711    .5348132 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1          | 
          age |   1.489746   .1510649     9.86   0.000     1.193664    1.785828 
        agesq |  -.0290606   .0028341   -10.25   0.000    -.0346153   -.0235059 
         male |  -.9042557    .209688    -4.31   0.000    -1.315237   -.4932748 
     minority |  -.0438336   .1833028    -0.24   0.811    -.4031005    .3154332 
 socialassist |   3.109302   .2212496    14.05   0.000      2.67566    3.542943 
secondaryeduc |  -.3147433    .118473    -2.66   0.008    -.5469462   -.0825404 
 tertiaryeduc |   .8323472   .1235364     6.74   0.000     .5902204    1.074474 
       hhsize |  -.1567485   .0230038    -6.81   0.000    -.2018351    -.111662 
    hhsizegen |   .0265874   .0301634     0.88   0.378    -.0325317    .0857065 
      ferizaj |   .8335969   .1508638     5.53   0.000     .5379093    1.129285 
      gjakova |   .9042148   .1490287     6.07   0.000      .612124    1.196306 
      gjilani |   1.832649   .1431117    12.81   0.000     1.552155    2.113142 
    mitrovica |   1.113014    .158378     7.03   0.000     .8025985    1.423429 
         peja |    .511612   .1512205     3.38   0.001     .2152254    .8079987 
     prizreni |   .8182876   .1460099     5.60   0.000     .5321135    1.104462 
        _cons |  -19.86672   1.987935    -9.99   0.000      -23.763   -15.97044 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
420 
 
*** Balancing diagnostics  
 
. tebalance sum 
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                   Raw     Weighted 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                          Number of obs =        7,753      7,753.0 
                          Treated obs   =          847      3,946.7 
                          Control obs   =        6,906      3,806.3 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw    Weighted           Raw   Weighted 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
              age |  -.6060234   -.0475656      .3243216   .9581938 
            agesq |  -.6665971   -.0487129      .2800718   .9868389 
             male |  -.4618398     .002955      1.323737   .9996149 
         minority |   .0377737     .020367       1.14086    1.07147 
     socialassist |   .3709548    .1592337       7.49496   1.722564 
    secondaryeduc |  -.4394493    .0089127      1.036461   1.003264 
     tertiaryeduc |   .5968176   -.0343847      1.880529   .9884746 
           hhsize |   -.453916   -.0079835      .3536742   .9402526 
        hhsizegen |  -.5622479   -.0072016      .5529141   .9931567 
          ferizaj |   .0111471    .0257461      1.026757   1.061253 
          gjakova |   .0257213   -.0029112       1.06098   .9936182 
          gjilani |   .4442438    .0212012      2.838404    1.03094 
        mitrovica |   .1091392   -.0225392      1.308213   .9529385 
             peja |  -.0639643   -.0171653      .8656221   .9599668 
         prizreni |  -.0658709   -.0128522      .8802186   .9739011 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
*** Multinomial probit model  
 
. teffects ipw (empl1112) (multitreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc  hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja 
prizren ) if insampm==1, atet vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  2.160e-25   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  1.373e-31   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : inverse-probability weights 
Outcome model  : weighted mean 
Treatment model: (multinomial) logit 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |               Robust 
      empl1112 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET           | 
multitreatment | 
421 
 
     (1 vs 0)  |    .025506   .0262566     0.97   0.331     -.025956     .076968 
     (2 vs 0)  |  -.0311061   .0354972    -0.88   0.381    -.1006793    .0384671 
     (3 vs 0)  |  -.1539268   .0492953    -3.12   0.002    -.2505438   -.0573098 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean         | 
multitreatment | 
            0  |   .5106642   .0154777    32.99   0.000     .4803285    .5409998 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1           | 
           age |   1.452835   .1796828     8.09   0.000     1.100663    1.805007 
         agesq |  -.0285565   .0033743    -8.46   0.000      -.03517    -.021943 
          male |  -.6717092   .2580573    -2.60   0.009    -1.177492   -.1659261 
      minority |  -.1324891    .231146    -0.57   0.567    -.5855269    .3205486 
  socialassist |   3.067042   .2537005    12.09   0.000     2.569798    3.564286 
 secondaryeduc |  -.3466381   .1509441    -2.30   0.022    -.6424831   -.0507931 
  tertiaryeduc |   .8748281   .1537469     5.69   0.000     .5734897    1.176166 
        hhsize |  -.1274079   .0279889    -4.55   0.000    -.1822651   -.0725507 
     hhsizegen |  -.0067229   .0368747    -0.18   0.855     -.078996    .0655502 
       ferizaj |   .8270523   .1986786     4.16   0.000     .4376494    1.216455 
       gjakova |   1.108157    .191103     5.80   0.000     .7336015    1.482712 
       gjilani |   1.934041    .184201    10.50   0.000     1.573013    2.295068 
     mitrovica |   1.243574   .2015755     6.17   0.000     .8484936    1.638655 
          peja |   .5639601   .2007041     2.81   0.005     .1705872     .957333 
      prizreni |   1.069853   .1865271     5.74   0.000     .7042669     1.43544 
         _cons |  -20.13843   2.367687    -8.51   0.000    -24.77901   -15.49785 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME2           | 
           age |   1.360546   .2673669     5.09   0.000     .8365163    1.884575 
         agesq |  -.0264873   .0050132    -5.28   0.000    -.0363131   -.0166615 
          male |  -.8044124    .369694    -2.18   0.030    -1.528999   -.0798254 
      minority |   .0870677   .2874638     0.30   0.762     -.476351    .6504864 
  socialassist |   3.380726   .2945283    11.48   0.000     2.803462    3.957991 
 secondaryeduc |  -.0570558   .2159371    -0.26   0.792    -.4802847    .3661731 
  tertiaryeduc |   1.108868   .2257367     4.91   0.000     .6664318    1.551303 
        hhsize |  -.1674929   .0365388    -4.58   0.000    -.2391076   -.0958782 
     hhsizegen |   .0219234   .0553486     0.40   0.692    -.0865579    .1304047 
       ferizaj |   1.565415   .2914305     5.37   0.000     .9942216    2.136608 
       gjakova |   1.608339   .2940545     5.47   0.000     1.032002    2.184675 
       gjilani |   2.324789   .2845205     8.17   0.000     1.767139    2.882439 
     mitrovica |   1.920447   .2892411     6.64   0.000     1.353545    2.487349 
          peja |   1.408167   .2860544     4.92   0.000     .8475103    1.968823 
      prizreni |   1.137828   .3102009     3.67   0.000     .5298456    1.745811 
         _cons |  -20.35176   3.514834    -5.79   0.000     -27.2407   -13.46281 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME3           | 
           age |   1.914787   .3967772     4.83   0.000     1.137118    2.692456 
         agesq |  -.0366737    .007375    -4.97   0.000    -.0511284   -.0222189 
          male |   -1.91522   .4409584    -4.34   0.000    -2.779483   -1.050958 
      minority |   .0075032   .3308248     0.02   0.982    -.6409015     .655908 
  socialassist |   2.702783   .3957607     6.83   0.000     1.927106    3.478459 
 secondaryeduc |  -.6107306   .2664775    -2.29   0.022    -1.133017   -.0884443 
  tertiaryeduc |    .240355   .2659369     0.90   0.366    -.2808719    .7615818 
        hhsize |  -.2508386   .0533032    -4.71   0.000     -.355311   -.1463662 
422 
 
     hhsizegen |   .1607539    .066522     2.42   0.016     .0303731    .2911347 
       ferizaj |   .1565877   .2890636     0.54   0.588    -.4099665    .7231419 
       gjakova |  -.7563943   .4065169    -1.86   0.063    -1.553153    .0403642 
       gjilani |   1.227501   .2417102     5.08   0.000     .7537573    1.701244 
     mitrovica |  -.4284341   .3908317    -1.10   0.273     -1.19445    .3375821 
          peja |  -.8302177   .3820004    -2.17   0.030    -1.578925   -.0815106 
      prizreni |   -.086036   .3056564    -0.28   0.778    -.6851115    .5130396 
         _cons |  -25.72966   5.288687    -4.87   0.000     -36.0953   -15.36402 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
*** Balancing diagnostics  
 
 
. tebalance sum 
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                 Observations       
                               Treatment           Raw     Weighted 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                          0bn.multitr~t =        6,906      1,896.0 
                          1.multitrea~t =          470      1,960.1 
                          2.multitrea~t =          241      1,948.6 
                          3.multitrea~t =          136      1,948.2 
                          Total         =        7,753      7,753.0 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw    Weighted           Raw   Weighted 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  1.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.6269269   -.0462105      .3221864   .9580967 
            agesq |  -.6869872   -.0474977      .2738164   .9782737 
             male |  -.4450008    .0028551      1.321906   .9995277 
         minority |   .0052393    .0177392      1.021027   1.066792 
     socialassist |   .3428648    .1476677      6.827683    1.70901 
    secondaryeduc |  -.4696964    .0073878       1.02591   1.003128 
     tertiaryeduc |   .6244724   -.0308911      1.899256   .9911459 
           hhsize |  -.4328879   -.0097892      .3461522   .8800767 
        hhsizegen |  -.5568747   -.0071883      .5330855    .965112 
          ferizaj |  -.0306483    .0224416      .9316378   1.057842 
          gjakova |   .0687207   -.0002716       1.16296   .9994342 
          gjilani |   .4292703    .0220984      2.780606   1.033354 
        mitrovica |   .1178972   -.0252817      1.334737   .9483873 
             peja |  -.0830119   -.0134813      .8265375   .9670548 
         prizreni |  -.0032518   -.0128668      .9960333   .9769054 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  2.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.5756687   -.0272215      .3526933    .886999 
            agesq |  -.6322685   -.0338573      .3161966   .9219734 
             male |  -.4294723    .0190387      1.321162   .9966462 
         minority |    .078628     .018009       1.30295   1.067823 
     socialassist |   .4499272    .1682574      9.517168   1.818464 
423 
 
    secondaryeduc |  -.4066554    .0050543      1.050123   1.002149 
     tertiaryeduc |   .6102409   -.0286358      1.895007   .9918568 
           hhsize |  -.4703471   -.0504451      .3897204    .985924 
        hhsizegen |  -.5477794   -.0074872      .5800314   1.034602 
          ferizaj |   .0779458    .0060072      1.185588   1.015414 
          gjakova |   .0702349    .0057401      1.168982   1.011579 
          gjilani |   .4113551    .0422679      2.713313   1.063398 
        mitrovica |   .2067901   -.0181121      1.594995   .9630094 
             peja |   .0507065    .0136519      1.112635   1.033515 
         prizreni |  -.1745717   -.0439517      .6845422   .9209734 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  3.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.5874766   -.0331906      .2839457   1.004342 
            agesq |  -.6574538   -.0315444      .2399639   1.066691 
             male |  -.5770215    .1266538      1.335005   .9645727 
         minority |   .0709291   -.0126459       1.27692   .9533034 
     socialassist |   .3115719    .1480874       6.14469   1.711224 
    secondaryeduc |  -.3928189    .0507329      1.057358   1.019453 
     tertiaryeduc |   .4754033   -.1121614      1.788427   .9592518 
           hhsize |  -.4971539   -.0105451      .3182613   .8636918 
        hhsizegen |   -.605161    .1136171      .5796272   1.029173 
          ferizaj |   .0290471    .0097819      1.074949   1.025132 
          gjakova |  -.2503322    .0209289      .4612281   1.042249 
          gjilani |   .5480294    .0117647      3.261717   1.017808 
        mitrovica |  -.1407073   -.0966607      .6399687   .8040265 
             peja |  -.2319707    .0250584      .5307899   1.061657 
         prizreni |  -.1079457     .014166      .8079007   1.025317 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table A6.4.3 RA 
*** Binary treatment model  
 
. teffects ra (empl1112 age agesq male minority socialassist secondaryeduc 
tertiaryeduc hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja prizreni, logit) 
(multitreatment) if insampm==1, atet vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  7.788e-17   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  2.843e-27   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: none 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |               Robust 
      empl1112 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET           | 
multitreatment | 
     (1 vs 0)  |   .0225809   .0252208     0.90   0.371    -.0268511    .0720128 
     (2 vs 0)  |  -.0314998   .0345424    -0.91   0.362    -.0992016     .036202 
     (3 vs 0)  |  -.1619296   .0456342    -3.55   0.000     -.251371   -.0724883 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean         | 
424 
 
multitreatment | 
            0  |   .5135893   .0140706    36.50   0.000     .4860115    .5411671 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0           | 
           age |   .4218355   .0492325     8.57   0.000     .3253415    .5183294 
         agesq |  -.0053135   .0008252    -6.44   0.000    -.0069308   -.0036962 
          male |   .6953048   .1367735     5.08   0.000     .4272338    .9633759 
      minority |   .0540327   .1106093     0.49   0.625    -.1627575    .2708229 
  socialassist |  -1.669971   .2750154    -6.07   0.000    -2.208992   -1.130951 
 secondaryeduc |   .5943007   .0718422     8.27   0.000     .4534925    .7351089 
  tertiaryeduc |   1.210722   .0947223    12.78   0.000      1.02507    1.396374 
        hhsize |   .0101914   .0137174     0.74   0.458    -.0166942     .037077 
     hhsizegen |  -.0013489   .0158066    -0.09   0.932    -.0323293    .0296315 
       ferizaj |  -.0133214   .0899299    -0.15   0.882    -.1895809     .162938 
       gjakova |  -.6499175   .0951831    -6.83   0.000     -.836473   -.4633621 
       gjilani |   .0107498   .1186282     0.09   0.928    -.2217572    .2432569 
     mitrovica |  -.3425645   .0927862    -3.69   0.000     -.524422    -.160707 
          peja |  -1.431714   .0917698   -15.60   0.000     -1.61158   -1.251849 
      prizreni |   .7294603   .0932899     7.82   0.000     .5466154    .9123052 
         _cons |  -8.165179   .7301844   -11.18   0.000    -9.596314   -6.734044 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1           | 
           age |   .6792348   .2967876     2.29   0.022     .0975419    1.260928 
         agesq |  -.0112742   .0053536    -2.11   0.035     -.021767   -.0007814 
          male |  -.1062614   .5455349    -0.19   0.846     -1.17549    .9629674 
      minority |  -1.305959   .5432352    -2.40   0.016     -2.37068   -.2412374 
  socialassist |   .2111297   .3870835     0.55   0.585    -.5475401    .9697994 
 secondaryeduc |   .4389903   .2970251     1.48   0.139    -.1431682    1.021149 
  tertiaryeduc |   .7105868   .3003635     2.37   0.018     .1218851    1.299288 
        hhsize |   -.061795   .0588051    -1.05   0.293    -.1770509    .0534608 
     hhsizegen |   .1136662   .0828352     1.37   0.170    -.0486879    .2760203 
       ferizaj |  -.1672238    .395912    -0.42   0.673     -.943197    .6087494 
       gjakova |   .1102961   .3884224     0.28   0.776    -.6509978      .87159 
       gjilani |  -.6744633   .3593402    -1.88   0.061    -1.378757    .0298305 
     mitrovica |  -.8125503   .3931781    -2.07   0.039    -1.583165   -.0419354 
          peja |   .2596473   .4106387     0.63   0.527    -.5451899    1.064484 
      prizreni |   .0589143   .3800356     0.16   0.877    -.6859418    .8037705 
         _cons |  -9.923026    4.09973    -2.42   0.016    -17.95835   -1.887703 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME2           | 
           age |  -.1128602   .3830579    -0.29   0.768    -.8636398    .6379194 
         agesq |   .0026772   .0068576     0.39   0.696    -.0107634    .0161178 
          male |    .304864   .7275617     0.42   0.675    -1.121131    1.730859 
      minority |  -.8498043   .5712328    -1.49   0.137      -1.9694    .2697914 
  socialassist |  -.6574525   .4679755    -1.40   0.160    -1.574668    .2597626 
 secondaryeduc |  -.4811004   .4036198    -1.19   0.233    -1.272181    .3099799 
  tertiaryeduc |  -.0865895   .4132696    -0.21   0.834    -.8965832    .7234041 
        hhsize |  -.0872666   .0925523    -0.94   0.346    -.2686657    .0941326 
     hhsizegen |    .086008   .1105473     0.78   0.437    -.1306606    .3026767 
       ferizaj |  -1.121272   .6137825    -1.83   0.068    -2.324264    .0817197 
       gjakova |  -1.186881   .6329124    -1.88   0.061    -2.427367    .0536046 
       gjilani |  -1.053826   .5982276    -1.76   0.078    -2.226331    .1186782 
     mitrovica |  -1.685266   .6220251    -2.71   0.007    -2.904413   -.4661194 
          peja |  -1.693098   .6390675    -2.65   0.008    -2.945647   -.4405486 
      prizreni |  -.9423325   .6414572    -1.47   0.142    -2.199566    .3149006 
         _cons |    2.51059    5.35139     0.47   0.639    -7.977941    12.99912 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME3           | 
           age |   .4641524   .5694996     0.82   0.415    -.6520463    1.580351 
         agesq |  -.0060196   .0102927    -0.58   0.559    -.0261929    .0141538 
          male |   .1276887   1.165306     0.11   0.913    -2.156269    2.411646 
425 
 
      minority |  -2.259389   1.454987    -1.55   0.120    -5.111111     .592333 
  socialassist |  -1.080894   1.157489    -0.93   0.350    -3.349531    1.187743 
 secondaryeduc |    .552582   .5857586     0.94   0.345    -.5954838    1.700648 
  tertiaryeduc |   .6563583   .6459736     1.02   0.310    -.6097267    1.922443 
        hhsize |  -.0915123   .1539948    -0.59   0.552    -.3933365     .210312 
     hhsizegen |   .1409588   .1820127     0.77   0.439    -.2157795    .4976971 
       ferizaj |   .6829105   .6542256     1.04   0.297     -.599348    1.965169 
       gjakova |  -.9671729   .9841802    -0.98   0.326    -2.896131    .9617849 
       gjilani |   .2796782   .5672048     0.49   0.622    -.8320228    1.391379 
     mitrovica |  -.2773383   .7611357    -0.36   0.716    -1.769137     1.21446 
          peja |  -1.348642   .8456574    -1.59   0.111      -3.0061    .3088161 
      prizreni |  -1.325335   .8412332    -1.58   0.115    -2.974122    .3234514 
         _cons |  -8.592283   7.897945    -1.09   0.277    -24.07197    6.887404 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
***Multinomial probit treatment model  
 
 
. teffects ra (empl1112 age agesq male minority socialassist secondaryeduc 
tertiaryeduc hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjako 
> va gjilani mitrovica peja prizreni, logit) (bintreatment) if insampm==1, atet 
vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  1.040e-22   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  9.901e-33   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: none 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     empl1112 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
 bintreatment | 
    (1 vs 0)  |  -.0203787   .0199001    -1.02   0.306    -.0593821    .0186248 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
 bintreatment | 
           0  |   .5091626   .0124222    40.99   0.000     .4848156    .5335096 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0          | 
          age |   .4218355   .0492325     8.57   0.000     .3253415    .5183294 
        agesq |  -.0053135   .0008252    -6.44   0.000    -.0069308   -.0036962 
         male |   .6953048   .1367735     5.08   0.000     .4272338    .9633759 
     minority |   .0540327   .1106093     0.49   0.625    -.1627575    .2708229 
 socialassist |  -1.669971   .2750154    -6.07   0.000    -2.208992   -1.130951 
secondaryeduc |   .5943007   .0718422     8.27   0.000     .4534925    .7351089 
 tertiaryeduc |   1.210722   .0947223    12.78   0.000      1.02507    1.396374 
       hhsize |   .0101914   .0137174     0.74   0.458    -.0166942     .037077 
    hhsizegen |  -.0013489   .0158066    -0.09   0.932    -.0323293    .0296315 
      ferizaj |  -.0133214   .0899299    -0.15   0.882    -.1895809     .162938 
      gjakova |  -.6499175   .0951831    -6.83   0.000     -.836473   -.4633621 
      gjilani |   .0107498   .1186282     0.09   0.928    -.2217572    .2432569 
    mitrovica |  -.3425645   .0927862    -3.69   0.000     -.524422    -.160707 
         peja |  -1.431714   .0917698   -15.60   0.000     -1.61158   -1.251849 
     prizreni |   .7294603   .0932899     7.82   0.000     .5466154    .9123052 
        _cons |  -8.165179   .7301844   -11.18   0.000    -9.596314   -6.734044 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
426 
 
OME1          | 
          age |   .3305926   .2184138     1.51   0.130    -.0974905    .7586758 
        agesq |  -.0048342   .0039498    -1.22   0.221    -.0125757    .0029072 
         male |   .1709132   .3987284     0.43   0.668    -.6105802    .9524065 
     minority |  -1.170302    .343686    -3.41   0.001    -1.843914     -.49669 
 socialassist |  -.1999319   .2669771    -0.75   0.454    -.7231974    .3233337 
secondaryeduc |   .2368948   .2084322     1.14   0.256    -.1716248    .6454144 
 tertiaryeduc |   .5403934   .2165122     2.50   0.013     .1160373    .9647494 
       hhsize |  -.0685269   .0468878    -1.46   0.144    -.1604252    .0233714 
    hhsizegen |   .0855868   .0607878     1.41   0.159     -.033555    .2047286 
      ferizaj |  -.1591271   .2777483    -0.57   0.567    -.7035036    .3852495 
      gjakova |  -.1249758   .2782001    -0.45   0.653    -.6702379    .4202863 
      gjilani |  -.4762569   .2481513    -1.92   0.055    -.9626246    .0101108 
    mitrovica |  -.8189919   .2787783    -2.94   0.003    -1.365387   -.2725965 
         peja |  -.2692949   .2831428    -0.95   0.342    -.8242445    .2856547 
     prizreni |  -.1805978   .2740146    -0.66   0.510    -.7176566     .356461 
        _cons |  -5.228399    3.00209    -1.74   0.082    -11.11239    .6555888 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table A6.4.4 IPWRA  
*** Binary treatment model  
 
. teffects ipwra (empl1112 age agesq male minority socialassist secondaryeduc 
tertiaryeduc hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja prizreni, logit) 
(bintreatment age agesq male minority socialassist secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc  hhsize 
hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja prizren ) if insampm==1, atet 
vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  5.414e-15   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  2.721e-26   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : IPW regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: logit 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     empl1112 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
 bintreatment | 
    (1 vs 0)  |   .0055448   .0208449     0.27   0.790    -.0353105    .0464001 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
 bintreatment | 
           0  |   .4832391   .0140324    34.44   0.000      .455736    .5107422 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0          | 
          age |   .1813934   .1368893     1.33   0.185    -.0869047    .4496914 
        agesq |  -.0002334   .0025172    -0.09   0.926    -.0051669    .0047002 
         male |   .5118456   .3101503     1.65   0.099    -.0960378    1.119729 
     minority |  -.9294639   .2581721    -3.60   0.000    -1.435472    -.423456 
 socialassist |  -2.858017   .5812323    -4.92   0.000    -3.997212   -1.718823 
secondaryeduc |   .8383777   .1335969     6.28   0.000     .5765325    1.100223 
427 
 
 tertiaryeduc |   .9977612   .1523835     6.55   0.000      .699095    1.296428 
       hhsize |  -.0190644      .0388    -0.49   0.623     -.095111    .0569823 
    hhsizegen |   .0103909   .0424914     0.24   0.807    -.0728907    .0936724 
      ferizaj |   -.058146   .1640144    -0.35   0.723    -.3796082    .2633162 
      gjakova |  -.6045963   .1574492    -3.84   0.000    -.9131911   -.2960016 
      gjilani |  -.0017457   .2110771    -0.01   0.993    -.4154491    .4119578 
    mitrovica |  -.5568174   .1712103    -3.25   0.001    -.8923834   -.2212514 
         peja |  -1.168458   .1773605    -6.59   0.000    -1.516079   -.8208382 
     prizreni |   .8802752   .1631405     5.40   0.000     .5605258    1.200025 
        _cons |  -5.223139    1.82486    -2.86   0.004    -8.799798   -1.646479 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1          | 
          age |   .3305926   .2184138     1.51   0.130    -.0974905    .7586758 
        agesq |  -.0048342   .0039498    -1.22   0.221    -.0125757    .0029072 
         male |   .1709132   .3987284     0.43   0.668    -.6105802    .9524065 
     minority |  -1.170302    .343686    -3.41   0.001    -1.843914     -.49669 
 socialassist |  -.1999319   .2669771    -0.75   0.454    -.7231974    .3233337 
secondaryeduc |   .2368948   .2084322     1.14   0.256    -.1716248    .6454144 
 tertiaryeduc |   .5403934   .2165122     2.50   0.013     .1160373    .9647494 
       hhsize |  -.0685269   .0468878    -1.46   0.144    -.1604252    .0233714 
    hhsizegen |   .0855868   .0607878     1.41   0.159     -.033555    .2047286 
      ferizaj |  -.1591271   .2777483    -0.57   0.567    -.7035036    .3852495 
      gjakova |  -.1249758   .2782001    -0.45   0.653    -.6702379    .4202863 
      gjilani |  -.4762569   .2481513    -1.92   0.055    -.9626246    .0101108 
    mitrovica |  -.8189919   .2787783    -2.94   0.003    -1.365387   -.2725965 
         peja |  -.2692949   .2831428    -0.95   0.342    -.8242445    .2856547 
     prizreni |  -.1805978   .2740146    -0.66   0.510    -.7176566     .356461 
        _cons |  -5.228399    3.00209    -1.74   0.082    -11.11239    .6555888 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1          | 
          age |   1.489746   .1510649     9.86   0.000     1.193664    1.785828 
        agesq |  -.0290606   .0028341   -10.25   0.000    -.0346153   -.0235059 
         male |  -.9042557    .209688    -4.31   0.000    -1.315237   -.4932748 
     minority |  -.0438336   .1833028    -0.24   0.811    -.4031005    .3154332 
 socialassist |   3.109302   .2212496    14.05   0.000      2.67566    3.542943 
secondaryeduc |  -.3147433    .118473    -2.66   0.008    -.5469462   -.0825404 
 tertiaryeduc |   .8323472   .1235364     6.74   0.000     .5902204    1.074474 
       hhsize |  -.1567485   .0230038    -6.81   0.000    -.2018351    -.111662 
    hhsizegen |   .0265874   .0301634     0.88   0.378    -.0325317    .0857065 
      ferizaj |   .8335969   .1508638     5.53   0.000     .5379093    1.129285 
      gjakova |   .9042148   .1490287     6.07   0.000      .612124    1.196306 
      gjilani |   1.832649   .1431117    12.81   0.000     1.552155    2.113142 
    mitrovica |   1.113014    .158378     7.03   0.000     .8025985    1.423429 
         peja |    .511612   .1512205     3.38   0.001     .2152254    .8079987 
     prizreni |   .8182876   .1460099     5.60   0.000     .5321135    1.104462 
        _cons |  -19.86672   1.987935    -9.99   0.000      -23.763   -15.97044 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
*** Multinomial probit model  
 
 
428 
 
. teffects ipwra (empl1112 age agesq male minority socialassist secondaryeduc 
tertiaryeduc hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja prizreni, logit) 
(multitreatment age agesq male minority socialassist secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc  
hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani mitrovica peja prizren ) if insampm==1, atet 
vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  5.169e-24   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  1.178e-31   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      7,753 
Estimator      : IPW regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: (multinomial) logit 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |               Robust 
      empl1112 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET           | 
multitreatment | 
     (1 vs 0)  |   .0468789   .0259494     1.81   0.071     -.003981    .0977387 
     (2 vs 0)  |  -.0096058   .0353888    -0.27   0.786    -.0789666     .059755 
     (3 vs 0)  |  -.1318541   .0449612    -2.93   0.003    -.2199764   -.0437318 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean         | 
multitreatment | 
            0  |   .4892913   .0156023    31.36   0.000     .4587115    .5198712 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0           | 
           age |   .1747972   .1368043     1.28   0.201    -.0933344    .4429287 
         agesq |  -.0001479   .0025245    -0.06   0.953    -.0050959       .0048 
          male |   .5426173    .302843     1.79   0.073    -.0509441    1.136179 
      minority |  -.8978346   .2619882    -3.43   0.001    -1.411322   -.3843472 
  socialassist |  -2.981883     .58361    -5.11   0.000    -4.125738   -1.838029 
 secondaryeduc |   .7528368   .1362856     5.52   0.000     .4857219    1.019952 
  tertiaryeduc |   .9278286   .1564167     5.93   0.000     .6212576      1.2344 
        hhsize |  -.0177029   .0357547    -0.50   0.621    -.0877809    .0523751 
     hhsizegen |   .0044896   .0399185     0.11   0.910    -.0737492    .0827284 
       ferizaj |  -.0408549   .1638213    -0.25   0.803    -.3619389     .280229 
       gjakova |   -.597973   .1587051    -3.77   0.000    -.9090293   -.2869166 
       gjilani |  -.0204982   .2129989    -0.10   0.923    -.4379684     .396972 
     mitrovica |  -.5476132   .1708405    -3.21   0.001    -.8824545    -.212772 
          peja |  -1.169302   .1802516    -6.49   0.000    -1.522588   -.8160152 
      prizreni |   .8850417   .1640825     5.39   0.000     .5634459    1.206637 
         _cons |  -5.049253    1.82372    -2.77   0.006    -8.623679   -1.474827 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1           | 
           age |   .6792348   .2967876     2.29   0.022     .0975419    1.260928 
         agesq |  -.0112742   .0053536    -2.11   0.035     -.021767   -.0007814 
          male |  -.1062614   .5455349    -0.19   0.846     -1.17549    .9629674 
      minority |  -1.305959   .5432352    -2.40   0.016     -2.37068   -.2412374 
  socialassist |   .2111297   .3870835     0.55   0.585    -.5475401    .9697994 
 secondaryeduc |   .4389903   .2970251     1.48   0.139    -.1431682    1.021149 
  tertiaryeduc |   .7105868   .3003635     2.37   0.018     .1218851    1.299288 
429 
 
        hhsize |   -.061795   .0588051    -1.05   0.293    -.1770509    .0534608 
     hhsizegen |   .1136662   .0828352     1.37   0.170    -.0486879    .2760203 
       ferizaj |  -.1672238    .395912    -0.42   0.673     -.943197    .6087494 
       gjakova |   .1102961   .3884224     0.28   0.776    -.6509978      .87159 
       gjilani |  -.6744633   .3593402    -1.88   0.061    -1.378757    .0298305 
     mitrovica |  -.8125503   .3931781    -2.07   0.039    -1.583165   -.0419354 
          peja |   .2596473   .4106387     0.63   0.527    -.5451899    1.064484 
      prizreni |   .0589143   .3800356     0.16   0.877    -.6859418    .8037705 
         _cons |  -9.923026    4.09973    -2.42   0.016    -17.95835   -1.887703 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME2           | 
           age |  -.2708713   .4760537    -0.57   0.569    -1.203919    .6621768 
         agesq |    .005918   .0087167     0.68   0.497    -.0111664    .0230024 
          male |   .2602801   .7468733     0.35   0.727    -1.203565    1.724125 
      minority |    -.78222   .6193928    -1.26   0.207    -1.996208    .4317676 
  socialassist |  -.8487386   .5067341    -1.67   0.094    -1.841919    .1444421 
 secondaryeduc |  -.5799618    .430704    -1.35   0.178    -1.424126    .2642026 
  tertiaryeduc |  -.2179208   .4386981    -0.50   0.619    -1.077753    .6419116 
        hhsize |  -.1094553   .0958173    -1.14   0.253    -.2972539    .0783432 
     hhsizegen |   .1062815   .1131365     0.94   0.348     -.115462     .328025 
       ferizaj |  -.9485797   .6583913    -1.44   0.150    -2.239003    .3418435 
       gjakova |  -1.100652   .6602612    -1.67   0.096     -2.39474    .1934359 
       gjilani |   -.942762   .6254498    -1.51   0.132    -2.168621    .2830971 
     mitrovica |  -1.528071   .6580075    -2.32   0.020    -2.817742      -.2384 
          peja |   -1.62864   .6724134    -2.42   0.015    -2.946546   -.3107341 
      prizreni |  -.9487918    .656736    -1.44   0.149    -2.235971    .3383871 
         _cons |   4.490317   6.479971     0.69   0.488    -8.210193    17.19083 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME3           | 
           age |   .2609986   .4822458     0.54   0.588    -.6841859    1.206183 
         agesq |  -.0014034   .0085829    -0.16   0.870    -.0182256    .0154188 
          male |   .3095447   1.301042     0.24   0.812    -2.240451    2.859541 
      minority |  -2.786682   1.423009    -1.96   0.050    -5.575729     .002365 
  socialassist |  -1.271493   1.183893    -1.07   0.283    -3.591881    1.048895 
 secondaryeduc |   .7815913   .6895376     1.13   0.257    -.5698776     2.13306 
  tertiaryeduc |   1.112657   .7914902     1.41   0.160    -.4386352     2.66395 
        hhsize |  -.1692422    .147936    -1.14   0.253    -.4591915     .120707 
     hhsizegen |   .1432245   .1927477     0.74   0.457     -.234554    .5210031 
       ferizaj |    1.16948    .698987     1.67   0.094     -.200509     2.53947 
       gjakova |  -1.042794   1.000341    -1.04   0.297    -3.003426    .9178394 
       gjilani |   .0934563   .6177404     0.15   0.880    -1.117293    1.304205 
     mitrovica |  -.1266804   .7783693    -0.16   0.871    -1.652256    1.398895 
          peja |  -1.422819   .9443763    -1.51   0.132    -3.273762    .4281244 
      prizreni |  -1.025527   .9272289    -1.11   0.269    -2.842862    .7918083 
         _cons |  -6.462511   6.855552    -0.94   0.346    -19.89915    6.974123 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1           | 
           age |   1.452835   .1796828     8.09   0.000     1.100663    1.805007 
         agesq |  -.0285565   .0033743    -8.46   0.000      -.03517    -.021943 
          male |  -.6717092   .2580573    -2.60   0.009    -1.177492   -.1659261 
      minority |  -.1324891    .231146    -0.57   0.567    -.5855269    .3205486 
  socialassist |   3.067042   .2537005    12.09   0.000     2.569798    3.564286 
 secondaryeduc |  -.3466381   .1509441    -2.30   0.022    -.6424831   -.0507931 
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  tertiaryeduc |   .8748281   .1537469     5.69   0.000     .5734897    1.176166 
        hhsize |  -.1274079   .0279889    -4.55   0.000    -.1822651   -.0725507 
     hhsizegen |  -.0067229   .0368747    -0.18   0.855     -.078996    .0655502 
       ferizaj |   .8270523   .1986786     4.16   0.000     .4376494    1.216455 
       gjakova |   1.108157    .191103     5.80   0.000     .7336015    1.482712 
       gjilani |   1.934041    .184201    10.50   0.000     1.573013    2.295068 
     mitrovica |   1.243574   .2015755     6.17   0.000     .8484936    1.638655 
          peja |   .5639601   .2007041     2.81   0.005     .1705872     .957333 
      prizreni |   1.069853   .1865271     5.74   0.000     .7042669     1.43544 
         _cons |  -20.13843   2.367687    -8.51   0.000    -24.77901   -15.49785 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME2           | 
           age |   1.360546   .2673669     5.09   0.000     .8365163    1.884575 
         agesq |  -.0264873   .0050132    -5.28   0.000    -.0363131   -.0166615 
          male |  -.8044124    .369694    -2.18   0.030    -1.528999   -.0798254 
      minority |   .0870677   .2874638     0.30   0.762     -.476351    .6504864 
  socialassist |   3.380726   .2945283    11.48   0.000     2.803462    3.957991 
 secondaryeduc |  -.0570558   .2159371    -0.26   0.792    -.4802847    .3661731 
  tertiaryeduc |   1.108868   .2257367     4.91   0.000     .6664318    1.551303 
        hhsize |  -.1674929   .0365388    -4.58   0.000    -.2391076   -.0958782 
     hhsizegen |   .0219234   .0553486     0.40   0.692    -.0865579    .1304047 
       ferizaj |   1.565415   .2914305     5.37   0.000     .9942216    2.136608 
       gjakova |   1.608339   .2940545     5.47   0.000     1.032002    2.184675 
       gjilani |   2.324789   .2845205     8.17   0.000     1.767139    2.882439 
     mitrovica |   1.920447   .2892411     6.64   0.000     1.353545    2.487349 
          peja |   1.408167   .2860544     4.92   0.000     .8475103    1.968823 
      prizreni |   1.137828   .3102009     3.67   0.000     .5298456    1.745811 
         _cons |  -20.35176   3.514834    -5.79   0.000     -27.2407   -13.46281 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME3           | 
           age |   1.914787   .3967772     4.83   0.000     1.137118    2.692456 
         agesq |  -.0366737    .007375    -4.97   0.000    -.0511284   -.0222189 
          male |   -1.91522   .4409584    -4.34   0.000    -2.779483   -1.050958 
      minority |   .0075032   .3308248     0.02   0.982    -.6409015     .655908 
  socialassist |   2.702783   .3957607     6.83   0.000     1.927106    3.478459 
 secondaryeduc |  -.6107306   .2664775    -2.29   0.022    -1.133017   -.0884443 
  tertiaryeduc |    .240355   .2659369     0.90   0.366    -.2808719    .7615818 
        hhsize |  -.2508386   .0533032    -4.71   0.000     -.355311   -.1463662 
     hhsizegen |   .1607539    .066522     2.42   0.016     .0303731    .2911347 
       ferizaj |   .1565877   .2890636     0.54   0.588    -.4099665    .7231419 
       gjakova |  -.7563943   .4065169    -1.86   0.063    -1.553153    .0403642 
       gjilani |   1.227501   .2417102     5.08   0.000     .7537573    1.701244 
     mitrovica |  -.4284341   .3908317    -1.10   0.273     -1.19445    .3375821 
          peja |  -.8302177   .3820004    -2.17   0.030    -1.578925   -.0815106 
      prizreni |   -.086036   .3056564    -0.28   0.778    -.6851115    .5130396 
         _cons |  -25.72966   5.288687    -4.87   0.000     -36.0953   -15.36402 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 6.5 Outcome variable: contract – Model 1 
Table A6.5.1 Balancing diagnostics for full model specification  
 
. *** Multinomial probit treatment model  
 
.  
. teffects ipw (contract) (multitreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc emp2011 emphist hhsize hhsizegen ferizaj gjakova gjilani 
mitrovica peja prizren), atet vce(robust) aequ 
 
*** Balancing diagnostics  
 
. tebalance sum  
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                 Observations       
                               Treatment           Raw     Weighted 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                          0bn.multitr~t =        3,030        981.3 
                          1.multitrea~t =          192        805.6 
                          2.multitrea~t =           85        817.8 
                          3.multitrea~t =           41        743.3 
                          Total         =        3,348      3,348.0 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw    Weighted           Raw   Weighted 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  1.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.8541074    .1985329      .3211038   1.011826 
            agesq |  -.9042022    .1939183      .2602484   1.048803 
             male |  -.3350564   -.0321589      1.300651     1.0144 
         minority |  -.1939599    .0499512      .4096266   1.385678 
     socialassist |    .318195   -.1924937      16.49953   .5499166 
    secondaryeduc |  -.5828769    .1492713      .9783695   1.127637 
     tertiaryeduc |   .6902729    .2977356      1.390499    1.02651 
          emp2011 |  -1.061003    .2780044      17.92027   .9553397 
          emphist |  -.6408278    .0459344       14.8085   .9359292 
           hhsize |  -.4313253   -.0517238       .340526   1.521414 
        hhsizegen |  -.4544393     -.05962      .5452324   1.091934 
          ferizaj |  -.1755376    .1360573      .6441975   1.623591 
          gjakova |   .2596445    .2515405      1.742028   1.694551 
          gjilani |    .242738    .1137196      1.942823   1.303381 
        mitrovica |  -.0767595    .1176713       .804163   1.533829 
             peja |   .2896076   -.4374641      2.148954   .5867448 
         prizreni |  -.0659324    .1643801      .9052136    1.39153 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  2.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.8206716     .234506      .3880385   .9673091 
            agesq |  -.8688701    .2284668      .3077882   .9740608 
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             male |  -.2089692    .0464143      1.225166    .976314 
         minority |  -.0322535    .0244565       .900063   1.181404 
     socialassist |   .4291552   -.1728828      26.21908   .5925965 
    secondaryeduc |  -.5729057    .0867995      .9900074   1.079246 
     tertiaryeduc |   .5118697     .379239      1.410183   1.003156 
          emp2011 |  -.9178498    .2532006      16.74044   .9652274 
          emphist |   -.504344       .0114      11.38537    .984434 
           hhsize |  -.4823514   -.0935517      .3923256    1.81289 
        hhsizegen |  -.3935506   -.0173187      .5850512   1.200256 
          ferizaj |  -.0259818    .1704414      .9564168     1.7973 
          gjakova |   .1679657    .3082595      1.491215   1.846884 
          gjilani |   .4536141    .0773054      2.808791   1.205164 
        mitrovica |   .0920838    .0987764      1.266311    1.44252 
             peja |    .213936   -.4999056      1.848637    .518054 
         prizreni |   -.349434    .2287288       .472546    1.54132 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  3.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.7769607    .5690412      .2918462    1.83106 
            agesq |  -.8300852    .5606674       .261426   2.417672 
             male |  -.5140741    .1470868       1.37947   .9117922 
         minority |  -.2031288    -.069451      .3918567    .559816 
     socialassist |  -.0813654   -.4980214             0          0 
    secondaryeduc |  -.4888091    .3427804      1.044886   1.224401 
     tertiaryeduc |   .4948223    .2058703      1.425718   1.037678 
          emp2011 |  -.4369979     .196124      8.219791   .9839879 
          emphist |  -.1018025    .4338279      2.263379   .3751892 
           hhsize |  -.6049662   -.0900813      .2959158   .9724069 
        hhsizegen |  -.6203855    .0872319      .5012403   .9334936 
          ferizaj |   .0229168    .0493114      1.074228   1.213258 
          gjakova |  -.1866564    .0880038        .54102   1.240396 
          gjilani |   .5543133    .2320697       3.21803   1.622259 
        mitrovica |  -.3161127    -.154569      .2709133   .4377105 
             peja |  -.2006215   -.5278004      .3954956   .4874217 
         prizreni |  -.3816488    .5462008       .429547   2.145062 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Table A6.5.2 PSM  
. ***Binary treatment model  
 
.  
. teffects psmatch (contract) (bintreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc emp2011 hhsize hhsizegen regunmp),  nneighbor(1) atet 
vce(robust) 
 
Treatment-effects estimation                   Number of obs      =      4,023 
Estimator      : propensity-score matching     Matches: requested =          1 
Outcome model  : matching                                     min =          1 
Treatment model: logit                                        max =          8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              AI Robust 
    contract |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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ATET         | 
bintreatment | 
   (1 vs 0)  |  -.0813941   .0337876    -2.41   0.016    -.1476166   -.0151717 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. *** Balancing diagnostics  
 
. tebalance sum  
note: refitting the model using the generate() option 
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                   Raw      Matched 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                          Number of obs =        4,023          636 
                          Treated obs   =          318          318 
                          Control obs   =        3,705          318 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw     Matched           Raw    Matched 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
              age |  -.6687634    .0689689      .3058151   .9148338 
            agesq |  -.7321206    .0616005      .2567381    .910696 
             male |  -.3082088    .0319953      1.268022   .9875495 
         minority |  -.1413025   -.0779213       .548575   .6988825 
     socialassist |   .3160415    .0271762      12.33553   1.110221 
    secondaryeduc |  -.5695604    .0462669      .9849315   1.030838 
     tertiaryeduc |   .6534658    .0376899      1.464296    .998576 
          emp2011 |  -.3353843    .0656348      1.442703   .9610169 
           hhsize |  -.4669681    .0400817      .3434917   1.412011 
        hhsizegen |   -.445257    .0699095      .5424293    1.19541 
          regunmp |   .2064665   -.0534836      1.718873   1.029532 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. 
Table A6.5.3 IPW  
. ***Binary treatment model  
 
.  
. teffects ipw (contract) (bintreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc emp2011 hhsize hhsizegen regunmp), atet vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  1.495e-24   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  6.230e-32   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      4,023 
Estimator      : inverse-probability weights 
Outcome model  : weighted mean 
Treatment model: logit 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     contract |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
 bintreatment | 
    (1 vs 0)  |  -.0531552   .0295037    -1.80   0.072    -.1109814    .0046711 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
 bintreatment | 
434 
 
           0  |   .7795703   .0206726    37.71   0.000     .7390528    .8200877 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1          | 
          age |   1.787138   .2308881     7.74   0.000     1.334606    2.239671 
        agesq |  -.0343107   .0042514    -8.07   0.000    -.0426433   -.0259781 
         male |   -.989517   .3603567    -2.75   0.006    -1.695803   -.2832309 
     minority |   -.413426   .3689081    -1.12   0.262    -1.136473    .3096206 
 socialassist |   3.544421   .4672553     7.59   0.000     2.628618    4.460225 
secondaryeduc |  -.5413661   .2171526    -2.49   0.013    -.9669775   -.1157547 
 tertiaryeduc |   .5932904   .2221933     2.67   0.008     .1577995    1.028781 
      emp2011 |  -.5266228    .146149    -3.60   0.000    -.8130696   -.2401759 
       hhsize |  -.2203855   .0473569    -4.65   0.000    -.3132033   -.1275677 
    hhsizegen |   .1038605   .0554772     1.87   0.061    -.0048728    .2125937 
      regunmp |    .015951   .0067856     2.35   0.019     .0026514    .0292507 
        _cons |  -23.34299   3.071429    -7.60   0.000    -29.36288    -17.3231 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
.  
.  
. ***Balancing diagnostics  
 
.  
. tebalance sum  
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                   Raw     Weighted 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                          Number of obs =        4,023      4,023.0 
                          Treated obs   =          318      2,031.7 
                          Control obs   =        3,705      1,991.3 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw    Weighted           Raw   Weighted 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
              age |  -.6687634   -.0101709      .3058151   .9922146 
            agesq |  -.7321206   -.0104416      .2567381   1.008397 
             male |  -.3082088   -.0566228      1.268022   1.027775 
         minority |  -.1413025    .0105815       .548575   1.056288 
     socialassist |   .3160415      .01832      12.33553   1.072081 
    secondaryeduc |  -.5695604    .0033879      .9849315   1.002053 
     tertiaryeduc |   .6534658    .0655545      1.464296   .9993383 
          emp2011 |  -.3353843     .026965      1.442703   .9826809 
           hhsize |  -.4669681   -.0266543      .3434917   1.151019 
        hhsizegen |   -.445257   -.0498187      .5424293   1.051337 
          regunmp |   .2064665    .0377149      1.718873   1.232486 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
.  
.  
. *** Multinomial probit treatment model  
 
.  
. teffects ipw (contract) (multitreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc emp2011 hhsize hhsizegen regunmp), atet vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  7.102e-13   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  1.004e-17   
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convergence not achieved 
    The Gauss-Newton stopping criterion has been met but missing standard errors 
indicate some of the parameters are 
    not identified. 
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      4,023 
Estimator      : inverse-probability weights 
Outcome model  : weighted mean 
Treatment model: (multinomial) logit 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |               Robust 
      contract |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET           | 
multitreatment | 
     (1 vs 0)  |  -.0889677   .0358217    -2.48   0.013     -.159177   -.0187584 
     (2 vs 0)  |   .0367267   .0420389     0.87   0.382     -.045668    .1191214 
     (3 vs 0)  |  -.0442655   .1281331    -0.35   0.730    -.2954018    .2068709 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean         | 
multitreatment | 
            0  |   .7868844   .0229639    34.27   0.000      .741876    .8318927 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1           | 
           age |    1.83568   .2897825     6.33   0.000     1.267717    2.403644 
         agesq |  -.0352208   .0053346    -6.60   0.000    -.0456764   -.0247653 
          male |  -.7631337   .4220943    -1.81   0.071    -1.590423    .0641558 
      minority |  -.6129588   .5288955    -1.16   0.246    -1.649575    .4236573 
  socialassist |    3.53812   .4913523     7.20   0.000     2.575087    4.501153 
 secondaryeduc |  -.2788955   .2901324    -0.96   0.336    -.8475447    .2897536 
  tertiaryeduc |   .9085453   .2890925     3.14   0.002     .3419345    1.475156 
       emp2011 |  -.7336788   .1753622    -4.18   0.000    -1.077382   -.3899752 
        hhsize |   -.173284   .0548441    -3.16   0.002    -.2807764   -.0657916 
     hhsizegen |   .0711857   .0638124     1.12   0.265    -.0538844    .1962558 
       regunmp |   .0251459    .007902     3.18   0.001     .0096582    .0406337 
         _cons |  -25.20534   3.881139    -6.49   0.000    -32.81223   -17.59844 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME2           | 
           age |   1.507212   .3312607     4.55   0.000     .8579531    2.156471 
         agesq |   -.029378   .0060251    -4.88   0.000    -.0411869    -.017569 
          male |  -.8360754   .6654798    -1.26   0.209    -2.140392    .4682411 
      minority |   .0408404   .4922064     0.08   0.934    -.9238664    1.005547 
  socialassist |   3.925611   .5632369     6.97   0.000     2.821687    5.029535 
 secondaryeduc |  -.7885371   .3534703    -2.23   0.026    -1.481326   -.0957481 
  tertiaryeduc |   .3625745   .3605925     1.01   0.315    -.3441738    1.069323 
       emp2011 |  -.4472538   .2575516    -1.74   0.082    -.9520457     .057538 
        hhsize |  -.2509303   .0838872    -2.99   0.003    -.4153462   -.0865144 
     hhsizegen |   .1175312   .1045144     1.12   0.261    -.0873132    .3223757 
       regunmp |   .0164741   .0123149     1.34   0.181    -.0076626    .0406107 
         _cons |  -20.64357    4.42078    -4.67   0.000    -29.30814     -11.979 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME3           | 
           age |   2.302579   .9654508     2.38   0.017     .4103298    4.194827 
         agesq |  -.0431406   .0180003    -2.40   0.017    -.0784205   -.0078607 
          male |  -2.026273   .9184989    -2.21   0.027    -3.826498   -.2260485 
      minority |  -.7855342   1.000049    -0.79   0.432    -2.745595    1.174526 
  socialassist |  -12.59514   .5067366   -24.86   0.000    -13.58833   -11.60195 
 secondaryeduc |   -.902355   .5215018    -1.73   0.084     -1.92448    .1197698 
  tertiaryeduc |  -.0747231   .5343684    -0.14   0.889    -1.122066    .9726196 
       emp2011 |   .5515534   .5077857     1.09   0.277    -.4436883    1.546795 
        hhsize |  -.3513137   .1202542    -2.92   0.003    -.5870075   -.1156199 
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     hhsizegen |   .2030183   .1510145     1.34   0.179    -.0929646    .4990012 
       regunmp |  -.0483703    .026105    -1.85   0.064    -.0995351    .0027946 
         _cons |  -30.23574   13.01587    -2.32   0.020    -55.74638   -4.725104 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Warning: convergence not achieved 
 
.  
.  
. *** Balancing diagnostics  
 
.  
. tebalance sum  
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                 Observations       
                               Treatment           Raw     Weighted 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                          0bn.multitr~t =        3,705        998.1 
                          1.multitrea~t =          192      1,029.7 
                          2.multitrea~t =           85      1,038.9 
                          3.multitrea~t =           41        956.4 
                          Total         =        4,023      4,023.0 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw    Weighted           Raw   Weighted 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  1.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.6857613    .0009526       .294323   .9883095 
            agesq |  -.7495821    .0002474      .2458971    1.00425 
             male |  -.3180552   -.0536444      1.275838   1.024964 
         minority |  -.1887856   -.0043507      .4175114   .9745746 
     socialassist |   .3072133    .0402706      11.88382   1.175286 
    secondaryeduc |  -.5837315   -.0050938      .9788369   .9967731 
     tertiaryeduc |   .7274203    .0691563      1.453482   .9903449 
          emp2011 |  -.4439931    .0042727      1.534379   .9980736 
           hhsize |  -.4313584   -.0269137      .3356183    1.03329 
        hhsizegen |  -.4406238   -.0471646       .537843   .9962539 
          regunmp |   .3088582    .0468255      1.875375   1.192052 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  2.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.6578699    .0261223      .3556752   1.057265 
            agesq |  -.7180838    .0291261      .2908153   1.050132 
             male |  -.1922079   -.0702873      1.201792   1.031568 
         minority |  -.0268375   -.0304171      .9173881   .8283963 
     socialassist |    .420082    .0276942      18.88434    1.11935 
    secondaryeduc |  -.5737564   -.0555737      .9904803   .9626369 
     tertiaryeduc |   .5472105    .1190416      1.474056   .9775959 
          emp2011 |  -.3125861   -.0515535      1.433359   1.020049 
           hhsize |  -.4821607    .0066335      .3866713   1.428475 
        hhsizegen |  -.3801953   -.0347226      .5771221   1.277959 
          regunmp |    .189243    .0635752      1.725023   1.151698 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  3.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.6091167    .1958112      .2675056   1.377136 
            agesq |  -.6772006    .2010263      .2470098   1.732563 
             male |  -.4966504    .1967056      1.353153    .865665 
         minority |  -.1979924   -.1732274      .3993995   .1957617 
     socialassist |  -.0960031   -.3183801             0          0 
    secondaryeduc |  -.4896376   -.0778948      1.045385   .9462672 
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     tertiaryeduc |   .5298783    .2181423      1.490295   .9387354 
          emp2011 |   .1956196    .2140998      .7037994   .8663008 
           hhsize |  -.6039881   -.1060098       .291651   .6602269 
        hhsizegen |  -.6055871    .0877931       .494447   .7545209 
          regunmp |  -.3595329   -.0348564      .6350091   1.110573 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. 
Table A6.5.4 RA  
 
***Binary treatment model  
 
 
. teffects ra (contract age agesq male minority secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc emp2011 
hhsize hhsizegen regunmp, logit) (bintreatment), atet vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  2.394e-23   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  8.661e-34   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      4,023 
Estimator      : regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: none 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     contract |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
 bintreatment | 
    (1 vs 0)  |  -.1036555   .0255562    -4.06   0.000    -.1537448   -.0535663 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
 bintreatment | 
           0  |   .8300706    .012748    65.11   0.000     .8050849    .8550563 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0          | 
          age |   -.019906   .0825943    -0.24   0.810     -.181788    .1419759 
        agesq |   .0009741   .0014081     0.69   0.489    -.0017856    .0037339 
         male |  -1.397117   .2572819    -5.43   0.000     -1.90138   -.8928536 
     minority |   .4338751   .2101851     2.06   0.039     .0219199    .8458303 
secondaryeduc |   .9506443   .1091263     8.71   0.000     .7367607    1.164528 
 tertiaryeduc |   3.008406   .2328904    12.92   0.000      2.55195    3.464863 
      emp2011 |   1.617769   .1039142    15.57   0.000     1.414101    1.821437 
       hhsize |  -.0529813   .0248429    -2.13   0.033    -.1016725     -.00429 
    hhsizegen |   .0464073    .027145     1.71   0.087    -.0067959    .0996105 
      regunmp |  -.0129036   .0048244    -2.67   0.007    -.0223592    -.003448 
        _cons |   .4794648   1.189622     0.40   0.687    -1.852151     2.81108 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1          | 
          age |  -.3100284    .478725    -0.65   0.517    -1.248312    .6282553 
        agesq |   .0049427   .0086465     0.57   0.568    -.0120042    .0218897 
         male |  -1.512794   .8843458    -1.71   0.087    -3.246079    .2204922 
     minority |   .1456986   .6401009     0.23   0.820    -1.108876    1.400273 
secondaryeduc |  -.2178101   .3739005    -0.58   0.560    -.9506417    .5150215 
 tertiaryeduc |   1.991002   .4548181     4.38   0.000     1.099575    2.882429 
      emp2011 |  -.2222226   .3391423    -0.66   0.512    -.8869293     .442484 
       hhsize |  -.1741016   .1189143    -1.46   0.143    -.4071694    .0589662 
    hhsizegen |   .1428746   .1328593     1.08   0.282    -.1175249    .4032742 
      regunmp |   .0385752   .0153333     2.52   0.012     .0085224    .0686279 
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        _cons |   5.498698   6.755251     0.81   0.416    -7.741351    18.73875 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
.  
.  
. ***Multinomial probit treatment model  
 
.  
.  
. teffects ra (contract age agesq male minority secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc emp2011 
hhsize hhsizegen regunmp, logit) (m 
> ultitreatment), atet vce(robust) aequ  
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  8.985e-08   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  1.571e-09   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      4,023 
Estimator      : regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: none 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |               Robust 
      contract |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET           | 
multitreatment | 
     (1 vs 0)  |   -.134498   .0332475    -4.05   0.000    -.1996618   -.0693342 
     (2 vs 0)  |  -.0247958   .0448081    -0.55   0.580    -.1126181    .0630265 
     (3 vs 0)  |  -.1135615   .0840305    -1.35   0.177    -.2782584    .0511353 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean         | 
multitreatment | 
            0  |   .8324147   .0153225    54.33   0.000     .8023831    .8624462 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0           | 
           age |   -.019906   .0825943    -0.24   0.810     -.181788    .1419759 
         agesq |   .0009741   .0014081     0.69   0.489    -.0017856    .0037339 
          male |  -1.397117   .2572819    -5.43   0.000     -1.90138   -.8928536 
      minority |   .4338751   .2101851     2.06   0.039     .0219199    .8458303 
 secondaryeduc |   .9506443   .1091263     8.71   0.000     .7367607    1.164528 
  tertiaryeduc |   3.008406   .2328904    12.92   0.000      2.55195    3.464863 
       emp2011 |   1.617769   .1039142    15.57   0.000     1.414101    1.821437 
        hhsize |  -.0529813   .0248429    -2.13   0.033    -.1016725     -.00429 
     hhsizegen |   .0464073    .027145     1.71   0.087    -.0067959    .0996105 
       regunmp |  -.0129036   .0048244    -2.67   0.007    -.0223592    -.003448 
         _cons |   .4794648   1.189622     0.40   0.687    -1.852151     2.81108 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1           | 
           age |  -.8460147   .9887881    -0.86   0.392    -2.784004    1.091974 
         agesq |   .0160004   .0182369     0.88   0.380    -.0197432     .051744 
          male |  -1.063684   1.230949    -0.86   0.388      -3.4763    1.348933 
      minority |   .0393711   1.344069     0.03   0.977    -2.594956    2.673698 
 secondaryeduc |  -.0885031   .5206252    -0.17   0.865     -1.10891    .9319035 
  tertiaryeduc |   2.255794   .6350693     3.55   0.000     1.011081    3.500507 
       emp2011 |  -.2505181   .4336732    -0.58   0.563    -1.100502    .5994658 
        hhsize |  -.0587541   .1454687    -0.40   0.686    -.3438676    .2263593 
     hhsizegen |   .0715809   .1724455     0.42   0.678    -.2664061     .409568 
       regunmp |   .0663749   .0202058     3.28   0.001     .0267723    .1059774 
         _cons |   9.852523    13.3482     0.74   0.460    -16.30948    36.01452 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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OME2           | 
           age |  -.3017703    1.00923    -0.30   0.765    -2.279825    1.676284 
         agesq |   .0018968   .0185297     0.10   0.918    -.0344208    .0382144 
          male |   -.965941   1.558284    -0.62   0.535    -4.020122     2.08824 
      minority |  -.2374131   .9844084    -0.24   0.809    -2.166818    1.691992 
 secondaryeduc |  -1.163633   .7580274    -1.54   0.125    -2.649339    .3220736 
  tertiaryeduc |   1.672863   .9902008     1.69   0.091    -.2678953     3.61362 
       emp2011 |  -.5460076    .732963    -0.74   0.456    -1.982589    .8905736 
        hhsize |  -.0100316   .2159048    -0.05   0.963    -.4331972    .4131341 
     hhsizegen |  -.0230368   .2551221    -0.09   0.928    -.5230671    .4769934 
       regunmp |  -.0187081   .0307634    -0.61   0.543    -.0790032     .041587 
         _cons |   9.970235   13.84832     0.72   0.472    -17.17197    37.11244 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME3           | 
           age |   .2384848   1.159651     0.21   0.837     -2.03439    2.511359 
         agesq |  -.0066156   .0191827    -0.34   0.730     -.044213    .0309819 
          male |  -2.786613   3.645735    -0.76   0.445    -9.932121    4.358896 
      minority |   1.251966   2.320986     0.54   0.590    -3.297082    5.801014 
 secondaryeduc |   .5300096   1.164119     0.46   0.649    -1.751621     2.81164 
  tertiaryeduc |   2.548267   1.367172     1.86   0.062    -.1313407    5.227875 
       emp2011 |   .1117718   1.209827     0.09   0.926    -2.259445    2.482989 
        hhsize |  -.4779169   .5049383    -0.95   0.344    -1.467578     .511744 
     hhsizegen |   .4880868   .6084775     0.80   0.422    -.7045071    1.680681 
       regunmp |  -.0261873   .0512062    -0.51   0.609    -.1265495     .074175 
         _cons |   1.586871   18.43861     0.09   0.931    -34.55214    37.72588 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table A6.5.5 IPWRA  
. *** Binary treatment model  
 
.  
. teffects ipwra (contract age agesq male minority secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc emp2011 
hhsize hhsizegen regunmp, logit)  (bintreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc emp2011 hhsize hhsizegen regunmp), atet vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  1.945e-23   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  6.302e-32   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      4,023 
Estimator      : IPW regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: logit 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     contract |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
 bintreatment | 
    (1 vs 0)  |  -.0917676   .0257825    -3.56   0.000    -.1423004   -.0412347 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
 bintreatment | 
           0  |   .8181827   .0138309    59.16   0.000     .7910747    .8452906 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0          | 
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          age |  -.3948837   .1830529    -2.16   0.031    -.7536608   -.0361066 
        agesq |   .0075974    .003376     2.25   0.024     .0009805    .0142143 
         male |  -1.173328   .6182617    -1.90   0.058    -2.385098    .0384429 
     minority |   1.045111   .4014246     2.60   0.009     .2583332    1.831889 
secondaryeduc |   1.298832    .178498     7.28   0.000     .9489823    1.648682 
 tertiaryeduc |   3.475867   .3279171    10.60   0.000     2.833161    4.118573 
      emp2011 |   1.571532   .1725883     9.11   0.000     1.233266    1.909799 
       hhsize |  -.0098002    .080823    -0.12   0.903    -.1682104      .14861 
    hhsizegen |   -.000643    .083786    -0.01   0.994    -.1648606    .1635745 
      regunmp |  -.0131503   .0083096    -1.58   0.114    -.0294368    .0031362 
        _cons |   5.072553   2.421922     2.09   0.036     .3256719    9.819433 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1          | 
          age |  -.3100284    .478725    -0.65   0.517    -1.248312    .6282553 
        agesq |   .0049427   .0086465     0.57   0.568    -.0120042    .0218897 
         male |  -1.512794   .8843458    -1.71   0.087    -3.246079    .2204922 
     minority |   .1456986   .6401009     0.23   0.820    -1.108876    1.400273 
secondaryeduc |  -.2178101   .3739005    -0.58   0.560    -.9506417    .5150215 
 tertiaryeduc |   1.991002   .4548181     4.38   0.000     1.099575    2.882429 
      emp2011 |  -.2222226   .3391423    -0.66   0.512    -.8869293     .442484 
       hhsize |  -.1741016   .1189143    -1.46   0.143    -.4071694    .0589662 
    hhsizegen |   .1428746   .1328593     1.08   0.282    -.1175249    .4032742 
      regunmp |   .0385752   .0153333     2.52   0.012     .0085224    .0686279 
        _cons |   5.498698   6.755251     0.81   0.416    -7.741351    18.73875 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1          | 
          age |   1.787138   .2308881     7.74   0.000     1.334606    2.239671 
        agesq |  -.0343107   .0042514    -8.07   0.000    -.0426433   -.0259781 
         male |   -.989517   .3603567    -2.75   0.006    -1.695803   -.2832309 
     minority |   -.413426   .3689081    -1.12   0.262    -1.136473    .3096206 
 socialassist |   3.544421   .4672553     7.59   0.000     2.628618    4.460225 
secondaryeduc |  -.5413661   .2171526    -2.49   0.013    -.9669775   -.1157547 
 tertiaryeduc |   .5932904   .2221933     2.67   0.008     .1577995    1.028781 
      emp2011 |  -.5266228    .146149    -3.60   0.000    -.8130696   -.2401759 
       hhsize |  -.2203855   .0473569    -4.65   0.000    -.3132033   -.1275677 
    hhsizegen |   .1038605   .0554772     1.87   0.061    -.0048728    .2125937 
      regunmp |    .015951   .0067856     2.35   0.019     .0026514    .0292507 
        _cons |  -23.34299   3.071429    -7.60   0.000    -29.36288    -17.3231 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. ***Multinomial probit treatment model  
 
. teffects ipwra (contract age agesq male minority secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc emp2011 
hhsize hhsizegen regunmp, logit) (multitreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc emp2011 hhsize hhsizegen regunmp), atet vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  1.773e-07   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  4.322e-09   
Iteration 2:   EE criterion =  1.790e-09  (not concave) 
Iteration 3:   EE criterion =  4.122e-10  (not concave) 
Iteration 4:   EE criterion =  3.292e-10   
convergence not achieved 
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    The Gauss-Newton stopping criterion has been met but missing standard errors 
indicate some of the parameters are 
    not identified. 
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      4,023 
Estimator      : IPW regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: (multinomial) logit 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |               Robust 
      contract |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET           | 
multitreatment | 
     (1 vs 0)  |  -.1254563   .0329997    -3.80   0.000    -.1901344   -.0607781 
     (2 vs 0)  |  -.0097316    .042872    -0.23   0.820    -.0937592     .074296 
     (3 vs 0)  |  -.0586955   .0555669    -1.06   0.291    -.1676046    .0502136 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean         | 
multitreatment | 
            0  |   .8233547   .0164465    50.06   0.000       .79112    .8555893 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0           | 
           age |  -.3845057   .1909874    -2.01   0.044     -.758834   -.0101773 
         agesq |   .0075053   .0035191     2.13   0.033      .000608    .0144026 
          male |   -1.21692   .5895516    -2.06   0.039     -2.37242   -.0614204 
      minority |   1.130275   .4071697     2.78   0.006     .3322369    1.928313 
 secondaryeduc |   1.312264   .2025688     6.48   0.000     .9152367    1.709292 
  tertiaryeduc |   3.592639   .3526157    10.19   0.000     2.901525    4.283753 
       emp2011 |   1.514393   .1788322     8.47   0.000     1.163888    1.864898 
        hhsize |  -.0146814   .0744079    -0.20   0.844    -.1605183    .1311555 
     hhsizegen |   .0001983   .0774412     0.00   0.998    -.1515836    .1519802 
       regunmp |  -.0123379    .009066    -1.36   0.174     -.030107    .0054312 
         _cons |    4.89783    2.54936     1.92   0.055    -.0988233    9.894484 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1           | 
           age |  -.8460147   .9887859    -0.86   0.392    -2.783999     1.09197 
         agesq |   .0160004   .0182368     0.88   0.380    -.0197431    .0517439 
          male |  -1.063684   1.230948    -0.86   0.388    -3.476298     1.34893 
      minority |   .0393694   1.344071     0.03   0.977    -2.594961      2.6737 
 secondaryeduc |   -.088504   .5206255    -0.17   0.865    -1.108911    .9319032 
  tertiaryeduc |   2.255794   .6350687     3.55   0.000     1.011082    3.500506 
       emp2011 |  -.2505188   .4336729    -0.58   0.563    -1.100502    .5994644 
        hhsize |  -.0587542   .1454687    -0.40   0.686    -.3438676    .2263591 
     hhsizegen |   .0715808   .1724454     0.42   0.678     -.266406    .4095677 
       regunmp |   .0663748   .0202057     3.28   0.001     .0267723    .1059774 
         _cons |   9.852523   13.34818     0.74   0.460    -16.30943    36.01447 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME2           | 
           age |    .038327   .9934928     0.04   0.969    -1.908883    1.985537 
         agesq |  -.0036796   .0182128    -0.20   0.840     -.039376    .0320168 
          male |  -.5615904   1.383975    -0.41   0.685    -3.274132    2.150951 
      minority |   .0786396   .9613683     0.08   0.935    -1.805608    1.962887 
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 secondaryeduc |  -.9512698   .8003593    -1.19   0.235    -2.519945    .6174055 
  tertiaryeduc |   1.567525   1.003617     1.56   0.118    -.3995295    3.534579 
       emp2011 |  -.7392993   .7239441    -1.02   0.307    -2.158204    .6796051 
        hhsize |   .1042546   .1858189     0.56   0.575    -.2599439     .468453 
     hhsizegen |  -.0811694   .2268486    -0.36   0.720    -.5257844    .3634456 
       regunmp |  -.0112761   .0316631    -0.36   0.722    -.0733346    .0507823 
         _cons |   3.991379    13.8049     0.29   0.772    -23.06573    31.04849 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME3           | 
           age |   .9253214   1.221767     0.76   0.449    -1.469297     3.31994 
         agesq |  -.0218975   .0209477    -1.05   0.296    -.0629543    .0191593 
          male |  -5.765252   4.051101    -1.42   0.155    -13.70526    2.174761 
      minority |    2.36218   2.379711     0.99   0.321    -2.301967    7.026327 
 secondaryeduc |   .5367164   1.314153     0.41   0.683    -2.038975    3.112408 
  tertiaryeduc |   2.982151   1.586117     1.88   0.060    -.1265812    6.090884 
       emp2011 |  -1.508574    1.19464    -1.26   0.207    -3.850027    .8328781 
        hhsize |  -.9145722   .6076637    -1.51   0.132    -2.105571    .2764268 
     hhsizegen |   .9735966   .6708974     1.45   0.147    -.3413381    2.288531 
       regunmp |   .0124613   .0592105     0.21   0.833    -.1035891    .1285116 
         _cons |  -2.752929   18.38747    -0.15   0.881     -38.7917    33.28584 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1           | 
           age |    1.83568   .2897815     6.33   0.000     1.267719    2.403642 
         agesq |  -.0352208   .0053346    -6.60   0.000    -.0456764   -.0247653 
          male |  -.7631325   .4220953    -1.81   0.071    -1.590424     .064159 
      minority |  -.6129801   .5289027    -1.16   0.246     -1.64961    .4236502 
  socialassist |   3.538121    .491353     7.20   0.000     2.575087    4.501155 
 secondaryeduc |  -.2788772   .2901332    -0.96   0.336    -.8475277    .2897733 
  tertiaryeduc |   .9085496   .2890938     3.14   0.002     .3419362    1.475163 
       emp2011 |  -.7337022   .1753612    -4.18   0.000    -1.077404   -.3900005 
        hhsize |  -.1732843   .0548445    -3.16   0.002    -.2807775   -.0657912 
     hhsizegen |    .071187   .0638126     1.12   0.265    -.0538834    .1962574 
       regunmp |   .0251459    .007902     3.18   0.001     .0096581    .0406336 
         _cons |  -25.20534   3.881125    -6.49   0.000     -32.8122   -17.59847 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME2           | 
           age |   1.507212   .3312599     4.55   0.000     .8579547     2.15647 
         agesq |   -.029378   .0060251    -4.88   0.000    -.0411869    -.017569 
          male |  -.8360743   .6654799    -1.26   0.209    -2.140391    .4682424 
      minority |   .0408385   .4922064     0.08   0.934    -.9238682    1.005545 
  socialassist |   3.925612   .5632367     6.97   0.000     2.821688    5.029535 
 secondaryeduc |  -.7885339   .3534696    -2.23   0.026    -1.481321   -.0957462 
  tertiaryeduc |    .362573   .3605922     1.01   0.315    -.3441747    1.069321 
       emp2011 |  -.4472578    .257551    -1.74   0.082    -.9520485    .0575329 
        hhsize |  -.2509302   .0838874    -2.99   0.003    -.4153465   -.0865139 
     hhsizegen |   .1175317   .1045143     1.12   0.261    -.0873127     .322376 
       regunmp |   .0164741   .0123148     1.34   0.181    -.0076626    .0406107 
         _cons |  -20.64357   4.420769    -4.67   0.000    -29.30812   -11.97902 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME3           | 
           age |   2.302577   .9655172     2.38   0.017     .4101979    4.194956 
         agesq |  -.0431407   .0180015    -2.40   0.017     -.078423   -.0078584 
          male |  -2.026316   .9185344    -2.21   0.027     -3.82661   -.2260216 
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      minority |  -.7851754   .9998204    -0.79   0.432    -2.744787    1.174436 
  socialassist |  -1.57e+25          .        .       .            .           . 
 secondaryeduc |  -.9025561   .5215195    -1.73   0.084    -1.924716    .1196035 
  tertiaryeduc |  -.0747617   .5343678    -0.14   0.889    -1.122103      .97258 
       emp2011 |   .5517549   .5078745     1.09   0.277    -.4436607    1.547171 
        hhsize |  -.3513113   .1202511    -2.92   0.003    -.5869992   -.1156235 
     hhsizegen |   .2030071   .1510193     1.34   0.179    -.0929852    .4989995 
       regunmp |  -.0483687   .0261055    -1.85   0.064    -.0995346    .0027972 
         _cons |  -30.23575   13.01677    -2.32   0.020    -55.74815   -4.723346 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Warning: convergence not achieved 
 
Table 6.6 Outcome variable: contract – Model 2, excluding 
emp2011 
Table A6.6.1 PSM  
*** Binary treatment model  
 
. teffects psmatch (contract) (bintreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc hhsize hhsizegen regunmp),  nneighbor(1) atet vce(robust) 
 
Treatment-effects estimation                   Number of obs      =      4,034 
Estimator      : propensity-score matching     Matches: requested =          1 
Outcome model  : matching                                     min =          1 
Treatment model: logit                                        max =         10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              AI Robust 
    contract |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET         | 
bintreatment | 
   (1 vs 0)  |  -.0897799   .0330325    -2.72   0.007    -.1545224   -.0250373 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
*** Balancing diagnostics  
 
 
 
. tebalance sum 
note: refitting the model using the generate() option 
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                   Raw      Matched 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                          Number of obs =        4,034          636 
                          Treated obs   =          318          318 
                          Control obs   =        3,716          318 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw     Matched           Raw    Matched 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
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              age |  -.6683655   -.0652905      .3059298   .9740904 
            agesq |  -.7316696   -.0653543      .2568255   .9619142 
             male |  -.3074472     -.05818      1.266947   1.028703 
         minority |  -.1416016    .0974457      .5479843   1.803953 
     socialassist |   .3139258    .0558519      11.68782   1.249945 
    secondaryeduc |   -.567801    .0730582      .9840757   1.051425 
     tertiaryeduc |   .6537529   -.0314459      1.464826   1.003378 
           hhsize |  -.4663061    .0313226      .3440954   1.220738 
        hhsizegen |  -.4445942   -.0094706      .5429146   1.182609 
          regunmp |   .2053474   -.0394231      1.714623   1.138531 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table A6.6.2 IPW  
 
. ***Binary treatment model  
 
. 
.  
. teffects ipw (contract) (bintreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc hhsize hhsizegen regunmp) if insampm2==1, atet vce(robust) 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  1.128e-24   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  1.820e-31   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      4,034 
Estimator      : inverse-probability weights 
Outcome model  : weighted mean 
Treatment model: logit 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     contract |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
 bintreatment | 
    (1 vs 0)  |  -.0795846   .0270803    -2.94   0.003    -.1326611   -.0265082 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
 bintreatment | 
           0  |   .8059997   .0166957    48.28   0.000     .7732767    .8387227 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. *** Balancing diagnostics  
 
.  
. tebalance sum  
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                   Raw     Weighted 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                          Number of obs =        4,034      4,034.0 
                          Treated obs   =          318      2,045.6 
                          Control obs   =        3,716      1,988.4 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
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                  |        Raw    Weighted           Raw   Weighted 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
              age |  -.6683655    -.006593      .3059298   .9905808 
            agesq |  -.7316696   -.0070228      .2568255   1.003412 
             male |  -.3074472    -.044584      1.266947    1.02122 
         minority |  -.1416016    .0055177      .5479843   1.028734 
     socialassist |   .3139258    .0825861      11.68782   1.407681 
    secondaryeduc |   -.567801   -.0039861      .9840757   .9975961 
     tertiaryeduc |   .6537529    .0413855      1.464826   .9985752 
           hhsize |  -.4663061   -.0185211      .3440954   1.125238 
        hhsizegen |  -.4445942   -.0391478      .5429146   1.044958 
          regunmp |   .2053474    .0163749      1.714623   1.201666 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
.  
.  
. ***Multivalued treatment model  
 
.  
. teffects ipw (contract) (multitreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc hhsize hhsizegen regunmp) if insampm2==1, atet vce(robust) 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  4.151e-11   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  2.627e-18   
convergence not achieved 
    The Gauss-Newton stopping criterion has been met but missing standard errors 
indicate some of the parameters are 
    not identified. 
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      4,034 
Estimator      : inverse-probability weights 
Outcome model  : weighted mean 
Treatment model: (multinomial) logit 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |               Robust 
      contract |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET           | 
multitreatment | 
     (1 vs 0)  |  -.1212863   .0330934    -3.66   0.000    -.1861481   -.0564245 
     (2 vs 0)  |   .0008112   .0406699     0.02   0.984    -.0789002    .0805227 
     (3 vs 0)  |  -.0420783   .0860356    -0.49   0.625    -.2107049    .1265483 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean         | 
multitreatment | 
            0  |    .819203   .0178698    45.84   0.000     .7841788    .8542271 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Warning: convergence not achieved 
 
.  
. *** Balancing diagnostics  
 
.  
. tebalance sum  
 
  Covariate balance summary 
                                                 Observations       
                               Treatment           Raw     Weighted 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
                          0bn.multitr~t =        3,716        975.3 
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                          1.multitrea~t =          192      1,011.2 
                          2.multitrea~t =           85      1,012.4 
                          3.multitrea~t =           41      1,035.0 
                          Total         =        4,034      4,034.0 
                          ----------------------------------------- 
 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |Standardized differences          Variance ratio 
                  |        Raw    Weighted           Raw   Weighted 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  1.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.6853646    .0006308      .2944334   .9909685 
            agesq |   -.749132    .0000898      .2459809   1.003484 
             male |  -.3172932   -.0427811      1.274756   1.019348 
         minority |  -.1890778   -.0032868      .4170619   .9806851 
     socialassist |   .3050684    .1197272      11.25983   1.716186 
    secondaryeduc |  -.5819661   -.0070876      .9779864   .9955346 
     tertiaryeduc |   .7277135    .0391452      1.454008   .9933294 
           hhsize |  -.4306719   -.0174493      .3362081   1.009848 
        hhsizegen |  -.4399588   -.0369529      .5383242    .991684 
          regunmp |   .3077284    .0162281      1.870737   1.162522 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  2.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.6574762   -.0077818      .3558087   1.039286 
            agesq |  -.7176357   -.0053773      .2909144   1.021221 
             male |  -.1914564   -.0696512      1.200773   1.029694 
         minority |   -.027143   -.0114377      .9164003   .9335883 
     socialassist |   .4183005    .1216673      17.89277   1.729156 
    secondaryeduc |  -.5719987   -.0421551      .9896197   .9723164 
     tertiaryeduc |   .5474891     .067965       1.47459   .9865208 
           hhsize |   -.481514    .0170899      .3873509   1.399928 
        hhsizegen |  -.3795199    -.029527      .5776384   1.277966 
          regunmp |   .1881332    .0152758      1.720757   1.100384 
  ----------------+------------------------------------------------ 
  3.multitreatm~t | 
              age |  -.6087055   -.0341952      .2676059   .7487333 
            agesq |  -.6767408   -.0478777       .247094   .8549602 
             male |  -.4958697    .1844547      1.352005   .8796062 
         minority |  -.1982826   -.1593651      .3989694   .2438254 
     socialassist |  -.0986528   -.2591778             0          0 
    secondaryeduc |  -.4879232   -.2440004      1.044477   .8029359 
     tertiaryeduc |   .5301546    .3063669      1.490834    .873212 
           hhsize |  -.6034122     -.22448      .2921636   .6309171 
        hhsizegen |  -.6049638   -.0132029      .4948894   .6579276 
          regunmp |   -.360582    .2120915      .6334388   1.274302 
  ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. 
Table A6.6.3 RA  
*** Binary treatment model  
 
. teffects ra (contract age agesq male minority secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc hhsize 
hhsizegen regunmp, logit) (bintreatment) if insampm2==1, atet vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  2.472e-20   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  2.141e-33   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      4,034 
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Estimator      : regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: none 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     contract |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
 bintreatment | 
    (1 vs 0)  |  -.1155597   .0244018    -4.74   0.000    -.1633863   -.0677331 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
 bintreatment | 
           0  |   .8419748   .0109942    76.58   0.000     .8204265    .8635231 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0          | 
          age |   .1509179   .0760053     1.99   0.047     .0019503    .2998854 
        agesq |  -.0014991   .0012969    -1.16   0.248    -.0040409    .0010428 
         male |  -1.119548   .2352938    -4.76   0.000    -1.580715   -.6583806 
     minority |   .4620416   .2029913     2.28   0.023     .0641861    .8598972 
secondaryeduc |   1.010762   .1056509     9.57   0.000     .8036898    1.217834 
 tertiaryeduc |   2.988407   .2196649    13.60   0.000     2.557871    3.418942 
       hhsize |  -.0469601   .0222715    -2.11   0.035    -.0906115   -.0033087 
    hhsizegen |   .0392287   .0247578     1.58   0.113    -.0092956    .0877531 
      regunmp |  -.0122432   .0046459    -2.64   0.008     -.021349   -.0031374 
        _cons |  -1.424089   1.092765    -1.30   0.193    -3.565869     .717691 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1          | 
          age |  -.3297062   .4786149    -0.69   0.491    -1.267774    .6083617 
        agesq |    .005416    .008662     0.63   0.532    -.0115613    .0223933 
         male |  -1.487412     .89927    -1.65   0.098    -3.249949    .2751249 
     minority |   .1079531   .6478203     0.17   0.868    -1.161751    1.377658 
secondaryeduc |  -.2079764   .3746633    -0.56   0.579     -.942303    .5263501 
 tertiaryeduc |   2.004656   .4553119     4.40   0.000     1.112261    2.897051 
       hhsize |  -.1737133   .1218414    -1.43   0.154    -.4125181    .0650915 
    hhsizegen |   .1389784   .1355916     1.02   0.305    -.1267763    .4047331 
      regunmp |   .0410547   .0147819     2.78   0.005     .0120828    .0700266 
        _cons |   5.438624   6.717985     0.81   0.418    -7.728385    18.60563 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. ***Multivalued treatment model 
 
. teffects ra (contract age agesq male minority secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc hhsize 
hhsizegen regunmp, logit) (multitreatment) if insampm2==1, atet vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  9.201e-08   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  1.557e-09   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      4,034 
Estimator      : regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: none 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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               |               Robust 
      contract |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET           | 
multitreatment | 
     (1 vs 0)  |  -.1536416   .0310279    -4.95   0.000    -.2144552    -.092828 
     (2 vs 0)  |  -.0462612   .0451839    -1.02   0.306      -.13482    .0422977 
     (3 vs 0)  |  -.1277609   .0718879    -1.78   0.076    -.2686585    .0131367 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean         | 
multitreatment | 
            0  |   .8515583   .0127352    66.87   0.000     .8265977    .8765188 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0           | 
           age |   .1509179   .0760053     1.99   0.047     .0019503    .2998854 
         agesq |  -.0014991   .0012969    -1.16   0.248    -.0040409    .0010428 
          male |  -1.119548   .2352938    -4.76   0.000    -1.580715   -.6583806 
      minority |   .4620416   .2029913     2.28   0.023     .0641861    .8598972 
 secondaryeduc |   1.010762   .1056509     9.57   0.000     .8036898    1.217834 
  tertiaryeduc |   2.988407   .2196649    13.60   0.000     2.557871    3.418942 
        hhsize |  -.0469601   .0222715    -2.11   0.035    -.0906115   -.0033087 
     hhsizegen |   .0392287   .0247578     1.58   0.113    -.0092956    .0877531 
       regunmp |  -.0122432   .0046459    -2.64   0.008     -.021349   -.0031374 
         _cons |  -1.424089   1.092765    -1.30   0.193    -3.565869     .717691 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1           | 
           age |   -.816214   .9952297    -0.82   0.412    -2.766828      1.1344 
         agesq |   .0155984   .0184517     0.85   0.398    -.0205664    .0517632 
          male |  -1.065753   1.253671    -0.85   0.395    -3.522903    1.391397 
      minority |   .0286073   1.389039     0.02   0.984    -2.693859    2.751073 
 secondaryeduc |  -.0919015   .5221325    -0.18   0.860    -1.115262    .9314594 
  tertiaryeduc |   2.252352   .6304068     3.57   0.000     1.016777    3.487926 
        hhsize |  -.0617598   .1493416    -0.41   0.679     -.354464    .2309443 
     hhsizegen |   .0710117   .1762196     0.40   0.687    -.2743724    .4163957 
       regunmp |   .0693664   .0203803     3.40   0.001     .0294217    .1093111 
         _cons |   9.117835    13.3014     0.69   0.493    -16.95242    35.18809 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME2           | 
           age |  -.5053123   .9575999    -0.53   0.598    -2.382174    1.371549 
         agesq |   .0058938    .017436     0.34   0.735    -.0282802    .0400679 
          male |  -.7932958   1.560302    -0.51   0.611    -3.851431     2.26484 
      minority |   -.382802    .981652    -0.39   0.697    -2.306805    1.541201 
 secondaryeduc |  -1.132552   .7404314    -1.53   0.126    -2.583771     .318667 
  tertiaryeduc |   1.748164   .9586256     1.82   0.068    -.1307072    3.627036 
        hhsize |  -.0038068   .2140206    -0.02   0.986    -.4232794    .4156658 
     hhsizegen |  -.0434369   .2515896    -0.17   0.863    -.5365435    .4496697 
       regunmp |  -.0144334   .0282511    -0.51   0.609    -.0698045    .0409377 
         _cons |    11.8829   13.32835     0.89   0.373    -14.24018    38.00599 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME3           | 
           age |    .262944   1.096424     0.24   0.810    -1.886007    2.411895 
         agesq |  -.0071313   .0177355    -0.40   0.688    -.0418922    .0276296 
          male |  -2.790956   3.628883    -0.77   0.442    -9.903435    4.321524 
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      minority |   1.253479   2.297178     0.55   0.585    -3.248907    5.755864 
 secondaryeduc |   .5137475   1.150719     0.45   0.655     -1.74162    2.769115 
  tertiaryeduc |   2.538786   1.361588     1.86   0.062    -.1298767    5.207448 
        hhsize |  -.4808211   .5027216    -0.96   0.339    -1.466137    .5044951 
     hhsizegen |   .4901745   .6083491     0.81   0.420    -.7021679    1.682517 
       regunmp |  -.0250085   .0508912    -0.49   0.623    -.1247535    .0747364 
         _cons |    1.39812   18.10044     0.08   0.938    -34.07809    36.87433 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. 
Table A6.6.4 IPWRA  
*** Binary treatment model 
 
. teffects ipwra (contract age agesq male minority secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc hhsize 
hhsizegen regunmp, logit) (bintreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc emp2011 hhsize hhsizegen regunmp) if insampm2==1, atet 
vce(robust) aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  4.291e-24   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  9.033e-32   
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      4,023 
Estimator      : IPW regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: logit 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     contract |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET          | 
 bintreatment | 
    (1 vs 0)  |  -.0781049   .0256902    -3.04   0.002    -.1284567   -.0277531 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean        | 
 bintreatment | 
           0  |     .80452   .0144908    55.52   0.000     .7761186    .8329214 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0          | 
          age |  -.2213412   .1783175    -1.24   0.215     -.570837    .1281546 
        agesq |    .004747   .0032516     1.46   0.144    -.0016259    .0111199 
         male |   -1.18453   .5210096    -2.27   0.023    -2.205689   -.1633696 
     minority |   .9736999   .3917071     2.49   0.013     .2059681    1.741432 
secondaryeduc |    1.53916   .2220761     6.93   0.000     1.103899    1.974421 
 tertiaryeduc |   3.595352   .3326008    10.81   0.000     2.943467    4.247238 
       hhsize |  -.0334602   .0667151    -0.50   0.616    -.1642194     .097299 
    hhsizegen |   .0287724   .0703799     0.41   0.683    -.1091696    .1667144 
      regunmp |  -.0110411   .0079914    -1.38   0.167    -.0267039    .0046217 
        _cons |   3.180737   2.349005     1.35   0.176    -1.423228    7.784701 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1          | 
          age |  -.3297062   .4786149    -0.69   0.491    -1.267774    .6083617 
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        agesq |    .005416    .008662     0.63   0.532    -.0115613    .0223933 
         male |  -1.487412     .89927    -1.65   0.098    -3.249949    .2751249 
     minority |   .1079531   .6478203     0.17   0.868    -1.161751    1.377658 
secondaryeduc |  -.2079764   .3746633    -0.56   0.579     -.942303    .5263501 
 tertiaryeduc |   2.004656   .4553119     4.40   0.000     1.112261    2.897051 
       hhsize |  -.1737133   .1218414    -1.43   0.154    -.4125181    .0650915 
    hhsizegen |   .1389784   .1355916     1.02   0.305    -.1267763    .4047331 
      regunmp |   .0410547   .0147819     2.78   0.005     .0120828    .0700266 
        _cons |   5.438624   6.717985     0.81   0.418    -7.728385    18.60563 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1          | 
          age |   1.787138   .2308881     7.74   0.000     1.334606    2.239671 
        agesq |  -.0343107   .0042514    -8.07   0.000    -.0426433   -.0259781 
         male |   -.989517   .3603567    -2.75   0.006    -1.695803   -.2832309 
     minority |   -.413426   .3689081    -1.12   0.262    -1.136473    .3096206 
 socialassist |   3.544421   .4672553     7.59   0.000     2.628618    4.460225 
secondaryeduc |  -.5413661   .2171526    -2.49   0.013    -.9669775   -.1157547 
 tertiaryeduc |   .5932904   .2221933     2.67   0.008     .1577995    1.028781 
      emp2011 |  -.5266228    .146149    -3.60   0.000    -.8130696   -.2401759 
       hhsize |  -.2203855   .0473569    -4.65   0.000    -.3132033   -.1275677 
    hhsizegen |   .1038605   .0554772     1.87   0.061    -.0048728    .2125937 
      regunmp |    .015951   .0067856     2.35   0.019     .0026514    .0292507 
        _cons |  -23.34299   3.071429    -7.60   0.000    -29.36288    -17.3231 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. ***Multivalued treatment model 
 
.  
. teffects ipwra (contract age agesq male minority secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc  hhsize 
hhsizegen regunmp, logit) (multitreatment age agesq male minority socialassist 
secondaryeduc tertiaryeduc hhsize hhsizegen regunmp) if insampm2==1, atet vce(robust) 
aequ 
 
Iteration 0:   EE criterion =  2.187e-07   
Iteration 1:   EE criterion =  3.446e-10   
Iteration 2:   EE criterion =  9.884e-11   
convergence not achieved 
    The Gauss-Newton stopping criterion has been met but missing standard errors 
indicate some of the parameters are 
    not identified. 
 
Treatment-effects estimation                    Number of obs     =      4,034 
Estimator      : IPW regression adjustment 
Outcome model  : logit 
Treatment model: (multinomial) logit 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |               Robust 
      contract |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATET           | 
multitreatment | 
     (1 vs 0)  |  -.1342829   .0316864    -4.24   0.000    -.1963871   -.0721787 
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     (2 vs 0)  |  -.0223395   .0433742    -0.52   0.607    -.1073514    .0626725 
     (3 vs 0)  |  -.1111155   .0695782    -1.60   0.110    -.2474864    .0252553 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
POmean         | 
multitreatment | 
            0  |   .8321996   .0149664    55.60   0.000     .8028659    .8615333 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME0           | 
           age |  -.2721033   .1814601    -1.50   0.134    -.6277586     .083552 
         agesq |   .0059646    .003324     1.79   0.073    -.0005503    .0124795 
          male |  -1.184218   .5403033    -2.19   0.028    -2.243193   -.1252434 
      minority |   .8540586   .4248918     2.01   0.044     .0212859    1.686831 
 secondaryeduc |   1.430745   .2309481     6.20   0.000     .9780949    1.883395 
  tertiaryeduc |   3.207037   .3268682     9.81   0.000     2.566387    3.847687 
        hhsize |  -.0171822   .0621049    -0.28   0.782    -.1389056    .1045412 
     hhsizegen |   .0145005   .0673594     0.22   0.830    -.1175215    .1465225 
       regunmp |  -.0142443    .008678    -1.64   0.101    -.0312529    .0027643 
         _cons |   4.005356   2.369792     1.69   0.091    -.6393508    8.650063 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME1           | 
           age |   -.816214   .9952297    -0.82   0.412    -2.766828      1.1344 
         agesq |   .0155984   .0184517     0.85   0.398    -.0205664    .0517632 
          male |  -1.065753   1.253671    -0.85   0.395    -3.522903    1.391397 
      minority |   .0286073   1.389039     0.02   0.984    -2.693859    2.751073 
 secondaryeduc |  -.0919015   .5221325    -0.18   0.860    -1.115262    .9314594 
  tertiaryeduc |   2.252352   .6304068     3.57   0.000     1.016777    3.487926 
        hhsize |  -.0617598   .1493416    -0.41   0.679     -.354464    .2309443 
     hhsizegen |   .0710117   .1762196     0.40   0.687    -.2743724    .4163957 
       regunmp |   .0693664   .0203803     3.40   0.001     .0294217    .1093111 
         _cons |   9.117835    13.3014     0.69   0.493    -16.95242    35.18809 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME2           | 
           age |  -.4008049   .9087165    -0.44   0.659    -2.181857    1.380247 
         agesq |   .0047686    .016508     0.29   0.773    -.0275865    .0371236 
          male |  -.3087912   1.322937    -0.23   0.815    -2.901699    2.284117 
      minority |  -.1051537   .9575459    -0.11   0.913    -1.981909    1.771602 
 secondaryeduc |  -.8943782   .7643829    -1.17   0.242    -2.392541    .6037847 
  tertiaryeduc |   1.607709   .9624972     1.67   0.095    -.2787508    3.494169 
        hhsize |    .099376   .1774577     0.56   0.575    -.2484348    .4471868 
     hhsizegen |  -.1037994   .2139058    -0.49   0.627    -.5230469    .3154482 
       regunmp |  -.0059434   .0273337    -0.22   0.828    -.0595164    .0476295 
         _cons |    8.79672   12.73684     0.69   0.490    -16.16704    33.76048 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
OME3           | 
           age |   .3816243   1.083634     0.35   0.725     -1.74226    2.505509 
         agesq |  -.0087275    .018378    -0.47   0.635    -.0447478    .0272927 
          male |  -8.130264   5.777888    -1.41   0.159    -19.45472    3.194188 
      minority |   1.506297    3.44271     0.44   0.662    -5.241289    8.253884 
 secondaryeduc |   1.055591   1.445295     0.73   0.465    -1.777135    3.888318 
  tertiaryeduc |    3.01527   1.597167     1.89   0.059    -.1151199    6.145661 
        hhsize |  -1.245441   .8237584    -1.51   0.131    -2.859978    .3690959 
     hhsizegen |   1.132854   .8469339     1.34   0.181    -.5271064    2.792814 
       regunmp |   .0306643   .0547067     0.56   0.575    -.0765589    .1378875 
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         _cons |   3.152773   15.48246     0.20   0.839    -27.19229    33.49783 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME1           | 
           age |   1.747354   .2817436     6.20   0.000     1.195147    2.299561 
         agesq |  -.0339454   .0052062    -6.52   0.000    -.0441494   -.0237414 
          male |  -.7344126   .4155233    -1.77   0.077    -1.548823     .079998 
      minority |  -.6291995   .5317115    -1.18   0.237    -1.671335     .412936 
  socialassist |   3.617107   .4685271     7.72   0.000     2.698811    4.535403 
 secondaryeduc |  -.3055899    .282592    -1.08   0.280    -.8594601    .2482803 
  tertiaryeduc |   .8989405   .2824734     3.18   0.001     .3453029    1.452578 
        hhsize |  -.1672484   .0526473    -3.18   0.001    -.2704353   -.0640615 
     hhsizegen |   .0632256   .0621255     1.02   0.309    -.0585382    .1849894 
       regunmp |   .0289595   .0080931     3.58   0.000     .0130973    .0448216 
         _cons |  -24.41935   3.781561    -6.46   0.000    -31.83108   -17.00763 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME2           | 
           age |   1.457357   .3349016     4.35   0.000     .8009621    2.113752 
         agesq |  -.0286626   .0061042    -4.70   0.000    -.0406265   -.0166987 
          male |  -.7573875   .6619038    -1.14   0.253    -2.054695    .5399201 
      minority |  -.0020738   .5049319    -0.00   0.997    -.9917222    .9875746 
  socialassist |   3.941553   .5473745     7.20   0.000     2.868719    5.014387 
 secondaryeduc |  -.7964917   .3493081    -2.28   0.023    -1.481123   -.1118604 
  tertiaryeduc |    .363226   .3568313     1.02   0.309    -.3361506    1.062603 
        hhsize |  -.2387306   .0812043    -2.94   0.003    -.3978881   -.0795731 
     hhsizegen |   .1033364   .1029335     1.00   0.315    -.0984096    .3050824 
       regunmp |   .0182749   .0124787     1.46   0.143    -.0061829    .0427326 
         _cons |  -20.28296   4.458232    -4.55   0.000    -29.02094   -11.54499 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
TME3           | 
           age |   2.372024   .9986721     2.38   0.018     .4146623    4.329385 
         agesq |  -.0442698   .0186045    -2.38   0.017     -.080734   -.0078056 
          male |  -2.079666   .9191793    -2.26   0.024    -3.881224   -.2781076 
      minority |  -.8449368   .9976037    -0.85   0.397    -2.800204    1.110331 
  socialassist |  -13.51197   .4909363   -27.52   0.000    -14.47419   -12.54976 
 secondaryeduc |  -.8778545   .5180509    -1.69   0.090    -1.893216    .1375066 
  tertiaryeduc |  -.0566182   .5325123    -0.11   0.915    -1.100323    .9870868 
        hhsize |  -.3615299   .1230742    -2.94   0.003    -.6027508   -.1203089 
     hhsizegen |    .213772   .1515059     1.41   0.158     -.083174    .5107181 
       regunmp |   -.051403   .0249489    -2.06   0.039    -.1003021    -.002504 
         _cons |  -30.69931   13.28566    -2.31   0.021    -56.73872   -4.659898 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Warning: convergence not achieved 
 
 
